3 WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS
107. The Comprehensive Approach is difficult to implement
because of the number of international parties usually engaged
in a conflict situation. In addition, interactions occur at many
different levels between allies so increasing the complexity.
This will also be true of future conflicts. This difficulty makes
relationships, co-ordination and understanding between international
organisations and allies all the more important.
108. The MoD, the FCO and DFID told us that the
UK had been one of the strongest advocates of the Comprehensive
Approach across a wide range of international organisations, in
order better to combine civil and military measures and co-ordination
within any given operational environment.[110]
109. Other allies and international organisations
have a concept similar to the Comprehensive Approach adopted in
the UK. There are, however, different views internationally as
to its exact definition. In June 2008, the Finnish government
hosted an international seminar on the 'Comprehensive Approach
to Crisis Prevention and Management' attended by many nations
and the principal international organisations including the UN,
NATO and the EU. The seminar adopted an overarching definition
of the Comprehensive Approach.
While there is no commonly accepted definition
for 'Comprehensive Approach', there is broad agreement that it
implies pursuing an approach aimed at integrating the political,
security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian
dimensions of international missions.[111]
The United Nations
110. The UN has taken steps to move towards a more
comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Measures
include joint assessments, joint programme frameworks, and the
adoption of integrated UN Missions in a number of countries, such
as Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. There is also the Peacebuilding
Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body of the UN, which
supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict. Its
role includes bringing together all relevant actors, marshalling
resources, and supporting the development of integrated peacebuilding
strategies.[112]
111. The United Nations issued Guidelines on Integrated
Missions Planning Process in June 2006. This guidance provided
for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to planning
of integrated missions, bringing together different UN departments
and agencies and formed part of the broader UN peacebuilding strategy.
The UN recognised that it "struggles with integrated planning
due to its huge and bureaucratic decision-making system, the applicability
of current planning procedures to the field and the fluid context
on the ground."[113]
112. In addition, the UN is working to improve joint
working with other partners. For example, in 2008, it signed the
UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis
Situations and a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments
and Recovery Planning with the World Bank and the European Commission.[114]
113. Prompted by a UK-led debate at the UN Security
Council in May 2008, the UN instituted a review of how it could
provide more effective and well co-ordinated support to countries
emerging from conflict. The Presidential Statement that followed
the debate highlighted the following gaps:
The Security Council encourages efforts to address
the urgent need for rapidly deployable civilian expertise and
stresses that the critical role for such expertise is working
in co-operation with national authorities to strengthen national
capacities. The Security Council highlights the need for the United
Nations to play a leading role in the field in co-ordinating international
efforts in post-conflict situations. The Security Council stresses
that coordination between national authorities and others involved
in longer-term reconstruction and development, including organs
of the UN system in accordance with their respective mandates,
the international financial institutions, as well as with civil
society and the business sector, is vital for the success of UN
and international engagement in post conflict situations. The
Security Council stresses the need to ensure that finance is available
from the outset for recovery and peacebuilding activities to meet
immediate needs, and to lay a solid foundation for longer-term
reconstruction and development.[115]
114. The Report of the Secretary-General on the review,
'Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict', was published
in June 2009. The Report highlighted the challenges that post-conflict
countries and the international community face in the aftermath
of conflict and stressed the importance of the earliest phase
following a conflict. It concluded that, in many cases, it had
missed this early window.
The immediate post-conflict period offers a window
of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends,
shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen
core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts. If countries
succeed in these core areas early on, it substantially increases
the chances for sustainable peaceand reduces the risk of
relapse into conflict.
While building peace is primarily the responsibility
of national actors, the international community can play a critical
role. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Time
and time again, we have failed to catalyse a response that delivers
immediate, tangible results on the ground. Often, it has taken
months before essential government functions resume or basic services
are available. In some case, it has taken several years before
the international community has aligned its efforts behind a common
strategic vision. Capacities and resources have been insufficient
to meet urgent demands on the ground. Even though capacity is
limited, we frequently struggle to focus scarce resources on a
limited set of agreed results that can enhance confidence in and
commitment to a peaceful future.[116]
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
115. NATO adopted political guidance on the Comprehensive
Approach in 2006. In April 2008, NATO agreed an Action Plan with
pragmatic proposals to develop and implement its contribution
to a comprehensive approach. The plan states that NATOthe
Headquarters, the Command Structure and the nationswants
to bring together all the resources at its disposalmilitary
and civilianto deal with the problems that face it. It
also focused on improving NATO's co-operation with other actors,
including other international organisations and NGOs. The Comprehensive
Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan, agreed at the
same time, embodied this.[117]
116. In April 2009, NATO reaffirmed this approach
at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Following the Summit, the Heads
of State and Government confirmed the priority afforded to the
Comprehensive Approach.
Experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrates
that today's security challenges require a comprehensive approach
by the international community, combining civil and military measures
and coordination. Its effective implementation requires all international
actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense
of openness and determination, taking into account their respective
strengths and mandates. We welcome the significant progress achieved,
in line with the Action Plan agreed at Bucharest, to improve NATO's
own contribution to such a comprehensive approach, including through
a more coherent application of its crisis management instruments
and efforts to associate its military capabilities with civilian
means. Progress includes NATO's active promotion of dialogue with
relevant players on operations; the development of a database
of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation to advise
NATO forces; and the involvement of selected international organisations,
as appropriate, in NATO crisis management exercises.[118]
117. UN Security Council resolutions have provided
the mandate for NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan,
and the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. NATO has
also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical
assistance to the African Union's UN endorsed peacekeeping operations
in Darfur, Sudan and in Somalia; support for UN disaster relief
operations in Pakistan, following the earthquake in 2005; and
escorting ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies
off the
coast of Somalia. The September 2008 NATO-UN Declaration committed
both organisations to work together more closely and establish
a framework for consultation and co-operation, and reaffirmed
their willingness to provide assistance to regional and sub-regional
organisations as requested. The MoD, the FCO and DFID told us
that practical co-operation to deliver the comprehensive approach
on specific operations is generally further advanced than political
co-operation between Headquarters.[119]
118. In Afghanistan, the UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan and NATO are working together on the ground and have
jointly developed an integrated planning process to focus civilian
and military resources on key districts in a coordinated way.
In 2008, NATO also generated a NATO-wide policy for Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their management. The work of
the PRTs in Afghanistan is now co-ordinated through the Executive
Steering Committee which is chaired by an Afghan national and
has representatives from the following organisations on it: the
NATO SCR, the UN, the EU and ISAF.
119. The witnesses from NATO told us that NATO considered
the Comprehensive Approach to be important although they recognised
that NATO was considerably behind the UK in the development of
the Comprehensive Approach. General McColl said:
It is far more difficult for NATO to do that
than the UK. Whereas from where I sit in my NATO position, [
]in
comparison to other nations, it is often commented to me that
the UK is joined up in this respect. When you look inside the
UK and understand the various difficulties that we have in delivering
that Comprehensive Approach, it may not appear quite like that
to us, and there are difficulties and there are areas where we
can make improvement. [
] but given the fact that it has
really only been since last year that we have given ourselves
a commitment to do this, it is not surprising that the UKwhich
has been at this for slightly longerhas made far greater
progress.[120]
120. When asked if it was more difficult for NATO
because it is a military alliance, General McColl said it was
more difficult because it is primarily a political alliance and
in order to move forward on the Comprehensive Approach, NATO needed
consensus from all nations. One of the primary obstacles is the
relationship with the EU.[121]
This is dealt with in paragraph 124 below.
European Union
121. As well as being the biggest donor of development
funding, the European Union (EU) has a powerful set of civilian
and military resources which should enable it to apply a comprehensive
approach to crisis management: civilian expertise, judges, police
officers and customs officials; military force, economic might
and the most extensive diplomatic network in the world. Since
the launch of the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
mission in 2003, the EU has deployed civilian and military personnel
in three continents in areas of UK strategic interest. Of the
21 ESDP operations launched to date most have had a more civilian
than military focushelping to build the rule of law, support
peace agreements or monitor borders.[122]
122. In the wider context of the EU's ability to
adopt a Comprehensive Approach, the existing pillar structures
of the EU institutions have a fragmented approach to crisis management,
post-conflict reconstruction and development. There is a gap in
culture, working practice and political direction, between the
Commission and the Council Secretariat, and within the Secretariat
between the policy and operations arms.[123]
The MoD, the FCO and DFID told us that the UK fully supported
and helped to influence and accelerate EU thinking on this subject,
through the active participation of the Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (both part
of the MoD) and the Stabilisation Unit.[124]
NATO-EU
123. There are standing arrangements agreed for consultation
and co-operation between the EU and NATO, including the "Berlin
Plus" arrangements whereby the EU has both guaranteed access
to NATO planning capabilities (aimed at avoiding unnecessary duplication)
and use of NATO's command and control arrangements for running
operations. EU military operations thus fall into two categories,
"Berlin Plus" operations using NATO command and control
arrangements, like EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia, and "autonomous"
operations using command and control provided by one or more Member
States, like Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden. The MoD,
the FCO and DFID told us that the UK continued to engage actively
to encourage progress, including through a NATO-EU capabilities
group that brings together nations and staff from both organisations.[125]
124. The primary obstacle to progress is NATO's relationship
with the EU. It has not been possible to sign a security agreement
with the EU because of continuing issues with Turkey and Greece
related to Cyprus. For example, NATO has not been able to sign
an agreement with the European Police Mission. The Mission has
had to sign separate agreements with every nation that runs a
PRT. Similarly, they have not been able to develop a vehicle tracking
system showing where EU and NATO vehicles are in Afghanistan.
