House of Commons - Defence Committee

The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace - Defence Committee Contents

Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum addresses the subjects raised by the Defence Committee[1] on the validity of the Comprehensive Approach and how well the government is working internally and with external partners to "enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes".[2] This memorandum covers the background and development of the Comprehensive Approach within the UK and explains the work that is ongoing within relevant government departments and in the wider international community.

The main focus of this memorandum is the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach within the context of stabilisation and conflict prevention operations. It is predominantly focused on the relationship between government bodies, though the contribution of and engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations are briefly covered. Making the comprehensive approach work in practice is hard work for all concerned. It involves learning to understand and accommodate the different priorities and expectations of partners across government and beyond. The government is not complacent about the room for further improvement, but it is convinced that good progress has been made and the foundations for maintaining and building on what has already been achieved are sound.

BACKGROUND

The government has always worked cross-departmentally; this is evident from policy development work through to policy/operational delivery. The Cabinet Office, in particular, plays a key role in bringing departments together to deliver against specific outcomes. Examples include work on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and the recently published UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[3]

In recent years, the Balkans has been the best example of how what was initially perceived as a principally military task, subsequently evolved into a comprehensive approach. From 1991, it was increasingly apparent that operations in Bosnia involved a complex interplay of civilians, para-military and military groups and individuals, international organisations and international media. The Ministry of Defence recognised the roles played by and importance of Other Government Departments and Non-Governmental Organisations, but noted that they added to the complexity and that efforts were rarely coordinated or focused on a common set of objectives.[4] Nevertheless, the progress made when activity was coordinated reinforced the importance of an holistic approach. These views were reinforced by subsequent engagement in West Africa, East Timor as well as the wider Balkans.

Cross-Whitehall work between the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development resulted in the establishment of tri-departmental funding arrangements for Conflict Prevention, Stabilisation and Peace-Keeping activities. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (now called the Stabilisation Unit), also owned by all three Departments, was established in 2004. Concepts such as Defence Diplomacy, Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention were introduced into individual Departmental Plans, sitting underneath overarching outcome-focused Public Service Agreements. A Stabilisation Guidance Note was agreed and published[5] to provide best practice in stabilisation operations.

The significant deployments of UK forces and resources to Afghanistan and Iraq encouraged further development of this area. The Ministry of Defence responded in 2005 by producing a Joint Discussion Note on the Comprehensive Approach.[6] This stated that:

The realisation of national strategic objectives inevitably relies on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customised, agile and sensitive influence and information effort

This highlights the fact that the Comprehensive Approach is a philosophy and a framework that needs to be adapted for each situation. It is not a prescribed way of doing things nor about creating homogeneity across government departments and systems. Rather, it is a common framework for assessment and planning of goals, specific objectives and, above all, a unified effort in delivery.

Stabilisation operations are usually focused on protecting people from violent conflict, enhancing the legitimacy and capability of a state and allowing its government and people to work towards a better, fairer future through non-violent political processes. Activity will normally cover four main strands: Governance, Security, Political and Development/Reconstruction. These strands cover a great deal of activity from the training of effective armed forces to developing an independent justice system as well as establishing or reinforcing the system of national and local government. This requires leadership from (and of) the diplomatic, military and development communities to support local processes and to help the state fulfil its functions. As such activity often takes place in situations where efforts are severely impeded by armed violence, stabilisation usually requires significant military contributions (often from UN-mandated forces) to provide the essential security to allow non-military actors to operate.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

In order to deliver a comprehensive approach the government developed a number of key policies that influenced and developed the UK's approach to preventing and resolving conflict. Effort is focused not only at joining up UK activity, but on improving the effectiveness of the wider international community. Key developments include:

The National Security Strategy[8] was published by the Prime Minister in March 2008. It outlined the threats to the UK and its interests, together with the UK's responses. It states that:

4.47 To improve integration at the multilateral level, we will work to ensure that the UN delivers its commitment to genuinely integrated missions, and support the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which works to ensure integrated effort by all donors on strategy and delivery, and to provide immediate support for postconflict reconstruction. We advocate the development of a stronger international capacity, including through the EU and UN, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts, including judges, lawyers and police, at short notice and in larger numbers and to make them available for multilateral deployment|

5.5 Building on recent experience at home (for example on counter-terrorism) and overseas (for example in Afghanistan, where security, policy and development officials now work together in joint teams), we will continue to seek greater integration and responsiveness at the operational level. The new Stabilisation Unit will have a key role.

Public Service Agreements (PSAs)

Initially, PSAs were focused on individual departments and on the effective and efficient generation of departmental outputs. This has now evolved into a framework of outcome-focused PSAs "owned" by more than one department. As part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review process, Public Service Agreement 30 Delivery Agreement: Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts was produced in October 2007.[9] The FCO is the lead department for the delivery of PSA 30, supported by the MoD and DFID along with other departments and agencies. This work focuses on how we use key tools/resources including the tri-departmental funding for discretionary conflict activity, including support to international capacity building and regional support.

