



House of Commons
Defence Committee

National security and resilience

Third Report of Session 2009–10

*Report, together with formal minutes, and
written evidence*

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The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

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The following Members were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament.

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Derek Conway MP (*Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup*)
Mr Kevan Jones MP (*Labour, Durham North*)
Mr Mark Lancaster MP (*Conservative, North East Milton Keynes*)
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The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at: www.parliament.uk/defcom

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Mike Hennessy (Clerk), Richard Ward (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Judy Goodall (Inquiry Manager), Richard Dawson (Senior Committee Assistant), Christine McGrane (Committee Assistant) and Miguel Boo Fraga (Committee Support Assistant).

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Introduction

1. This Report responds to the latest information we have formally received from the Government concerning the defence contribution to UK national security and resilience and highlights the importance we ascribe to this subject. The publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in March 2008 was one of the Government's most important initiatives during this Parliament.¹ It directly led to our undertaking the inquiry into the defence contribution to UK national security and resilience, which we announced on 2 April 2008. This inquiry took in a number of evidence sessions, from the MoD and other government departments (OGDs), including the Home and Cabinet Offices, as well as from the defence industry, the Commander-in-Chief HQ Land Forces, and a panel of maritime security stakeholders. We also received several classified briefings and papers from the MoD and the Armed Forces. We visited the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) at Porton Down, where the work of the Counter-Terrorism Science and Technology Centre was explained to us, and HM Naval Base Clyde to examine the role played by the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines in defending the strategic nuclear deterrent and vessels in transit along the Clyde.

2. We met to agree our Report, *The Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience*, on 5 May 2009, and it was published just under a fortnight later on 18 May.² The Government response to our Report was received on 20 July, just two days before the House rose for its summer adjournment. We considered the response shortly after the House returned in October and, dissatisfied with a number of the Government's responses to our recommendations and conclusions, sought further information from the MoD. This further information was received on 18 November and considered at a meeting of our Committee on 1 December. Both the Government response and the supplementary memorandum are appended to this Report.³

Context

3. We welcome the updating of the NSS in July 2009 set out in *Security for the Next Generation*.⁴ We are still however awaiting the establishment of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy which the Prime Minister called for in July 2008.⁵ As other select committees, most notably the Home Affairs Committee, have also taken an interest in this Strategy,⁶ there will be potential issues of overlap of scrutiny and responsibility between this Committee and relevant select committees. However, this area requires focused, coordinated and joined-up scrutiny by more than one committee. **Issues of national**

1 Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world*, Cm 7291, March 2008

2 Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2008–09, *The Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience*, HC 121

3 Ev 1–5

4 Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009, Security for the Next Generation*, Cm 7590, June 2009

5 HC Deb 22 July 2008, col 111WS

6 See, for example, Home Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2008–09, *Project CONTEST: The Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, HC 212

security are likely to dominate key areas of political debate during the next Parliament as they have during this; they will continue to feature prominently in the forum of public debate, and that prominence will only increase in the run-up to the 2012 Olympics. We very much hope that our successor Committee will take a strong interest in this subject.

Need for better cooperation

4. It is on account of the importance of UK national security and resilience, and the pivotal role played by MoD assets within the NSS, that **we are disappointed with the quality of the information contained both within the MoD's initial response to our Report and in the supplementary memorandum. We believe that the MoD has a good story to tell in relation to national security, all the more given the heavy reliance upon the capabilities of our Armed Forces to maintain that security. We therefore have difficulty in understanding why the MoD has been so reticent in responding to our requests for further information. It seems unduly anxious about setting out in more detail the important role it plays and its account of its own national security-related activities. All of this seems to reveal a lack of confidence and an attempt to downplay the importance of its role.**

Need for better information: maritime security review

5. As we have found in our inquiry into the Comprehensive Approach, all governments find coordination of leadership, activity and funding between their departments difficult to achieve.⁷ In our original Report on national security we drew attention to some issues of coordination, particularly with regard to the admittedly complex jigsaw of maritime security stakeholders. Our concerns during the inquiry led to us seeking reassurance from a panel of such stakeholders at our last evidence session.⁸ Reassurance was not forthcoming. We asked the Government to update us on the review which it is conducting into this area. The Government response said very little except to acknowledge that the review is underway.⁹ We sought more information from the MoD but the response received in the supplementary memorandum added very little indeed, saying only that the project was “still at an early stage” and citing three areas on which the project was focusing.¹⁰ **We would welcome from the MoD more information on the review of maritime security** which, given when it was established, cannot still be at such an early stage as to lack all discloseable content.

