2 IN WHITEHALL
31. Given the nature of the Comprehensive Approach,
it is vital that it is co-ordinated at all levels: centrally in
the UK; with allies and international organisations; and at all
levels on the ground. Some witnesses told us that the Comprehensive
Approach was better developed on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan
than it was in Whitehall.
This chapter deals with how the Comprehensive Approach has been
developed within Government and covers what we see as the vital
elements needed to deliver an effective Comprehensive Approach:
a clear vision and strategic intention; strong leadership; a change
in departmental cultures, structure, funding and personnel arrangements;
better working with NGOs and local nationals.
Strategic intent and planning
32. Many witnesses agreed that it was crucial for
the UK to have an agreed understanding of the strategic intent
of the undertaking, plus a clear vision of the objectives and
the proposed end state.
Such understanding and vision were needed prior to the start of
such an intervention. The use of the Comprehensive Approach required
as much prior intelligence as possible and thorough preparation
and planning to be undertaken jointly with the three most relevant
departmentsthe MoD, DFID and the FCOand, in some
cases, with other departments as well, such as the Home Office.
Liaison with international organisations and allies and with NGOs
was also a key component of such planning.
33. None of the situations where the use of the Comprehensive
Approach will be of value is likely to be straightforward to resolve.
This, inevitably, makes preparation difficult and time-consuming.
The situation in Afghanistan was and still is complex. General
McColl supported the use of the Comprehensive Approach there but
pointed out, for example, that co-ordination in Afghanistan is
If you analyse the future threats that we might
face, they are largely bracketed around the concept of instability,
and the lines of operation that deliver you strategic success
in respect of instability problems are economics and governance;
the security operation simply holds the ring. [
] we have
40 nations in the alliance. Each of them has three or more departments
involved in this issue of the Comprehensive Approach. We then
have at least ten others who are critical players in the country.
We have international organisationsanother 20we
then have NGOs, who run into their hundreds. Then on top of that,
of course, we have the Afghan National Government. [
what we have to have is a concept which enables to us co-ordinate
a reference in a coherent way, and the Comprehensive Approach,
as we have heard, is the language of common currency in Afghanistan
and in many of these theatres, because it is commonly understood
that we need to work together.
34. Before the Iraq invasion, Major General Tim Cross,
a Service advisor to our Committee, who was involved in both the
preparation for the immediate aftermath of the invasion in terms
of military logistics and the issue of humanitarian support and
immediate reconstruction after it, saw no evidence of longer term
reconstruction planning. In his evidence to the Chilcott Inquiry
into Iraq, he wrote:
There was scant evidence of any serious so-called
Phase IV planning (reconstruction). [
] I tried to work through
the immediate implications of the proposed operations and their
possible aftermath; not just the military logistic implications
but the issues of refugees, humanitarian support and immediate
] I cannot claim to have given any immediate
thought to the longer term reconstructionphysical or politicalof
Iraq, nor perhaps, as an operational military commander, should
I have done. But importantly I got no sense of anyone else doing
so either, neither in the UK nor in the US.
Overall, I therefore saw no evidence of a (relatively)
clear Strategic Level 'End State' for post-war Iraq, or an overall
Campaign Plan for how we would get to that 'End State'. All such
debates seemingly ended with the military defeat of Saddam's Forces.
35. Brigadier Butler also saw a void in planning
for stabilisation in Afghanistan and Iraq and that the allied
forces had missed the opportunity of the "first 100 days"
after the initial conflict.
Firstly, there is still a crying requirement
for one plan and one lead in Afghanistan and I think that is the
same on all operations/campaigns which we deploy on.
36. In recognition of the changing circumstances
and the absence of a joint strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the UK published a new comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan in April 2009. In announcing the new Strategy, the
Prime Minister recognised this deficit.
So I am pleased to publish this comprehensive
strategy setting out our approach to Afghanistan and Pakistanbuilding
on the strategy for Afghanistan I announced in December 2007,
and the consistent support we have given to Pakistan in recent
years. In previous decades the international community has not
always shown the long-term vision that is so badly needed.
37. The Strategy set out the context of the situation
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, it dealt with the
importance of the area in combating terrorism and denying a safe
haven to Al Qaida. It also acknowledged that it was an area of
conflict with regional instability and transnational crime, with
Afghanistan being the source of 90% of the heroin in the UK. The
importance of Pakistan being a nuclear-armed state with weapons
of mass destruction was also stressed.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are of critical importance
to the UK and the international community as a whole. Instability
and insecurity in both countries have a direct impact on our national
security and the safety of our citizens.
38. The guiding principles set out in the Strategy
underpin the need for a Comprehensive Approach.
- an international approach:
living up to our international obligations, working closely with
the international community to leverage the UK's resources and
ensure proper burden sharing;
- a regional approach: promoting peaceful
relations between all countries in the region, focused on countering
the threat of violent extremism;
- a joint civilian-military approach: recognising
that military force alone will not solve the region's problems;
- a better co-ordinated approach: within
each country; across the two countries especially on the border
areas; and across the different lines of activity, from counter-terrorism,
counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics, to governance and development;
- a long-term approach focused on developing
capacity in both countries, including moving to a transition
process for Afghan security forces to take over responsibility
in Afghanistan, with international forces moving to a training
and support role;
- a political approach encouraging reconciliation
in both countries so that militants renounce violence in favour
of legitimate political processes;
- an approach that combines respect for sovereignty
and local values with respect for international standards
of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human
- a hard headed approach: setting clear
and realistic objectives with clear metrics for success.
39. In August 2009, General McChrystal, Commander
NATO International Security Assistance Force, made an assessment
of the situation in Afghanistan following the early days of his
appointment. He reported on the need for NATO to develop a new
strategy that was credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.
To execute the strategy, we must grow the Afghan
National Security Forces and elevate the importance of governance.
We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population
is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal
unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we
must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the
impacts and the importance of time, and change our operational
40. He also said that to defeat the insurgency, there
needed to be a properly resourced strategy based on four main
- improve effectiveness through
greater partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces;
- prioritise responsive and accountable governance;
- gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency's
- focus resources to those areas where vulnerable
populations are most threatened.
41. It is evident that the need for a clear strategy
and vision has been recognised for Afghanistan. It is important
that all parties share an understanding of the context and nature
of the challenges faced. In future situations where the Comprehensive
Approach is adopted all relevant government departments and the
Armed Forces should agree a clear set of objectives with appropriate
measures of achievement and with a clearly defined end state set
in the context of the nature of the challenges faced. The need
for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation should be recognised
and incorporated into the planning at the earliest stages. These
objectives may need to adapt and evolve but it is essential that
the agencies pursuing the Comprehensive Approach have an agreed
and feasible end state in mind at every appropriate juncture.
