House of Commons - The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace

The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace - Defence Committee Contents

2 IN WHITEHALL

31. Given the nature of the Comprehensive Approach, it is vital that it is co-ordinated at all levels: centrally in the UK; with allies and international organisations; and at all levels on the ground. Some witnesses told us that the Comprehensive Approach was better developed on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan than it was in Whitehall.[23] This chapter deals with how the Comprehensive Approach has been developed within Government and covers what we see as the vital elements needed to deliver an effective Comprehensive Approach: a clear vision and strategic intention; strong leadership; a change in departmental cultures, structure, funding and personnel arrangements; better working with NGOs and local nationals.

Strategic intent and planning

32. Many witnesses agreed that it was crucial for the UK to have an agreed understanding of the strategic intent of the undertaking, plus a clear vision of the objectives and the proposed end state.[24] Such understanding and vision were needed prior to the start of such an intervention. The use of the Comprehensive Approach required as much prior intelligence as possible and thorough preparation and planning to be undertaken jointly with the three most relevant departments—the MoD, DFID and the FCO—and, in some cases, with other departments as well, such as the Home Office. Liaison with international organisations and allies and with NGOs was also a key component of such planning.

33. None of the situations where the use of the Comprehensive Approach will be of value is likely to be straightforward to resolve. This, inevitably, makes preparation difficult and time-consuming. The situation in Afghanistan was and still is complex. General McColl supported the use of the Comprehensive Approach there but pointed out, for example, that co-ordination in Afghanistan is difficult.

34. Before the Iraq invasion, Major General Tim Cross, a Service advisor to our Committee, who was involved in both the preparation for the immediate aftermath of the invasion in terms of military logistics and the issue of humanitarian support and immediate reconstruction after it, saw no evidence of longer term reconstruction planning. In his evidence to the Chilcott Inquiry into Iraq, he wrote:

There was scant evidence of any serious so-called Phase IV planning (reconstruction). […] I tried to work through the immediate implications of the proposed operations and their possible aftermath; not just the military logistic implications but the issues of refugees, humanitarian support and immediate reconstruction. […] I cannot claim to have given any immediate thought to the longer term reconstruction—physical or political—of Iraq, nor perhaps, as an operational military commander, should I have done. But importantly I got no sense of anyone else doing so either, neither in the UK nor in the US.

35. Brigadier Butler also saw a void in planning for stabilisation in Afghanistan and Iraq and that the allied forces had missed the opportunity of the "first 100 days" after the initial conflict.

36. In recognition of the changing circumstances and the absence of a joint strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the UK published a new comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 2009. In announcing the new Strategy, the Prime Minister recognised this deficit.

37. The Strategy set out the context of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, it dealt with the importance of the area in combating terrorism and denying a safe haven to Al Qaida. It also acknowledged that it was an area of conflict with regional instability and transnational crime, with Afghanistan being the source of 90% of the heroin in the UK. The importance of Pakistan being a nuclear-armed state with weapons of mass destruction was also stressed.

38. The guiding principles set out in the Strategy underpin the need for a Comprehensive Approach.

an international approach: living up to our international obligations, working closely with the international community to leverage the UK's resources and ensure proper burden sharing;
a regional approach: promoting peaceful relations between all countries in the region, focused on countering the threat of violent extremism;
a joint civilian-military approach: recognising that military force alone will not solve the region's problems;
a better co-ordinated approach: within each country; across the two countries especially on the border areas; and across the different lines of activity, from counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics, to governance and development;
a long-term approach focused on developing capacity in both countries, including moving to a transition process for Afghan security forces to take over responsibility in Afghanistan, with international forces moving to a training and support role;
a political approach encouraging reconciliation in both countries so that militants renounce violence in favour of legitimate political processes;
an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; and
a hard headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics for success.[30]

39. In August 2009, General McChrystal, Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, made an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan following the early days of his appointment. He reported on the need for NATO to develop a new strategy that was credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.