Capability Reviews

The government has driven an agenda to help departments work better together and approach problems in a more comprehensive way. Building on the initial Capability Reviews conducted in 2006, all three key departments have just been re-reviewed and the results published in March 2009. The recent reviews, which covered both policy formulation and operational delivery, commented that:

Doctrine

In addition to the 2006 Joint Discussion Note quoted earlier, a Joint Doctrine Note Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach (JDN 2/07) was published in March 2007 and is informing the development of the Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation; The Military Contribution.[13] The current edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) was published in August 2008.[14] BDD sets out that a Comprehensive Approach is based on four guiding principles:

Proactive Engagement

Shared Understanding

Outcome-Based Thinking

Collaborative Working

Above all, a Comprehensive Approach requires those dealing with a crisis to be predisposed to cooperation and structured to develop a shared understanding of a situation and its dynamics. This approach should aid the formulation of an agreed collective intent and output-focused objectives, leading in turn to the implementation of mutually supporting activities. Where it is not possible to coordinate or regulate all participants, actions and effects, then steps should be taken to achieve deconfliction at least.

DELIVERING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

There are a number of good examples of UK teams working together to deliver our objectives in a comprehensive way, some of which are covered in the back of this memorandum. The way in which those objectives are defined and delivered has changed over time to ensure that results are achieved faster and more effectively with a view to sustained and long-term benefits to the UK.

At the strategic level, the interdepartmental work on a Conflict Strategy has developed the principles and commitments made in the National Security Strategy to deliver an integrated approach that cuts across traditional boundaries. We continue to develop our understanding of the effectiveness of various military and civilian tools in different circumstances; and are identifying areas where UK and international capability needs to be developed (such as UK civilian capabilities, UN leadership, civilian capability and flexible funding mechanisms).

STABILISATION OPERATIONS

On the specific issue of stabilisation-type operations, the glue that binds our stabilisation efforts together is a sufficiently common culture among staff, and leaders who are able to collaborate effectively across departments. This comes from training and exercising together (see below) as well as developing understanding of each department through interchanges and posting.

On 6 March 2009, a Conference was held specifically to address Stabilisation Operations, attended by Ministers and senior officials. It concluded that the relative roles of Whitehall and the in-country team will vary with the nature of the operation. But, in the broad sense, Whitehall should focus on high level aims, a division of responsibility for their delivery, accountability, provision of resources and support to the UK political debate. In-country teams should focus on operational planning to deliver those aims. Difficult questions such as the authority of a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) need to be solved in the context of a specific operation as will the issue of which Department should provide the SRO and what their remit should be. There is general agreement that an SRO should be in theatre but also a recognition that such an SRO will have to deliver some of their objectives by influence rather than executive authority.

One element of the Cross-Departmental Review on Lesson Learning in Conflict Prevention, Management and Stabilisation remit covers how better to integrate lesson learning. It builds on the work undertaken by the Comprehensive Approach Working Group, chaired by the FCO.

The Stabilisation Unit continues to fulfil its three roles of: facilitating cross-departmental assessment and planning; developing and deploying civilian expertise; and, lesson learning. It is the primary source of civilian experts to the Helmand mission and has deployed experts elsewhere such as Iraq, Kabul, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Staff from the Unit supported a refresh of the integrated Helmand Roadmap and continue to support military exercises and planning in Whitehall for future UK engagement on conflict, bilaterally and multilaterally. The Unit is developing itself as a repository of expertise and lessons on stabilisation. It is coordinating cross-Whitehall work on improving joint assessment and planning at the strategic level and operational level. The Unit is also establishing a UK Civilian Standby Capacity (over 1000 civilians and police) to be able continuously to deploy up to 350 personnel. This will primarily be achieved by:

— enhancing the existing database of Deployable Civilian Experts, so that it holds around 800 quality assured personnel;

— forming a cross-government Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (of around 200);

— as well as appealing to a wide range of volunteer networks, and making better use of the relevant civilian skills of our Armed Forces Reservists.

A Stabilisation Implementation Team (SIT) was established earlier this year to deliver these Ministerial commitments and determine the nature and extent of additional Stabilisation Unit planning capability and how best to implement it. It will also consider the terms and conditions of service, as well as risk and safety considerations, for deployed civilian staff.

Operational and exercise experience has highlighted the need better to align and link departmental Information Technology and Information Management systems to ensure connectivity and improved communications. This is particularly important in theatre as it will allow better knowledge and information management. The three Permanent Secretaries have tasked their Chief Information Officers to identify options for tackling these constraints.

Additionally, departments meet regularly with International and Non Governmental Organisations both in-country and in London to ensure they are aware of the international community's and the UK's objectives in particular countries or regions. These meetings are valuable in exchanging perceptions, de-conflicting initiatives and, where appropriate, identifying common objectives and how best to coordinate in their achievement. The NGO-Military Contact Group also meets regularly to cover generic issues, including enhancing mutual understanding and, where appropriate, better ways of working together and the development of a more comprehensive approach to issues.