Who is in charge?
42. The Comprehensive Approach needs strong leadership.
There is currently no accepted procedure for appointing someone
at departmental level to take the lead in each situation where
the Comprehensive Approach is used. For example, when asked about
who was in charge of the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach
in Afghanistan, we were told that it was the Prime Minister.
The MoD, the FCO and DFID all stated that it would not be appropriate
for one departmental Minister to be designated for a conflict
situation such as Afghanistan as it would lead to other Ministers
giving it a lower priority. For example, Sir Peter Ricketts, Permanent
Under Secretary at the FCO, told us:
I do not think that it would be a good thing
to have a single day to day minister. It would be for the Prime
Minister to judge, but it is actually a Cabinet Committee of the
three Secretaries of State here represented with the Prime Minister
in the chair. If you want to have all three departments fully
committed, seeing this as a core part of their business I think
you need all three Secretaries of State as part of a collective
ministerial group that is directing it.
] in choosing a single minister I think
you would risk disengaging other departments, which is the opposite
of the Comprehensive Approach really.
43. Although the joint memorandum from the Departments
said that a Senior Responsible Owner should ideally be appointed
in the relevant theatre, we could not identify who this might
be in Afghanistan but, nevertheless, we believe such an appointment
could be important. Some witnesses suggested that even if no specific
Minister was appointed then there should be an MoD Permanent Joint
Head Quarters equivalent in the Cabinet Office, supported by staff
there, or a Regional Envoy appointed for the area reporting directly
to the Prime Minister.
44. As it stands, it is difficult to know who, within
Whitehall, is charged with translating what Ministers want into
a Comprehensive Strategy. Professor Chalmers recognised the strain
placed on the centre of Government but was not convinced that
there was a major problem with co-ordination. 
I think ultimately it has to be at the centre
of government with the Prime Minister at the highest level, and
therefore with the Cabinet Office working to co-ordinate the different
departments in furtherance of that objective. That puts a lot
of strain on the centre but I think inevitably, if that is the
case, in implementing particular aspects of the Comprehensive
Approach, however, in Afghanistan for example, different departments
will take leads depending on what the particular issue is.
Stephen Grey disagreed.
As to the solutions, obviously there are many,
but the only thing I would highlight is that at the moment the
strategic commander of all UK agencies is the Prime Minister,
and there is no other place where it comes together. [
I think the Prime Minister of Britain has got other things on
his mind, and that is the real problem. So I think there needs
to be someone, not quite a General Templer of Malaya who had full
civilian powers dealing with a sovereign country, but there are
so many agencies involved, so many countries involved here that
Britain's interests need to be combined into one role, an ambassador
that combines the role of both military commander and civil commander.
As did Brigadier Butler.
We have touched on a potential czar to bring
this all together. Where it started to work was when Dr Reid was
Secretary of State for Defence and he was the primus inter
pares between DFID and the FCO and the military. He really
got to grips with things in the last part of his tenure as Secretary
of State, in those two or three months up to his move to the Home
Office. He knocked heads together. We discussed/argued what the
priorities were, what the issues were, what those definitions
of sufficient security were and then he knocked their heads together
and action was starting to take place. So it can work while you
have one Secretary of State who is responsible for delivering
stabilization operations in a campaign.
45. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the relevant
Secretaries of State had met monthly to deal with Afghanistan
and Iraq. This, however,
was not part of any formal Cabinet Office structure.
He also said that the Ministerial Committee on National Security,
International Relations and Development (NSID) discussed Afghanistan
and other issues involving the use of the Comprehensive Approach.
It had met, for example, the previous week to discuss Somalia.
He stressed that the meeting of the three Secretaries of State
was to supplement NSID not replace it.
You would have to accept that NSID meeting on
a geographic basis to deal with issues is a perfectly logical
way of conducting its business. The Afghanistan issues require
Afghanistan teams to be at the meeting and briefs. I am not sure
to deal with it thematically as a comprehensive approach would
necessarily contribute. Let me be clear that the meeting of the
three Secretaries of State is intended to supplement and give
urgency and momentum to decision-making, not to replace NSID.
46. Bill Rammell said that the meeting on Somalia
had looked at all aspects from the military perspective to development
in Somalia and building judicial capacity within the region.
Mr Teuten told us that the sub-Committee of NSID on overseas defence
had responsibility for the Comprehensive Approach.
47. We understand why, for major situations such
as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is inevitable that the Prime
Minister should take overall responsibility for the use of the
Comprehensive Approach. We note there has been a debate about
whether this is necessary, whether it provides effective leadership
and clarity for all missions and whether it might be appropriate
for the Prime Minister to appoint a lead Minister. We consider
that at the start of each operation using the Comprehensive Approach,
the Government should formally decide and announce what the appropriate
governance arrangements should be. Certainly as missions evolve
these matters should be kept under review.
48. As part of its role in facilitating cross-departmental
assessment and planning, the Stabilisation Unit should support
the relevant Minister and Whitehall committees in the operation
of the Comprehensive Approach. The Government should consider
whether the Unit should be placed within the Cabinet Office to
ensure it has sufficient political clout with other departments.
Likewise, leadership focus and effectiveness in some missions
might be enhanced by appointing a special envoy or representative.
This person should have direct access to the Prime Minister.
49. The relevant cabinet committee (NSID) only meets
"probably every couple of months". Lord Malloch-Brown
also told us that "the tripartite meeting is really the principal
vehicle for overseeing in the case of Afghanistan", but this
only meets monthly, is not a formal subcommittee of the Cabinet
and lacks a Cabinet Office secretariat.
Lord Malloch-Brown felt that this system was "on probation"
and they still need to "show it works".
The Government should consider whether there is any benefit
in putting this on a more formal basis.
Changing departmental cultures
50. As set out above, the three main departments
involved in the Comprehensive Approach are the FCO, DFID and the
MoD, including the Armed Forces; but other government departments,
such as the department for Business, Innovation and Skills (for
developing trade links) and the Home Office (for police training)
also have a role to play. Each of these organisations has a very
distinct culture and limited experience of working jointly. We
asked the Permanent Under Secretaries (PUSs) of the MoD, DFID
and the FCO how well their departments worked together. All three
PUSs reported that there had previously been difficulties but
that staff in each department now had a greater understanding
of the issues faced by the other departments.