Need for better scrutiny: updates and briefings

6. **We acknowledge that, for security reasons, elements of the MoD's and the Government's work in the area of national security cannot be placed within the public domain. However, the Government needs to be more explicit about what exactly it is**

7 See, for example, oral evidence on the Comprehensive Approach given to the Committee on 7 July 2009: uncorrected transcript available on the Committee website: www.parliament.uk/defcom

8 HC (2008–09) 121, Ev 43–57

9 Ev 3, para 15

10 Ev 5

doing, how it will fund its activities and plans, and who will lead and coordinate them. We also believe that the Government should provide updates by classified memorandum or briefing to our Committee and other appropriate select committees. We deplore the fact that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, announced almost eighteen months ago in July 2008, has not yet even been appointed, let alone met, and will now presumably have no effect until after the General Election. It is a vital part of the work of scrutiny given by the House to such committees as ours to assure ourselves that the Government is operating effectively, especially in such an important area as national security. This is an issue of public confidence as well as of effective deterrence.

Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development

7. A particular area where more information is required is the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), which was set up in July 2007 to consider issues relating to national security and the Government's international and European development policies. Our request that the Government state how many times NSID had met since its establishment was not answered.¹¹ This only serves to fuel the belief that it has met seldom if at all. While it may be more active through its sub-committees there is no need for the Government not to reveal its general levels of activity which would demonstrate the Government's focus on this area. **We would welcome clarification from the Government of how frequently the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development and its sub-committees have met or otherwise discussed matters since they were established.**

2012 Olympics security assessment

8. The MoD expects to receive from the Home Office an outline or estimate of the military assistance required for the 2012 Olympics in late November 2009. The MoD should then reply by March 2010 identifying the defence capabilities available to fulfil this requirement together with indicative costs. While we are aware that the final assessment of military capabilities required cannot take place until the Olympics are much closer in time, **the House ought to be kept informed of the progress of the dialogue between the MoD and the Home Office over preparations for security at the Olympics in as much detail as appropriate.**

Strategic Defence Review

9. Finally, we would also like to use this opportunity to stress the important contribution to UK national security and resilience of two forthcoming processes and documents: the imminent Defence Green Paper and the Strategic Defence Review which is expected to follow the 2010 Election. Reviews of whatever sort are always in danger of becoming captives of the circumstances in which they are born: Afghanistan may dominate our thoughts at present but we cannot afford to let it dominate our future planning. **It is vital**

that the forthcoming Green Paper makes all the necessary and important connections between national security and our strategic defence capabilities. The next Government must, in its work on the Strategic Defence Review, make more explicit than is currently the case those connections and spell out clearly the role of the UK's defence assets in our national security.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. Issues of national security are likely to dominate key areas of political debate during the next Parliament as they have during this; they will continue to feature prominently in the forum of public debate, and that prominence will only increase in the run-up to the 2012 Olympics. We very much hope that our successor Committee will take a strong interest in this subject. (Paragraph 3)
2. We are disappointed with the quality of the information contained both within the MoD's initial response to our Report and in the supplementary memorandum. We believe that the MoD has a good story to tell in relation to national security, all the more given the heavy reliance upon the capabilities of our Armed Forces to maintain that security. We therefore have difficulty in understanding why the MoD has been so reticent in responding to our requests for further information. It seems unduly anxious about setting out in more detail the important role it plays and its account of its own national security-related activities. All of this seems to reveal a lack of confidence and an attempt to downplay the importance of its role. (Paragraph 4)
3. We would welcome from the MoD more information on the review of maritime security. (Paragraph 5)
4. We acknowledge that, for security reasons, elements of the MoD's and the Government's work in the area of national security cannot be placed within the public domain. However, the Government needs to be more explicit about what exactly it is doing, how it will fund its activities and plans, and who will lead and coordinate them. We also believe that the Government should provide updates by classified memorandum or briefing to our Committee and other appropriate select committees. We deplore the fact that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, announced almost eighteen months ago in July 2008, has not yet even been appointed, let alone met, and will now presumably have no effect until after the General Election. (Paragraph 6)
5. We would welcome clarification from the Government of how frequently the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development and its sub-committees have met or otherwise discussed matters since they were established. (Paragraph 7)
6. The House ought to be kept informed of the progress of the dialogue between the MoD and the Home Office over preparations for security at the Olympics in as much detail as appropriate. (Paragraph 8)
7. It is vital that the forthcoming Green Paper makes all the necessary and important connections between national security and our strategic defence capabilities. The next Government must, in its work on the Strategic Defence Review, make more explicit than is currently the case those connections and spell out clearly the role of the UK's defence assets in our national security. (Paragraph 9)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 8 December 2009

