REPORT
Introduction
1. This Report responds to the latest information
we have formally received from the Government concerning the defence
contribution to UK national security and resilience and highlights
the importance we ascribe to this subject. The publication of
the National Security Strategy (NSS) in March 2008 was one of
the Government's most important initiatives during this Parliament.[1]
It directly led to our undertaking the inquiry into the defence
contribution to UK national security and resilience, which we
announced on 2 April 2008. This inquiry took in a number of evidence
sessions, from the MoD and other government departments (OGDs),
including the Home and Cabinet Offices, as well as from the defence
industry, the Commander-in-Chief HQ Land Forces, and a panel of
maritime security stakeholders. We also received several classified
briefings and papers from the MoD and the Armed Forces. We visited
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) at Porton
Down, where the work of the Counter-Terrorism Science and Technology
Centre was explained to us, and HM Naval Base Clyde to examine
the role played by the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines in
defending the strategic nuclear deterrent and vessels in transit
along the Clyde.
2. We met to agree our Report, The Defence
contribution to UK national security and resilience, on 5
May 2009, and it was published just under a fortnight later on
18 May.[2] The Government
response to our Report was received on 20 July, just two days
before the House rose for its summer adjournment. We considered
the response shortly after the House returned in October and,
dissatisfied with a number of the Government's responses to our
recommendations and conclusions, sought further information from
the MoD. This further information was received on 18 November
and considered at a meeting of our Committee on 1 December. Both
the Government response and the supplementary memorandum are appended
to this Report.[3]
Context
3. We welcome the updating of the NSS in July
2009 set out in Security for the Next Generation.[4]
We are still however awaiting the establishment of the Joint Committee
on the National Security Strategy which the Prime Minister called
for in July 2008.[5] As
other select committees, most notably the Home Affairs Committee,
have also taken an interest in this Strategy,[6]
there will be potential issues of overlap of scrutiny and responsibility
between this Committee and relevant select committees. However,
this area requires focused, coordinated and joined-up scrutiny
by more than one committee. Issues
of national security are likely to dominate key areas of political
debate during the next Parliament as they have during this; they
will continue to feature prominently in the forum of public debate,
and that prominence will only increase in the run-up to the 2012
Olympics. We very much hope that our successor Committee will
take a strong interest in this subject.
Need for better cooperation
4. It is on account of the importance of UK national
security and resilience, and the pivotal role played by MoD assets
within the NSS, that we
are disappointed with the quality of the information contained
both within the MoD's initial response to our Report and in the
supplementary memorandum. We believe that the MoD has a good story
to tell in relation to national security, all the more given the
heavy reliance upon the capabilities of our Armed Forces to maintain
that security. We therefore have difficulty in understanding why
the MoD has been so reticent in responding to our requests for
further information. It seems unduly anxious about setting out
in more detail the important role it plays and its account of
its own national security-related activities. All of this seems
to reveal a lack of confidence and an attempt to downplay the
importance of its role.
Need for better information: maritime
security review
5. As we have found in our inquiry into the Comprehensive
Approach, all governments find coordination of leadership, activity
and funding between their departments difficult to achieve.[7]
In our original Report on national security we drew attention
to some issues of coordination, particularly with regard to the
admittedly complex jigsaw of maritime security stakeholders. Our
concerns during the inquiry led to us seeking reassurance from
a panel of such stakeholders at our last evidence session.[8]
Reassurance was not forthcoming. We asked the Government to update
us on the review which it is conducting into this area. The Government
response said very little except to acknowledge that the review
is underway.[9] We sought
more information from the MoD but the response received in the
supplementary memorandum added very little indeed, saying only
that the project was "still at an early stage" and citing
three areas on which the project was focusing.[10]
We would
welcome from the MoD more information on the review of maritime
security which, given
when it was established, cannot still be at such an early stage
as to lack all discloseable content.
Need for better scrutiny: updates
and briefings
6. We acknowledge that, for
security reasons, elements of the MoD's and the Government's work
in the area of national security cannot be placed within the public
domain. However, the Government needs to be more explicit about
what exactly it is doing, how it will fund its activities and
plans, and who will lead and coordinate them. We also believe
that the Government should provide updates by classified memorandum
or briefing to our Committee and other appropriate select committees.
We deplore the fact that the Joint Committee on the National Security
Strategy, announced almost eighteen months ago in July 2008, has
not yet even been appointed, let alone met, and will now presumably
have no effect until after the General Election.
It is a vital part of the work of scrutiny given by the House
to such committees as ours to assure ourselves that the Government
is operating effectively, especially in such an important area
as national security. This is an issue of public confidence as
well as of effective deterrence.
Ministerial Committee on National
Security, International Relations and Development
7. A particular area where more information
is required is the Ministerial Committee on National Security,
International Relations and Development (NSID), which was set
up in July 2007 to consider issues relating to national security
and the Government's international and European development policies.
Our request that the Government state how many times NSID had
met since its establishment was not answered.[11]
This only serves to fuel the belief that it has met seldom if
at all. While it may be more active through its sub-committees
there is no need for the Government not to reveal its general
levels of activity which would demonstrate the Government's focus
on this area. We
would welcome clarification from the Government of how frequently
the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International
Relations and Development and its sub-committees have met or otherwise
discussed matters since they were established.
2012 Olympics security assessment
8. The MoD expects to receive from the Home Office
an outline or estimate of the military assistance required for
the 2012 Olympics in late November 2009. The MoD should then reply
by March 2010 identifying the defence capabilities available to
fulfil this requirement together with indicative costs. While
we are aware that the final assessment of military capabilities
required cannot take place until the Olympics are much closer
in time, the
House ought to be kept informed of the progress of the dialogue
between the MoD and the Home Office over preparations for security
at the Olympics in as much detail as appropriate.
Strategic Defence Review
9. Finally, we would also like to use this opportunity
to stress the important contribution to UK national security and
resilience of two forthcoming processes and documents: the imminent
Defence Green Paper and the Strategic Defence Review which is
expected to follow the 2010 Election. Reviews of whatever sort
are always in danger of becoming captives of the circumstances
in which they are born: Afghanistan may dominate our thoughts
at present but we cannot afford to let it dominate our future
planning. It
is vital that the forthcoming Green Paper makes all the necessary
and important connections between national security and our strategic
defence capabilities. The next Government must, in its work on
the Strategic Defence Review, make more explicit than is currently
the case those connections and spell out clearly the role of the
UK's defence assets in our national security.
1 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy
of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world,
Cm 7291, March 2008 Back
2
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2008-09, The Defence
contribution to UK national security and resilience, HC 121 Back
3
Ev 1-5 Back
4
Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom: Update 2009, Security for the Next Generation, Cm
7590, June 2009 Back
5
HC Deb 22 July 2008, col 111WS Back
6
See, for example, Home Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session
2008-09, Project CONTEST: The Government's Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, HC 212 Back
7
See, for example, oral evidence on the Comprehensive Approach
given to the Committee on 7 July 2009: uncorrected transcript
available on the Committee website: www.parliament.uk/defcom Back
8
HC (2008-09) 121, Ev 43-57 Back
9
Ev 3, para 15 Back
10
Ev 5 Back
11
Ev 4 Back
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