OPERATIONAL DELIVERY IN-COUNTRY

One good example of the Comprehensive Approach being used in practice is the UK Civil-Military Mission Helmand (CMMH) in Lashkar Gah. The CMMH is the integrated structure that brought together the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the military led Task Force Helmand (TFH), and it co-ordinates the efforts of DFID, FCO, MoD, and other international partners, including the US, Denmark and Estonia, in a comprehensive approach to stabilisation including a seamless package of reconstruction assistance for Helmand province. Staff are also based in five Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across Helmand Province in Gereshk, Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Sangin.

The structure is based more on cross-team working than on traditional lines of management. The mission is neither a traditional FCO-style "post", nor a headquarters in the formal military sense. It provides a mechanism, through joint teams, for tracking and driving implementation across the thematic and geographical strands of the Helmand Roadmap.

The Basra PRT was established in April 2006 under UK leadership. Since September 2007, the PRT has been located with the military divisional headquarters and UK Consulate on the Contingency Operating Base, Basra Airport. The Basra PRT transferred to US leadership on 1 April 2009, the day after UK forces handed over coalition divisional command in southern Iraq to the US.

The PRT's specific objectives have been to:

— build the capacity of the institutions of government in Basra to deliver for the people of Basra;

— put the economic enablers in place to allow private sector growth; and

— improve the ability of the legal establishment and the media to act as checks on the Iraqi Government and illegal groups.

In order to deliver its diverse set of objectives, the Basra PRT has drawn its staffing from a range of UK Government departments, UK military, US military and Foreign Service, and contracted consultants. It has also worked closely with a wide range of interlocutors in these and other institutions (the United Nations, for example).

The PRT's key achievements have included:

— helping the Basra Provincial Council to increase by 10 times the budget it manages and the services provided to the people of Basra;

— formulating the Basra Economic Development Strategy;

— establishing a scheme to provide jobs and training to unemployed youths, and

— setting up a project to provide credit to small businesses.

US Commander in Iraq, General Odierno, commented "They are completely integrated down there, and that really is the future if we are going to support the Iraqis in the right way next year. Basra is the way forward."

The comprehensive approach is also highly developed away from Afghanistan and Iraq; the British Embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a good example. Its efforts were formally recognised last year, winning both the Joined Up Government Award and the Cabinet Secretary's Award at the Civil Service Awards 2008.

The key to this success was the fact that the DFID, MoD and FCO team recognises no border between development, military and political issues. They have pushed the boundaries for joined up work not just by having joint policy teams but also creating joint management functions and a joint communications unit to handle press and public affairs. The UK earned a reputation for speaking with one voice and linking political pressure and programmes to influence partners towards a positive result. The departments continue to work together to deliver our contribution to international efforts to secure a lasting peace in DRC by pooling analysis, ideas and problem solving and shifting funding flexibly to take advantage of opportunities.

Such collaboration does not end with the cross-Whitehall conflict prevention initiative. A recent example of how closely the departments work together has been as part of a project to re-build a vital bridge in eastern DRC. Although funded through DFID's infrastructure programme, much of the expertise needed to deliver the project is being sourced through MoD's links with the military engineer community. This comprehensive approach has contributed to providing the leverage needed to encourage the UN locally to provide the construction manpower. Overall, this means the project can be delivered quicker, more effectively and at less cost than would otherwise be the case.

Further details on these examples are set out at the back of this document.

FUNDING AND RESOURCES

The government has established joint funding arrangements for Conflict Prevention, Stabilisation and Peace-keeping activity with the aim of obtaining a global and regional reduction in conflict and its impact through improved UK and international efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, and to create the conditions required for effective state-building and economic development. Additional funding for operations that are delivering objectives by means of the Comprehensive Approach are funded in the normal way, with departments either finding resources from within existing allocations or by drawing on the HM Treasury's Reserve to fund Urgent Operational Requirements for the military.

INTERNATIONAL WORK WITH ALLIES

The UK has been one of the strongest advocates of the Comprehensive Approach across a wide range of international organisations, in order better to combine civil and military measures and coordination within any given operational environment.

United Nations

The UN has taken some steps to move towards a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Measures include joint assessments, joint programme frameworks, and the adoption of integrated UN Missions in a number of countries, such as Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. There is also the Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body of the UN, which supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict. Its role includes bringing together all relevant actors, marshalling resources, and supporting the development of integrated peacebuilding strategies. In addition, the UN is working to improve joint working with other partners. For example, in 2008, it signed the UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations and a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning with the World Bank and the European Commission.

However, more needs to be done. Prompted by a UK-led debate at the UN Security Council in May 2008, the UN is now looking at how it can provide more effective and well coordinated support to countries emerging from conflict. The Presidential Statement that followed the debate highlighted the following gaps:

"The Security Council encourages efforts to address the urgent need for rapidly deployable civilian expertise and stresses that the critical role for such expertise is working in co-operation with national authorities to strengthen national capacities. The Security Council highlights the need for the United Nations to play a leading role in the field in co-ordinating international efforts in post-conflict situations. The Security Council stresses that coordination between national authorities and others involved in longer-term reconstruction and development, including organs of the UN system in accordance with their respective mandates, the international financial institutions, as well as with civil society and the business sector, is vital for the success of UN and international engagement in post-conflict situations. The Security Council stresses the need to ensure that finance is available from the outset for recovery and peacebuilding activities to meet immediate needs, and to lay a solid foundation for longer-term reconstruction and development."

