Memorandum from the NAO (National Audit
Office)
1. In Spring 2009 the Defence Committee
announced it was undertaking an inquiry into the Comprehensive
Approach in which it would examine to what extent UK military
and non-military agencies work effectively through a Comprehensive
Approach "with commonly understood principles and collaborative
processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring
outcomes within a particular situation".[22]
2. To inform its inquiry, the Defence Committee
asked the National Audit Office (NAO) to undertake research to
identify the views of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) about
the Comprehensive Approach. This Paper provides the results of
research undertaken by the NAO in June 2009 which included receiving
papers from three NGOs, interviewing seven other NGOs and one
body responsible for representing NGOs operating in Afghanistan,[23]
and summarising the main points made during the interviews.
3. The NAO agreed, with the Defence Committee,
the terms of reference for this research, including the range
and type of NGOs that were invited to take part and the broad
themes that each of the NGOs were asked to address. Appendix A
to this Paper sets out the NAO's methodology (page 20).
4. Each of the NGOs involved in this research
is, or has been, operating in one or more countries in conflict.
Most of the NGO staff who took part in this research were based
in the UK but a number were based in countries currently in conflict.
The majority of the UK-based staff had previously operated in
countries in conflict.
5. The first part of this Paper provides
a summary of the views of the ten NGOs and the NGO representative
body (pages 2 to 4). It then discusses in more detail the views
of the NGOs and the NGO representative body under ten broad themes
(pages 4 to 18). This discussion is supported by Appendices B-K,
which provide summaries of the key points arising from each of
the interviews the NAO conducted and papers prepared by NGOs (pages
22 onwards). Due to security concerns, one of the NGOs asked not
to be identified in this Paper and thus throughout it is referred
to as "NGO 10".
6. The information presented in this Paper
is drawn exclusively from the papers submitted by the NGOs, the
interviews the NAO held with NGOs and the NGO representative body,
and publicly available documents referred to by NGOs during interviews.
Neither the research, nor this Paper, has been discussed with
the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID) or
any other government department. The views contained in this Paper,
therefore, are solely those of the NGOs (or their representatives)
that contributed to this research.
VIEWS OF
NGOS—SUMMARY
7. NGOs were generally aware of the Comprehensive
Approach as a concept and understood the logic behind the UK Government
seeking to bring to bear, in a co-ordinated or integrated manner,
the range of instruments (eg defence, diplomacy and development)
at its disposal to achieve an overarching objective. Five NGOs
told us they were either not aware of any MoD or UK Government
definition or guidance on the Comprehensive Approach or that there
appeared to be no shared or common understanding of the term across
UK Government (paragraphs 17 to 20).
8. Six NGOs identified a number of potential
or actual benefits of the Comprehensive Approach. These include
the potential for the Comprehensive Approach to bridge the gap
between insecurity and security and thus create a stable environment
in which humanitarian and development activities can be conducted.
The Comprehensive Approach can also address both the initial stabilisation
of a country and the subsequent risk of the country slipping back
into conflict (paragraphs 21 to 22).
9. Each of the ten NGOs raised concerns
about the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Approach when it
is applied to a country in conflict (paragraph 21). NGOs told
us that the Comprehensive Approach can:
— distort aid flows, with resources being
moved away from meeting the greatest humanitarian and development
needs towards stabilisation activities (paragraph 23);
— reduce the effectiveness and overall
value for money of aid spending (paragraph 24);
— blur the lines between military and humanitarian
organisations. This blurring can impact on the local population's
perceptions of the neutrality, impartiality and independence of
NGOs, and thus NGOs' ability to operate effectively and safely
in countries where there is a conflict. Consequently, NGO access
to vulnerable and /or remote populations in conflict situations
can be hindered (paragraph 25 to 27);
— increase the militarisation of civilian
settings or facilities, such as hospitals, in the host country.
For example, the presence of armed private security providers
in Afghan hospitals (to protect DFID staff) can turn the facilities,
and the Afghan users of those facilities, into targets for belligerents
(paragraph 28); and
— result in governments, including their
military organisations, undertaking a greater role in the provision
of humanitarian assistance. This increased role can be at odds
with international guidelines and agreements (for example, authored
by the UN) on the provision of humanitarian assistance in general,
and the relationship between humanitarian and military actors
in particular. Amongst other things, the guidelines and agreements
seek to ensure that differences between humanitarian and military
actors are recognised and respected and there is space for humanitarian
organisations to operate safely and effectively (paragraphs 29
to 30).
10. These five general concerns about the
effectiveness of the Comprehensive Approach are linked, in part,
to the view expressed by six NGOs that the UK had not achieved
the right balance between the different elements of the Comprehensive
Approach. Defence was viewed as being dominant at the expense
of development and, to a lesser extent, diplomacy (paragraph 33).
11. NGOs demonstrated different levels of
willingness to engage with UK Government on the Comprehensive
Approach. Two wanted greater involvement in the planning of particular
engagements so they could influence the Comprehensive Approach.