40. He also said that to defeat the insurgency, there needed to be a properly resourced strategy based on four main pillars:

improve effectiveness through greater partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces;
prioritise responsive and accountable governance;
gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency's momentum; and
focus resources to those areas where vulnerable populations are most threatened.[32]

41. It is evident that the need for a clear strategy and vision has been recognised for Afghanistan. It is important that all parties share an understanding of the context and nature of the challenges faced. In future situations where the Comprehensive Approach is adopted all relevant government departments and the Armed Forces should agree a clear set of objectives with appropriate measures of achievement and with a clearly defined end state set in the context of the nature of the challenges faced. The need for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation should be recognised and incorporated into the planning at the earliest stages. These objectives may need to adapt and evolve but it is essential that the agencies pursuing the Comprehensive Approach have an agreed and feasible end state in mind at every appropriate juncture.

Who is in charge?

42. The Comprehensive Approach needs strong leadership. There is currently no accepted procedure for appointing someone at departmental level to take the lead in each situation where the Comprehensive Approach is used. For example, when asked about who was in charge of the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan, we were told that it was the Prime Minister.[33] The MoD, the FCO and DFID all stated that it would not be appropriate for one departmental Minister to be designated for a conflict situation such as Afghanistan as it would lead to other Ministers giving it a lower priority. For example, Sir Peter Ricketts, Permanent Under Secretary at the FCO, told us:

43. Although the joint memorandum from the Departments said that a Senior Responsible Owner should ideally be appointed in the relevant theatre, we could not identify who this might be in Afghanistan but, nevertheless, we believe such an appointment could be important. Some witnesses suggested that even if no specific Minister was appointed then there should be an MoD Permanent Joint Head Quarters equivalent in the Cabinet Office, supported by staff there, or a Regional Envoy appointed for the area reporting directly to the Prime Minister.[36]

44. As it stands, it is difficult to know who, within Whitehall, is charged with translating what Ministers want into a Comprehensive Strategy. Professor Chalmers recognised the strain placed on the centre of Government but was not convinced that there was a major problem with co-ordination.[37]

Stephen Grey disagreed.

As did Brigadier Butler.

primus inter pares

45. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the relevant Secretaries of State had met monthly to deal with Afghanistan and Iraq.[41] This, however, was not part of any formal Cabinet Office structure.[42] He also said that the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) discussed Afghanistan and other issues involving the use of the Comprehensive Approach. It had met, for example, the previous week to discuss Somalia. He stressed that the meeting of the three Secretaries of State was to supplement NSID not replace it.[43]

46. Bill Rammell said that the meeting on Somalia had looked at all aspects from the military perspective to development in Somalia and building judicial capacity within the region.[45] Mr Teuten told us that the sub-Committee of NSID on overseas defence had responsibility for the Comprehensive Approach.[46]

47. We understand why, for major situations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is inevitable that the Prime Minister should take overall responsibility for the use of the Comprehensive Approach. We note there has been a debate about whether this is necessary, whether it provides effective leadership and clarity for all missions and whether it might be appropriate for the Prime Minister to appoint a lead Minister. We consider that at the start of each operation using the Comprehensive Approach, the Government should formally decide and announce what the appropriate governance arrangements should be. Certainly as missions evolve these matters should be kept under review.

48. As part of its role in facilitating cross-departmental assessment and planning, the Stabilisation Unit should support the relevant Minister and Whitehall committees in the operation of the Comprehensive Approach. The Government should consider whether the Unit should be placed within the Cabinet Office to ensure it has sufficient political clout with other departments. Likewise, leadership focus and effectiveness in some missions might be enhanced by appointing a special envoy or representative. This person should have direct access to the Prime Minister.