A Secretary-General's report on this subject is due out this summer (2009). We hope this report will set out a clear plan for addressing the above gaps. We will work closely with the UN and other partners to support the implementation of this report.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

In April 2008 NATO agreed an Action Plan with pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. The plan states that NATO—the Headquarters, the Command Structure and the nations—want to bring together all the resources at their disposal—military and civilian—to deal with the problems that face us. It also focused on improving NATO's co-operation with other actors, including other international organisations and NGOs. The Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan, agreed at the same time, embodied this. This approach was reaffirmed at NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009:

"experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrates that today's security challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, combining civil and military measures and coordination. Its effective implementation requires all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths and mandates. We welcome the significant progress achieved, in line with the Action Plan agreed at Bucharest, to improve NATO's own contribution to such a comprehensive approach, including through a more coherent application of its crisis management instruments and efforts to associate its military capabilities with civilian means. Progress includes NATO's active promotion of dialogue with relevant players on operations; the development of a database of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation to advise NATO forces; and the involvement of selected international organisations, as appropriate, in NATO crisis management exercises."

NATO-UN

UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. NATO has also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical assistance to the African Union's UN endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan and in Somalia; support for UN disaster relief operations in Pakistan, following the earthquake in 2005; and escorting ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia. The September 2008 NATO-UN Declaration committed both organisations to work together more closely and establish a framework for consultation and co-operation, and reaffirmed their willingness to provide assistance to regional and sub-regional organisations as requested. This marked real progress in the NATO-UN relationship. A NATO civ-mil liaison office is now being established in New York. This should increase staff contacts across the range of disciplines. UN OCHA, UNHCR and DPKO will this year participate for the first time in the Alliance wide crisis management exercise. All of this helps both organisations work together at the strategic HQ level.

Cooperation to deliver the comprehensive approach in theatre (on specific operations) is generally further advanced than between Headquarters. In Afghanistan UNAMA and NATO are working together on the ground, as over the past 6 months they have jointly developed an integrated planning process to focus civilian and military resources on key districts in a coordinated way.

NATO-EU

There are standing arrangements agreed for consultation and co-operation between the EU and NATO including the "Berlin Plus" arrangements whereby the EU has guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities (aimed at avoiding unnecessary duplication) and can use NATO's command and control arrangements for running operations. EU military operations thus fall into two categories, "Berlin Plus" operations using NATO command and control arrangements, like EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia, and "autonomous" operations using command and control provided by one or more Member States, like Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden.

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team operates alongside the EU Military Staff and an EU Cell is based in SHAPE (NATO's strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium). We continue to engage actively to encourage progress, including through a NATO-EU capabilities group that brings together nations and staff from both organisations.

European Union

The European Union (EU) has a powerful set of civilian and military resources which enable it to apply a comprehensive approach to crisis management: civilian expertise, judges, police officers and customs officials; military force, economic might and the most extensive diplomatic network in the world, as well as the EU being the biggest donor of development funding. Since the launch of the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in 2003, the EU has deployed civilian and military personnel in three continents in areas of UK strategic interest. Of the 21 ESDP operations launched to date most have had a more civilian than military focus—helping to build the rule of law, support peace agreements or monitor borders.

In the wider context of the EU's ability to adopt a Comprehensive Approach, the existing pillar structures of the EU institutions precipitate a somewhat fragmented approach to crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction and development. There is a gap in culture, working practice and political direction, between the Commission and the Council Secretariat, and within the Secretariat between the policy and operations arms. Constitutional amendments proposed in the Lisbon Treaty would, if ratified, offer a potential solution to this fragmentation through the creation of the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, responsible for conducting the EU's foreign and security policy and for ensuring consistency of the Union's external action. The High Representative would be supported in his role by the creation of the European External Action Service, helping to improve some of the structural issues.

Improving the ability of the EU to plan and conduct operations that include both civilian and military elements remains of significant importance and the UK welcomed the European Council agreement in December 2008 of a joint civilian-military strategic level planning structure: the Crisis Management Planning Directorate. Within the military domain, the EU Military Staff initiated a study in March 2009 to consider the Military Implications of the Comprehensive Approach at the theatre level. The study's aim is to identify any military capability requirements to support the Comprehensive Approach and to inform deliberations at the strategic level within the EU in due course. The UK fully supports and helps to influence and accelerate EU thinking on this subject, through the active participation of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, the Joint Force Headquarters and the Stabilisation Unit.