AFTERNOON SITTING

Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S. Borrow

Mr David Crausby

Linda Gilroy

Mr Mike Hancock

Mr Dai Havard

Mr Brian Jenkins

Robert Key

Draft Report (*National security and resilience*), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 9 read and agreed to.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report.

Resolved, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House.

[Adjourned till 15 December at 10:00 a.m.]

List of written evidence

1 Ministry of Defence

Ev 1, Ev 4

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2009–10

First Report	The work of the Committee 2008–09	HC 119
Second Report	MoD Winter Supplementary Estimate	HC 150

Session 2008–09

First Report	Winter Supplementary Estimates 2008–09	HC 52 ^A
Second Report	The work of the Committee 2007–08	HC 106
Third Report	Defence Equipment 2009	HC 107 (HC 491)
Fourth Report	Spring Supplementary Estimate 2008–09	HC 301 ^B
Fifth Report	Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007–08	HC 214 (HC 534)
Sixth Report	The UK's Defence contribution to the UK's national security and resilience	HC 121
Seventh Report	Defence Support Group	HC 120 (HC 984)
Eighth Report	Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces: the first year	HC 277 (HC 985)
Ninth Report	Ministry of Defence Main Estimates	HC 773 (HC 986)
Tenth Report	Russia: a new confrontation?	HC 276 (HC 987)
Eleventh Report	Helicopter capability	HC 434
Twelfth Report	Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly Reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation	HC 178 (Cm 7698)

^A Government response published as a Memorandum in the Committee's Fourth Report (HC 301)

^B Government response published as a Memorandum in the Committee's Ninth Report (HC 773)

Session 2007–08

First Report	UK land operations in Iraq 2007	HC 110 (HC 352)
Second Report	Costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: Winter Supplementary Estimate 2007–08	HC 138 ^A
Third Report	UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty	HC 107 (HC 375)
Fourth Report	The Iran hostages incident: the lessons learned	HC 181 (HC 399)
Fifth Report	Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006–07	HC 61 (HC 468)
Sixth Report	The work of the Committee in 2007	HC 274
Seventh Report	Medical care for the Armed Forces	HC 327 (HC 500)
Eighth Report	Operational costs in Afghanistan and Iraq: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2007–08	HC 400 ^B
Ninth Report	The future of NATO and European defence	HC 111 (HC 660)
Tenth Report	Defence Equipment 2008	HC 295 (HC 555)

Eleventh Report	Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2008–09	HC 885 (HC 1072)
Twelfth Report	Scrutiny of Arms Export controls (2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly Reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control legislation	HC 254
Thirteen Report	The contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR capability	HC 535 (HC 1087)
Fourteenth Report	Recruiting and retaining Armed Forces personnel	HC 424 (HC 1074)
Fifteenth Report	UK operations in Iraq and the Gulf	HC 982 (HC 1073)

^A Government response published as Memorandum in the Committee's Eighth Report (HC 400)

^B Government response published as Memorandum in the Committee's Eleventh Report (HC 885)