Dr Shafik: Clearly in the early
days there was not a long tradition of DFID working with the MoDthere
was a longer tradition of DFID working with the FCOand
we had obstacles to overcome. But I think it is fair to say that
over the last few years there has been a huge uptick in the quality
of the engagement. [
]I think that can be evidenced by the
huge increase in resources that we have put into conflict and
fragile states; by the decision that we have taken to put half
of our aid budget into what we call fragile and conflict states,
going forward; and there has been a steady improvement in terms
of the level of interaction with DFID staff actively engaging
with the military in terms of pre-deployment and in terms of training
programmes. We now have a whole cadre of people in DFID who speak
military, which is quite an achievement actually because it takes
a while to learn the language and the ways of working with a different
Sir Bill Jeffrey: I admire my military
colleagues greatly but they have a very special way of doing things
and they have a language of their own in the international development
world and indeed in the international world. People come at things
from different angles and I think that the most challenging thing
we have had to do is to build understanding among well motivated
people who just approach things in different ways. My sense is
that that is where we have made some progress. [
] my observation
over the three and a half years I have been doing this job is
that DFID's approach to this has changed quite substantially.
It is not that they were not contributing three and a half years
ago; it is more that in the intervening period they have an even
clearer recognition of the inter-relationship between conflict
reduction and poverty reduction. And throughout that period the
law has been the same, so I think it is more about policy and
the attitudes of people and addressing these cultural issues.
Sir Peter Ricketts: For me in the
last 12 years I have been very closely involved with the FCO work
in Bosnia, in Kosovo and then in the early days in Afghanistan
and Iraq, so I have seen over 12 years a considerable improvement
in our capacity to establish ourselves and operate in these difficult
and dangerous circumstances. [
] We have learnt how to operate
right alongside the military and we have had to learn about duty
of care to our staff so that our staff can be out there right
behind the front line and working very closely with DFID in doing
that. Yes, I am sure that we did not do it well in the early days
and I think we did not do as well as we should in learning the
lessons of Bosnia for Kosovo and of Kosovo for Afghanistan.
51. These comments were echoed by Ministers although
they recognised that there was more to do.
Bill Rammell: If I am honest, I
think there are still cultural challenges between all of our three
departments in that the military, aid workers and diplomats have
a different mindset when they come at a problem initially but
some fundamental shared interests. I think we still need to do
more to ensure we can break down those barriers. [
is something which, again, will develop over time as more people
within DFID, the FCO and the MoD have direct contact and experience
with this kind of engagement and develop the appropriate skills.
Lord Malloch-Brown: You have to
look at this at probably three levels: the on-the-ground level
in a place like Helmand; the London level; and then what I would
argue is by far the most important level, which is the international
level of how we work with allies and partners, either through
the vehicle of the United Nations or narrower coalitions where
that is the case. If you take each, on the ground I think in terms
of the philosophy and administrative arrangements, a comprehensiveness
of a Comprehensive Approach, it is working well and the shortcomings,
which are considerable, are not shortcomings of those administrative
arrangements but shortcomings imposed by a highly insecure situation
where the practical difficulties of doing development while there
is still a war on are very, very difficult. [
]I have no
doubt there are still cultural issues to be resolved, but the
area where I would argue, perhaps, we have fallen well short is
at global level. [
] While I think in Afghanistan we are
now starting to see real progress with the new US administration
in its focus on both a military and development surge, if you
step back and look globally, an awful lot of these operations
are still bedevilled by a lack of clear command and control structures,
if you like, at the international level and a lack of strategy
and priority setting.
52. Professor Farrell also gave an external perspective
on the cultural and operational differences between the Departments.
] so you need to appreciate obviously
from DFID's point of view that Afghanistan is not necessarily
the main effort and it draws resources away, and perhaps this
is partly true for the FCO. I would also point to culture, conceptual
differences and operational differences and if you go down through
those, it perhaps helps you appreciate how far we have come is
quite extraordinary, given these natural tensions. When DFID and
FCO and MoD get into a room together they barely understand the
language they use together. DFID personnel sometimes do not even
understand what they mean by these words and that makes it very,
very difficult to build shared understanding.
53. Professor Chalmers said that by and large the
Armed Forces had accepted the principle of the Comprehensive Approach
but some had been frustrated by the slow progress in other departments.
Professor Farrell said that, in recent research, 86% of officers
surveyed recognised that the Comprehensive Approach was the future
of the military operations.
54. We recognise and welcome the progress that
has been made in making the Comprehensive Approach a reality.
The MoD, the FCO and DFID have all made efforts to reduce cultural
and operational differences but all acknowledge more needs to
be done. We call upon the Departments to identify what changes,
particularly in respect of departmental cultures and working practices,
still need to be made. For example, we expect, as a minimum, to
see that any review should consider the involvement of high level
officials, the enhancement of promotion prospects for those involved
in Comprehensive Approach activities and a financial commitment
to co-ordination of the Approach. The three Departments should,
in response to this Report, provide us with the results of the
review into the changes needed to working practices and how they
intend to plan and manage the necessary changes.
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT
55. The International Development Act 2002 established
poverty reduction as the overarching purpose of British development
assistance, either by furthering sustainable development or improving
the welfare of the recipients. There are differing views as to
whether the Act with its emphasis on poverty reduction operates
as a constraint on what DFID can do as part of the Comprehensive
Approach and its work on reconstruction and post-conflict stabilisation.
56. A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research
called Shared Responsibilities: a national security strategy
for the UK, recommended that the 2002 Act be amended to make
DFID's mission that of the promotion of development through poverty
reduction and the promotion of conditions of safety and security
in the developing world.
Professor Chalmers said that many of the poorest countries in
the world were affected by conflict and "we should not immediately
assume that there is a fundamental conflict between security and
57. Daniel Korski suggested that the International
Development Act 2002 bred an organisational culture which militated
against spending resources within countries at risk.
There have been initiatives to compel departments
to think about projects jointly (eg by pooling funds). However
the majority of funds to be used in conflict environments are
still allocated to DFID, which is circumscribed by the strictures
of the International Development Act that mandates that funds
have to focus on poverty-alleviation. Though this need not, in
fact, constrain spending decisions, it has bred an organisational
culture inside DFID that militates against spending resources
in countries-at-risk of instability as well as alongside the military.[
It is hard to see how anything
else than statutory change can help engender a new culture inside
58. Michael Foster and Dr Shafik, the Minister and
PUS at DFID, both reported that the Act was not an obstacle to
their full participation in the Comprehensive Approach and post-conflict
stabilisation and reconstruction. Their view was that there was
no conflict between poverty and security aims as many of the poorest
nations are designated fragile states and, therefore, no revision
of the Act was needed.
Dr Shafik also pointed out that half the activities funded under
the Conflict Fund did not qualify as official development assistance.
