CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The
MoD and the Armed Forces, the FCO and DFID all recognise that
engagement in future conflicts is likely to require the use of
the Comprehensive Approach. It is, therefore essential that a
shared understanding exists across Government and, in particular,
within the MoD, the FCO and DFID about what the Comprehensive
Approach is. This must be underpinned by joint policy and doctrine.
In recent years, the UK has always operated in coalition with
allies and international organisations making a common understanding
of methods and desired outcomes and of the Comprehensive Approach
crucial. The UK has been at the forefront of thinking on and the
development of the Comprehensive Approach, and it must continue
to work with allies to embed its use in the major international
organisations—the UN, NATO and the EU. (Paragraph 175)
2. The forthcoming
Strategic Defence Review should form part of a wider and more
comprehensive security review looking at the UK's desire and ability
to participate in operations requiring the use of the Comprehensive
Approach. The Review presents an opportunity to ensure that the
Comprehensive Approach is embedded in future Government policy
and that the Armed Forces are designed, trained and equipped to
perform their role in such operations. (Paragraph 176)
3. It is crucial that,
in all situations requiring the Comprehensive Approach, certain
elements should be agreed at the very earliest stage based on
a thorough and all-embracing assessment of the situation. These
elements include leadership, objectives, a defined end state,
strategy, tactics and the nature of personnel required. This assessment
may need to be amended in response to changing threats and other
circumstances but this should not prevent an early assessment
taking place which reflects the needs and expectations of local
nationals. Communication is a key component of any strategy and
needs to include plans for conveying the strategic intent of the
mission to local nationals and also to the British public in an
informative but fair and balanced way. (Paragraph 177)
4. There is evidence
that the Comprehensive Approach is beginning to work in Afghanistan
and elsewhere but there is still much to develop especially in
Whitehall and in working multi-nationally with allies and international
organisations. We have heard a lot said about the importance of
the Approach but if it is to continue to work in Afghanistan and
in future areas of conflict, then the policy must be given the
leadership, political clout and resources it needs. In responding
to this Report, the MoD must set out how the Comprehensive Approach
is being addressed in the Strategic Defence Review. (Paragraph
178)
Development of the Comprehensive Approach
5. The
Comprehensive Approach is widely accepted as valid in most situations
where military force is required and in other situations such
as those requiring post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation.
The National Security Strategy re-iterated the need for a cross-government
approach drawing upon the capabilities of the Armed Forces, the
FCO, DFID and others. We recommend that the MoD, the FCO and DFID,
working together with the Stabilisation Unit, produce a Comprehensive
Approach policy and doctrine. Many of the ingredients for such
a policy and doctrine already exist but are not brought together
in one place. The doctrine should take account of our recommendations
in the remainder of this Report. The MoD should incorporate the
Comprehensive Approach policy into its Strategic Defence Review.
(Paragraph 30)
Strategic intent and planning
6. It
is evident that the need for a clear strategy and vision has been
recognised for Afghanistan. It is important that all parties share
an understanding of the context and nature of the challenges faced.
In future situations where the Comprehensive Approach is adopted
all relevant government departments and the Armed Forces should
agree a clear set of objectives with appropriate measures of achievement
and with a clearly defined end state set in the context of the
nature of the challenges faced. The need for post-conflict reconstruction
and stabilisation should be recognised and incorporated into the
planning at the earliest stages. These objectives may need to
adapt and evolve but it is essential that the agencies pursuing
the Comprehensive Approach have an agreed and feasible end state
in mind at every appropriate juncture. (Paragraph 41)
Who is in charge?
7. We
understand why, for major situations such as those in Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is inevitable that the Prime Minister should take
overall responsibility for the use of the Comprehensive Approach.
We note there has been a debate about whether this is necessary,
whether it provides effective leadership and clarity for all missions
and whether it might be appropriate for the Prime Minister to
appoint a lead Minister. We consider that at the start of each
operation using the Comprehensive Approach, the Government should
formally decide and announce what the appropriate governance arrangements
should be. Certainly as missions evolve these matters should be
kept under review. (Paragraph 47)
8. As part of its
role in facilitating cross-departmental assessment and planning,
the Stabilisation Unit should support the relevant Minister and
Whitehall committees in the operation of the Comprehensive Approach.