TRAINING

The opportunities for joint training involving civilians and military together have increased greatly and all Brigade mission rehearsal exercises for Helmand now include a civilian component to assist the realism of military training and to help prepare the civilians themselves. The civilian contribution to Staff College training is significant, as is the civilian input to the doctrine taught on the College's courses. In addition to preparation for Helmand and routine training, our cross Whitehall aim (operational commitments allowing) is to support one major exercise per year for the purpose of test comprehensive approach concepts and capturing lessons. Last year this exercise was Joint Venture 2008 (JV08).

Exercise Joint Venture is the UK's biennial exercise in the planning and conduct of joint operations in a medium scale stabilisation intervention. It is a predominantly military command-post exercise designed to test our expeditionary capabilities in dealing with a complex regional scenario and series of political-military events.[17] JV08 aimed to set the military aspects of the stabilisation operations in the wider context of a cross-government "Comprehensive Approach". It focused upon the interaction between the 3* Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and 2*/1* Component headquarters (Maritime, Land, Air, Logistic and Special Forces), an inter-Departmental steering group and an inter-Departmental planning team (Stabilisation Planning Team or SPT), each incorporating staffs from the key Whitehall Departments, International and Non-Governmental Organizations and other players.

An FCO official was appointed the Senior Responsible Officer in order that civil-military co-operation could be tested, with the objectives of building on existing models from Helmand and elsewhere, and thus learning lessons that could apply to real-world scenarios. Participants included representatives of the FCO, DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and other parts of government, representatives of NGOs as well as from a number of international partners. Work is now in hand to develop the next ARRCADE Fusion (the annual Allied Rapid Reaction Corps exercise). This exercise, which will take place later this year, already involves officials from the FCO and DFID in its development.

CONCLUSION

The Comprehensive Approach is a philosophy and a framework that needs to be adopted but adapted for each situation and operation. It is not a prescribed way of doing things but a description of how a joined-up and cross-government/organisation helps to reach common goals. The benefits are greater responsiveness and effective use of limited resources through flexibility based on common analysis and planning towards goals and objectives. The UK uses a Comprehensive Approach to operational issues that is based around a number of key principles—proactive engagement, a shared understanding of the goals and issues, outcome-based thinking and collaborative working between the military and civilians, including the wider international community and non-governmental organisations.

In improving our capability to work this way, Ministers and senior officials have visited deployed teams and re-organised functions within their departments. This has resulted in the development of the tri-departmental Stabilisation Unit and funding mechanisms, together with working groups and inter-departmental units in London and the creation of civilian-military teams in Iraq, Afghanistan and other embassies. Each operation or team has resulted in changes to the approach to and ways of working together, with improvements introduced covering unilateral and multilateral operations. As the UK is likely to be part of a multinational operation, it is vital that the UK works with its allies to see that the wider international effort is delivered in a comprehensive way. It is for this reason that the UK has spent time and effort helping to shape the policy within international organisations, such as the UN, NATO and EU, for a Comprehensive Approach. While it would be fair to say that progress has been made within the UK inter-departmental processes and their capability to deliver on the ground and, to a more limited extent, within the wider international community, there remains a considerable amount that still needs to be done. There are tensions and issues such as authority, funding, data sharing/communications that currently limit progress and they are acknowledged as such. But they are being addressed and our approach is becoming more comprehensive.

CASE STUDIES

Helmand[18]

The UK Strategy for Afghanistan is owned and overseen by NSID(OD) (Cabinet Committee for National Security, International Relations and Development), with the objectives and guiding principles set out in the UK policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward[19] published in April 2009. In addition to the normal Departmental support provided by officials to Ministers there are two Cabinet Office chaired committees—the Afghanistan Strategy Group (ASG) and the Afghanistan Senior Officials Group (ASOG) who have oversight of the delivery against objectives and the prioritisation of efforts. All Departmental stakeholders are represented in these committees, including Her Majesty's Ambassador in Kabul and the Civil-Military Mission Helmand. The Cabinet Office and the ASG have been recently enhanced by the creation of a cross-government Afghanistan Strategy Team (AST) whose primary roles are to develop long term strategy and to undertake regular periodic reviews. In addition, two other cross-government teams have been established to support co-ordinated delivery: the Afghanistan Strategic Communications Team (ASCT) and the Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit (ADIDU).

The Afghan Delivery Group (ADG) is the primary governance body in-country and co-ordinates activities on the ground in Afghanistan. It is made up of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department for International Development (DFID) and is chaired by HM Ambassador in Kabul. It reports to Ministers through the ASG. Funding for ADG-approved activities come from a number of sources: the tri-departmental funds, FCO programme budgets (Strategic Programme Fund (SPF) and Bilateral Programme Budget) and DFID's Country Plan for Afghanistan.[20]

UK Civil-Military Mission Helmand

The UK assumed control of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province in May 2006. In June 2008 the UK PRT became part of the Civil-Military Mission in Helmand. Despite difficult working conditions, in the toughest of environments, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence, supported by staff from the Stabilisation Unit, the US, Denmark and Estonia are working hard alongside UK and other armed forces in Helmand Province to provide a seamless package of reconstruction assistance. Staff from the FCO and Stabilisation Unit are also based, with the military, in five Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across Helmand Province in Gereshk, Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Sangin.

