Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International
Development
INTRODUCTION
This memorandum addresses the subjects raised
by the Defence Committee[1]
on the validity of the Comprehensive Approach and how well the
government is working internally and with external partners to
"enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes".[2]
This memorandum covers the background and development of the Comprehensive
Approach within the UK and explains the work that is ongoing within
relevant government departments and in the wider international
community.
The main focus of this memorandum is the delivery
of a Comprehensive Approach within the context of stabilisation
and conflict prevention operations. It is predominantly focused
on the relationship between government bodies, though the contribution
of and engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations are briefly
covered. Making the comprehensive approach work in practice is
hard work for all concerned. It involves learning to understand
and accommodate the different priorities and expectations of partners
across government and beyond. The government is not complacent
about the room for further improvement, but it is convinced that
good progress has been made and the foundations for maintaining
and building on what has already been achieved are sound.
BACKGROUND
The government has always worked cross-departmentally;
this is evident from policy development work through to policy/operational
delivery. The Cabinet Office, in particular, plays a key role
in bringing departments together to deliver against specific outcomes.
Examples include work on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
and the recently published UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[3]
In recent years, the Balkans has been the best
example of how what was initially perceived as a principally military
task, subsequently evolved into a comprehensive approach. From
1991, it was increasingly apparent that operations in Bosnia involved
a complex interplay of civilians, para-military and military groups
and individuals, international organisations and international
media. The Ministry of Defence recognised the roles played by
and importance of Other Government Departments and Non-Governmental
Organisations, but noted that they added to the complexity and
that efforts were rarely coordinated or focused on a common set
of objectives.[4]
Nevertheless, the progress made when activity was coordinated
reinforced the importance of an holistic approach. These views
were reinforced by subsequent engagement in West Africa, East
Timor as well as the wider Balkans.
Cross-Whitehall work between the Ministry of
Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for
International Development resulted in the establishment of tri-departmental
funding arrangements for Conflict Prevention, Stabilisation and
Peace-Keeping activities. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
(now called the Stabilisation Unit), also owned by all three Departments,
was established in 2004. Concepts such as Defence Diplomacy, Stabilisation
and Conflict Prevention were introduced into individual Departmental
Plans, sitting underneath overarching outcome-focused Public Service
Agreements. A Stabilisation Guidance Note was agreed and published[5]
to provide best practice in stabilisation operations.
The significant deployments of UK forces and
resources to Afghanistan and Iraq encouraged further development
of this area. The Ministry of Defence responded in 2005 by producing
a Joint Discussion Note on the Comprehensive Approach.[6]
This stated that:
The realisation of national strategic objectives
inevitably relies on a combination of diplomatic, military and
economic instruments of power, together with an independent package
of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customised, agile
and sensitive influence and information effort.[7]
This highlights the fact that the Comprehensive
Approach is a philosophy and a framework that needs to be adapted
for each situation. It is not a prescribed way of doing things
nor about creating homogeneity across government departments and
systems. Rather, it is a common framework for assessment and planning
of goals, specific objectives and, above all, a unified effort
in delivery.
Stabilisation operations are usually focused
on protecting people from violent conflict, enhancing the legitimacy
and capability of a state and allowing its government and people
to work towards a better, fairer future through non-violent political
processes. Activity will normally cover four main strands: Governance,
Security, Political and Development/Reconstruction. These strands
cover a great deal of activity from the training of effective
armed forces to developing an independent justice system as well
as establishing or reinforcing the system of national and local
government. This requires leadership from (and of) the diplomatic,
military and development communities to support local processes
and to help the state fulfil its functions. As such activity often
takes place in situations where efforts are severely impeded by
armed violence, stabilisation usually requires significant military
contributions (often from UN-mandated forces) to provide the essential
security to allow non-military actors to operate.
POLICY FRAMEWORK
In order to deliver a comprehensive approach
the government developed a number of key policies that influenced
and developed the UK's approach to preventing and resolving conflict.
Effort is focused not only at joining up UK activity, but on improving
the effectiveness of the wider international community. Key developments
include:
The National Security Strategy[8]
was published by the Prime Minister in March 2008. It outlined
the threats to the UK and its interests, together with the UK's
responses. It states that:
4.47 To improve integration at the multilateral
level, we will work to ensure that the UN delivers its commitment
to genuinely integrated missions, and support the UN Peacebuilding
Commission, which works to ensure integrated effort by all donors
on strategy and delivery, and to provide immediate support for
postconflict reconstruction. We advocate the development of a
stronger international capacity, including through the EU and
UN, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts, including judges,
lawyers and police, at short notice and in larger numbers and
to make them available for multilateral deployment|
5.5 Building on recent experience at home
(for example on counter-terrorism) and overseas (for example in
Afghanistan, where security, policy and development officials
now work together in joint teams), we will continue to seek greater
integration and responsiveness at the operational level. The new
Stabilisation Unit will have a key role.
Public Service Agreements (PSAs)
Initially, PSAs were focused on individual departments
and on the effective and efficient generation of departmental
outputs. This has now evolved into a framework of outcome-focused
PSAs "owned" by more than one department. As part of
the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review process, Public Service
Agreement 30 Delivery Agreement: Reduce the impact of conflict
through enhanced UK and international efforts was produced
in October 2007.[9]
The FCO is the lead department for the delivery of PSA 30, supported
by the MoD and DFID along with other departments and agencies.
This work focuses on how we use key tools/resources including
the tri-departmental funding for discretionary conflict activity,
including support to international capacity building and regional
support.