49. The relevant cabinet committee (NSID) only meets "probably every couple of months". Lord Malloch-Brown also told us that "the tripartite meeting is really the principal vehicle for overseeing in the case of Afghanistan", but this only meets monthly, is not a formal subcommittee of the Cabinet and lacks a Cabinet Office secretariat.[47] Lord Malloch-Brown felt that this system was "on probation" and they still need to "show it works".[48] The Government should consider whether there is any benefit in putting this on a more formal basis.

Changing departmental cultures

50. As set out above, the three main departments involved in the Comprehensive Approach are the FCO, DFID and the MoD, including the Armed Forces; but other government departments, such as the department for Business, Innovation and Skills (for developing trade links) and the Home Office (for police training) also have a role to play. Each of these organisations has a very distinct culture and limited experience of working jointly. We asked the Permanent Under Secretaries (PUSs) of the MoD, DFID and the FCO how well their departments worked together. All three PUSs reported that there had previously been difficulties but that staff in each department now had a greater understanding of the issues faced by the other departments.

Dr Shafik:

Sir Bill Jeffrey:

Sir Peter Ricketts:

51. These comments were echoed by Ministers although they recognised that there was more to do.

Bill Rammell:

Lord Malloch-Brown:

52. Professor Farrell also gave an external perspective on the cultural and operational differences between the Departments.

53. Professor Chalmers said that by and large the Armed Forces had accepted the principle of the Comprehensive Approach but some had been frustrated by the slow progress in other departments.[55] Professor Farrell said that, in recent research, 86% of officers surveyed recognised that the Comprehensive Approach was the future of the military operations.[56]

54. We recognise and welcome the progress that has been made in making the Comprehensive Approach a reality. The MoD, the FCO and DFID have all made efforts to reduce cultural and operational differences but all acknowledge more needs to be done. We call upon the Departments to identify what changes, particularly in respect of departmental cultures and working practices, still need to be made. For example, we expect, as a minimum, to see that any review should consider the involvement of high level officials, the enhancement of promotion prospects for those involved in Comprehensive Approach activities and a financial commitment to co-ordination of the Approach. The three Departments should, in response to this Report, provide us with the results of the review into the changes needed to working practices and how they intend to plan and manage the necessary changes.

THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT

55. The International Development Act 2002 established poverty reduction as the overarching purpose of British development assistance, either by furthering sustainable development or improving the welfare of the recipients. There are differing views as to whether the Act with its emphasis on poverty reduction operates as a constraint on what DFID can do as part of the Comprehensive Approach and its work on reconstruction and post-conflict stabilisation.

56. A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research called Shared Responsibilities: a national security strategy for the UK, recommended that the 2002 Act be amended to make DFID's mission that of the promotion of development through poverty reduction and the promotion of conditions of safety and security in the developing world.[57] Professor Chalmers said that many of the poorest countries in the world were affected by conflict and "we should not immediately assume that there is a fundamental conflict between security and development objectives".[58]

57. Daniel Korski suggested that the International Development Act 2002 bred an organisational culture which militated against spending resources within countries at risk.

58. Michael Foster and Dr Shafik, the Minister and PUS at DFID, both reported that the Act was not an obstacle to their full participation in the Comprehensive Approach and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Their view was that there was no conflict between poverty and security aims as many of the poorest nations are designated fragile states and, therefore, no revision of the Act was needed.[60] Dr Shafik also pointed out that half the activities funded under the Conflict Fund did not qualify as official development assistance.[61] The Minister, Michael Foster, told us:

59. We asked Dr Shafik if there had been any conflict within DFID in working in Iraq, potentially one of the richest countries in the world.

We also asked if there was a sense of resentment amongst DFID employees that they were spending time and resource on a rich country.

60. Whilst we note that DFID believes that the International Development Act allows it to participate fully in reconstruction and stabilisation operations and in conflict prevention, we believe a review of whether the Act creates a culture within DFID which adversely impacts on its participation would merit the further attention of post-legislative scrutiny.