Structure

The Civil-Military Mission Helmand is an integrated structure bringing together the PRT and Task Force Helmand and is charged with delivering our comprehensive strategy in Helmand. Its creation followed the decision that UK efforts should concentrate on delivering a comprehensive, politically-led, counter insurgency campaign. It is a permanent organisation, providing continuity into which the deployed Brigade will plug for its six month tour. It is tasked to provide clear political leadership; direct our support to Afghan reconstruction and reconciliation efforts; and plans, co-ordinates and delivers civil-military counter-insurgency activities.

It is headed jointly by the UK Senior Representative and the Commander Task Force Helmand. The UK Senior Representative reports to HMA Kabul. The Brigade remains under the command of ISAF for all operational military matters. The Commander of TFH takes military direction from Commander ISAF and from Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) at Permanent Joint Head Quarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, but consults and seeks guidance from the UK Senior Representative in mounting military operations.

Under this civilian-military structure tasks such as intelligence, political analysis, planning, district level stabilisation, media and communications, which previously were carried out by civilians and military in parallel, are now conducted jointly with the aim of achieving more integrated operations, using cross team-working rather than traditional lines of management. While physical co-location is heavily constrained by the available accommodation, the structure itself provides a framework in which the military and the growing number of civilian staff can integrate their work more effectively.

The mission is neither a traditional FCO-style "post", nor a headquarters in the formal military sense. It provides a mechanism, through joint teams, for tracking and driving implementation across the thematic and geographical strands of the integrated plan for delivering HMG's priorities in Helmand, the Helmand Roadmap. It has required a significant cultural shift for both sides, and resulted in better transparency and teamwork at all levels plus leadership that resolves differences co-operatively.

What does the Civil Military Mission Helmand do in Helmand?

The Civil Military Mission Helmand supports the Afghan Government to promote counter narcotics, security, good governance, rule of law and social and economic development in order to promote a more developed, secure and stable Afghanistan.

It is focused on establishing an effective police force, improved access to justice and sound provincial administration in the province. The Mission is also facilitating development assistance and delivery of Afghanistan's National Drug Control Strategy in Helmand and helping to create a sustainable legitimate economy capable of providing livelihoods for the local population.

Officials work with a wide range of people in the province, from the Governor of Helmand, Mohammad Gulabuddin Mangal, to local non-governmental organisations to deliver the UK strategy in Helmand. Governance, police reform, counter-narcotics and justice sector experts are in place to work with provincial officials and help strengthen and reform local governance structures.

Development is necessarily a long-term activity but the Civil Military Mission Helmand, working within the improved security environment provided by the Task Force Helmand and Afghan National Security Forces, is balancing this with more immediate stabilisation projects to deliver security through stabilisation in the key population areas of Helmand.

Progress[21]

The joint civilian-military team in Helmand now numbers 165, of which approximately 80 are civilian experts, a two-fold increase in the last year. The civilian-military mission in Helmand is based in Lashkar Gah, and has outposts in the other five districts Gereshk, Garmsir, Sangin, Musa Qala and, since December 2008, Nad-e-Ali each with a civilian-military stabilisation team of up to 10 staff, co-located with the relevant Battlegroup HQ.

The Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP), led by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, is an attempt to build better links between the Afghan Government and communities in areas where the former has been limited or non-existent. In Helmand we are supporting Governor Mangal to use the ASOP to roll out cross-cutting shuras (community councils) in all six of the key population centres. These aim to build a bridge between the lowest level of formal governance (District Governors) and the enduring grass-roots tribal system, by creating councils that take charge of local development, empowering "local solutions to local problems". They have been established in Nad-e-Ali, Garmsir and Gereshk, with Musa Qaleh and Sangin to follow during the summer of 2009 and we will allocate at least £20 million to this over the next four years. We are providing capacity-building support to the provincial offices of key national line ministries, the office of the Provincial Governor and the Lashkar Gah Municipality. We are also supporting Afghan-led efforts to promote reconciliation at a local level, in line with the national approach to encourage insurgents to reconcile to local legitimate government, and to renounce violence.

We are helping to establish informal justice shuras and commissions to provide traditional, accessible dispute resolution by local elders, under the overall tutelage of District Governors. These shuras are a legitimate, working alternative at the grass-roots to `Taleban justice', while also being linked to the formal justice system. They have been established in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir and Gereshk, and a separate prisoner review shura has been established in Musa Qala. Helmand Provincial Court is operating more effectively, convictions have risen 400% since June 2008 and legal representation, including a legal aid office, has been introduced. As part of our wider efforts in support of the formal justice system, we are also assisting with the construction of a new prison in Helmand province, with training support from a team of four officers from HM Prison Service.