One of these NGOs said UK Government should make better use of
the NGOs' local knowledge. Seven other NGOs said they would not
engage in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach. Their main
reasons for not engaging were a lack of shared objectives with
UK Government and the need to maintain their independence, impartiality
and neutrality. Two of these seven NGOs did, however, say that
they might engage in some co-ordination with UK Government, and
three others said they might engage in dialogue with UK Government.
One NGO explained that it might work with government to de-conflict
their respective activities but would not be part of a fully co-ordinated
and regulated approach where parties were working to a single
plan. Another NGO said dialogue with government "may be needed
at the operational level, strictly provided that it poses no security
issue, particularly for beneficiaries and local partners, and
that it is necessary to save lives, protect and promote humanitarian
principles, avoid competition and minimise inconsistency"
(paragraphs 35 to 40).
12. Seven NGOs were clear that they did
not wish to engage in the delivery of the Comprehensive Approach,
and the three other NGOs did not say whether or not they would
engage in delivery (paragraph 41).
13. Five NGOs commented on gaining local
ownership of the Comprehensive Approach. In general, these NGOs
considered that local ownership was difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve as typically the Comprehensive Approach is applied
to local people in the host country, and they have limited or
no opportunity to influence it. NGOs believed, however, that local
people might accept a Comprehensive Approach, but this would require:
— the Comprehensive Approach to address
issues which are important to local people. Research undertaken
by one NGO shows that in Afghanistan the local people's priorities
are improved governance and establishing the rule of law (paragraphs
44-45); and
— UK Government and the wider international
community to engage effectively with local people and their representatives
(paragraphs 44 to 45).
14. NGOs identified a number of lessons
to be learned from the application of the Comprehensive Approach
to date. These included lessons for improving the Comprehensive
Approach in Afghanistan, for example, by putting Afghan people
at the centre of the Comprehensive Approach and by the international
community gaining a better understanding of the Afghan people
so that it is better placed to design development and other programmes.
There were also more generic lessons, such as political pressure
for rapid results being unhelpful and unachievable. One NGO identified
the need for caution in seeking to apply lessons from Afghanistan
and Iraq to other countries in conflict as there are substantial
differences between conflicts, for example, in their causes and
nature. The NGO told us that "as UK Government recognises,
the Comprehensive Approach can not be a prescribed set of procedures,
but must be applied flexibly to reflect the specific circumstances
of the conflict. Across most of Whitehall this appears to be accepted
conceptually, but there is little evidence of it being operationalised
effectively." Two other NGOs argued that the UK Government
and other governments have not evaluated the impact of the Comprehensive
Approach in Afghanistan and Iraq in general, or the role of the
military in particular (paragraphs 46 to 52).
15. One of the NGOs[24]
captured comments made to us by many of the NGOs when it concluded
that "if the Comprehensive Approach is going to be an effective
way of addressing the problems of a country in conflict it needs
to:
— be operated in way which respects the
boundaries and mandates of different organisations;
— reflect the context of the country where
it is being applied, and be based on a good understanding of the
local people;
— support the development objectives of
the host country and the priorities of the local people; and
— take account of the range of international
governments and international bodies involved in the host country."
VIEWS OF
NGOS—BY
THEME
16. The following paragraphs discuss in
more detail the points made by the NGOs under the different themes
we asked them to address.
Theme 1: From a UK perspective, what does
your organisation understand by the term "Comprehensive Approach?"
(Theme addressed by nine NGOs)
17. The large majority of NGOs were aware
of the Comprehensive Approach as a concept before we contacted
them. Two or more NGOs referred to the following key dimensions
of the Comprehensive Approach:
— an integrated, co-ordinated or coherent
approach and policy across government and possibly the private
sector and NGOs;[25]
— application of defence (or military),
development and diplomatic instruments;[26]
and
— focus on a single policy objective
or agreed objective(s).[27]
18. The dimensions of the Comprehensive
Approach identified by NGOs were in general reflected in MoD's
extant 2006 joint discussion note on the Comprehensive Approach.[28]
Theme 2: Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
effectively communicated what it understands by the Comprehensive
Approach and the merits of such an approach? (Theme addressed
by nine NGOs)
19. NGOs have differing views on the adequacy
of communication. World Vision was encouraged that MoD's joint
discussion note on the Comprehensive Approach separated "diplomatic,
military and economic instruments of power" from an "independent
package of developmental and humanitarian activity". World
Vision told us "that this separation, however, has not been
maintained on the ground in Afghanistan."[29]
Three of the other NGOs that addressed this theme said that prior
to this research they were not aware of any MoD or UK Government
definition or guidance on the Comprehensive Approach.[30]
Another NGO—British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
and Afghan Aid—told us "UK Government has not effectively
communicated its understanding of the Comprehensive Approach.
In part the absence of communication may reflect the lack of a
shared or common understanding across UK Government on the Comprehensive
Approach." A similar point was made by CARE International
UK who told us "Different military and government officials
maintain quite varied understanding of the term's definition."
20. In preparing its paper for this research,
War Child identified and reviewed guidance prepared by MoD and
the Stabilisation Unit[31]
on the Comprehensive Approach. War Child concluded that "Both
documents were very limited in terms of communicating the merits
of a Comprehensive Approach". Particular weaknesses identified
by War Child included: no example of how the Comprehensive Approach
has or might be applied; no consideration of cross-government
capability; limited assessment of the challenges to the practical
implementation of the Comprehensive Approach; and no consideration
of how adopting the Comprehensive Approach will require the buy-in
and commitment, as well as capability development, among other
nations, not least NATO and EU member states.