The Minister, Michael Foster, told us:
] the poverty reduction testwhich
I think is used by some people to suggest that somehow you cannot
use DFID funding to deliver in conflict and fragile statescan
be long-term and it can be indirect. I think there is a greater
recognition now on the ground that dealing with conflict, dealing
with fragile states all add to the case for poverty reduction,
it is just that it is not a direct link as would be the case of
providing education to a primary school pupil. There is a very
clear link then between an education a child has and the reduction
in poverty. Indirectly, it can make sure schools are not destroyed
by conflict, people are not injured or killed by conflict because
all of those add to poverty reduction. Anything which prevents
injuries, deaths, damage to infrastructure is by its nature poverty
reduction and, therefore, can fulfil part of the Act quite comfortably.
59. We asked Dr Shafik if there had been any conflict
within DFID in working in Iraq, potentially one of the richest
countries in the world.
I think we have always known that Iraq is not
a poor country and it would not have been a natural place for
DFID focus in the early days. Iraq's revenue last year was $60
billion, in contrast to a place like Afghanistan, which was $4
billion - so a completely different scale of resources. The issue
in Iraq has never been resources; it has been helping the Iraqis
use their own resources better. But in the early days in Iraq
we found ourselves doing a lot more large-scale infrastructure
than you might expect in a country with that per capita income
because of the level of destruction associated with the conflict
and also because of the years of neglect of Basra and the Basra
Province during Saddam's regime.
We also asked if there was a sense of resentment
amongst DFID employees that they were spending time and resource
on a rich country.
I do not think I would quite use the word "resentment".
I think there was an issue of defining a meaningful role in a
country of where the issue of resource transfer was not the priority
and I think we have successfully defined what that role is. Just
to give you an example, we quickly realised that the issue for
Basra was not putting lots of DFID aid money into Basra; the issue
was helping the Basra Provincial Council to make itself an effective
vehicle for tapping into central government money and being able
to spend it. [
] It is not DFID money; but what DFID did
was work with the Provincial Council to help them develop the
capacity to plan, to prepare proposals so that the central government
would allocate resources, and to be able to spend it themselves.
60. Whilst we note that DFID believes that the
International Development Act allows it to participate fully in
reconstruction and stabilisation operations and in conflict prevention,
we believe a review of whether the Act creates a culture within
DFID which adversely impacts on its participation would merit
the further attention of post-legislative scrutiny.
Structure and funding
61. The three Departmentsthe MoD, the FCO
and DFIDare funded and structured differently, reflecting
different roles and responsibilities, which inevitably impacts
on their ability to respond to conflict. The MoD is usually funded
and prepared for contingent operations and the Armed Forces have
personnel prepared for deployment in conflict. Most of the additional
costs of operations are funded from the Reserve. DFID has little
capacity to find staff to deploy to conflict zones quickly. In
the early days in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department did not
have enough staff willing to be deployed. To staff and fund work
in a conflict, DFID has to reprioritise its work and divert resources
from other areas whilst maintaining its commitment to providing
support to many developing countries across the world. The FCO
does have staff it can deploy across the world but again has to
reprioritise its work to do so.
62. Professor Chalmers said that the Comprehensive
Approach would work better in the future, if the asymmetry of
funding and structure between the three Departments were addressed.
] we do have to look at resourcing and
funding and the basic asymmetry between the nature of the different
departments, the three main departments (MoD, DFID and the Foreign
Office) which are likely to be involved in this sort of operation
in future. The MoD, the Armed Forces, is an organisation which
appears to have significant spare capacity in order to be able
to intervene. They also have an arrangement with the Treasury,
which is clearly fraying right now but it certainly has been in
operation in recent years, where the additional costs of operations
are funded from the reserve.
He compared this with DFID and the FCO:
DFID has I think around 1500 home-based, UK staff
globally; they do not do development directly so much as manage
development contracts. The average DFID member of staff has £3
million a year to manage. They do not have a surge capacity and
also of course there is a very large number of countries in which
they are engaged. The Stabilisation Unit is one way of getting
round that issue providing some civilian surge capacity but I
think there is an issue about whether that is large enough for
the demands. Finally, the Foreign Office again has a wide variety
of different responsibilities. Certainly the way in which Foreign
Office engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq has been funded in recent
years is by being asked to re-prioritise away from other areas
into Afghanistan and Iraq, which indeed they have done, but inevitably
that is a slower process. I really think resourcing and financing
arrangements and having a more level playing field between the
different departments is actually critical.
63. The level of resources deployed on the Comprehensive
Approach by each of the Departments is different. The Stabilisation
Unit had an annual budget of £7 million. This is to rise
to £12.7 million from 2010.
The shared pools for conflict prevention, peace support and stabilisation
totalled only £171 million in 2009-10, after allowing for
contributions to international organisations. Even that level
of funding required the Departments to dip into their normal funds
to make up the deficit caused by a weak pound resulting in the
subscriptions to international organisations being higher than
planned. Money for
aid in Afghanistan is likely to total some £450 million over
4 years to 2008-09. In comparison, the cost to the Reserve of
the additional costs of the Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
were £4 billion in 2008-09.
64. Bill Rammell commented that the military component
was often necessarily the first required for any given situation:
The MoDI will put this up frontis
in a slightly different position in that the cost of conflict
has never been a mainstream part of our budget, and therefore
we have got to call on the urgent operational requirement and
the reserve. But I do think within this context that sometimes
there is a misleading impression that you can therefore trade
off the security elements into the other areas. I do believe [
the military component is fundamentally necessary before you can
move on into the other areas, so I do not think you can actually
trade that military component.
65. It is only right that the Armed Forces should
be funded from the Reserve for operations such as those in Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, as situations change and conflicts move
away from war fighting to reconstruction and stabilisation, resources
may need to be reprioritised or redistributed. The balance of
investment decisions become crucial. The Government, therefore,
should clarify the mechanism which funds other government departments
The Stabilisation Unit
66. The Government established the tri-departmental
Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004. In late 2007, it was
renamed the Stabilisation Unit to reflect the nature of its role
in supporting the management of the MoD's Stabilisation Aid fund.
It sits in DFID but is jointly owned by DFID, the FCO and the
MoD. Its role is to facilitate cross-departmental assessment and
planning; to develop and deploy civilian expertise; and to identify
and learn lessons. It has been the primary source of civilian
experts to the Helmand mission and has deployed experts elsewhere
such as Iraq, Kabul, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Staff from the Unit produced an updated version of the integrated
Helmand Roadmap (plan) and continue to support military exercises
and planning in Whitehall for future UK engagement on conflict,
bilaterally and multilaterally. The Unit is developing itself
as a repository of expertise and experience on stabilisation.
It is coordinating cross-Whitehall work on improving joint assessment
and planning at the strategic and operational levels.