Session 2006–07

First Report	Defence Procurement 2006	HC 56 (HC 318)
Second Report	Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005–06	HC 57 (HC 376)
Third Report	Costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: Winter Supplementary Estimate 2006–07	HC 129 (HC 317)
Fourth Report	The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base	HC 59 (HC 304)
Fifth Report	The work of the Committee in 2005 and 2006	HC 233 (HC 344)
Sixth Report	The Defence Industrial Strategy: update	HC 177 (HC 481)
Seventh Report	The Army's requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme	HC 159 (HC 511)
Eighth Report	The work of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the funding of defence research	HC 84 (HC 512)
Ninth Report	The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper	HC 225–I and –II (HC 551)
Tenth Report	Cost of military operations: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2006–07	HC 379 (HC 558)
Eleventh Report	Strategic Lift	HC 462 (HC1025)
Twelfth Report	Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2007–08	HC 835 (HC 1026)
Thirteenth Report	UK operations in Afghanistan	HC 408 (HC 1024)
Fourteenth Report	Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review	HC 117 (Cm 7260)
Fifteenth Report	The work of Defence Estates	HC 535 (HC 109)

Session 2005–06

First Report	Armed Forces Bill	HC 747 (HC 1021)
Second Report	Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes	HC 554 (HC 926)
Third Report	Delivering Front Line Capability to the RAF	HC 557 (HC 1000)
Fourth Report	Costs of peace-keeping in Iraq and Afghanistan: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2005–06	HC 980 (HC 1136)
Fifth Report	The UK deployment to Afghanistan	HC 558 (HC 1211)
Sixth Report	Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004–05	HC 822 (HC 1293)
Seventh Report	The Defence Industrial Strategy	HC 824 (HC 1488)
Eighth Report	The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context	HC 986 (HC 1558)

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Ninth Report	Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2006–07	HC 1366 (<i>HC 1601</i>)
Tenth Report	The work of the Met Office	HC 823 (<i>HC 1602</i>)
Eleventh Report	Educating Service Children	HC 1054 (<i>HC 58</i>)
Twelfth Report	Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2004, Quarterly Reports for 2005, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 873 (<i>Cm 6954</i>)
Thirteenth Report	UK Operations in Iraq	HC 1241 (<i>HC 1603</i>)
Fourteenth Report	Armed Forces Bill: proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner	HC 1711 (<i>HC 180</i>)

Written evidence

Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HCDC REPORT ON THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO UK NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, (HC121), SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09

1. The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence Committee's report on the Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience.

2. We are pleased that the Committee has recognised the vital and unique role contribution the Armed Forces make in supporting national security and resilience. We agree with the thrust of the report and work on many of the conclusions in well advanced. Taken together with the report by the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, we conclude that the MoD's planning for UK Counter Terrorism and Resilience is well developed.

3. The Government's response to the Committee's individual conclusions and recommendations as set out on pages 19–20 of the report are as follows:

Parliamentary scrutiny of national security issues is a developing area. Once stabilised, it remains to be seen precisely how responsibilities will be divided. The Joint Committee will need to work out how its intended role in examining the overall strategy in its successive iterations will connect with scrutiny by existing committees. Whatever happens, we as the Defence Committee will retain an interest and therefore reserve the right to inquire into related issues as and when they arise. (Paragraph 10)

We expect the creation of a Joint Committee to improve Parliament's scrutiny of the NSS by bringing them together. However, the question of from which minister the new Joint Committee will take evidence is unclear, unless it is the Prime Minister, calls on whose time are many. We are concerned that this generates two problems: first, that co-ordination at the political level might not be as good as it could be, and secondly, that it only reaches the top of the in-tray in times of crisis. There are various views about the value of the appointment of a National Security Adviser reporting to the Cabinet. We request that the Government sets out its thinking on the matter in its response. (Paragraph 12)

4. Strategic level oversight of national security matters across Government is undertaken by the PM chaired Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) which includes the Secretaries of State of all departments with a locus in national security. This is supported by the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office which reports to the Prime Minister's National Security Adviser and also co-ordinates implementation of the National Security Strategy. Evidence to the JCNSS on National Security matters will be provided by the lead Minister, dependent on the subject matter and by the Prime Minister's National Security Adviser.

5. In their recently published report Project CONTEST: The Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy the Home Affairs Committee described how they were initially unconvinced that the Government was following the most logical and coordinated approach to "these matters" which are so vital to our national interest. However, based on the evidence taken and the briefings they received, they were satisfied that "the UK's counter-terrorism apparatus is first class, effective and as 'joined-up' as any system of government can expect."