Structure and funding

61. The three Departments—the MoD, the FCO and DFID—are funded and structured differently, reflecting different roles and responsibilities, which inevitably impacts on their ability to respond to conflict. The MoD is usually funded and prepared for contingent operations and the Armed Forces have personnel prepared for deployment in conflict. Most of the additional costs of operations are funded from the Reserve. DFID has little capacity to find staff to deploy to conflict zones quickly. In the early days in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department did not have enough staff willing to be deployed. To staff and fund work in a conflict, DFID has to reprioritise its work and divert resources from other areas whilst maintaining its commitment to providing support to many developing countries across the world. The FCO does have staff it can deploy across the world but again has to reprioritise its work to do so.[65]

62. Professor Chalmers said that the Comprehensive Approach would work better in the future, if the asymmetry of funding and structure between the three Departments were addressed.

[…] we do have to look at resourcing and funding and the basic asymmetry between the nature of the different departments, the three main departments (MoD, DFID and the Foreign Office) which are likely to be involved in this sort of operation in future. The MoD, the Armed Forces, is an organisation which appears to have significant spare capacity in order to be able to intervene. They also have an arrangement with the Treasury, which is clearly fraying right now but it certainly has been in operation in recent years, where the additional costs of operations are funded from the reserve.

He compared this with DFID and the FCO:

63. The level of resources deployed on the Comprehensive Approach by each of the Departments is different. The Stabilisation Unit had an annual budget of £7 million. This is to rise to £12.7 million from 2010.[67] The shared pools for conflict prevention, peace support and stabilisation totalled only £171 million in 2009-10, after allowing for contributions to international organisations. Even that level of funding required the Departments to dip into their normal funds to make up the deficit caused by a weak pound resulting in the subscriptions to international organisations being higher than planned.[68] Money for aid in Afghanistan is likely to total some £450 million over 4 years to 2008-09. In comparison, the cost to the Reserve of the additional costs of the Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were £4 billion in 2008-09.

64. Bill Rammell commented that the military component was often necessarily the first required for any given situation:

65. It is only right that the Armed Forces should be funded from the Reserve for operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as situations change and conflicts move away from war fighting to reconstruction and stabilisation, resources may need to be reprioritised or redistributed. The balance of investment decisions become crucial. The Government, therefore, should clarify the mechanism which funds other government departments for conflict.

The Stabilisation Unit

66. The Government established the tri-departmental Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004. In late 2007, it was renamed the Stabilisation Unit to reflect the nature of its role in supporting the management of the MoD's Stabilisation Aid fund. It sits in DFID but is jointly owned by DFID, the FCO and the MoD. Its role is to facilitate cross-departmental assessment and planning; to develop and deploy civilian expertise; and to identify and learn lessons. It has been the primary source of civilian experts to the Helmand mission and has deployed experts elsewhere such as Iraq, Kabul, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Staff from the Unit produced an updated version of the integrated Helmand Roadmap (plan) and continue to support military exercises and planning in Whitehall for future UK engagement on conflict, bilaterally and multilaterally. The Unit is developing itself as a repository of expertise and experience on stabilisation. It is coordinating cross-Whitehall work on improving joint assessment and planning at the strategic and operational levels.[70]

67. In 2008, the National Security Strategy (NSS) identified the need to improve the effectiveness of the UK and the international community in supporting countries affected by violent conflict, including how better to deploy civilian stabilisation experts. When announcing the NSS, the Prime Minister said that:

68. A Cabinet Office Task Force Review of Stabilisation and Civil Effect was launched in June 2008 to determine how best to achieve this outcome. It reported to the NSID sub-committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) in January 2009 focusing on the creation of the 1000-strong Civilian Stabilisation Capacity and the strengthening of the role of the Stabilisation Unit.[72] A Stabilisation Implementation Team was also established in early 2009 to deliver these Ministerial commitments and to determine the nature and extent of additional Stabilisation Unit planning capability and how best to implement it. It was also to consider the terms and conditions of service, as well as risk and safety considerations, for deployed civilian staff. [73]

