Memorandum from the International Development
Committee, House of Commons
Thank you for your letter of 24 March. The International
Development Committee welcomes your Committee's inquiry into joint
working between military and non-military agencies.
As you know, the International Development Committee
published its Report on Reconstructing Afghanistan in February
2008 (Fourth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 65). As part of the
inquiry, we visited Afghanistan in October 2007. Our itinerary
included Helmand and Balkh Provinces as well as Kabul, and we
were able to observe the operation of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in two contrasting regions. We thought it would be helpful
to your Committee's inquiry to draw out our findings on the effectiveness
of joint civilian-military working (which are mainly contained
in Chapter 8 of our report).
— In relation to Helmand, we observed
that the UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was trialling new
methods of joint civilian-military co-operation in what were clearly
very difficult circumstances. We believed that the co-location
of civilian and military teams was a good practice which helped
ensure joined-up decision-making. Our view was that it was of
the utmost importance that military operations did not outpace
the capacity of civilian members of the PRT. In its response to
our Report, DFID accepted "the importance of civilian and
military actions being planned and delivered in concert behind
a unified political objective" (Third Special Report, Session
2007-08, HC 509, p 19).
— We found that Quick Impact Projects,
aimed at bringing about a rapid "peace dividend" were
valid although it was important that the views of development
advisers were sought before any such project proceeded. QIPs could
never be a substitute for long-term development and reconstruction
which involves full engagement with local people and with national
and local governance structures. In saying this, we of course
acknowledged the difficulties of providing development assistance
in insecure environments. As far as possible, development in Afghanistan
should be "Afghan-led", supported rather than driven
by the international community.
— We were keen to emphasise that the
UK's strategy for Afghanistan should be a "whole of Afghanistan"
one which recognises the significantly different challenge of
supporting development in insecure provinces such as Helmand compared
to the opportunities provided in the more peaceful provinces including
Balkh, which we visited, where aid can be delivered effectively
by development agencies and where the Provincial Reconstruction
Team approach may not be the most appropriate one. We recommended
that there should be a clear exit strategy for PRTs, as envisaged
when they were originally set up.
— In our Report we highlighted that
the UK's commitment to Afghanistan "in terms of development
assistance, is likely to last at least a generation". DFID
drew attention in its Response to the 10-year Development Partnership
Agreement which it signed with the Afghan Government in 2006;
and its annual funding commitment to Afghanistan was recently
confirmed to 2013. The UK military is less likely to able to plan
to such a long-term timetable. Joint working needs to take account
of the implications of this difference.
We welcome DFID's new Afghanistan Country Plan
which forms part of the new UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
launched by the Prime Minister on 29 April. We are pleased that
the new policy recognises that "military force alone will
not solve the region's problems" and that a joint civil-military
approach is one of its guiding principles. However, neither document
has much to say about how a comprehensive approach to joint civilian
and military working will operate in practice. I am sure this
is an issue which you will pursue with the Government in the course
of your inquiry.
We will follow your inquiry closely and look
forward to reading your eventual report.
12 May 2009
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