Capability Reviews
The government has driven an agenda to help
departments work better together and approach problems in a more
comprehensive way. Building on the initial Capability Reviews
conducted in 2006, all three key departments have just been re-reviewed
and the results published in March 2009. The recent reviews, which
covered both policy formulation and operational delivery, commented
that:
For the DFID: "Stakeholders have
seen a step change in Whitehall working and DFID's relations with
other government departments have significantly improved. This
focus has helped shape wider-government policies that advance
UK and international development interests, for example on trade,
climate, security, migration international collaboration and responses
to the global financial crisis. Stakeholders, including other
departments, want DFID to go further in doing this. The review
team also saw some good examples of the Department working well
with other government departments at country level.[10]
For the FCO: "At senior level, the
working relationships with the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have improved noticeably.
This is as a result of concerted efforts by the Permanent Secretaries
in particular, who, for example, now undertake joint trips to
key posts to gather evidence of progress on the ground."[11]
For the MoD: "The [MoD]'s update
of the Defence Strategic Guidance in 2008 to include lessons from
operations is applauded by other government departments, and it
is continuing to support improved ways of working between the
military and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department
for International Development on operations. Government departments
and key stakeholders widely praise the efforts that MoD has made
to tackle perceived insularity, as highlighted in the 2007 Capability
Review. The Department is credited for its important roles in
a number of cross-departmental initiatives, such as... the National
Security Strategy."[12]
Doctrine
In addition to the 2006 Joint Discussion Note
quoted earlier, a Joint Doctrine Note Countering Irregular
Activity within a Comprehensive Approach (JDN 2/07) was published
in March 2007 and is informing the development of the Joint Doctrine
Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation; The Military Contribution.[13]
The current edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) was published
in August 2008.[14]
BDD sets out that a Comprehensive Approach is based on four guiding
principles:
Proactive Engagement, if possible ahead
of a crisis, enables coordinated approaches to complex situations.
This requires a shared approach to the collection and interpretation
of crisis indicators and warnings in order to inform planning
and increase the time available for reaction.
Shared Understanding between parties is
essential to optimize the effectiveness of their various capabilities.
Where possible, shared understanding should be engendered through
cooperative working practices, liaison and education in between
crises.
Outcome-Based Thinking. All participants
involved in crisis resolution need to base their thinking on outcomes
and what is required to deliver a favourable situation, when planning
and conducting activities. Planning and activity should be focused
on a single purpose and progress judged against mutually agreed
measures of effectiveness.
Collaborative Working. Institutional familiarity,
generated through personal contact and human networking, enhances
collaborative working and mutual trust. Integrated information
management, infrastructure and connectivity enable information
sharing and common working practices.
Above all, a Comprehensive Approach requires
those dealing with a crisis to be predisposed to cooperation and
structured to develop a shared understanding of a situation and
its dynamics. This approach should aid the formulation of an agreed
collective intent and output-focused objectives, leading in turn
to the implementation of mutually supporting activities. Where
it is not possible to coordinate or regulate all participants,
actions and effects, then steps should be taken to achieve deconfliction
at least.
DELIVERING THE
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
There are a number of good examples of UK teams
working together to deliver our objectives in a comprehensive
way, some of which are covered in the back of this memorandum.
The way in which those objectives are defined and delivered has
changed over time to ensure that results are achieved faster and
more effectively with a view to sustained and long-term benefits
to the UK.
At the strategic level, the interdepartmental
work on a Conflict Strategy has developed the principles and commitments
made in the National Security Strategy to deliver an integrated
approach that cuts across traditional boundaries. We continue
to develop our understanding of the effectiveness of various
military and civilian tools in different circumstances; and are
identifying areas where UK and international capability needs
to be developed (such as UK civilian capabilities, UN leadership,
civilian capability and flexible funding mechanisms).
STABILISATION OPERATIONS
On the specific issue of stabilisation-type
operations, the glue that binds our stabilisation efforts together
is a sufficiently common culture among staff, and leaders who
are able to collaborate effectively across departments. This comes
from training and exercising together (see below) as well as developing
understanding of each department through interchanges and posting.
On 6 March 2009, a Conference was held specifically
to address Stabilisation Operations, attended by Ministers and
senior officials. It concluded that the relative roles of Whitehall
and the in-country team will vary with the nature of the operation.
But, in the broad sense, Whitehall should focus on high level
aims, a division of responsibility for their delivery, accountability,
provision of resources and support to the UK political debate.
In-country teams should focus on operational planning to deliver
those aims. Difficult questions such as the authority of a Senior
Responsible Officer (SRO) need to be solved in the context of
a specific operation as will the issue of which Department should
provide the SRO and what their remit should be. There is general
agreement that an SRO should be in theatre but also a recognition
that such an SRO will have to deliver some of their objectives
by influence rather than executive authority.
One element of the Cross-Departmental Review
on Lesson Learning in Conflict Prevention, Management and Stabilisation
remit covers how better to integrate lesson learning. It builds
on the work undertaken by the Comprehensive Approach Working Group,
chaired by the FCO.
The Stabilisation Unit continues to fulfil its
three roles of: facilitating cross-departmental assessment and
planning; developing and deploying civilian expertise; and, lesson
learning. It is the primary source of civilian experts to the
Helmand mission and has deployed experts elsewhere such as Iraq,
Kabul, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Staff from
the Unit supported a refresh of the integrated Helmand Roadmap
and continue to support military exercises and planning in Whitehall
for future UK engagement on conflict, bilaterally and multilaterally.
The Unit is developing itself as a repository of expertise and
lessons on stabilisation. It is coordinating cross-Whitehall work
on improving joint assessment and planning at the strategic level
and operational level. The Unit is also establishing a UK Civilian
Standby Capacity (over 1000 civilians and police) to be able continuously
to deploy up to 350 personnel. This will primarily be achieved
by:
enhancing the existing database of Deployable
Civilian Experts, so that it holds around 800 quality assured
personnel;
forming a cross-government Civil Service
Stabilisation Cadre (of around 200);
as well as appealing to a wide range
of volunteer networks, and making better use of the relevant civilian
skills of our Armed Forces Reservists.