The United Kingdom faces many disparate threats, now rightly recognised as needing a combined response. The Armed Forces make a vital and unique contribution to national security and resilience. It is for this reason that this contribution must be appropriately understood, directed, and resourced. (Paragraph 14)

6. We are grateful to the Committee for highlighting the vital and unique contribution the Armed Forces make to national security and resilience. The Government recognises the disparate threats faced by the UK and the need for a comprehensive response which includes Defence. This is set out in *Security for the Next Generation*, the 2009 update to the UK National Security Strategy.

7. Naturally we agree with the Committee that the contribution of the Armed Forces must be appropriately understood, directed and resourced. We believe that it is. As our evidence to the Committee illustrated we are engaged with all of the relevant organisations at all levels, including through a network of full-time liaison officers across the country. Although there is always more that can be done to improve mutual understanding we are confident that the current arrangements are very strong. We have made significant efforts to make clear to potential partners what capabilities might be available. Notably through the publication of the capability compendium made available at the same time as the Ingram Review. Where there are predictable demands on defence capabilities to respond to serious incidents these are part of the planned force structure. These capabilities are kept under review in order to ensure they are the most appropriate for the circumstances at the time.

We have been informed of the frustration felt by many in the Territorial Army, and by District Commanders, that the Territorials are rarely—if ever—called upon in civil emergencies, even though it would be practical and good for their morale to do so. Following publication of the Strategic Review of Reserve Forces, we request that the Government investigate how District Commanders could more easily make use of willing and available local TA volunteers, rather than always resorting to regular troops. (Paragraph 20)

8. This recommendation seems to be based upon a misunderstanding of the operational role of the Armed Forces in the UK. It is simply not the case that military personnel regularly carry out operational tasks in large numbers in the UK or that it is difficult for reservists to be employed. The vast majority of requests for military assistance involve specialist niche capabilities requiring the deployment of very small numbers of personnel. The role of the reserves is, at relatively short notice, to support the Regular force at maximum effort and provide augmentation and resilience at various stages of an operation or emergency. This is as true of operations in the UK as it is overseas. We therefore do not prioritise regular over reserve forces or vice versa. Force planners identify the most appropriate force package for the task in hand. In some cases this will involve reserve forces. Over 1,000 personnel were deployed in response to flooding in the south west in 2007 and this was the last occasion on which more than 10–15 personnel were required for any operation in the UK since 2004–05.¹

9. The Strategic Review of Reserves updated the Civil Contingency Reaction Force (CCRF) concept in light of experience since they were established in 2002 and improvements in civil resilience. We now intend to deliver any reserve contributions to operations in the UK by considering all of the reserve to be potentially available, whilst maintaining a command and control structure capable of operating with civil responders.

Concerns about managing expectations and reputational risk directly impact upon two of the elements of the MoD's balanced scorecard, namely "Defence in the Wider Community" and "Reputation". Any room for misunderstanding has serious consequences for the MoD, the Armed Forces, and the department or agency to which assistance is being provided. (Paragraph 26)

10. The Government agrees that any misunderstanding by departments or agencies of what assistance can be provided by the Armed Forces could have serious consequences for both parties. However, we do not believe this to be likely. The MoD makes significant effort to ensure that all partner organisations understand what Defence can do to support them. We intend to publish a guide for responders on how to access Defence assistance and are in the process of reaching formal agreements with lead organisations over the level of support which we can guarantee in a range of circumstances. The committee has also heard about our extensive joint exercise programme and full time liaison footprint. In summary, although we can always do more, we believe that the risk of there being misunderstanding over the level of Armed Forces support is low.

It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget and that, when a request is made, it is accompanied by a clear statement of requirement. (Paragraph 34)

11. This government is committed to the proper funding of national security. That is why the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review announced increased resources for counter-terrorism and intelligence with spending set to reach £3.5 billion by 2010–11. NSS(2) recognised the importance of strategic, cross-government approach with the integration of national security action vital. NSS concluded that the means to do this would be through a strategic framework with clear planning assumptions that would form the basis for prioritisation across government. The planning assumptions set out the Government's long-term view of issues that have national security implications so that they can be fully taken into account in the future planning decisions of each department.