67. In 2008, the National Security Strategy (NSS)
identified the need to improve the effectiveness of the UK and
the international community in supporting countries affected by
violent conflict, including how better to deploy civilian stabilisation
experts. When announcing the NSS, the Prime Minister said that:
We must have civilian experts and professionals
ready to deploy quickly to assist failing states and help rebuild
countries emerging from conflict,
available a 1000-strong UK civilian standby capacity.
68. A Cabinet Office Task Force Review of Stabilisation
and Civil Effect was launched in June 2008 to determine how best
to achieve this outcome. It reported to the NSID sub-committee
on National Security, International Relations and Development
(Overseas and Defence) in January 2009 focusing on the creation
of the 1000-strong Civilian Stabilisation Capacity and the strengthening
of the role of the Stabilisation Unit.
A Stabilisation Implementation Team was also established in early
2009 to deliver these Ministerial commitments and to determine
the nature and extent of additional Stabilisation Unit planning
capability and how best to implement it. It was also to consider
the terms and conditions of service, as well as risk and safety
considerations, for deployed civilian staff. 
69. The Review also recommended that the Stabilisation
Unit become the "single HMG delivery unit for civil effect",
including the responsibility for managing the deployments of civilians
and police officers for UK stabilisation missions in hostile environments
and international peacebuilding missions. The Stabilisation Unit
is, however, not responsible for all civilians in hostile environmentsthe
bulk of these posts are posts in UK Embassies and DFID offices
and are filled using their standard recruitment processes.
70. The Unit was tasked with establishing a UK Civilian
Stabilisation Capacity (now called the Civilian Stabilisation
Group) of over 1,000 civilians and police. This pool would allow
the continuous deployment of up to 200 personnel. This was primarily
to be achieved by:
- enhancing the existing database
of Deployable Civilian Experts, so that it held 800-1,000 quality
assured personnel from outside Government;
- forming a cross-government Civil Service Stabilisation
Cadre (of around 200); and
- appealing to a wide range of volunteer networks,
and making better use of the relevant civilian skills of Armed
71. The number of personnel required by type of skills
was determined on the basis of analysis agreed across government
of the respective roles of civilians and the military in stabilisation
environments, taking account of recent experiences and possible
72. In 2008-09, the Stabilisation Unit reviewed all
individuals then on its database to assess their suitability for
working in challenging environments. Significantly enhanced experience
of stabilisation activities on the ground in Afghanistan and elsewhere
meant that a much more specific requirement for personnel could
be set. As a result the number of personnel on the database was
halved. Over the course of 2009 a targeted recruitment campaign
generated over 1,200 new applications. A detailed assessment process,
including face to face interviews with more than 400 individuals,
was followed by more targeted efforts to meet specific skill sets.
The majority of the Deployable Civilian Experts are self employed.
73. Recruitment from the Civil Service for the Cadre
began in July 2009. Applications were received from 35 government
departments including from devolved administrations, as well as
Local Government employees, representing administrative grades
up to the Senior Civil Service. All applicant members obtained
the agreement of their line managers to join the Cadre, with the
requirement for additional line management endorsement for specific
74. The Stabilisation Unit is providing 'core training'
to 390 of the 1150 Cadre (34%) most likely to be deployed over
the period to mid 2011. Training provides an understanding of
how to work in hostile environments and of good practice in stabilisation
planning. By giving this training in advance of an appointment
to a particular post, the lead time between appointment and deployment
is minimised. Once appointed to a post, an individual also receives
training specific to that post ('pre-deployment training'). The
34% core training coverage represents a balance between maximising
preparedness and minimising expenditure on personnel who are not
75. The Stabilisation Unit took on responsibility
for deployments of Home Office police officers and civilians deployed
to multilateral missions in October, with the transfer of the
International Secondments Team from the FCO. The Stabilisation
Unit currently manages 121 personnel deployed overseas in any
month, comprising 33 serving police officers and 88 civilians
serving on both multilateral and bilateral missions. Personnel
were deployed as of November 2009 in 17 countries, including 47
to Afghanistan, 23 to Kosovo, 15 to Iraq, 13 to Georgia and 5
to Sudan. Other deployments were to the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Pakistan.
76. The work of the Stabilisation Unit in developing
and maintaining a cadre of deployable civilians and civil servants
has been significant in the UK's capacity to implement the Comprehensive
Approach. The Stabilisation Unit should be provided with sufficient
resources to continue maintaining this capacity and the training
of appropriate individuals.
77. We understand that, in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
it has been difficult to recruit serving policemen to assist with
the training of the local police forces and that, consequently,
the MoD Police currently provide the bulk of support. For example,
in Afghanistan, the UK provided six police mentoring teams in
Helmand all of which were made up of the MoD Police supported
by the infantry. There are no serving UK civilian police officers
working alongside UK military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan.
However, there is a small number of serving UK civilian police
officers in Kabul as part of NATO or EU deployments. Concerns
apparently remain about whether such officers should be deployed
into hostile environments. The Association of Chief Police Officers
is examining the current policy and conditions under which the
UK can deploy UK civilian police officers.
We look forward to seeing the results of the Association of
Chief Police Officers' work on the deployment of serving police
officers. The Home Office and the devolved administrations should
resolve the issues inhibiting serving police officers from volunteering
to serve in areas of need as quickly as possible. The Home Office
and the devolved administrations should promote the use of serving
police officers to train local police forces in areas of need.
The MoD should also set out the role for the MoD Police in contributing
to stabilisation operations.
78. Some witnesses told us that a crucial component
of using the Comprehensive Approach successfully is the process
by which lessons are learned and that the UK did not take all
of the lessons learned from the early days in Afghanistan into
Iraq nor from Iraq then into the later phases in Afghanistan.
 Sir Peter
I am sure that we did not do it well in the early
days and I think we did not do as well as we should in learning
the lessons of Bosnia for Kosovo and of Kosovo for Afghanistan.
I think now, having created this Stabilisation Unit, which is
there to centralise and preserve the lessons from this extraordinary
decade of involvement in stabilisation work, so that if we had
to do it again there are people and there are doctrines and there
is experience available for the next time around, I think that
means we will be much better placed if we have to do this again
then we were starting out from 1995/6 in Bosnia.
79. Professor Farrell also told us that there had
been a history of poor lessons learning:
]in Britain we do not really have a very
good strategic lesson-learning process. There are individual lesson-learning
processes going on in the various government departments. It seems
to me that that is one of the things the Government should be
focusing attention on, less on what we saw and more on government
departments across the board coming together to learn the lessons
from the operation. [
] if you look at the history of counterinsurgency,
for instance, in all historical cases we have time and again gone
in, made mistakes, learned from the mistakes, got a lot better,
managed the operation, got into another operation and made the
exact same mistakes again. We go through these cycles of constantly
rebooting our memory and relearning. It is one thing that the
British have yet to really get better atinstitutional memory.