Theme 3: Does your organisation see the Comprehensive
Approach as an effective way of addressing international crisis?
(Theme addressed by 10 NGOs)
21. Whilst six NGOs recognised actual or
potential benefits to the UK Government of adopting a Comprehensive
Approach all ten NGOs raised significant concerns about its application
to countries in conflict.[32]
NGOs were particularly concerned about how the Comprehensive Approach
impacted on:
— the effectiveness of humanitarian
and development aid in general;
— the NGOs' ability to undertake their
role safely and effectively; and
— governments' involvement in providing
humanitarian aid.
BENEFITS OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH
22. The benefits of the Comprehensive Approach
identified by NGOs included:
— co-ordinated activity across defence
(military), development and diplomatic arms of government (ActionAid);
— "coherence of government policy
is an obvious and important objective" (CARE International
UK);
— "creates conditions for a more
inclusive consultation of key stakeholders in a way that could
make an intervention more responsive to the needs of the civilians
on the ground" (War Child);
— "the Comprehensive Approach
is a valid experiment to address the political process and bridge
the gap between insecurity and security in order to create a stable
environment in which to conduct humanitarian aid and development
activities"(Tearfund); and
— has the potential to address both
the initial stabilisation of a country and the subsequent risk
of the country slipping back into conflict (World Vision, War
Child).
IMPACT OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH ON
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF HUMANITARIAN
AND DEVELOPMENT
AID IN
GENERAL
23. The Comprehensive Approach can distort
aid flows away from meeting the greatest humanitarian and development
needs. Tearfund told us that "the close coordination of development
objectives and strategies with military and diplomatic ones should
not be limited to those areas or populations which are foreign
policy priorities for the MoD or FCO". Four NGOs told us,
however, that in practice an increasing amount of UK aid in Afghanistan
is being used in Helmand to assist with stabilisation rather than
being distributed according to need.[33]
24. The Comprehensive Approach may reduce
the effectiveness and overall value for money of aid spending.
In commenting on Afghanistan, NGO 10 argued that "Hearts
and Minds projects do not work and do not deter insurgency attacks".
It told us that:
"Individual quick impact development projects
often do not address key development challenges. Moreover, with
full consideration given to the particular history and context
of Afghanistan (especially the south and south-east), namely,
the history of foreign military interference, persistent poverty
and unemployment, corrupt and unjust government, excessive use
of force by international military forces, widespread illiteracy,
Islamist propaganda, and the systematic use of terror and intimidation
by militants, it is clear that limited assistance projects will
have little impact on support for, or engagement in, insurgent
activity."
Mercy Corps told us that "It does not consider
that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the right approach
for delivering humanitarian and development assistance and views
them as inappropriate and ineffective."[34]
Mercy Corps concerns included:
— "communities want long-term
development assistance based on transparency, accountability and
local ownership. Such approaches are not compatible with the short-term
imperatives which drive the military's stabilisation strategy.
The military's use of often costly, ineffective and unaccountable
implementing partners is also highly problematic";
— "PRTs do not distribute humanitarian
assistance within Afghanistan according to need";
— "PRTs are not a cost effective
mechanism for delivering humanitarian or development aid. For
example, PRT staff undertaking humanitarian or development activities
are often escorted by armed personnel which increases cost and
can reduce the willingness of Afghans to take-up the assistance
provided".
IMPACT OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH ON
NGOS' ABILITY
TO UNDERTAKE
THEIR ROLE
SAFELY AND
EFFECTIVELY.
25. The Comprehensive Approach can blur
the lines between military and humanitarian organisations, impacting
on local people's perceptions of the neutrality, impartiality
and independence of NGOs and thus their ability to operate effectively
and safely. Consequently, the Comprehensive Approach can hinder
NGO access to vulnerable and /or remote populations in conflict
situations. Between them, eight NGOs provided a range of examples
of how the Comprehensive Approach could put their independence
and impartiality at risk, including:[35]
— if an NGO is seen to be engaging
with overseas governments involved in a country where there is
conflict;
— by the engagement of other NGOs with
an overseas government as local people may see NGOs as a homogenous
group; and
— by direct overseas government provision
of aid, for example through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
in Afghanistan, as local people may not distinguish between the
Teams and humanitarian agencies.
Thus the direct or indirect involvement of UK
Government and other governments in providing aid could reduce
the scope, in both the short run and long run, for independent
NGOs to operate in a country without putting their staff at unacceptable
levels of risk. MSF told us that:
"in Iraq humanitarian NGOs were seen by
many as part of the wider western military effort and were presented
by the US military as such. This false representation of humanitarian
action as part of the military effort increased the security risks
faced by NGO staff operating in the field and, as a result, MSF
and many other humanitarian NGOs withdrew from Iraq. If MSF, and
similar organisations, are squeezed out by the Comprehensive Approach,
the population is deprived of life-saving assistance in its hour
of greatest need. As an alternative the military will undertake
relief activities, not only for altruistic purposes but also for
the benefits of hearts and minds, but only in the areas under
their direct control, which may result in large numbers of the
civilian population receiving no support. And a withdrawal of
NGOs will only increase the length of time that the military needs
to undertake this direct provision of relief."