12. The Committee appears to have misunderstood the evidence on statements of requirement. Most requests for assistance can be met from the existing force structure. Clearly Defence does not agree to carry out operational tasks without properly understanding them. We are however agreeing Service Level Agreements between the MoD and the lead organisation. These are intended to cover areas where there is an expectation that the MoD will hold forces, which it may not otherwise need, specifically to support other organisations if they are needed. These will be based on a Statement of Requirement from the lead organisation as described during the evidence sessions. The MoD's initial evidence to the Committee on this inquiry made clear which capabilities are part of the planned force structure. The Service Level Agreements or Statements of Requirement described in evidence will set out the extent, depth and readiness of the capabilities which Defence will hold rather than requesting a particular response for a specific operation.

We understand that the Government is engaging with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) in order to improve the channels of communication between industry and government. We welcome this engagement, but note that if there is a piece missing from the jigsaw, it is a clear connection between the National Security Strategy and industry. We recommend that the Government rectifies this when the time comes to update the NSS. (Paragraph 37)

¹ This does not include Military support to the Police in Northern Ireland where larger deployments of personnel occur infrequently associated with explosive ordnance disposal and high assurance search capability.

13. *Security for the Next Generation* reiterates the Government's commitment to strategic partnership and dialogue with the UK security industry including through the Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Community (RISC).

Ensuring the security of the Games for the six week period in the summer of 2012 will be an immense challenge. Whilst it may not be possible to anticipate every threat to the Olympics and Paralympics, we urge the MoD to advertise and exploit the Armed Forces' relevant expertise during the planning phases. (Paragraph 39)

14. The MoD has been closely engaged in planning for the security of the 2012 Olympic Games from the beginning. In addition to the MoD's normal role in collective decision making, it has provided a senior officer on loan to the Home Office's Olympic Security Directorate and a maritime planner to support Dorset Police. The relevant parts of the MoD have participated in several workshops and table top exercises and planning advice has been made available from the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre. We will continue to make available whatever skills and expertise are required to ensure that our collective planning is as robust as it can be. This will ensure that the Defence part of the operational response is adequate and appropriately integrated.

Despite our witnesses' assurances that the present arrangements for maritime security in the UK did not need improving upon, we understand that a review may in fact be underway. We request that the Government updates us on developments in its response. (Paragraph 43)

15. The first annual update to the National Security Strategy (NSS2) announced that the Cabinet Office "is leading a cross-government study that will bring together key elements of government and industry" prioritise aims, assess current capabilities, and identify ways to fill any gaps and remove duplication across the "full range of maritime security challenges". The project will, over the next twelve months, define a set of strategic objectives for maritime security and develop recommendations to address gaps in the UK's approach.

We are concerned at the level of action being taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical national infrastructure, such as ports, and that what assets are available for the purposes of maritime security tend to be largely reactive forces. (Paragraph 48)

16. The Committee only took Government evidence on the response to maritime threats which have already materialised. It is unsurprising therefore that they concluded that resources are devoted to reactive forces. In fact TRANSEC within the Department for Transport and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure work together at major ports, and especially coastal refineries, to identify threats and engage with industry to mitigate security risks.

We feel that there is a strong case for developing a deterrent capability in relation to threats to civilian maritime targets. It need not necessarily be resourced by the military, but we are not satisfied that an intelligence-led approach is sufficient. (Paragraph 49)

17. We agree with the Committee that a response that relies entirely upon intelligence is not appropriate. Through the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), and subsequent EC requirements, the UK has in place a maritime security regime for commercial ports and shipping that is responsive to the threat (as informed by intelligence) but includes permanent baseline measures including a requirement for security and response plans, access controls, and screening of passengers and baggage where appropriate.

Lord West speculated that it might take 30 years to control radicalisation and extremism. Opportunities exist at home and abroad for Defence to play a very important role in national security and resilience. We urge the MoD to consider what further steps could be taken to use its resources and expertise to achieve this. (Paragraph 53)

18. The MoD contributes to all workstreams of the Government's Counter-Terrorism strategy, CONTEST. We support *Pursue* through operations overseas to detain terrorists and deal with insurgencies, as well as through intelligence collection and counter-terrorism capability building for partner nations (which together with conflict prevention work, also supports *Prevent*) and support to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. The contribution Defence can make to the projection of soft power and exerting influence to prevent conflict and promote stable States is an area that will be looked at as part of the Defence Green Paper announced in Parliament on 7 July. We support *Protect* by encouraging improved domestic security and co-operation between the Armed Forces and the UK civilian Emergency Services. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MoD can provide support to *Prepare* through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.