It is about better learning and retaining the knowledge so we
do not have to relearn the mistakes we have made.
80. The Stabilisation Unit has an overarching responsibility
for the process of learning and disseminating lessons.
We asked the MoD and DFID how the Stabilisation Unit linked in
with the thorough process of identifying and learning lessons
from operations managed by the Armed Forces' Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ). They told us the following:
PJHQ Lessons are sourced from Post Operational
Reports raised by returning Operational Commanders at 1 and 2
star level. The PJHQ Lessons staff identifies those lessons which
require a civilian input and assigns them on the Defence
Lessons Identified Management System; where these are within the mandate of
the Stabilisation Unit (SU), they are assigned to the Unit for
MoD as a whole, together with DFID, FCO and Stabilisation
Unit are implementing a capability for learning cross-cutting
lessons on conflict (within the scope of PSA 30) across the three
Departments, which will be based in the Stabilisation Unit.
81. We acknowledge that the evolution of the work
of the Stabilisation Unit will progressively ensure that cross-institutional
knowledge and skills gained during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan
will be retained and built on. How to maximise improved capability
for the Comprehensive Approach from 'lessons learned' should be
addressed in the Strategic Defence Review.
82. We note that the three Departments are looking
further at the process of learning lessons. The Stabilisation
Unit working with the three Government Departments should make
it a priority to encourage those involved in the Comprehensive
Approach to learn lessons from each situation and to disseminate
the lessons as appropriate. In particular, the Stabilisation Unit
should work closely with the Permanent Joint Headquarters of the
Armed Forces drawing on its thorough and comprehensive lessons
learned process. The Stabilisation Unit should institute a transparent
and regular process of such dissemination and should run regular
seminars for relevant staff in the three principal Departments
and in other departments involved and for staff on its database
of deployable personnel. The Unit should be given sufficient resources
to carry out this essential function.
Making the case in the UK
83. Situations which require the use of the Comprehensive
Approach are by their nature likely to be complex involving many
parties including international organisations and other allies.
Communicating the need for such conflicts or interventions is
not easy. However, it must be a key component of the Comprehensive
Approach not only to win the hearts and minds of the relevant
local nationals but also to make the case in the UK for the importance
of the relevant operation in both the national and international
84. Bill Rammell said that the UK Government was
getting the message about the importance of Afghanistan across
to the British public but did recognise that communication was
a continuing challenge.
We are getting the message across. We have undertaken
some structural initiatives like a joint communications unit in
Afghanistan to achieve that end. There is a disjuncture. We face
a very difficult situation in Afghanistan and the loss of life
is extraordinarily concerning, but I think there is a disjuncture
sometimes between the media perception of what is happening in
Afghanistan and actually where people are at.
I think we need probably to be just more simple
and clear about why we are there. It is the point [
actually were we to withdraw from Afghanistan today, then the
threat to our national security in this country I genuinely believe,
based on the evidence, would be much more significant. I think
we have got to get that across more effectively.
85. Communication is a key component of maintaining
support amongst the British public for the use of military and
civilian forces in unstable areas. As part of the planning process
for the use of the Comprehensive Approach, a communications strategy
should be developed for each deployment and then be implemented
to ensure that Government policy is fully described and communicated
to the British public. This strategy should be part of a wider
strategic communications plan linking in with communication to
all parties including allies, international organisations and,
importantly, to local nationals.
86. It is inevitable that military and civilian personnel
have different terms and conditions and perhaps that Departments
have widely different approaches to their duty of care towards
staff, to health and safety considerations and to risk assessment
and management. The terms and conditions of the staff in the three
Departments are also different and staff from DFID and the FCO
have not been recruited or trained to work in dangerous areas.
At first this led to delays in deploying staff and limited their
ability to work in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Brigadier Butler
told us that the difficulty of getting civilians to engage in
reconstruction and development in Helmand in 2006 was frustrating
for the military.
I think the challenge was [
] what individuals'
definitions of security and sufficient security was all about
and that was linked to what individuals and departments' thresholds
for risk were about. Most risk averse was DFID and that was institutional,
legal, personal and cultural, then you had the FCO, then members
of the security services and then the military, and trying to
get a common consensus of what was secure and sufficient security
to go out and do the business, in this case reconstruction and
development, was extremely frustrating on all sides.
Dr Shafik said that many of these earlier problems
had been overcome.
I think that there is actually quite a good story
to tell in terms of the lesson learning and the adaptation that
has occurred in terms of the number of people and types of people
we have been able to deploy. If you look at the early days there
was serious difficulty, for example, in recruiting civilians to
go to Helmand. At the moment the vacancy rate in Helmand is well
below 10 per cent and we are able to fill every post, and that
reflects the fact that we have tapped into lots of different kinds
of people and we have trained our own people and we have systems
in place that can support them when they are there so that they
can be effective, and I think that is a very good sign of us being
able to respond and adapt.
87. Sir Peter Ricketts recognised that the FCO had
not learnt the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo as well as they
might but agreed that the situation had improved recently.
I have seen over 12 years a considerable improvement
in our capacity to establish ourselves and operate in these difficult
and dangerous circumstances. We did not have in 2003 an embassy
in Baghdad; we did not have an embassy in Kabul; we did not have
anything in Lashkar Gah or anything in Basra, and over the last
five or six years we have built up to having one of our largest
concentrations of diplomats anywhere in the world actually in
Kabul; and very substantial operations in Lashkar Gah and in Baghdad
and now a small but remaining mission in Basra. We have learnt
how to operate right alongside the military and we have had to
learn about duty of care to our staff so that our staff can be
out there right behind the front line and working very closely
with DFID in doing that. Yes, I am sure that we did not do it
well in the early days and I think we did not do as well as we
should in learning the lessons of Bosnia for Kosovo and of Kosovo
for Afghanistan. 
88. When asked whether the varying responsibilities
with regard to duty of care and health and safety in the FCO and
DFID had been resolved, Lord Malloch-Brown said that there had
been dramatic progress. He acknowledged that staff had not been
able to provide sufficient development and political support to
the military a few years ago but that there was no longer a yawning
gap between the risk appetite of the military and its other partners
in the Comprehensive Approach, although the gap was not completely
The duty of care was in the old days a terrible
restraint on being able to get the staff out doing the development
and political work that needed to be done. [
] There really
has been dramatic progress. [
] we had a situation where
we had increased the number of staff seven-fold essentially, and
that refers to both DFID and FCO staff. If you look today in Lashkar
Gah or in Kabul, as of literally today we have no vacancies in
either place. We have now got 64 UK-based staff in Kabul and 11
in Lashkar Gah, making a total of 76. We have also been able to
get them out and about. [
] We think we have given mobility
to the mission. It is getting out and about and is able to provide
the development and political support to the military side that
was not, frankly, happening a few years ago.