Tearfund supported MSF's position. It told us
that "it is imperative that the proponents of the Comprehensive
Approach do not see NGOs as `force multipliers' of HMG's strategy
in conflict areas."
26. NGOs referred to specific instances
where their field staff had been threatened, attacked, kidnapped
or killed. CARE International UK explained that "Our commitment
to humanitarian principles is not inspired by abstract theory,
but rather our need to ensure the safety and security of field
staff, partners and beneficiaries."
27. CARE International UK also told us that
NGOs' operations and safety are also threatened by the priority
given to military interests on the ground. It said:
"NGOs maintain serious concerns about potential
impacts of Comprehensive Approach implementation for their operations,
and the safety of their staff and beneficiaries. At field level,
experience of military operations in Afghanistan suggests that
international forces will continue to assert a military pre-eminence
in hostile environments in which they are conducting combat operations.
This partly reflects both the level of authority delegated to
the force commander in-theatre, and the imbalanced spread of resources
between military and civilian actors involved. Such an approach
threatens the space for NGOs or other agencies to deliver independent,
neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance."
28. MSF told us "that the Comprehensive
Approach can increase the militarisation of civilian settings
or facilities, such as hospitals, in the host country. Many armed
private security providers are being used to protect DFID staff
working in Afghanistan. The presence of armed security providers
in civilian facilities can turn the facilities, and the Afghan
users of those facilities, into targets for belligerents. In Afghanistan,
the UK Government has described armed private security providers
as armed civilians, which risks militarising the "civilian
status". Under the Geneva Convention civilians are individuals
who take no part in hostilities."
IMPACT OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH ON
GOVERNMENTS' INVOLVEMENT
IN PROVIDING
HUMANITARIAN AID
29. Three NGOs raised general points of
principle regarding governments providing humanitarian aid. Mercy
Corps said that "Humanitarian action is not an instrument
of conflict resolution or crisis management or a tool for fighting
terrorism as established clearly in the European Consensus on
Humanitarian Aid".15[36]
War Child said that:
"International Humanitarian Law dictates
that humanitarian assistance, which is currently seen as an element
of the Comprehensive Approach, should be given regardless of the
political affiliation of a person, their ethnicity, religion and
so on... If humanitarian action is sourced in a "whole government"
owned strategy and subsequently delivered through a Comprehensive
Approach then it is not impartial. Consequently, the humanitarian
delivery agents will not be perceived to be neutral within a conflict
or post-conflict situation."
War Child also told us that "Humanitarian
assistance delivered through a Comprehensive Approach diverts
funds away from the established humanitarian aid architecture."
World Vision told us that "The UK's application of the Comprehensive
Approach in Afghanistan has not followed the concepts set down
in MoD guidance. The split between "diplomatic, military
and economic instruments of power" and an "independent
package of developmental and humanitarian activity" has not
been maintained. Aid has been used to achieve stabilisation objectives."
30. NGO 10 and British and Irish Agencies
Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid raised specific concerns about
the military not respecting the independence and mandate of humanitarian
organisations in Afghanistan. They both referred to the 2008 "Guidelines
for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and
Military Actors in Afghanistan". NGO 10 said:[37]
"These Guidelines, which amongst others
have been signed by the United Nations Assistance Mission and
the International Security Assistance Force, state that the use
of `military assets' for `humanitarian relief operations' should
only be used if a number of conditions are met including:
— "there is no comparable civilian
alternative";
— "to the extent possible there
is civilian control over the operation"; and
— "military assets (used for humanitarian
relief operations) are clearly distinguished from those used for
military purposes".
In a number of areas, the military have undertaken
development or humanitarian operations where there are civilian
alternatives."
Theme 4: Has the MoD and/or UK Government
worked effectively with the international community to adopt a
Comprehensive Approach? (Theme addressed by eight NGOs)
31. The NGOs that addressed this question,
raised a range of points:
— There were different views on whether
the international community had worked well to adopt a Comprehensive
Approach in Afghanistan. ActionAid told us that "In Afghanistan,
the UK Government has worked effectively with other donor countries,
the UN and NATO in adopting a Comprehensive Approach". British
and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid said that
the UK had "sought to bring the US round to the UK's way
of thinking on the Comprehensive Approach, which has been helpful".
However, it also said that "currently different actors and
countries are coming to Afghanistan with their different approaches.
Ideally, all actors should come together to achieve the objectives
of the host government and people under the oversight of a single
body, such as the UN";
— NGO 10 and British and Irish Agencies
Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid told us that there was inadequate
liaison between international governments which increases the
burden on the Afghan government of interacting with donors;
— On a related point, Islamic Relief
commented on the capacity of the Afghan government to manage the
aid it was receiving. It said "in line with the Afghan government's
wishes, the UK Government and other donors have increasingly moved
funding away from projects to the multi-donor funded National
Solidarity Programme. This change has the potential to increase
the credibility of the Afghan Government. However, insufficient
resources have been available to administer these large flows
of aid and ensure they are well spent and effective, and that
local delivery mechanisms do not become corrupt";[38]
— CARE International UK and NGO 10
commented that the UK Government should do more to improve the
capability of the UN. CARE International UK told us "UK approaches
to the Comprehensive Approach are highly influenced by wider international
efforts. For this reason, DFID should invest in strengthening
UN humanitarian leadership and coordination structures, in particular,
UN OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs].