The Government should consider whether the Unit should be placed
within the Cabinet Office to ensure it has sufficient political
clout with other departments. Likewise, leadership focus and effectiveness
in some missions might be enhanced by appointing a special envoy
or representative. This person should have direct access to the
Prime Minister. (Paragraph 48)
Changing departmental cultures
9. The
Government should consider whether there is any benefit in putting
this on a more formal basis. (Paragraph 49)
10. We recognise and
welcome the progress that has been made in making the Comprehensive
Approach a reality. The MoD, the FCO and DFID have all made efforts
to reduce cultural and operational differences but all acknowledge
more needs to be done. We call upon the Departments to identify
what changes, particularly in respect of departmental cultures
and working practices, still need to be made. For example, we
expect, as a minimum, to see that any review should consider the
involvement of high level officials, the enhancement of promotion
prospects for those involved in Comprehensive Approach activities
and a financial commitment to co-ordination of the Approach. The
three Departments should, in response to this Report, provide
us with the results of the review into the changes needed to working
practices and how they intend to plan and manage the necessary
changes. (Paragraph 54)
11. Whilst we note
that DFID believes that the International Development Act allows
it to participate fully in reconstruction and stabilisation operations
and in conflict prevention, we believe a review of whether the
Act creates a culture within DFID which adversely impacts on its
participation would merit the further attention of post-legislative
scrutiny. (Paragraph 60)
Structure and funding
12. It
is only right that the Armed Forces should be funded from the
Reserve for operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, as situations change and conflicts move away from war
fighting to reconstruction and stabilisation, resources may need
to be reprioritised or redistributed. The balance of investment
decisions become crucial. The Government, therefore, should clarify
the mechanism which funds other government departments for conflict.
(Paragraph 65)
The Stabilisation Unit
13. The
work of the Stabilisation Unit in developing and maintaining a
cadre of deployable civilians and civil servants has been significant
in the UK's capacity to implement the Comprehensive Approach.
The Stabilisation Unit should be provided with sufficient resources
to continue maintaining this capacity and the training of appropriate
individuals. (Paragraph 76)
14. We look forward
to seeing the results of the Association of Chief Police Officers'
work on the deployment of serving police officers. The Home Office
and the devolved administrations should resolve the issues inhibiting
serving police officers from volunteering to serve in areas of
need as quickly as possible. The Home Office and the devolved
administrations should promote the use of serving police officers
to train local police forces in areas of need. The MoD should
also set out the role for the MoD Police in contributing to stabilisation
operations. (Paragraph 77)
Learning lessons
15. We
acknowledge that the evolution of the work of the Stabilisation
Unit will progressively ensure that cross-institutional knowledge
and skills gained during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will
be retained and built on. How to maximise improved capability
for the Comprehensive Approach from 'lessons learned' should be
addressed in the Strategic Defence Review. (Paragraph 81)
16. We note that the
three Departments are looking further at the process of learning
lessons. The Stabilisation Unit working with the three Government
Departments should make it a priority to encourage those involved
in the Comprehensive Approach to learn lessons from each situation
and to disseminate the lessons as appropriate. In particular,
the Stabilisation Unit should work closely with the Permanent
Joint Headquarters of the Armed Forces drawing on its thorough
and comprehensive lessons learned process. The Stabilisation Unit
should institute a transparent and regular process of such dissemination
and should run regular seminars for relevant staff in the three
principal Departments and in other departments involved and for
staff on its database of deployable personnel. The Unit should
be given sufficient resources to carry out this essential function.
(Paragraph 82)
Making the case in the UK
17. Communication
is a key component of maintaining support amongst the British
public for the use of military and civilian forces in unstable
areas. As part of the planning process for the use of the Comprehensive
Approach, a communications strategy should be developed for each
deployment and then be implemented to ensure that Government policy
is fully described and communicated to the British public. This
strategy should be part of a wider strategic communications plan
linking in with communication to all parties including allies,
international organisations and, importantly, to local nationals.
