Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry
of Defence
Set out below are the MOD responses to the questions
raised in the Select Committee's e-mail dated 25 November regarding:
1. The Committee would be grateful for an
explanation of what the £100 million Capital to Direct Resource
transfer within RFR1 relating to SUME flexibility refers to (sub
para 2.1e)
The Departmental Plan assumed a total transfer
of £700 million from SUME Capital to Direct Resource. However,
in the 2009-10 Main Estimate we deemed that it would be prudent
to only switch £600 million until the Departmental forecast
had sufficiently matured in year. Our 2009-10 Main Estimates Memoranda
pointed out that a further transfer from Capital (SUME) to Direct
Resource might be made in the Supplementary round (para 3.1) The
resource transfer has been allocated to the Defence Equipment
& Support TLB.
2. When is it expected that the Committee
might receive confirmation that there will indeed need to be a
request for additional funds in the SSE prior to that Estimate
being laid, along with some indication of the size of the funds
to be requested (para 5.2.2)?
The 2009-10 Spring Supplementary Estimates are scheduled
to be published in February 2010. The Department will need to
process any additional request for funds in the Treasury database
(COINS) during January 2010. We will provide an update to the
Committee should this prove necessary in January.
3. The Committee would welcome sight of the
MoD's current assessment of what the cost would be for the extra
500 troops to be deployed during this Financial Year.
Our current assessment of the costs to fall this
financial year (ie five months of 2009-10) associated with deploying
an extra 500 troops is in the region of £45 million for additional
personnel and sustainment. These troops will only deploy when
the conditions set out by the Prime Minister have been met. Because
the exact role of the 500 has yet to be determined, we cannot
assess what, if any, additional equipment requirements there will
be above the standard protective equipments that all personnel
deploy with. In any case, though, these are unlikely to fall in
this financial year. None of these costs of are currently included
in the 2009-10 Winter Supplementary Estimate figure.
4. Has there been any change to the £746
million forecast cost for UORs in 2009-10?
As detailed in the Government Report (HC 773)
the original £635 million UOR cost forecast was increased
by £101 million to £736 million to reflect the Counter-IED
task force being deployed to Afghanistan. As the then Secretary
of State set out in the WMS on 11 December 08, any excess UOR
spend over the estimate of £736 million will be repaid in
full from the Defence Budget in two years time (ie 2011-12). The
UOR estimate is not a limit—military operations drive the
estimate, not vice versa. We are still assessing our likely actual
expenditure against the existing forecast.
5. Has there been any change to the £424
million forecast cost for the Protected Mobility Package (PMP)
in 2009-10?
6. Has there been any change to the MoD's
assessment of the overall cost of the PMP?
The current MOD assessment of the PMP overall cost
is that it remains between £600-£700 million, as stated
by the then Secretary of State on 29 October 2008. The final outturn
will depend on exchange rate variations and essential changes
to vehicles to reflect operational requirements in Afghanistan.
Of this we continue to estimate that the bulk will fall in 2009-10.
7. The Committee would be grateful for an
indication of what proportion of the Iraq costs are for the continuing
presence in that country as opposed to those which relate to the
drawdown and to the presence of a larger number of troops in that
theatre before the drawdown (para 5.3.2)
It is difficult to indicate what proportion of costs
map across to those specific activities, as many costs—infrastructure
for example—continue throughout the financial year. However,
given the majority of UK troops withdrew from the Contingent Operating
Base (COB) in Basra by July 2009, our assessment is that the majority
of the 2009-10 WSE figure relates to drawdown costs that fell
in this financial year, and the estimated cost of our continued
presence in Iraq for the rest of this financial year. We will
of course be able to notify the Committee of the estimated cost
for our continued presence in Iraq for the 2010-11 Main Estimates.
8. The Committee would be grateful for an
explanation of the 50% increase in Civilian Personnel costs; for
the c28% increase in the Infrastructure Costs; and for the 10%
increase in Equipment Support Costs in Afghanistan between the
ME and the WSE
The increase in "Equipment Support" costs
demonstrates the additional costs of supporting essential Urgent
Operational Equipment in theatre, an increase in numbers of Protected
Mobility vehicles, and Support Helicopters in theatre. "Civilian
Personnel" costs includes overtime and austere conditions
allowances for UK MOD civilian personnel and MOD Police, the deployee
population of which has risen from 53 to 74 over the past year.
It also captures the costs of Locally Employed Civilians (LECs)
in theatre, which have increased by 25%, primarily as we now have
interpreters for troops operating on the front line outside of
the main bases. "Infrastructure" captures expenditure
relating to building maintenance, property lease charges but also
includes IT and Communications, and all utilities (eg heating
oil, gas, electricity, water and sewage), so it is not exceptional
to see a rise on these costs in parallel with an increased force
lay down. This increase in costs also reflects the construction
of small patrol and forward operating bases to expand our control
in the region, as well as recognition of the increase in the costs
of several locally sourced building materials necessary for the
construction of this new infrastructure.
30 November 2009
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