At present, UN OCHA is frequently constrained by inadequate human
resources and political backing to effectively engage in coordination
with political and military actors on an equal and independent
footing".
Theme 5: Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
built the UK's capacity to engage in a Comprehensive Approach
to a crisis? What more could be done? (Theme addressed by seven
NGOs)
32. Two of the NGOs addressing this question
referred to the establishment of the Stabilisation Unit (formerly
the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit). World Vision said that
"to date (the Stabilisation Unit) has primarily focused on
Iraq and Afghanistan, thus reducing the UK's ability to contribute
to other stabilisation activities where it has potential important
influence." World Vision also noted positively that the UK
Government was raising the civilian capacity of the Stabilisation
Unit by increasing the number of civilian experts it could call
upon. Tearfund commented, however, "that the aims of these
posts seem very foreign policy and military-led as opposed to
being led by the development needs of the population affected."
33. Six of the NGOs which addressed this
theme were concerned that the UK had not achieved the right balance
between defence, diplomacy and development in applying the Comprehensive
Approach.[39]
The NGOs told us that:
— the application of the Comprehensive
Approach in Afghanistan had "placed too much emphasis on
defence, with diplomacy and development being subordinated"
(ActionAid);
— "UK Government effort [in Afghanistan]
needs to be co-ordinated in a way which does not subordinate the
role of development" (NGO 10);[40]
— the majority of funding DFID directly
manages[41]
in Afghanistan "is now used by DFID for projects in Helmand
which are supporting the military intervention. By focusing the
aid it directly manages on a single province, DFID is going against
its general principle that aid should be distributed according
to need, with the aim of reducing poverty."[42]
The increasing focus on Helmand has also "reduced the amount
of UK funding available for NGOs working elsewhere in Afghanistan"
and led to the cancellation of some successful projects (British
and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid);
— "the UK Government should ensure
that development of the Comprehensive Approach respects the distinct
mandate and priorities of the Department for International Development
(DFID); in particular in relation to humanitarian action"
(CARE International UK).
34. At a policy level, NGOs saw the UK Government
as wishing to have a dialogue with NGOs on aid issues in general,
and the Comprehensive Approach in particular. This was welcomed
by NGOs, but four mentioned that NGOs' ability to engage was limited
by their resources.[43]
NGOs and NGO umbrella groups find it difficult to raise funds
to engage in policy work. The four NGOs told us that if UK Government
wants an intelligent debate with NGOs on the Comprehensive Approach
it may need to support them to do so. One of these four, CARE
International UK, recommended:
"The UK Government should invest in NGO
capacities and mechanisms to enable effective and appropriate
NGO engagement in policy dialogue on issues related to the Comprehensive
Approach; trainings and exercises with the military to sensitise
them to humanitarian principles; and programmatic learning on
effective NGO approaches to civil-military interaction at field
level."
Theme 6: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might the MoD/UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges? (Theme addressed by 10 NGOs)
35. NGOs demonstrated different levels of
willingness to engage with UK Government in the planning of a
Comprehensive Approach.
36. Two NGOs identified potential benefits
from greater involvement of NGOs in the planning of particular
engagements so they could influence the Comprehensive Approach.
ActionAid told us that there should be regular meetings with UK
Government in Afghanistan so that NGOs could "engage in planning
and in-country decision making, and provide feedback including
constructive criticism." ActionAid argued that "NGOs
have a much better understanding of the Afghan people, and UK
Government should make better use of NGOs' local knowledge."
Tearfund told us, that to maintain NGO independence, "the
most appropriate route for NGOs to engage with the planning of
the Comprehensive Approach would be through DFID. [But] There
has to date been little outreach from DFID to NGOs regarding this."
37. Seven NGOs told us they would not engage
in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach.[44]
The main reasons for not engaging were a lack of shared objectives
with UK Government and the need to maintain their independence,
impartiality and neutrality. Commenting on the lack of shared
objectives, MSF explained that "The UK Government wishes
to resolve conflict in a way which best suits the interests of
the UK. MSF does not share that objective and maintains its complete
independence from it, wishing only to provide impartial humanitarian
assistance to civilians caught up in a conflict situation regardless
of which side of a frontline they may reside."
38. Two of the NGOs (World Vision and British
and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid), who said
that they would not engage in the planning of a Comprehensive
Approach, said that they might engage in co-ordination. World
Vision identified two broad ways of operating the Comprehensive
Approach:
— a fully co-ordinated and regulated
activity with all parties working to a single plan; and
— more limited co-ordination to ensure
that the activities of different agencies do not conflict.