A Stabilisation Implementation Team (SIT) was
established earlier this year to deliver these Ministerial commitments
and determine the nature and extent of additional Stabilisation
Unit planning capability and how best to implement it. It will
also consider the terms and conditions of service, as well as
risk and safety considerations, for deployed civilian staff.
Operational and exercise experience has highlighted
the need better to align and link departmental Information Technology
and Information Management systems to ensure connectivity and
improved communications. This is particularly important in theatre
as it will allow better knowledge and information management.
The three Permanent Secretaries have tasked their Chief Information
Officers to identify options for tackling these constraints.
Additionally, departments meet regularly with
International and Non Governmental Organisations both in-country
and in London to ensure they are aware of the international community's
and the UK's objectives in particular countries or regions. These
meetings are valuable in exchanging perceptions, de-conflicting
initiatives and, where appropriate, identifying common objectives
and how best to coordinate in their achievement. The NGO-Military
Contact Group also meets regularly to cover generic issues, including
enhancing mutual understanding and, where appropriate, better
ways of working together and the development of a more comprehensive
approach to issues.
OPERATIONAL DELIVERY
IN-COUNTRY
One good example of the Comprehensive Approach
being used in practice is the UK Civil-Military Mission Helmand
(CMMH) in Lashkar Gah. The CMMH is the integrated structure that
brought together the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and
the military led Task Force Helmand (TFH), and it co-ordinates
the efforts of DFID, FCO, MoD, and other international partners,
including the US, Denmark and Estonia, in a comprehensive approach
to stabilisation including a seamless package of reconstruction
assistance for Helmand province. Staff are also based in five
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across Helmand Province in Gereshk,
Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Sangin.
The structure is based more on cross-team working
than on traditional lines of management. The mission is neither
a traditional FCO-style "post", nor a headquarters in
the formal military sense. It provides a mechanism, through joint
teams, for tracking and driving implementation across the thematic
and geographical strands of the Helmand Roadmap.
The Basra PRT was established in April 2006
under UK leadership. Since September 2007, the PRT has been located
with the military divisional headquarters and UK Consulate on
the Contingency Operating Base, Basra Airport. The Basra PRT transferred
to US leadership on 1 April 2009, the day after UK forces handed
over coalition divisional command in southern Iraq to the US.
The PRT's specific objectives have been to:
build the capacity of the institutions
of government in Basra to deliver for the people of Basra;
put the economic enablers in place to
allow private sector growth; and
improve the ability of the legal establishment
and the media to act as checks on the Iraqi Government and illegal
groups.
In order to deliver its diverse set of objectives,
the Basra PRT has drawn its staffing from a range of UK Government
departments, UK military, US military and Foreign Service, and
contracted consultants. It has also worked closely with a wide
range of interlocutors in these and other institutions (the United
Nations, for example).
The PRT's key achievements have included:
helping the Basra Provincial Council
to increase by 10 times the budget it manages and the services
provided to the people of Basra;
formulating the Basra Economic Development
Strategy;
establishing a scheme to provide jobs
and training to unemployed youths, and
setting up a project to provide credit
to small businesses.
US Commander in Iraq, General Odierno, commented
"They are completely integrated down there, and that really
is the future if we are going to support the Iraqis in the right
way next year. Basra is the way forward."
The comprehensive approach is also highly developed
away from Afghanistan and Iraq; the British Embassy in the Democratic
Republic of Congo is a good example. Its efforts were formally
recognised last year, winning both the Joined Up Government Award
and the Cabinet Secretary's Award at the Civil Service Awards
2008.
The key to this success was the fact that the
DFID, MoD and FCO team recognises no border between development,
military and political issues. They have pushed the boundaries
for joined up work not just by having joint policy teams but also
creating joint management functions and a joint communications
unit to handle press and public affairs. The UK earned a reputation
for speaking with one voice and linking political pressure and
programmes to influence partners towards a positive result. The
departments continue to work together to deliver our contribution
to international efforts to secure a lasting peace in DRC by pooling
analysis, ideas and problem solving and shifting funding flexibly
to take advantage of opportunities.
Such collaboration does not end with the cross-Whitehall
conflict prevention initiative. A recent example of how closely
the departments work together has been as part of a project to
re-build a vital bridge in eastern DRC. Although funded through
DFID's infrastructure programme, much of the expertise needed
to deliver the project is being sourced through MoD's links with
the military engineer community. This comprehensive approach has
contributed to providing the leverage needed to encourage the
UN locally to provide the construction manpower. Overall, this
means the project can be delivered quicker, more effectively and
at less cost than would otherwise be the case.
Further details on these examples are set out
at the back of this document.
FUNDING AND
RESOURCES
The government has established joint funding
arrangements for Conflict Prevention, Stabilisation and Peace-keeping
activity with the aim of obtaining a global and regional reduction
in conflict and its impact through improved UK and international
efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, and to create
the conditions required for effective state-building and economic
development. Additional funding for operations that are delivering
objectives by means of the Comprehensive Approach are funded in
the normal way, with departments either finding resources from
within existing allocations or by drawing on the HM Treasury's
Reserve to fund Urgent Operational Requirements for the military.
INTERNATIONAL WORK
WITH ALLIES
The UK has been one of the strongest advocates
of the Comprehensive Approach across a wide range of international
organisations, in order better to combine civil and military measures
and coordination within any given operational environment.
United Nations
The UN has taken some steps to move towards
a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Measures include joint assessments, joint programme frameworks,
and the adoption of integrated UN Missions in a number of countries,
such as Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. There is also the Peacebuilding
Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body of the UN, which
supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict. Its
role includes bringing together all relevant actors, marshalling
resources, and supporting the development of integrated peacebuilding
strategies. In addition, the UN is working to improve joint working
with other partners. For example, in 2008, it signed the UN-World
Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations
and a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery
Planning with the World Bank and the European Commission.