89. Michael Foster told us that there was now a greater,
although not overwhelming, appetite in staff to go into risky
Of the five most difficult environments that
we are currently working with, that seven-fold increase is from
14 to 98 HCS (Home Civil Service) staff, which is the seven-fold
increase that Mark referred to. For DFID, when we compare the
Afghanistan general posts, there is a greater rate of applicants
to those posts in Afghanistan than there is to DFID as a whole.
I am not saying that there is this overwhelming appetite to go
into risky environments, but it is now very clear that people
are moving that way because they are fulfilling posts.
90. On our January 2010 visit to Afghanistan, we
noted that there were still some obstacles which stood in the
way of effective joint working although many issues relating to
the varying risk appetite amongst different groups of staff had
been resolved. For example, Stabilisation Unit and DFID staff
are not permitted to take advantage of any temporary increase
in security created by the Armed Forces in order to facilitate
visits by senior Afghan or British politicians and officialshence
they cannot participate in such visits. We recommend that DFID,
the Stabilisation Unit and the FCO should reconsider whether they
can delegate to the MoD the responsibility for maintaining the
security of their personnel, to ensure that there is sufficient
flexibility to take account of temporary security arrangements
created by the Armed Forces in a way that meets the Departments'
duty of care.
91. Between January and May 2009, DFID carried out
a study: Meeting Workforce Demands in Hostile and Difficult Environments.
The study concluded that while the Department had been successful
in meeting the requirements for staff to work in difficult posts
it nevertheless needed to strengthen its approach to such arrangements
- the likely increase in workforce
demands from fragile and conflict affected states generated by
DFID's focus on this agenda; and
- a concern that the current approach could not
guarantee to generate a secure, predictable supply of the best,
well prepared talent to take on professionally challenging high
profile assignments which are hard to fill.
The study made a number of recommendations which
were accepted by the Department including:
- DFID should retain the volunteer
principle (even though there exists a legal case to deploy personnel
in specific locations);
- a strategy of developing and managing three sources
of volunteers from within the existing workforce, new recruits
and secondments and better and more use of consultants;
- strengthen career incentives (that is the next
posting and promotability) recognising the stretching experience
of working in fragile states;
- recruitment for those core skills in greatest
- draw on the Stabilisation Unit's Civil Service
92. The Stabilisation Unit has worked closely with
the MoD in supporting its thinking on the role of the military
in stabilisation. This has been based on a common understanding
that the military have a crucial supporting role in the delivery
of civil effect in hostile environments. The Unit has contributed
to the development of the role of the CivilMilitary Co-ordination
Group into the Military Support to Stabilisation Group, and to
stabilisation doctrine and training courses.
93. In a supplementary memorandum, the three principal
Departments told us that they recognised the potential role of
Reservists with civilian skills to enhance the capability of the
military in performing their supporting role. They also told us
how these skills were going to be exploited.
[The] MoD should rapidly identify members
of the Armed Forces Volunteer Reserves with relevant skills not
just to serve with the military but also to deploy as part of
the CSC. In consultation with the SU, FCO and DFID, MoD has written
a paper setting out options for the recruitment and deployment
of reservists in stabilisation roles, the recommendations of which
have been endorsed by the 3* Defence Strategy and Plans Group.
The MoD, in conjunction with SU, is now focussing on means of
identifying current reservists' civilian skills, in line with
SU's task matrix, and planning communications with reservists
and employers (including civilian opportunities available with
SU). A second phase of implementation will focus on recruitment
and training, and ensuring coherent mechanisms for identification
and employment of members of the CSC and of reservists.
94. The MoD told us that the Armed Forces had been
further developing their ability to provide civilian and military
Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) is acknowledged
as a critical activity in stabilisation operations. The military's
ability to deliver better 'co-operation and co-ordination' has
dramatically increased in the last 12 months with the development
of the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), which has
responsibility for: 'Preparation and delivery of civil effect/CIMIC
planning teams and functional specialists, capable of providing
stabilisation support to all deployed formation HQs and Battle
Groups (BGs) in order to contribute to PJHQ and Joint Task Force
The MSSG has been tasked with increasing the
capability, training and education in CIMIC, Military Assistance
to Civil Effect and Stabilisation and, since the summer 2008,
has provided a 400% increase in support of Op HERRICK. The
Group has doubled in size over the last 12 months and is yet to
reach its full establishment and therefore reduce the need for
augmentation to meet the operational need. CIMIC is the key enabling
function that facilitates the stabilisation plan in Afghanistan
to be delivered and is now recognised as a high priority to achieve
The MSSG currently has 40 personnel deployed
on Op HERRICK filling Stabilisation planning functions, which
mainly involve CIMIC. The deployment is manned by a combination
of Core MSSG staff and Individual Augmentees from all Three Services
and the Reserve: 40 personnel (10 MSSG); 6 Royal Navy; 28 Army
(6 Reservists); and 6 Royal Air Force.
95. Recognising the development of the Military
Stabilisation Support Group, the MoD should determine under what
circumstances this Group will work with the Stabilisation Unit
and whether it needs to strengthen its capability in reconstruction
and post-conflict stabilisation (and consequently its training
and recruitment). It should report to us on the results of this
assessment and confirm that this issue will be dealt with in the
context of the Strategic Defence Review.
96. There is a need for more cross-departmental
working with secondments between the three Departments to enhance
the skill sets of relevant staff and to increase the mutual understanding
of the different cultures in each Department. There may also be
the need to recruit staff with additional skill sets in each of
the Departments. DFID is already looking to do this. The FCO and
the MoD should review whether they need to modify or expand the
skills sets of the people they wish to recruit.
97. We were told by witnesses such as Professor Farrell
that there needed to be more opportunities for staff in the MoD,
the FCO and DFID to train together which would aid integration
of civilian and military personnel.
Professor Farrell said:
The basic problem with training is that the military
have a whole series of training regimens and various exercises,
but DFID in particular, FCO to a lesser extent, simply lack the
spare capacity to give staff over for these exercises, it is as
simple as that, whereas for the military it is built into how
they work, it is built into their personnel structure, they expect
staff to be doing this. [
] It is true that the key to getting
them to work together is better training, [
] but I suspect
] that a few months into deployment those personal relationships
build up and that is when you get a better understanding.