World Vision told us "MoD and other military
organisations may prefer the former, but World Vision would not
be part of a fully co-ordinated approach. World Vision can however
work with military organisations to de-conflict separate activities
so that they do not work against each other or duplicate each
other." World Vision had developed a tool "to assist
its staff to think through difficult operational and policy decisions
they may face when interacting with military actors. The tool
identifies that there is a spectrum of possible interactions between
humanitarian and military operations, ranging from a humanitarian
NGO curtailing its presence, through co-existence, co-ordination
to co-operation." World Vision sees an opportunity for the
NGO community to work together to strengthen and develop standard
rules for engaging with the military. It told us, however, that
such development work was likely to require funding from government
or international sources and additional support to the often marginalised
Civil-Military Coordination Section within the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.[45]
39. Another three of the NGOs, that said
that they would not engage in the planning of a Comprehensive
Approach, told us that they had or might have dialogue with governments
with regard to a particular situation.[46]
One of these, Mercy Corps, said that:
"Humanitarian workers and programmes may
be placed at risk if local populations, or warring parties, perceive
ties between military and humanitarian workers, Mercy Corps believes
that coordination between humanitarian actors and military/combatant
should be avoided. Yet, dialogue may be needed at the operational
level, strictly provided that it poses no security issue, particularly
for beneficiaries and local partners, and that it is necessary
to save lives, protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid
competition and minimise inconsistency."
CARE International UK summarised its position
on relations between UK Government and NGOs and concluded that:
"The UK Government should respect the non-governmental
and independent character of civil society and specifically NGOs
involved in humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected contexts.
For this reason, it should not seek to incorporate NGOs into a
Comprehensive Approach framework, but rather identify means to
enable appropriate and effective dialogue with NGOs on related
policy and operational issues."
40. World Vision and Islamic Relief identified
that the long-term nature of the development agenda can be at
odds with the shorter term focus of some in government. World
Vision stated the "horizons of different government and non-government
agencies can make it difficult to establish a common long term
plan which both addresses stabilisation and tackles the longer
term risk that a country slips back into conflict. For example,
diplomats focus on short term opportunities, the military often
have a two to three year horizon, whilst government aid agencies
and development NGOs are often focused on a 10 year development
agenda." Islamic Relief gave a specific example. It said
"encouraging Afghans to grow alternative crops to poppies
requires a long term commitment of ten years or more. But aid
agencies may only provide funding for short projects and there
are risks that projects do not get renewed, for example, because
there is a change in political leadership of the agency, or the
agency decides to channel its money through a multi-donor pool
(eg the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan) rather than
use it to fund its own projects."
Theme 7: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might MoD/UK Government assist NGOs in
addressing these challenges? (Theme addressed by 10 NGOs)
41. Seven NGOs were clear that they did not
wish to engage in the delivery of the Comprehensive Approach.[47]
The other three NGOs did not say whether or not they would engage
in delivery.
42. The reasons given by the seven NGOs
(who were clear they would not engage in delivery of the Comprehensive
Approach) generally repeated points made previously, such as the
lack of shared objectives with the UK Government and the risks
to NGO independence, impartiality and neutrality (see paragraph
37). The NGOs did, however, make some additional points regarding
the challenges they might face working in environments which had
adopted a Comprehensive Approach:
— There can be tension between governments
wishing to demonstrate the positive results of development or
humanitarian activities they have supported and the need for NGOs
to maintain their independence. Tearfund and Islamic Relief raised
this point, with Tearfund telling us that:
"Whether or not HMG (Her Majesty's Government)
considers increased political stabilisation to be a de facto
result of humanitarian NGO work (for example through improved
health, food security, or income in a given area), that work should
never be made a component of an explicit "hearts and minds"
campaign, in which infrastructure or other benefits are explicitly
claimed as an achievement by one of the parties to the conflict.
HMG can assist NGOs by recognizing this differentiation and adopting
a low profile approach to monitoring and publicizing NGO projects
in conflict areas."
— NGOs are not always able to operate
in areas the military think they should do. British and Irish
Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid, which does not engage
in the delivery of the Comprehensive Approach, explained that
"if a location is being `held' by the military it does not
mean that it is safe for unarmed NGO staff to start to deliver
programmes in what may well be an unfamiliar setting."
Theme 8: What are the challenges faced in
moving between different stages of a Comprehensive Approach, for
example from stabilisation to reconstruction? (Theme addressed
by six NGOs)
43. Theme 8 proved difficult for NGOs to
respond to. Four did not address the theme at all.[48]
Two said it was difficult to comment on the challenges faced in
moving between different stages of the Comprehensive Approach
either because they did not engage in the Comprehensive Approach
(MSF) or because those outside UK government have not been made
fully aware of the different stages (Tearfund). Three NGOs told
us that a conflict may not pass through distinct stages or there
may be overlap between those stages.[49]
Theme 9: How can local ownership for a Comprehensive
Approach be established? (Theme addressed by five NGOs)
44. The consensus of the five NGOs that
answered this question was that local ownership was difficult
to achieve.[50]
The Comprehensive Approach was typically applied to local people
in the host country, and they had limited or no opportunity to
influence it. ActionAid told us that in Afghanistan "Neither
the Afghan people, nor their elected representatives (the members
of the Afghan parliament), have been directly consulted about
the Comprehensive Approach." World Vision said that "Local
ownership is very difficult, if not impossible, where the Comprehensive
Approach is conceived of, developed and introduced from the outside
by the international community rather than by representatives
within the host country."