However, more needs to be done. Prompted by
a UK-led debate at the UN Security Council in May 2008, the UN
is now looking at how it can provide more effective and well coordinated
support to countries emerging from conflict. The Presidential
Statement that followed the debate highlighted the following gaps:
"The Security Council encourages efforts
to address the urgent need for rapidly deployable civilian expertise
and stresses that the critical role for such expertise is working
in co-operation with national authorities to strengthen national
capacities. The Security Council highlights the need for the United
Nations to play a leading role in the field in co-ordinating international
efforts in post-conflict situations. The Security Council stresses
that coordination between national authorities and others involved
in longer-term reconstruction and development, including organs
of the UN system in accordance with their respective mandates,
the international financial institutions, as well as with civil
society and the business sector, is vital for the success of UN
and international engagement in post-conflict situations. The
Security Council stresses the need to ensure that finance is available
from the outset for recovery and peacebuilding activities to meet
immediate needs, and to lay a solid foundation for longer-term
reconstruction and development."[15]
A Secretary-General's report on this subject
is due out this summer (2009). We hope this report will set out
a clear plan for addressing the above gaps. We will work closely
with the UN and other partners to support the implementation of
this report.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
In April 2008 NATO agreed an Action Plan with
pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's contribution
to a comprehensive approach. The plan states that NATOthe
Headquarters, the Command Structure and the nationswant
to bring together all the resources at their disposalmilitary
and civilianto deal with the problems that face us. It
also focused on improving NATO's co-operation with other actors,
including other international organisations and NGOs. The Comprehensive
Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan, agreed at the
same time, embodied this. This approach was reaffirmed at NATO's
Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009:
"experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan
demonstrates that today's security challenges require a comprehensive
approach by the international community, combining civil and military
measures and coordination. Its effective implementation requires
all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort,
in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account
their respective strengths and mandates. We welcome the significant
progress achieved, in line with the Action Plan agreed at Bucharest,
to improve NATO's own contribution to such a comprehensive approach,
including through a more coherent application of its crisis management
instruments and efforts to associate its military capabilities
with civilian means. Progress includes NATO's active promotion
of dialogue with relevant players on operations; the development
of a database of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation
to advise NATO forces; and the involvement of selected international
organisations, as appropriate, in NATO crisis management exercises."[16]
NATO-UN
UN Security Council resolutions have provided
the mandate for NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan,
and the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. NATO has
also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical
assistance to the African Union's UN endorsed peacekeeping operations
in Darfur, Sudan and in Somalia; support for UN disaster relief
operations in Pakistan, following the earthquake in 2005; and
escorting ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies
off the coast of Somalia. The September 2008 NATO-UN Declaration
committed both organisations to work together more closely and
establish a framework for consultation and co-operation, and reaffirmed
their willingness to provide assistance to regional and sub-regional
organisations as requested. This marked real progress in the NATO-UN
relationship. A NATO civ-mil liaison office is now being established
in New York. This should increase staff contacts across the range
of disciplines. UN OCHA, UNHCR and DPKO will this year participate
for the first time in the Alliance wide crisis management exercise.
All of this helps both organisations work together at the strategic
HQ level.
Cooperation to deliver the comprehensive approach
in theatre (on specific operations) is generally further advanced
than between Headquarters. In Afghanistan UNAMA and NATO are working
together on the ground, as over the past 6 months they have jointly
developed an integrated planning process to focus civilian and
military resources on key districts in a coordinated way.
NATO-EU
There are standing arrangements agreed for consultation
and co-operation between the EU and NATO including the "Berlin
Plus" arrangements whereby the EU has guaranteed access to
NATO planning capabilities (aimed at avoiding unnecessary duplication)
and can use NATO's command and control arrangements for running
operations. EU military operations thus fall into two categories,
"Berlin Plus" operations using NATO command and control
arrangements, like EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia, and "autonomous"
operations using command and control provided by one or more Member
States, like Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden.
Permanent military liaison arrangements have
been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational
level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team operates alongside the EU
Military Staff and an EU Cell is based in SHAPE (NATO's strategic
command for operations in Mons, Belgium). We continue to engage
actively to encourage progress, including through a NATO-EU capabilities
group that brings together nations and staff from both organisations.
European Union
The European Union (EU) has a powerful set of
civilian and military resources which enable it to apply a comprehensive
approach to crisis management: civilian expertise, judges, police
officers and customs officials; military force, economic might
and the most extensive diplomatic network in the world, as well
as the EU being the biggest donor of development funding. Since
the launch of the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
mission in 2003, the EU has deployed civilian and military personnel
in three continents in areas of UK strategic interest. Of the
21 ESDP operations launched to date most have had a more civilian
than military focushelping to build the rule of law, support
peace agreements or monitor borders.
In the wider context of the EU's ability to
adopt a Comprehensive Approach, the existing pillar structures
of the EU institutions precipitate a somewhat fragmented approach
to crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction and development.
There is a gap in culture, working practice and political direction,
between the Commission and the Council Secretariat, and within
the Secretariat between the policy and operations arms. Constitutional
amendments proposed in the Lisbon Treaty would, if ratified, offer
a potential solution to this fragmentation through the creation
of the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, responsible for conducting the EU's
foreign and security policy and for ensuring consistency of the
Union's external action. The High Representative would be supported
in his role by the creation of the European External Action Service,
helping to improve some of the structural issues.
Improving the ability of the EU to plan and
conduct operations that include both civilian and military elements
remains of significant importance and the UK welcomed the European
Council agreement in December 2008 of a joint civilian-military
strategic level planning structure: the Crisis Management Planning
Directorate. Within the military domain, the EU Military Staff
initiated a study in March 2009 to consider the Military Implications
of the Comprehensive Approach at the theatre level. The study's
aim is to identify any military capability requirements to support
the Comprehensive Approach and to inform deliberations at the
strategic level within the EU in due course. The UK fully supports
and helps to influence and accelerate EU thinking on this subject,
through the active participation of the Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre, the Joint Force Headquarters and the Stabilisation
Unit.