69. The Review also recommended that the Stabilisation Unit become the "single HMG delivery unit for civil effect", including the responsibility for managing the deployments of civilians and police officers for UK stabilisation missions in hostile environments and international peacebuilding missions. The Stabilisation Unit is, however, not responsible for all civilians in hostile environments—the bulk of these posts are posts in UK Embassies and DFID offices and are filled using their standard recruitment processes.[74]

70. The Unit was tasked with establishing a UK Civilian Stabilisation Capacity (now called the Civilian Stabilisation Group) of over 1,000 civilians and police. This pool would allow the continuous deployment of up to 200 personnel. This was primarily to be achieved by:

enhancing the existing database of Deployable Civilian Experts, so that it held 800-1,000 quality assured personnel from outside Government;
forming a cross-government Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (of around 200); and
appealing to a wide range of volunteer networks, and making better use of the relevant civilian skills of Armed Forces Reservists.

71. The number of personnel required by type of skills was determined on the basis of analysis agreed across government of the respective roles of civilians and the military in stabilisation environments, taking account of recent experiences and possible future scenarios.[75]

72. In 2008-09, the Stabilisation Unit reviewed all individuals then on its database to assess their suitability for working in challenging environments. Significantly enhanced experience of stabilisation activities on the ground in Afghanistan and elsewhere meant that a much more specific requirement for personnel could be set. As a result the number of personnel on the database was halved. Over the course of 2009 a targeted recruitment campaign generated over 1,200 new applications. A detailed assessment process, including face to face interviews with more than 400 individuals, was followed by more targeted efforts to meet specific skill sets. The majority of the Deployable Civilian Experts are self employed.[76]

73. Recruitment from the Civil Service for the Cadre began in July 2009. Applications were received from 35 government departments including from devolved administrations, as well as Local Government employees, representing administrative grades up to the Senior Civil Service. All applicant members obtained the agreement of their line managers to join the Cadre, with the requirement for additional line management endorsement for specific deployments.[77]

74. The Stabilisation Unit is providing 'core training' to 390 of the 1150 Cadre (34%) most likely to be deployed over the period to mid 2011. Training provides an understanding of how to work in hostile environments and of good practice in stabilisation planning. By giving this training in advance of an appointment to a particular post, the lead time between appointment and deployment is minimised. Once appointed to a post, an individual also receives training specific to that post ('pre-deployment training'). The 34% core training coverage represents a balance between maximising preparedness and minimising expenditure on personnel who are not ultimately deployed.[78]

75. The Stabilisation Unit took on responsibility for deployments of Home Office police officers and civilians deployed to multilateral missions in October, with the transfer of the International Secondments Team from the FCO. The Stabilisation Unit currently manages 121 personnel deployed overseas in any month, comprising 33 serving police officers and 88 civilians serving on both multilateral and bilateral missions. Personnel were deployed as of November 2009 in 17 countries, including 47 to Afghanistan, 23 to Kosovo, 15 to Iraq, 13 to Georgia and 5 to Sudan. Other deployments were to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Pakistan.[79]

76. The work of the Stabilisation Unit in developing and maintaining a cadre of deployable civilians and civil servants has been significant in the UK's capacity to implement the Comprehensive Approach. The Stabilisation Unit should be provided with sufficient resources to continue maintaining this capacity and the training of appropriate individuals.