The compromise is a system which shows where EU vehicles are to
NATO vehicles but not the reverse. General McColl said:
It is more difficult because it is primarily
a political alliance and, in order to move forward on something
as complex as the Comprehensive Approach, you need consensus from
all nations and there are a number of obstacles to that. The firstand
I would describe it as the primary obstacleis our relationship
with the EU. As you go round capitals, you will find capitals
outdoing each other in explaining how important they view the
relationship between NATO and the EU, and yet the reality on the
ground is somewhat different, and the reason for that is because
there are some nations who deem it unacceptable for us to sign
a security agreement with the EU.[126]
Working on the ground
125. As General McColl pointed out, the use of the
Comprehensive Approach is often characterised by the large number
of different players and the complexity of the co-ordination of
those players. This is very much so in Afghanistan.
Talking to the issue of Afghanistan [
]
we have 40 nations in the alliance. Each of them has three or
more departments involved in this issue of the Comprehensive Approach.
We then have at least ten others who are critical players in the
country. We have international organisationsanother 20we
then have NGOs, who run into their hundreds. Then on top of that,
of course, we have the Afghan National Government. All of that
needs corralling and the idea of having one single hand that is
going to control all of that is clearly wishful thinking. Therefore,
what we have to have is a concept which enables to us co-ordinate
a reference in a coherent way, and the Comprehensive Approach,
as we have heard, is the language of common currency in Afghanistan
and in many of these theatres, because it is commonly understood
that we need to work together. So I think from that perspective
it is absolutely essential that we have a comprehensive approach
and that we spell it out.[127]
126. General McChrystal reported that working in
a coalition presented inherent difficulties.
As formidable as the threat may be, we make the
problem harder. ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured
for COIN [counter-insurgency], inexperienced in local languages
and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition
warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our
current operational culture and how we operate.
Preoccupied with the protection of our own forces,
we have operated in a manner that distances usphysically
and psychologicallyfrom the people we seek to protect.
In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical
wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral
damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily but we can
defeat ourselves.[128]
127. The UK is at the forefront of the development
and use of the Comprehensive Approach and has worked well with
international organisations and other member states to further
the development of the Approach internationally. However, more
needs to be done. We, therefore, recommend that the MoD, the FCO
and DFID should continue to work with the UN, NATO and the EU
to promote the effective use of the Comprehensive Approach within
these organisations so that future complex emergencies requiring
a multilateral approach can operate more effectively. We consider
such work to be essential to addressing the perception and reality
of uneven burden-sharing amongst member states.
110 Ev 86 Back
111
Ministry of Defence (Finland) Seminar publication on Comprehensive
Approach: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation
in Crisis Prevention and Management, June 2008, www.defmin.fi/english Back
112
Ev 86 Back
113
United Nations, Integrated Missions Planning Process: Guidelines
endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, June 2006,
www.undg.org Back
114
Ev 86 Back
115
Ev 86 and United Nations Security Council, Statement by the president
of the Security Council (S/PRST/2008/16), 20 May 2008 Back
116
United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, Report of the
Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath
of conflict (A/63/881-S2009/304), 11 June 2009 Back
117
Ev 86 Back
118
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl, 4 April 2009, www.nato.int Back
119
Ev 87 Back
120
Q 215 Back
121
Q 216 Back
122
Ev 87 Back
123
ibid. Back
124
Ev 88 Back
125
Ev 87 Back
126
Q 216 Back
127
Q 235 Back
128
"Commander's Initial Assessment", 30 August 2009, www.media.washingtonpost.com Back
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