Helmand province, with its abundant natural resources, has the potential to be a centre of agricultural production and growth for Afghanistan. To help realise this potential, we will invest £68m over the next four years in agriculture, rural enterprise development and infrastructure. This assistance has built nearly 2,000 wells benefiting over 400,000 people, contributed to 160 district infrastructure projects reaching over 300,000 families and provided paid work for nearly 19,000 people. Current projects include: a major road-building programme linking Lashkar Gah to Garmsir, Nad-e-Ali and Gereshk; the refurbishment of the Gereshk hydropower plant (as part of a wider programme to double electricity production in 2009-10); and agri-business infrastructure in Lashkar Gah (funded by the US).

Successful military operations by ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces have brought more of Helmand under the control of the Afghan Government. In 2008 progress was made along the Helmand River valley—from Kajaki in the north to Garmsir in the south. Whilst challenges remain, a good example of progress was the clearing of Taleban in December 2008, by the Afghanistan National Security Force, supported by Task Force Helmand, from the town of Nad-e-Ali and its environs. The provision of a well-qualified and experienced Stabilisation Adviser one day after the end of kinetic operations was a good example of the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach.

Basra

It is only through concerted progress on security, political reconciliation and economic reconstruction that lasting stability in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq can be brought about. Our strategy has therefore been to take coordinated action across the military, diplomatic and economic lines of development, using all of the tools at its disposal.

Provincial Reconstruction Team

In April 2006, the Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was established under UK leadership, to act as a hub for multinational capacity-building in governance, the economy and infrastructure and rule of law. The formation of the PRT—operating alongside the UK-led Multi-National Division (MND) (South East) and the UK Consulate—completed the structures for the combined application of military and civilian effort in Basra which have remained in place until the transition of the mission in 2009. Since 2007, the PRT has been located with the MND (South East) headquarters and UK Consulate on the Contingency Operating Base (COB) at Basra Airport. The precise make-up of the PRT and mechanisms for civil-military coordination in Basra have evolved over time in response to conditions on the ground; the evolution of coalition and UK Government priorities and the lessons we have learned. Prior to the transfer of the Basra PRT to US leadership on 31 March 2009, the work of the PRT and MND (South East) was coordinated through joint plans for the development of Iraqi capacity and civil-military assistance—the Basra Development Plan—with leadership and direction provided by a steering group comprising the Head of the PRT, Consul General, UK military commander in Basra and head of the US Regional Embassy Office in Basra (which is also based on the COB). The Basra Development Plan also formed a central element of the MND (South East) campaign plan.

Aims and Objectives

Our initial aims in Basra were to provide basic levels of security; to prevent the collapse of basic infrastructure, which had been severely neglected under Saddam, and to foster the development of Iraqi sovereignty and democracy. As Iraqi institutions formed, increasingly our primary objective has been to build the capacity of the Iraqis themselves so that they can take the lead and develop longer-term, sustainable solutions to the challenges faced in Basra and elsewhere. As UK forces have trained and mentored the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army in southern Iraq, the 14th Division of the Iraqi Army in Basra and other Iraqi Security Forces, the PRT and UK Consulate have led work to develop the ability of the Basra provincial council to manage the economy and financial resources more effectively and in turn deliver better public services. As a result of these efforts, the provincial administration's ability to spend its own money has doubled in each of the last three years, and they have now contracted over 800 reconstruction projects since 2006, worth over $650 million.

Capacity building and economic development activities were hampered by the deterioration in the security situation in 2006 and the first half of 2007, which saw the PRT withdraw from Basra city to Kuwait at the end of 2006 until its return to the COB. However, as our strategy of handing over responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces we had trained was implemented in the second half of 2007, the security situation in Basra improved. Security improved still further after the Iraqi-led Operation Charge of the Knights from March 2008, and has been maintained since then. The improvements in security have allowed us to focus on encouraging the growth of a thriving private sector and attracting foreign direct investment to Basra, which will be essential to the creation of jobs; work to rebuild Basra's outdated infrastructure, and to help Iraq fulfil its potential.

Achievements

Overall, the UK Government has facilitated more than 30 investor visits (for 20 companies) to show international companies the opportunities available in Basra and elsewhere. These visits have led to proposals potentially worth up to $10 billion being submitted to the Iraqi Government. The visits themselves have been organised by the PRT and Basra Support Office—a combined Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and military organisation in Baghdad tasked with supporting Basra at a national level—with facilitation and logistical support from Consulate and Embassy staff and UK forces. Umm Qasr, Iraq's only deep water port, provides a good example of the practical implementation of a comprehensive approach. Royal Navy and British Army mentoring and training teams have helped the Iraqi Navy and Marines protecting Umm Qasr to establish a secure environment at the port, making it more attractive to potential international investors. The PRT has subsequently organised two major investment visits to Umm Qasr, with a view to financing an increase in the port's capacity to handle cargo and container ships, which would then contribute to economic growth and the creation of jobs in and beyond the region. This programme of activity in Iraq has been complemented by high profile investment conferences HMG has helped to organise in Kuwait, Istanbul and most recently in London on 30 April. The latter was attended by over 200 of the world's leading companies and saw the signing of a trade agreement; the establishment of an Iraq-UK business council and the announcement of new contracts worth $1 billion.