45. Three NGOs referred to local acceptance
rather than local ownership of the Comprehensive Approach.[51]
Local acceptance is possible but it would require:
— the Comprehensive Approach to address
issues which are important to local people. British and Irish
Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid told us that its "sponsored
research identified that, whilst development is important, the
priorities of the Afghan people are improved governance and establishing
the rule of law." The NGO told us that neither of these priorities
were being delivered currently; and
— UK Government and the international
community to engage more effectively with local people and their
representatives. Three NGOs identified that better engagement
would help.[52]
World Vision told us, however, that "dialogue and planning
can in fact put local people at risk of attack by those resisting
the presence of the international community." NGO 10 told
us that "excessive use of force by foreign military forces
in air-strikes and house-raids, especially by the US in the early
days, continues to undermine the Afghan people's support for the
international presence in their country".[53]
Theme 10: What lessons have been learnt from
the application of the Comprehensive Approach in Iraq, Afghanistan
or other countries? (Theme addressed by ten NGOs)
46. This question elicited a range of responses
from NGOs, with some emphasising points they had made to previous
questions, such as the risk that the Comprehensive Approach can
make it more difficult for humanitarian NGOs to operate effectively
and safely. The additional points raised by NGOs fell into two
main categories.
LESSONS FOR
DEVELOPING THE
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
IN AFGHANISTAN
47. ActionAid told us that "The Afghan
people need to be put at the centre of the Comprehensive Approach.
The current focus on security and wider geo-political objectives
will not benefit the Afghan people in the long run." This
view was consistent with the position of NGO 10 which identified
the following five actions that were required to improve development
and stability in Afghanistan:
— "The International community
must make a sincere commitment to state building";
— "Additional support is needed
for agriculture" as around 80% of Afghans depend on agriculture,
and connected occupations and trades;
— "The international community
needs to build the capability and professionalism of the Afghan
security forces";
— "Overseas military forces need
to change their emphasis. Rather than tracking down insurgents,
the overriding objective of military forces should be protecting
local Afghans so that they can get on with their lives";
and
— "The international community
must get a much better understanding of the Afghan people so that
it is better placed to design development and other programmes".
48. Three NGOs told us that experience to
date has demonstrated that short term "hearts and minds"
approaches do not work but one NGO said that in some regions of
Afghanistan there was some evidence that the work of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) was welcomed by local people. CARE
International UK said that "`lessons identified', if not
`lessons learned', emerging from Iraq and Afghanistan have underlined
the ineffective nature of short-termist and military-dominated
approaches to stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in such
contexts." British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and
Afghan Aid said that research it had sponsored in Afghanistan
"shows that the "hearts and minds" philosophy and
projects do not work as they do not address the priorities of
local people." NGO 10 commented on the performance of PRTs
in Afghanistan which it sees as operating along the lines of the
Comprehensive Approach. It told us that it was "not aware
of any PRT that has brought greater stability to its province".[54]
World Vision, however, told us that "amongst the Afghan people
there are different views of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
There is, for example, anecdotal evidence that the local people's
perspectives of the PRTs operating in Western Afghanistan are
relatively favourable and local people have been reported as being
frustrated with PRTs for not undertaking enough development work."
49. In summarising its position British
and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid told us that
"Afghanistan is a very difficult operating environment and
all organisations, whether government or NGOs, will make mistakes.
There is a need for different actors engaged in Afghanistan to
understand each other better and support each other more".[55]
LESSONS FOR
DEVELOPING THE
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
MORE GENERALLY
50. NGO 10 raised a question "over
whether the Comprehensive Approach is wrong in principle, or whether
the wrong polices have been used to implement the Comprehensive
Approach in practice". It went on to identify that:
— "there can be tension between
who should take credit for improvements made, for example, in
security and development in the host country when a Comprehensive
Approach is adopted. For example, if the international community
in Afghanistan takes credit for development work this can help
bolster its support amongst Afghans and the populations of donor
and troop contributing countries. However, this would do little
to provide the Afghan government with greater legitimacy, which
is a necessary condition for conferring legitimacy on the international
forces in the eyes of many Afghans";
— "the Cabinet Office may not
have the capacity or expertise to undertake their role of co-ordinating
UK Government activity as effectively as is required"; and
— "there can be political pressure
for rapid results which can be unhelpful and unachievable".
51. World Vision identified the need for
caution "in seeking to apply lessons from Afghanistan and
Iraq to other countries in conflict. There are substantial differences
between conflicts, for example, in their causes and nature. As
UK Government recognises, the Comprehensive Approach can not be
a prescribed set of procedures, but must be applied flexibly to
reflect the specific circumstances of the conflict. Across most
of Whitehall this appears to be accepted conceptually, but there
is little evidence of this being operationalised effectively."
52. Two NGOs argued that there have been
weaknesses in evaluation. Islamic Relief said "the UK Government
and other governments are now focusing on what should be done
to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. They are not looking to evaluate
how their interventions have impacted on:
— the humanitarian and development
agendas. Would the sums spent by the West on military action have
delivered better outcomes if the money had instead been used for
humanitarian and development programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq;
and
— the safety of the people in the West."