TRAINING
The opportunities for joint training involving
civilians and military together have increased greatly and all
Brigade mission rehearsal exercises for Helmand now include a
civilian component to assist the realism of military training
and to help prepare the civilians themselves. The civilian contribution
to Staff College training is significant, as is the civilian input
to the doctrine taught on the College's courses. In addition to
preparation for Helmand and routine training, our cross Whitehall
aim (operational commitments allowing) is to support one major
exercise per year for the purpose of test comprehensive approach
concepts and capturing lessons. Last year this exercise was Joint
Venture 2008 (JV08).
Exercise Joint Venture is the UK's biennial
exercise in the planning and conduct of joint operations in a
medium scale stabilisation intervention. It is a predominantly
military command-post exercise designed to test our expeditionary
capabilities in dealing with a complex regional scenario and series
of political-military events.[17]
JV08 aimed to set the military aspects of the stabilisation operations
in the wider context of a cross-government "Comprehensive
Approach". It focused upon the interaction between the 3*
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and 2*/1* Component headquarters
(Maritime, Land, Air, Logistic and Special Forces), an inter-Departmental
steering group and an inter-Departmental planning team (Stabilisation
Planning Team or SPT), each incorporating staffs from the key
Whitehall Departments, International and Non-Governmental Organizations
and other players.
An FCO official was appointed the Senior Responsible
Officer in order that civil-military co-operation could be tested,
with the objectives of building on existing models from Helmand
and elsewhere, and thus learning lessons that could apply to real-world
scenarios. Participants included representatives of the FCO, DFID,
the Stabilisation Unit and other parts of government, representatives
of NGOs as well as from a number of international partners. Work
is now in hand to develop the next ARRCADE Fusion (the annual
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps exercise). This exercise, which will
take place later this year, already involves officials from the
FCO and DFID in its development.
CONCLUSION
The Comprehensive Approach is a philosophy and
a framework that needs to be adopted but adapted for each situation
and operation. It is not a prescribed way of doing things but
a description of how a joined-up and cross-government/organisation
helps to reach common goals. The benefits are greater responsiveness
and effective use of limited resources through flexibility based
on common analysis and planning towards goals and objectives.
The UK uses a Comprehensive Approach to operational issues that
is based around a number of key principlesproactive engagement,
a shared understanding of the goals and issues, outcome-based
thinking and collaborative working between the military and civilians,
including the wider international community and non-governmental
organisations.
In improving our capability to work this way,
Ministers and senior officials have visited deployed teams and
re-organised functions within their departments. This has resulted
in the development of the tri-departmental Stabilisation Unit
and funding mechanisms, together with working groups and inter-departmental
units in London and the creation of civilian-military teams in
Iraq, Afghanistan and other embassies. Each operation or team
has resulted in changes to the approach to and ways of working
together, with improvements introduced covering unilateral and
multilateral operations. As the UK is likely to be part of a multinational
operation, it is vital that the UK works with its allies to see
that the wider international effort is delivered in a comprehensive
way. It is for this reason that the UK has spent time and effort
helping to shape the policy within international organisations,
such as the UN, NATO and EU, for a Comprehensive Approach. While
it would be fair to say that progress has been made within the
UK inter-departmental processes and their capability to deliver
on the ground and, to a more limited extent, within the wider
international community, there remains a considerable amount that
still needs to be done. There are tensions and issues such as
authority, funding, data sharing/communications that currently
limit progress and they are acknowledged as such. But they are
being addressed and our approach is becoming more comprehensive.
CASE STUDIES
Helmand[18]
The UK Strategy for Afghanistan is owned and
overseen by NSID(OD) (Cabinet Committee for National Security,
International Relations and Development), with the objectives
and guiding principles set out in the UK policy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan: the way forward[19]
published in April 2009. In addition to the normal Departmental
support provided by officials to Ministers there are two Cabinet
Office chaired committeesthe Afghanistan Strategy Group
(ASG) and the Afghanistan Senior Officials Group (ASOG) who have
oversight of the delivery against objectives and the prioritisation
of efforts. All Departmental stakeholders are represented in these
committees, including Her Majesty's Ambassador in Kabul and the
Civil-Military Mission Helmand. The Cabinet Office and the ASG
have been recently enhanced by the creation of a cross-government
Afghanistan Strategy Team (AST) whose primary roles are to develop
long term strategy and to undertake regular periodic reviews.
In addition, two other cross-government teams have been established
to support co-ordinated delivery: the Afghanistan Strategic Communications
Team (ASCT) and the Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit (ADIDU).
The Afghan Delivery Group (ADG) is the primary
governance body in-country and co-ordinates activities on the
ground in Afghanistan. It is made up of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department
for International Development (DFID) and is chaired by HM Ambassador
in Kabul. It reports to Ministers through the ASG. Funding for
ADG-approved activities come from a number of sources: the tri-departmental
funds, FCO programme budgets (Strategic Programme Fund (SPF) and
Bilateral Programme Budget) and DFID's Country Plan for Afghanistan.[20]
UK Civil-Military Mission Helmand
The UK assumed control of the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province in May 2006. In June
2008 the UK PRT became part of the Civil-Military Mission in Helmand.
Despite difficult working conditions, in the toughest of environments,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International
Development and Ministry of Defence, supported by staff from the
Stabilisation Unit, the US, Denmark and Estonia are working hard
alongside UK and other armed forces in Helmand Province to provide
a seamless package of reconstruction assistance. Staff from the
FCO and Stabilisation Unit are also based, with the military,
in five Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across Helmand Province
in Gereshk, Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Sangin.