19. Communications play a major part in dealing with radicalisation and extremism, and MoD works closely with RICU, as well as other Departments such as the FCO, to develop its messaging to help reduce any perceived provocative effect of some of its operations. Counter terrorism has been included amongst the MoD's communications priorities, MoD's regional press office network has been instructed to make engagement with minority media a priority, and awareness of counter terrorism messaging is included in appropriate MoD media operations training courses. We continue to examine how the Armed Forces represent themselves to the UK public, and how they are trained and taught doctrine before deploying overseas, to see what further improvements can be made. The Home Affairs Committee commented in their

report into CONTEST that they were encouraged by the proactive attitude of the Government towards the information war, as this is a central part of countering radicalisation and that they found the work of RICU of enormous value which “impressed us greatly”.

20 July 2009

Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HCDC REPORT ON THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO UK NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, (HC121), SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09

RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS DATED 5 NOVEMBER 2009

Could the MoD substantiate its statement that the MoD’s planning for Counter Terrorism and Resilience is well developed (paragraph 2 of the response)? The Committee would be grateful for a list of indicators or objectives met which provides strong evidence for this statement.

Our response was based on our assessment against a number of criteria including progress against the Committee’s and Adam Ingram’s recommendations, our ability to meet the obligations placed on us through the Home Office CONTEST strategy and the associated Service Level Agreements, as well as our commitment to the national CT exercise programme. There is no single list of indicators or objectives which would provide evidence for this statement over and above that already provided to the Committee in session.

How many times has the National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) Committee met?

The Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) and its subcommittees exist to consider issues relating to National Security, and the Governments’ international, European and international development policies.

NSID was established in July 2007, when the current Prime Minister took up office. It meets as required and is supplemented by a series of sub-committees. NSID and its subcommittees also deal with a variety of issues by correspondence.

Have budgetary responsibilities for the Armed Forces’ participation in work leading up to and during the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics been agreed? Who will bear the cost for (a) preparatory work done by the Armed Forces and (b) the actual employment of the Armed Forces over the period in question in 2012? Has any assessment of the costs of the use of the Armed Forces for both (a) and (b) yet been developed?

The Home Office is meeting the costs of those military personnel seconded to the Olympic Security Directorate to assist in planning the military contribution to Olympic security.

The MOD is expecting the submission of an outline or estimate of the military assistance that will potentially be required for 2012 in late November 2009. Once we have received this estimate we intend to inform the Home Office by March 2010 of the Defence capabilities available to fulfil the request together with indicative costs. It is too early to determine the full scale of likely military involvement and the associated costs.

The Committee took evidence from TRANSEC during its inquiry and would like an update on what work has been done by TRANSEC, the MoD and others since that evidence session on developing a non-reactive maritime capability to deal with threats to UK national security and resilience. The Committee would in particular be interested in learning:

- (a) what resources are committed to this capability, who has overall responsibility for them and how the cost of maintaining this capability is divided up between those involved, and*
- (b) what work is underway addressing the potential maritime threat through the identification of seawards surveillance and response capabilities and their overall command and control.*

I refer the Committee to the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Prime Minister on 25 June 2009, in which he laid before the House this year’s update to the National Security Strategy. In this year’s update a cross-cutting programme of work was announced, led by the National Security Secretariat and involving all key Government departments and agencies to tackle the full range of maritime security challenges. This work aims to clarify which elements pose the greatest challenges and which present the most opportunities for our national security. It will also prioritise our aims, assess our current capabilities and identify ways to fill any key gaps and remove duplication.

This project is still at any early stage and no definitive conclusions can be made at this point, however, amongst other areas it is explicitly examining: the level of maritime surveillance required both in UK territorial waters and internationally and how this should be achieved; engagement with industry on maritime security issues; the division of roles and responsibilities for aspects of maritime security between Government departments and agencies, and their oversight mechanisms.

A report with recommendations for further action will be completed by the summer 2010, following consultation with the National Security Forum and other experts.

Further information relating to this year's update of the National Security Strategy: *Security for the Next Generation* is available in the Library in the House or can be found at: <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/216734/nss2009v2.pdf>.

18 November 2009

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