98. In 2008, the MoD supported 'Joint Venture', a
joint biennial exercise in the planning and conduct of joint operations
in a medium scale stabilisation intervention. It is predominantly
a military command-post exercise designed to test expeditionary
capabilities in dealing with a complex regional scenario and series
of political-military events. A senior official from the FCO was
appointed Senior Responsible Officer in order that civil-military
co-operation could be tested, with the objective of building on
work in Helmand and elsewhere. Participants included representatives
of the FCO, DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and other parts of Government
as well as representatives from NGOs and international partners.
Michael Foster said in relation to Joint Venture, "there
can be an exchange of ideas which will bring what are characterised
as two extremes closer to one uniform policy".
99. In November 2009, NATO ran its exercise "Arrcade
Fusion" with a complex scenario designed "to provide
a key vehicle for developing a shared understanding of the comprehensive
approach and delivering unity of purpose across civil and military
communities." Some 1,500 civilian and military personnel
participated in the two-day exercise. The UK, including the FCO,
DFID and the MoD, played a strong role in the exercise. In particular,
the UK provided an "innovative civilian planning element"
and the Rt Hon Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, a former Secretary
General of NATO, played the role of the UN Special Envoy.
100. Professor Farrell suggested that a greater involvement
by the staff from other Departments and the Stabilisation Unit
in pre-deployment training, particularly the mission rehearsal
exercise, would also improve the integration of staff.
The two key things I would suggest are if we
could somehow get a better integration of folk from the stabilisation
unit in the pre-deployment training, particularly the mission
rehearsal exercise, [
] that would help build the partnership
between the deploying brigade and the PRT before the brigade gets
into theatre, and it would presumably help transfer knowledge
from the PRT to the brigade as it prepares for deployment. 
101. Sir Bill Jeffrey also stressed the importance
of training to the better use of the Comprehensive Approach.
The Stabilisation Unit itself provides quite
a bit of training for all purposes. The thing that I am most conscious
of, because we tend to provide it but it is proving valuable,
is that we now have routinely not many people but a significant
number of people from FCO and DFID on the Defence Academy advanced
command staff course and on pre-deployment exercises before troops
deploy to theatre. All brigade mission rehearsal exercises for
Helmand are now with civilians who are likely to be involved in
102. We asked if staff in DFID and the FCO were reluctant
to attend the courses provided at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham.
Dr Shafik commented as follows:
] in terms of DFID management we have
sent a very clear signal that attending these kinds of courses
like the higher command staff course [
] is a priority. I
think it is no accident that the Private Secretaries of most of
the ministers and my own have all served in Afghanistan and Iraq;
so the people who we signal are on the fast track in the organisation,
many of them are ones who have served in these posts and we have
sent a very clear signal that these are our best and our brightest
and that they will be rewarded for reaching out across Whitehall
and learning about cultures in other departments and working in
these very tough places.
103. Joint training is an important element in
the integration of civilian and military staff and in the successful
use of the Comprehensive Approach. There should be a greater sharing
of training and education within the three principal Departments.
At the minimum, civilians being posted to conflict areas such
as Afghanistan should participate in pre-deployment training with
the military about to be sent to such areas. This should be in
addition to the training provided by the Stabilisation Unit to
civilians in preparation for deployment into conflict areas. We
also expect to see continuing participation in joint exercises
such as Joint Venture and Arrcade Fusion. The Departments should
pursue appropriate means to ensure the knowledge gained by individuals
104. The FCO and DFID should seek to increase
the number of their staff attending the courses at the Defence
Academy, and the role of the Academy should be reviewed, as part
of the Strategic Defence Review, with a view to its becoming the
focus for Government-wide education and training on the Comprehensive
Departmental information technology
and information management systems
105. In their joint memorandum, the MoD, the FCO
and DFID said:
Operational and exercise experience has highlighted
the need better to align and link departmental Information Technology
and Information Management systems to ensure connectivity and
improved communications. This is particularly important in theatre
as it will allow better knowledge and information management.
The three Permanent Secretaries have tasked their Chief Information
Officers to identify options for tackling these constraints.
The Departments acknowledged that "there are
tensions and issues such as authority funding, data sharing/communication
that currently limit progress". They also said that these
are being addressed.
106. As the ability to communicate and share data
is key to the further development of the Comprehensive Approach,
the FCO, DFID and the MoD should provide us with an action plan
for how they intend to remedy the deficiencies in communication,
information systems and data sharing between their Departments.
The plan should include details of who will be responsible for
delivering the plan and its constituent parts as well as the timetable
23 Qq 88, 304, 391 Back
Qq 2, 3, 68, 73, 282 Back
Q 235 Back
Witness Statement by Major General Tim Cross CBE to the Iraq Inquiry,
7 December 2009, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk Back
Q 68 Back
HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way
forward, April 2009, p 3 Back
HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way
forward, April 2009, p 5 Back
ibid., p 14 Back
"Commander's Initial Assessment", 30 August 2009, www.media.washingtonpost.com Back
Qq 120, 127 319, 338, 341 Back
Q 121 Back
Q 133 Back
Qq 20, 59, 299 and Ev 149, 151 Back
Qq 20, 59 Back
Q 20 Back
Q 299 Back
Q 68 Back
Q 320 Back
Q 325 Back
Qq 320-328 Back
Q 328 Back
Q 329-330 Back
Q 331-332 Back
Qq 324-326 Back
Q 415 Back
Q 106 Back
Q 117 Back
Q 118 Back
Q 119 Back
Q 303 Back
Q 48 Back
Qq 23, 26 Back
Q 23 and Ev 152 Back
ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century,
Shared Responsibilities A national security strategy for the
UK, 30 June 2009, recommendation 88 Back
Q 52 Back
Ev 147 Back
Qq 108, 307 Back
Qq 109-111 Back
Q 307 Back
Q 112 Back
Q 113 Back
Qq 46-48 Back
Q 46 Back
Ev 169 Back
Qq 139, 346 Back
Q 408 Back
Ev 84 Back
Ev 167 Back
Ev 146 Back
Ev 85 Back
Ev 168 Back
Ev 167 Back
Ev 167 Back
Ev 161, 168 Back
Ev 163 Back
Qq 46, 72, 83, 87, 91, 96, 99, 119, 208, 270 Back
Q 119 Back
Q 83 Back
Q 136 Back
Ev 161 Back
Q 410 Back
Q 411 Back
Q 68 Back
Q 107 Back
Q 119 Back
Qq 375, 376 Back
Q 375 Back
Q 377 Back
Ev 170 Back
Ev 172 Back
Ev 170 Back
Ev 162 Back
Ev 163 Back
Q 49 Back
Q 50 Back
Ev 88 Back
Q 304 Back
105 Q91 Back
106 Q150 Back
Q 151 Back
Ev 85 Back
Ev 89 Back