Structure
The Civil-Military Mission Helmand is an integrated
structure bringing together the PRT and Task Force Helmand and
is charged with delivering our comprehensive strategy in Helmand.
Its creation followed the decision that UK efforts should concentrate
on delivering a comprehensive, politically-led, counter insurgency
campaign. It is a permanent organisation, providing continuity
into which the deployed Brigade will plug for its six month tour.
It is tasked to provide clear political leadership; direct our
support to Afghan reconstruction and reconciliation efforts; and
plans, co-ordinates and delivers civil-military counter-insurgency
activities.
It is headed jointly by the UK Senior Representative
and the Commander Task Force Helmand. The UK Senior Representative
reports to HMA Kabul. The Brigade remains under the command of
ISAF for all operational military matters. The Commander of TFH
takes military direction from Commander ISAF and from Chief of
Joint Operations (CJO) at Permanent Joint Head Quarters (PJHQ)
in Northwood, but consults and seeks guidance from the UK Senior
Representative in mounting military operations.
Under this civilian-military structure tasks
such as intelligence, political analysis, planning, district level
stabilisation, media and communications, which previously were
carried out by civilians and military in parallel, are now conducted
jointly with the aim of achieving more integrated operations,
using cross team-working rather than traditional lines of management.
While physical co-location is heavily constrained by the available
accommodation, the structure itself provides a framework in which
the military and the growing number of civilian staff can integrate
their work more effectively.
The mission is neither a traditional FCO-style
"post", nor a headquarters in the formal military sense.
It provides a mechanism, through joint teams, for tracking and
driving implementation across the thematic and geographical strands
of the integrated plan for delivering HMG's priorities in Helmand,
the Helmand Roadmap. It has required a significant cultural shift
for both sides, and resulted in better transparency and teamwork
at all levels plus leadership that resolves differences co-operatively.
What does the Civil Military Mission Helmand do
in Helmand?
The Civil Military Mission Helmand supports
the Afghan Government to promote counter narcotics, security,
good governance, rule of law and social and economic development
in order to promote a more developed, secure and stable Afghanistan.
It is focused on establishing an effective police
force, improved access to justice and sound provincial administration
in the province. The Mission is also facilitating development
assistance and delivery of Afghanistan's National Drug Control
Strategy in Helmand and helping to create a sustainable legitimate
economy capable of providing livelihoods for the local population.
Officials work with a wide range of people in
the province, from the Governor of Helmand, Mohammad Gulabuddin
Mangal, to local non-governmental organisations to deliver the
UK strategy in Helmand. Governance, police reform, counter-narcotics
and justice sector experts are in place to work with provincial
officials and help strengthen and reform local governance structures.
Development is necessarily a long-term activity
but the Civil Military Mission Helmand, working within the improved
security environment provided by the Task Force Helmand and Afghan
National Security Forces, is balancing this with more immediate
stabilisation projects to deliver security through stabilisation
in the key population areas of Helmand.
Progress[21]
The joint civilian-military team in Helmand
now numbers 165, of which approximately 80 are civilian experts,
a two-fold increase in the last year. The civilian-military mission
in Helmand is based in Lashkar Gah, and has outposts in the other
five districts Gereshk, Garmsir, Sangin, Musa Qala and, since
December 2008, Nad-e-Ali each with a civilian-military stabilisation
team of up to 10 staff, co-located with the relevant Battlegroup
HQ.
The Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP),
led by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, is an
attempt to build better links between the Afghan Government and
communities in areas where the former has been limited or non-existent.
In Helmand we are supporting Governor Mangal to use the ASOP to
roll out cross-cutting shuras (community councils) in all six
of the key population centres. These aim to build a bridge between
the lowest level of formal governance (District Governors) and
the enduring grass-roots tribal system, by creating councils that
take charge of local development, empowering "local solutions
to local problems". They have been established in Nad-e-Ali,
Garmsir and Gereshk, with Musa Qaleh and Sangin to follow during
the summer of 2009 and we will allocate at least £20 million
to this over the next four years. We are providing capacity-building
support to the provincial offices of key national line ministries,
the office of the Provincial Governor and the Lashkar Gah Municipality.
We are also supporting Afghan-led efforts to promote reconciliation
at a local level, in line with the national approach to encourage
insurgents to reconcile to local legitimate government, and to
renounce violence.
We are helping to establish informal justice
shuras and commissions to provide traditional, accessible dispute
resolution by local elders, under the overall tutelage of District
Governors. These shuras are a legitimate, working alternative
at the grass-roots to `Taleban justice', while also being linked
to the formal justice system. They have been established in Lashkar
Gah, Garmsir and Gereshk, and a separate prisoner review shura
has been established in Musa Qala. Helmand Provincial Court is
operating more effectively, convictions have risen 400% since
June 2008 and legal representation, including a legal aid office,
has been introduced. As part of our wider efforts in support of
the formal justice system, we are also assisting with the construction
of a new prison in Helmand province, with training support from
a team of four officers from HM Prison Service.
Helmand province, with its abundant natural
resources, has the potential to be a centre of agricultural production
and growth for Afghanistan. To help realise this potential, we
will invest £68m over the next four years in agriculture,
rural enterprise development and infrastructure. This assistance
has built nearly 2,000 wells benefiting over 400,000 people, contributed
to 160 district infrastructure projects reaching over 300,000
families and provided paid work for nearly 19,000 people. Current
projects include: a major road-building programme linking Lashkar
Gah to Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Gereshk; the refurbishment of the
Gereshk hydropower plant (as part of a wider programme to double
electricity production in 2009-10); and agri-business infrastructure
in Lashkar Gah (funded by the US).