War Child argued more generally that "whenever
military actors are involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
very little effort is made to learn and evaluate effectiveness".
This NGO also told us that "neither the MoD nor any other
element of the UK Government in Afghanistan has sought to monitor
the excess mortality of Afghan civilians..., nor has this been
championed as a necessity to ensure informed policy and decision
making within the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan".
It recommended that "a genuinely independent monitoring and
evaluation capability must be established to evaluate and bear
witness to the effects of military actions on civilians and the
delivery of humanitarian assistance (directly or indirectly) within
a Comprehensive Approach."
22 www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/defence_committee/def090325_no_26.cfm Back
23
In total the NAO held seven meetings. One of the meetings was
attended by both an NGO and the body responsible for representing
NGO views in Afghanistan. Back
24
British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid (supporting
material included under Theme 3 of the meeting). Back
25
NGOs referring to this dimension were War Child, MSF, British
and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid, CARE International
UK. Back
26
NGOs referring to this dimension were Tearfund, World Vision,
Islamic Relief. Back
27
NGOs referring to this dimension were MSF, ActionAid. Back
28
Joint Discussion Note 4/05 "The Comprehensive Approach",
January 2006. Back
29
Supporting material included under Theme 1 of the meeting with
World Vision. Back
30
Tearfund, Mercy Corps, War Child. Back
31
The FCO website states that "The Foreign Office, Ministry
of Defence and Department for International Development jointly
own the Stabilisation Unit. The Unit's role is to support countries
emerging from violent conflict through its specialist, targeted
and rapid assistance. By creating a `stable' environment, longer
term development can begin." The Units key tasks are: Assessment
and planning, deployment into conflict areas and learning lessons.
www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/conflict/peacekeeping/ Back
32
The six NGOs recognising actual or potential benefits were World
Vision, War Child, Tearfund, ActionAid, CARE International UK
and British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid. Back
33
ActionAid, World Vision, NGO 10, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan
Group and Afghan Aid (supporting material included under Theme
10 of the meeting with British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan
Group and Afghan Aid). Back
34
The FCO website says the "Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) are at the heart of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission and embody a joint military and civilian
approach to stabilising Afghanistan. They are a combination of
international military and civilian personnel based in provincial
areas of the country extending the authority of the Afghan Government,
supporting reform of the security sector, and facilitating development
and reconstruction. Each is tailored to the prevailing security
situation, socio-economic conditions, terrain, and reach of the
central government." www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/security/prt/ Back
35
War Child, Mercy Corps, MSF, Tearfund, NGO 10, CARE International
UK, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid,
Islamic Relief. Back
36
"The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid" was issued
as a Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council,
the European Parliament and the European Commission on 30 January
2008. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:025:SOM:en:HTML Back
37
Supporting material included under Theme 6 of the meeting with
NGO 10. Back
38
The National Solidarity Programme is funded by a number of donors
and is managed by the Afghan Government. Back
39
CARE International UK, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan
Group and Afghan Aid (supporting material included under overview
and context section and Theme 10 of the meeting with British and
Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid), NGO 10 (supporting
material included under Theme 10 of the meeting with NGO 10),
War Child, World Vision, ActionAid (supporting material included
under Theme 3 of the meeting with ActionAid). Back
40
Supporting material included under Theme 10 of the meeting with
NGO 10. Back
41
British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid told
us that in Afghanistan, DFID's aid is used in two ways. A high
proportion of DFID's aid-around 80 %-goes through multi-donor
trust funds. The remaining 20 % is directly managed by DFID. Multi-donor
trust funds are supported by a number of donors and are managed
by the Afghan Government. Back
42
The increasing focus on Helmand was also identified by other NGOs
see paragraph 23. Back
43
British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid, Islamic
Relief, CARE International UK, World Vision (supporting material
included under Theme 6 of the meeting with World Vision). Back
44
MSF, World Vision, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
and Afghan Aid, Mercy Corps, NGO 10, Islamic Relief, CARE International
UK. Back
45
This paragraph draws on material included in the following three
parts of the meeting with World Vision: Theme 2, Theme 6 and the
overview and context section. Back
46
Mercy Corps, Islamic Relief, CARE International UK. Back
47
MSF, Mercy Corps, World Vision, NGO 10, British and Irish Agencies
Afghanistan Group and Afghan Aid, Islamic Relief, CARE International
UK. Back
48
ActionAid, CARE International UK, NGO 10, Islamic Relief. Back
49
Mercy Corps, World Vision, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan
Group and Afghan Aid. Back
50
ActionAid, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Afghan
Aid, World Vision, Tearfund, War Child. Back
51
World Vision, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and
Afghan Aid, ActionAid. Back
52
War Child, ActionAid, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
and Afghan Aid. Back
53
Supporting material included under Theme 3 of the meeting with
NGO 10. Back
54
This quote is taken from the overview and context section of the
meeting with NGO 10. Back
55
This material is taken from the overview and context section of
the meeting with British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
and Afghan Aid. Back
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