77. We understand that, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been difficult to recruit serving policemen to assist with the training of the local police forces and that, consequently, the MoD Police currently provide the bulk of support. For example, in Afghanistan, the UK provided six police mentoring teams in Helmand all of which were made up of the MoD Police supported by the infantry. There are no serving UK civilian police officers working alongside UK military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan. However, there is a small number of serving UK civilian police officers in Kabul as part of NATO or EU deployments. Concerns apparently remain about whether such officers should be deployed into hostile environments. The Association of Chief Police Officers is examining the current policy and conditions under which the UK can deploy UK civilian police officers.[80] We look forward to seeing the results of the Association of Chief Police Officers' work on the deployment of serving police officers. The Home Office and the devolved administrations should resolve the issues inhibiting serving police officers from volunteering to serve in areas of need as quickly as possible. The Home Office and the devolved administrations should promote the use of serving police officers to train local police forces in areas of need. The MoD should also set out the role for the MoD Police in contributing to stabilisation operations.

Learning lessons

78. Some witnesses told us that a crucial component of using the Comprehensive Approach successfully is the process by which lessons are learned and that the UK did not take all of the lessons learned from the early days in Afghanistan into Iraq nor from Iraq then into the later phases in Afghanistan.[81] Sir Peter Ricketts said:

79. Professor Farrell also told us that there had been a history of poor lessons learning:

80. The Stabilisation Unit has an overarching responsibility for the process of learning and disseminating lessons.[84] We asked the MoD and DFID how the Stabilisation Unit linked in with the thorough process of identifying and learning lessons from operations managed by the Armed Forces' Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). They told us the following:

PJHQ Lessons are sourced from Post Operational Reports raised by returning Operational Commanders at 1 and 2 star level. The PJHQ Lessons staff identifies those lessons which require a civilian input and assigns them on the Defence Lessons Identified Management System; where these are within the mandate of the Stabilisation Unit (SU), they are assigned to the Unit for resolution.

81. We acknowledge that the evolution of the work of the Stabilisation Unit will progressively ensure that cross-institutional knowledge and skills gained during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will be retained and built on. How to maximise improved capability for the Comprehensive Approach from 'lessons learned' should be addressed in the Strategic Defence Review.

82. We note that the three Departments are looking further at the process of learning lessons. The Stabilisation Unit working with the three Government Departments should make it a priority to encourage those involved in the Comprehensive Approach to learn lessons from each situation and to disseminate the lessons as appropriate. In particular, the Stabilisation Unit should work closely with the Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Armed Forces drawing on its thorough and comprehensive lessons learned process. The Stabilisation Unit should institute a transparent and regular process of such dissemination and should run regular seminars for relevant staff in the three principal Departments and in other departments involved and for staff on its database of deployable personnel. The Unit should be given sufficient resources to carry out this essential function.

Making the case in the UK

83. Situations which require the use of the Comprehensive Approach are by their nature likely to be complex involving many parties including international organisations and other allies. Communicating the need for such conflicts or interventions is not easy. However, it must be a key component of the Comprehensive Approach not only to win the hearts and minds of the relevant local nationals but also to make the case in the UK for the importance of the relevant operation in both the national and international media.

84. Bill Rammell said that the UK Government was getting the message about the importance of Afghanistan across to the British public but did recognise that communication was a continuing challenge.

85. Communication is a key component of maintaining support amongst the British public for the use of military and civilian forces in unstable areas. As part of the planning process for the use of the Comprehensive Approach, a communications strategy should be developed for each deployment and then be implemented to ensure that Government policy is fully described and communicated to the British public. This strategy should be part of a wider strategic communications plan linking in with communication to all parties including allies, international organisations and, importantly, to local nationals.

Personnel

86. It is inevitable that military and civilian personnel have different terms and conditions and perhaps that Departments have widely different approaches to their duty of care towards staff, to health and safety considerations and to risk assessment and management. The terms and conditions of the staff in the three Departments are also different and staff from DFID and the FCO have not been recruited or trained to work in dangerous areas. At first this led to delays in deploying staff and limited their ability to work in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Brigadier Butler told us that the difficulty of getting civilians to engage in reconstruction and development in Helmand in 2006 was frustrating for the military.

Dr Shafik said that many of these earlier problems had been overcome.