Successful military operations by ISAF and Afghan
National Security Forces have brought more of Helmand under the
control of the Afghan Government. In 2008 progress was made
along the Helmand River valleyfrom Kajaki in the north
to Garmsir in the south. Whilst challenges remain, a good example
of progress was the clearing of Taleban in December 2008, by the
Afghanistan National Security Force, supported by Task Force Helmand,
from the town of Nad-e-Ali and its environs. The provision of
a well-qualified and experienced Stabilisation Adviser one day
after the end of kinetic operations was a good example of the
implementation of the Comprehensive Approach.
Basra
It is only through concerted progress on security,
political reconciliation and economic reconstruction that lasting
stability in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq can be brought about.
Our strategy has therefore been to take coordinated action across
the military, diplomatic and economic lines of development, using
all of the tools at its disposal.
Provincial Reconstruction Team
In April 2006, the Basra Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) was established under UK leadership, to act as a hub
for multinational capacity-building in governance, the economy
and infrastructure and rule of law. The formation of the PRToperating
alongside the UK-led Multi-National Division (MND) (South East)
and the UK Consulatecompleted the structures for the combined
application of military and civilian effort in Basra which have
remained in place until the transition of the mission in 2009.
Since 2007, the PRT has been located with the MND (South East)
headquarters and UK Consulate on the Contingency Operating Base
(COB) at Basra Airport. The precise make-up of the PRT and mechanisms
for civil-military coordination in Basra have evolved over time
in response to conditions on the ground; the evolution of coalition
and UK Government priorities and the lessons we have learned.
Prior to the transfer of the Basra PRT to US leadership on 31
March 2009, the work of the PRT and MND (South East) was coordinated
through joint plans for the development of Iraqi capacity and
civil-military assistancethe Basra Development Planwith
leadership and direction provided by a steering group comprising
the Head of the PRT, Consul General, UK military commander in
Basra and head of the US Regional Embassy Office in Basra (which
is also based on the COB). The Basra Development Plan also formed
a central element of the MND (South East) campaign plan.
Aims and Objectives
Our initial aims in Basra were to provide basic
levels of security; to prevent the collapse of basic infrastructure,
which had been severely neglected under Saddam, and to foster
the development of Iraqi sovereignty and democracy. As Iraqi institutions
formed, increasingly our primary objective has been to build the
capacity of the Iraqis themselves so that they can take the lead
and develop longer-term, sustainable solutions to the challenges
faced in Basra and elsewhere. As UK forces have trained and mentored
the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army in southern Iraq, the 14th
Division of the Iraqi Army in Basra and other Iraqi Security Forces,
the PRT and UK Consulate have led work to develop the ability
of the Basra provincial council to manage the economy and financial
resources more effectively and in turn deliver better public services.
As a result of these efforts, the provincial administration's
ability to spend its own money has doubled in each of the last
three years, and they have now contracted over 800 reconstruction
projects since 2006, worth over $650 million.
Capacity building and economic development activities
were hampered by the deterioration in the security situation in
2006 and the first half of 2007, which saw the PRT withdraw from
Basra city to Kuwait at the end of 2006 until its return to the
COB. However, as our strategy of handing over responsibility to
the Iraqi Security Forces we had trained was implemented in the
second half of 2007, the security situation in Basra improved.
Security improved still further after the Iraqi-led Operation
Charge of the Knights from March 2008, and has been maintained
since then. The improvements in security have allowed us to focus
on encouraging the growth of a thriving private sector and attracting
foreign direct investment to Basra, which will be essential to
the creation of jobs; work to rebuild Basra's outdated infrastructure,
and to help Iraq fulfil its potential.
Achievements
Overall, the UK Government has facilitated more
than 30 investor visits (for 20 companies) to show international
companies the opportunities available in Basra and elsewhere.
These visits have led to proposals potentially worth up to $10
billion being submitted to the Iraqi Government. The visits themselves
have been organised by the PRT and Basra Support Officea
combined Department for International Development, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and military organisation in Baghdad
tasked with supporting Basra at a national levelwith facilitation
and logistical support from Consulate and Embassy staff and UK
forces. Umm Qasr, Iraq's only deep water port, provides a good
example of the practical implementation of a comprehensive approach.
Royal Navy and British Army mentoring and training teams have
helped the Iraqi Navy and Marines protecting Umm Qasr to establish
a secure environment at the port, making it more attractive to
potential international investors. The PRT has subsequently organised
two major investment visits to Umm Qasr, with a view to financing
an increase in the port's capacity to handle cargo and container
ships, which would then contribute to economic growth and the
creation of jobs in and beyond the region. This programme of activity
in Iraq has been complemented by high profile investment conferences
HMG has helped to organise in Kuwait, Istanbul and most recently
in London on 30 April. The latter was attended by over 200 of
the world's leading companies and saw the signing of a trade agreement;
the establishment of an Iraq-UK business council and the announcement
of new contracts worth $1 billion.
In parallel to our work to attract foreign direct
investment, the PRT has established, trained and mentored the
Basra Investment Commission (BIC), an Iraqi institution which
now has lead responsibility for promoting and securing international
investment in Basra. The BIC recently granted a licence for a
$107M hotel and leisure complex, which was the first of its kind
in Basra and will help to persuade international companies that
Basra is ready for investment. In this and other work, the PRT
has relied upon the support of the British military and FCO. Complementing
the PRT's work to promote and secure foreign direct investment
in Basra, the Senior British Military Representative in Iraq,
who is based in Baghdad, holds the economics portfolio on behalf
of the coalition. He has sought to influence the Iraqi Government
and coalition efforts on key economic initiatives, including those
in Basra province such as the redevelopment of Umm Qasr.
As Basrawis' security concerns have reduced,
their demands for improvements in essential services as well as
employment prospects have risen. Therefore, in parallel with these
efforts to stimulate private sector investment, UK forces (and
more recently, US forces) and HMG civilians in Basra have continued
to work together to help the Iraqi authorities deliver grass-roots
reconstruction and basic services. In 2008, Joint Reconstruction
Action Teams were formed under a mixture of civilian and military
leadership, to support the Iraqi authorities to deliver improvements
to services, focussed on sewerage, water, electricity and waste
(or "trash").