In parallel to our work to attract foreign direct investment, the PRT has established, trained and mentored the Basra Investment Commission (BIC), an Iraqi institution which now has lead responsibility for promoting and securing international investment in Basra. The BIC recently granted a licence for a $107M hotel and leisure complex, which was the first of its kind in Basra and will help to persuade international companies that Basra is ready for investment. In this and other work, the PRT has relied upon the support of the British military and FCO. Complementing the PRT's work to promote and secure foreign direct investment in Basra, the Senior British Military Representative in Iraq, who is based in Baghdad, holds the economics portfolio on behalf of the coalition. He has sought to influence the Iraqi Government and coalition efforts on key economic initiatives, including those in Basra province such as the redevelopment of Umm Qasr.

As Basrawis' security concerns have reduced, their demands for improvements in essential services as well as employment prospects have risen. Therefore, in parallel with these efforts to stimulate private sector investment, UK forces (and more recently, US forces) and HMG civilians in Basra have continued to work together to help the Iraqi authorities deliver grass-roots reconstruction and basic services. In 2008, Joint Reconstruction Action Teams were formed under a mixture of civilian and military leadership, to support the Iraqi authorities to deliver improvements to services, focussed on sewerage, water, electricity and waste (or "trash").

The successful provincial elections in January 2009 provide another positive example of effective, coordinated support to the Iraqis, with coalition assistance in Basra managed through a working group led by the Consulate but involving the PRT, UK and US militaries. Since then, UK forces have completed their remaining military tasks with 14 Division and the leadership of the PRT has been passed to the US. British service personnel and HMG civilians have played a significant role in the transformation of Basra. We have learned a number of valuable lessons about implementing a comprehensive approach on stabilisation operations, and these same lessons are now being applied as appropriate in Afghanistan.

The British Embassy Kinshasa

The comprehensive approach is also highly developed wherever the MoD is contributing to post conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention work. One such example away from Afghanistan and Iraq is in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the British Embassy works in a highly collaborative way across departmental boundaries to deliver effect. Its efforts were formally recognised last year, winning both the Joined Up Government Award and the Cabinet Secretary's Award at the Civil Service Awards 2008.

The key to this success was the fact that the DIFD, MoD and FCO team recognises no border between development, military and political issues. They have pushed the boundaries for joined up work not just by having joint policy teams but also creating joint management functions and a joint communications unit to handle press and public affairs. The 108 staff work to one set of objectives under one roof and as one team.

As a result MoD, FCO and DFID worked extremely closely to coordinate military analysis, diplomacy and development funding to support the successful elections in 2006. The UK earned a reputation for speaking with one voice and linking strong analysis, political pressure and programmes to influence partners towards a positive result. During fighting in Kinshasa in August 2006 and March 2007, all Embassy staff worked together to ensure an effective response to the political, safety and consular consequences, again working across departmental divisions.

The Departments continue to work together to deliver our contribution to international efforts to secure a lasting peace in DRC by pooling analysis, ideas and problem solving across the three departments, shifting funding flexibly to take advantage of opportunities and speaking with one voice to partners. Whilst in-country projects are managed by individual departments to satisfy accountability requirements, they benefit from the collective engagement of all three, with each department bringing complementary skills and experience to bear.

This is not to say of course that much more work remains to be done. Recent events in the east mean that the DRC is approaching a turning point in its history, with lasting peace a possibility. But the security situation remains complex and fragile, and there is still considerable potential for progress to be derailed. The shared analysis to date points to three critical issues where engagement is needed: 1) dismantling the armed groups; 2) improving security and 3) generating economic opportunities. The UK is active in all three areas and will play a critical role as the largest bilateral contributor to stabilisation and security, and the DFID, FCO and MoD team in Kinshasa will be at the forefront of that.

We remain particularly engaged in the eastern DRC where problems caused by armed groups are a continuing source of national and regional instability, involved in a wide variety of projects from disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation, to roads, to humanitarian assistance, to community recovery programmes, to action against sexual violence. Progress on security sector reform remains pivotal to the core state survival function of delivering security and rule of law, and to providing the right conditions to allow the large UN presence in DRC to be drawn down.

12 May 2009

1 New Inquiry: The Comprehensive Approach, Defence Committee, Select Committee Announcement, 25 March 2009. Back

2 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, Ministry of Defence, p 1-5. Back

3 UK policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward published on 29 April 2009 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf Back

4 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, Ministry of Defence Ibid, p 1-1. Back

5 http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/Stabilisation_guide.pdf Back

6 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, Ministry of Defence. Back

7 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, Ministry of Defence,, pp 1-2-1-3. Back

8 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2009 http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf Back

9 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30.pdf Back

10 Department for International Development: Progress and next steps (Capability review), March 2009, http://beta.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/DFID-WEB_tcm6-6655.PDF Back

11 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Progress and next steps (Capability Review), March 2009, http://beta.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/FCO-WEB_tcm6-6654.PDF Back