87. Sir Peter Ricketts recognised that the FCO had not learnt the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo as well as they might but agreed that the situation had improved recently.

88. When asked whether the varying responsibilities with regard to duty of care and health and safety in the FCO and DFID had been resolved, Lord Malloch-Brown said that there had been dramatic progress. He acknowledged that staff had not been able to provide sufficient development and political support to the military a few years ago but that there was no longer a yawning gap between the risk appetite of the military and its other partners in the Comprehensive Approach, although the gap was not completely closed.[91]

89. Michael Foster told us that there was now a greater, although not overwhelming, appetite in staff to go into risky environments:

90. On our January 2010 visit to Afghanistan, we noted that there were still some obstacles which stood in the way of effective joint working although many issues relating to the varying risk appetite amongst different groups of staff had been resolved. For example, Stabilisation Unit and DFID staff are not permitted to take advantage of any temporary increase in security created by the Armed Forces in order to facilitate visits by senior Afghan or British politicians and officials—hence they cannot participate in such visits. We recommend that DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and the FCO should reconsider whether they can delegate to the MoD the responsibility for maintaining the security of their personnel, to ensure that there is sufficient flexibility to take account of temporary security arrangements created by the Armed Forces in a way that meets the Departments' duty of care.

91. Between January and May 2009, DFID carried out a study: Meeting Workforce Demands in Hostile and Difficult Environments.[94] The study concluded that while the Department had been successful in meeting the requirements for staff to work in difficult posts it nevertheless needed to strengthen its approach to such arrangements because of:

the likely increase in workforce demands from fragile and conflict affected states generated by DFID's focus on this agenda; and
a concern that the current approach could not guarantee to generate a secure, predictable supply of the best, well prepared talent to take on professionally challenging high profile assignments which are hard to fill.

The study made a number of recommendations which were accepted by the Department including:

DFID should retain the volunteer principle (even though there exists a legal case to deploy personnel in specific locations);
a strategy of developing and managing three sources of volunteers from within the existing workforce, new recruits and secondments and better and more use of consultants;
strengthen career incentives (that is the next posting and promotability) recognising the stretching experience of working in fragile states;
recruitment for those core skills in greatest demand; and
draw on the Stabilisation Unit's Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre.[95]

92. The Stabilisation Unit has worked closely with the MoD in supporting its thinking on the role of the military in stabilisation. This has been based on a common understanding that the military have a crucial supporting role in the delivery of civil effect in hostile environments. The Unit has contributed to the development of the role of the CivilMilitary Co-ordination Group into the Military Support to Stabilisation Group, and to stabilisation doctrine and training courses.[96]

93. In a supplementary memorandum, the three principal Departments told us that they recognised the potential role of Reservists with civilian skills to enhance the capability of the military in performing their supporting role. They also told us how these skills were going to be exploited.

94. The MoD told us that the Armed Forces had been further developing their ability to provide civilian and military co-operation:

Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) is acknowledged as a critical activity in stabilisation operations. The military's ability to deliver better 'co-operation and co-ordination' has dramatically increased in the last 12 months with the development of the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), which has responsibility for: 'Preparation and delivery of civil effect/CIMIC planning teams and functional specialists, capable of providing stabilisation support to all deployed formation HQs and Battle Groups (BGs) in order to contribute to PJHQ and Joint Task Force operational capability.'

95. Recognising the development of the Military Stabilisation Support Group, the MoD should determine under what circumstances this Group will work with the Stabilisation Unit and whether it needs to strengthen its capability in reconstruction and post-conflict stabilisation (and consequently its training and recruitment). It should report to us on the results of this assessment and confirm that this issue will be dealt with in the context of the Strategic Defence Review.

96. There is a need for more cross-departmental working with secondments between the three Departments to enhance the skill sets of relevant staff and to increase the mutual understanding of the different cultures in each Department. There may also be the need to recruit staff with additional skill sets in each of the Departments. DFID is already looking to do this. The FCO and the MoD should review whether they need to modify or expand the skills sets of the people they wish to recruit.