The successful provincial elections in January
2009 provide another positive example of effective, coordinated
support to the Iraqis, with coalition assistance in Basra managed
through a working group led by the Consulate but involving the
PRT, UK and US militaries. Since then, UK forces have completed
their remaining military tasks with 14 Division and the leadership
of the PRT has been passed to the US. British service personnel
and HMG civilians have played a significant role in the transformation
of Basra. We have learned a number of valuable lessons about implementing
a comprehensive approach on stabilisation operations, and these
same lessons are now being applied as appropriate in Afghanistan.
The British Embassy Kinshasa
The comprehensive approach is also highly developed
wherever the MoD is contributing to post conflict stabilisation
and conflict prevention work. One such example away from Afghanistan
and Iraq is in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the British
Embassy works in a highly collaborative way across departmental
boundaries to deliver effect. Its efforts were formally recognised
last year, winning both the Joined Up Government Award and the
Cabinet Secretary's Award at the Civil Service Awards 2008.
The key to this success was the fact that the
DIFD, MoD and FCO team recognises no border between development,
military and political issues. They have pushed the boundaries
for joined up work not just by having joint policy teams but also
creating joint management functions and a joint communications
unit to handle press and public affairs. The 108 staff work to
one set of objectives under one roof and as one team.
As a result MoD, FCO and DFID worked extremely
closely to coordinate military analysis, diplomacy and development
funding to support the successful elections in 2006. The UK earned
a reputation for speaking with one voice and linking strong analysis,
political pressure and programmes to influence partners towards
a positive result. During fighting in Kinshasa in August 2006
and March 2007, all Embassy staff worked together to ensure an
effective response to the political, safety and consular consequences,
again working across departmental divisions.
The Departments continue to work together to
deliver our contribution to international efforts to secure a
lasting peace in DRC by pooling analysis, ideas and problem solving
across the three departments, shifting funding flexibly to take
advantage of opportunities and speaking with one voice to partners.
Whilst in-country projects are managed by individual departments
to satisfy accountability requirements, they benefit from the
collective engagement of all three, with each department bringing
complementary skills and experience to bear.
Such collaboration does not end with the cross-Whitehall
conflict prevention initiative. A recent example of how closely
the departments work together has been as part of a project to
re-build a vital bridge in eastern DRC. Although funded through
DFID's infrastructure programme, much of the expertise needed
to deliver the project is being sourced through MoD's links with
the military engineer community. This comprehensive approach has
contributed to providing the leverage needed to encourage the
UN locally to provide the construction manpower. Overall, this
means the project can be delivered quicker, more effectively and
at less cost than would otherwise be the case.
This is not to say of course that much more
work remains to be done. Recent events in the east mean that the
DRC is approaching a turning point in its history, with lasting
peace a possibility. But the security situation remains complex
and fragile, and there is still considerable potential for progress
to be derailed. The shared analysis to date points to three critical
issues where engagement is needed: 1) dismantling the armed groups;
2) improving security and 3) generating economic opportunities.
The UK is active in all three areas and will play a critical role
as the largest bilateral contributor to stabilisation and security,
and the DFID, FCO and MoD team in Kinshasa will be at the forefront
of that.
We remain particularly engaged in the eastern
DRC where problems caused by armed groups are a continuing source
of national and regional instability, involved in a wide variety
of projects from disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation,
to roads, to humanitarian assistance, to community recovery programmes,
to action against sexual violence. Progress on security sector
reform remains pivotal to the core state survival function of
delivering security and rule of law, and to providing the right
conditions to allow the large UN presence in DRC to be drawn down.
12 May 2009
1 New Inquiry: The Comprehensive Approach, Defence
Committee, Select Committee Announcement, 25 March 2009. Back
2
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05,
January 2006, Ministry of Defence, p 1-5. Back
3
UK policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward
published on 29 April 2009 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf Back
4
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05,
January 2006, Ministry of Defence Ibid, p 1-1. Back
5
http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/Stabilisation_guide.pdf Back
6
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05,
January 2006, Ministry of Defence. Back
7
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05,
January 2006, Ministry of Defence,, pp 1-2-1-3. Back
8
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security
in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2009 http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf Back
9
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30.pdf Back
10
Department for International Development: Progress and next steps
(Capability review), March 2009, http://beta.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/DFID-WEB_tcm6-6655.PDF Back
11
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Progress and next steps (Capability
Review), March 2009, http://beta.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/FCO-WEB_tcm6-6654.PDF Back
12
Ministry of Defence: Progress and next steps (Capability Review),
March 2009, http://beta.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/MOD-WEB_tcm6-6653.PDF Back
13
Due for publication later in 2009. Back
14
BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (3rd
Edition) August 2008, Ministry of Defence p v. http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9E4BA75A-8E9F-4A52-983B-44A0226C4906/0/20080924_jdp0_01_3rdEd_U_DCDCIMAPPS.pdf Back
15
S/PRST/2008/16 of 20 May 2008: Post-conflict peacebuilding http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9311495.html Back
16
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease Back
17
The aim of Ex JV08 was " to maintain and promote the UK's
ability to conduct medium scale expeditionary operations across
the spectrum of conflict with a focus on integrating and developing
Joint Military Capability within a Comprehensive Approach". Back
18
Part of the information in this annex was originally submitted
to the Foreign Affairs Committee in response to their request
for information as part of their inquiry Global Security: Afghanistan
in January 2009. Back
19
UK policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward
published on 29 April 2009 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf Back
20
Announced 29 April 2009. Back
21
Detail can also be found in UK policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan:
the way forward published on 29 April 2009 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf Back
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