(Paragraph 85)
Personnel
18. We
recommend that DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and the FCO should
reconsider whether they can delegate to the MoD the responsibility
for maintaining the security of their personnel, to ensure that
there is sufficient flexibility to take account of temporary security
arrangements created by the Armed Forces in a way that meets the
Departments' duty of care. (Paragraph 90)
19. Recognising the
development of the Military Stabilisation Support Group, the MoD
should determine under what circumstances this Group will work
with the Stabilisation Unit and whether it needs to strengthen
its capability in reconstruction and post-conflict stabilisation
(and consequently its training and recruitment). It should report
to us on the results of this assessment and confirm that this
issue will be dealt with in the context of the Strategic Defence
Review. (Paragraph 95)
20. There is a need
for more cross-departmental working with secondments between the
three Departments to enhance the skill sets of relevant staff
and to increase the mutual understanding of the different cultures
in each Department. There may also be the need to recruit staff
with additional skill sets in each of the Departments. DFID is
already looking to do this. The FCO and the MoD should review
whether they need to modify or expand the skills sets of the people
they wish to recruit. (Paragraph 96)
21. Joint training
is an important element in the integration of civilian and military
staff and in the successful use of the Comprehensive Approach.
There should be a greater sharing of training and education within
the three principal Departments. At the minimum, civilians being
posted to conflict areas such as Afghanistan should participate
in pre-deployment training with the military about to be sent
to such areas. This should be in addition to the training provided
by the Stabilisation Unit to civilians in preparation for deployment
into conflict areas. We also expect to see continuing participation
in joint exercises such as Joint Venture and Arrcade Fusion. The
Departments should pursue appropriate means to ensure the knowledge
gained by individuals is consolidated. (Paragraph 103)
22. The FCO and DFID
should seek to increase the number of their staff attending the
courses at the Defence Academy, and the role of the Academy should
be reviewed, as part of the Strategic Defence Review, with a view
to its becoming the focus for Government-wide education and training
on the Comprehensive Approach. (Paragraph 104)
Departmental information technology and information
management systems
23. As
the ability to communicate and share data is key to the further
development of the Comprehensive Approach, the FCO, DFID and the
MoD should provide us with an action plan for how they intend
to remedy the deficiencies in communication, information systems
and data sharing between their Departments. The plan should include
details of who will be responsible for delivering the plan and
its constituent parts as well as the timetable for implementation.
(Paragraph 106)
Working on the ground
24. The
UK is at the forefront of the development and use of the Comprehensive
Approach and has worked well with international organisations
and other member states to further the development of the Approach
internationally. However, more needs to be done. We, therefore,
recommend that the MoD, the FCO and DFID should continue to work
with the UN, NATO and the EU to promote the effective use of the
Comprehensive Approach within these organisations so that future
complex emergencies requiring a multilateral approach can operate
more effectively. We consider such work to be essential to addressing
the perception and reality of uneven burden-sharing amongst member
states. (Paragraph 127)
25. We note the positive
examples of the use of the Comprehensive Approach in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, and recently, in Afghanistan.
These success stories should be brought together to inform the
development of a strengthened Comprehensive Approach doctrine.
Positive outcomes in Afghanistan should also be used to inform
the public debate about the success of operations there. (Paragraph
142)
Working with NGOs
26. The
MoD, DFID and the FCO recognise the importance of the independence
of NGOs and that care should be exercised when coordinating activities
with them. Nonetheless, NGOs are an important component in the
use of the Comprehensive Approach and have much to offer, not
only in terms of humanitarian aid work but in their knowledge
and understanding of the region and the needs of local people.
The three Departments should expand their work with NGOs to identify
better ways to draw on their expertise and to ensure that each
side is aware of the other's activities without compromising the
safety of aid workers on the ground. (Paragraph 152)
Working with local nationals
27. We
consider the ability to communicate directly with local nationals
to be important. We recognise that there has been additional language
training for deployment to Afghanistan since 2003 but progress,
particularly within DFID and the FCO, has been unimpressive. The
three Departments should give the matter higher priority both
in current and future operations. (Paragraph 158)
28. The MoD, the FCO
and DFID together with the Stabilisation Unit should provide training
and education on the culture, history and politics of areas where
their staff will be deployed on the Comprehensive Approach. For
instance, training could draw upon the knowledge and expertise
of personnel, including those of other countries and in particular
the USA, who have served in Afghanistan, in some cases on more
than one occasion. This training should be in addition to appropriate
language training. (Paragraph 167)
29. We endorse the
Government's intentions with regard to the support of women, in
line with UNSCR 1325, within the Comprehensive Approach and expect
to see explicit reference to this in the Comprehensive Approach
policy and doctrine that we call for earlier in this Report. (Paragraph
174)
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