TRAINING

97. We were told by witnesses such as Professor Farrell that there needed to be more opportunities for staff in the MoD, the FCO and DFID to train together which would aid integration of civilian and military personnel.[100] Professor Farrell said:

101

98. In 2008, the MoD supported 'Joint Venture', a joint biennial exercise in the planning and conduct of joint operations in a medium scale stabilisation intervention. It is predominantly a military command-post exercise designed to test expeditionary capabilities in dealing with a complex regional scenario and series of political-military events. A senior official from the FCO was appointed Senior Responsible Officer in order that civil-military co-operation could be tested, with the objective of building on work in Helmand and elsewhere. Participants included representatives of the FCO, DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and other parts of Government as well as representatives from NGOs and international partners.[102] Michael Foster said in relation to Joint Venture, "there can be an exchange of ideas which will bring what are characterised as two extremes closer to one uniform policy".[103]

99. In November 2009, NATO ran its exercise "Arrcade Fusion" with a complex scenario designed "to provide a key vehicle for developing a shared understanding of the comprehensive approach and delivering unity of purpose across civil and military communities." Some 1,500 civilian and military personnel participated in the two-day exercise. The UK, including the FCO, DFID and the MoD, played a strong role in the exercise. In particular, the UK provided an "innovative civilian planning element" and the Rt Hon Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, a former Secretary General of NATO, played the role of the UN Special Envoy.[104]

100. Professor Farrell suggested that a greater involvement by the staff from other Departments and the Stabilisation Unit in pre-deployment training, particularly the mission rehearsal exercise, would also improve the integration of staff.

105

101. Sir Bill Jeffrey also stressed the importance of training to the better use of the Comprehensive Approach.

106

102. We asked if staff in DFID and the FCO were reluctant to attend the courses provided at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham. Dr Shafik commented as follows:

107

103. Joint training is an important element in the integration of civilian and military staff and in the successful use of the Comprehensive Approach. There should be a greater sharing of training and education within the three principal Departments. At the minimum, civilians being posted to conflict areas such as Afghanistan should participate in pre-deployment training with the military about to be sent to such areas. This should be in addition to the training provided by the Stabilisation Unit to civilians in preparation for deployment into conflict areas. We also expect to see continuing participation in joint exercises such as Joint Venture and Arrcade Fusion. The Departments should pursue appropriate means to ensure the knowledge gained by individuals is consolidated.

104. The FCO and DFID should seek to increase the number of their staff attending the courses at the Defence Academy, and the role of the Academy should be reviewed, as part of the Strategic Defence Review, with a view to its becoming the focus for Government-wide education and training on the Comprehensive Approach.

Departmental information technology and information management systems

105. In their joint memorandum, the MoD, the FCO and DFID said:

108

The Departments acknowledged that "there are tensions and issues such as authority funding, data sharing/communication that currently limit progress". They also said that these are being addressed.[109]

106. As the ability to communicate and share data is key to the further development of the Comprehensive Approach, the FCO, DFID and the MoD should provide us with an action plan for how they intend to remedy the deficiencies in communication, information systems and data sharing between their Departments. The plan should include details of who will be responsible for delivering the plan and its constituent parts as well as the timetable for implementation.

23 Qq 88, 304, 391 Back

24 Qq 2, 3, 68, 73, 282 Back

25 Q 235 Back

26 Witness Statement by Major General Tim Cross CBE to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk Back

27 Q 68 Back

28 HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward, April 2009, p 3 Back

29 HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward, April 2009, p 5 Back

30 ibid., p 14 Back

31 "Commander's Initial Assessment", 30 August 2009, www.media.washingtonpost.com Back

32 ibid. Back

33 Qq 120, 127 319, 338, 341 Back

34 Q 121 Back