APPENDIX F
ISLAMIC RELIEF
NAO summary of meeting with representatives of
Islamic Relief 4 June 2009
Present from Islamic Relief:
Haroun Atallah, Finance Director (and former CEO)
Jamal Al-Din Belke, Head of Middle East and Eastern
Europe (Country Director of Islamic Relief Afghanistan 2002-2004)
OVERVIEW AND
CONTEXT
Islamic Relief has had an interest in the Comprehensive
Approach and similar concepts such as the 3Ds (Diplomacy, Defence,
Development) over the last five to six years. Islamic Relief staff
have, for example, attended relevant forums and Islamic Relief
has had some engagement at a policy level with the European Union
as well as the UK Government.
Military engagement in the provision of aid,
or contact between military organisations and NGOs, blurs the
distinction between military and civilian organisations and can
bring serious risks to NGO staff. In some cases, such as the Asia/Kashmir
earthquake in 2005, military engagement in humanitarian activities,
may be welcomed as the military have logistics and other support
which NGOs do not have. However, where countries are in conflict
or are unstable, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, contact with the
military, and western governments who have military forces operating
on the ground in combat roles, can damage the reputation of an
NGO as impartial, neutral and independent, and consequently NGO
staff can be seen as spies or collaborators. Reputational damage
can be long lasting and can increase the risk to NGO staff (from
both local and international NGOs) of intimidation and serious
attacks, including kidnapping. Association with the UK military
and in certain circumstances the UK Government can not only bring
risks to Islamic Relief's staff in the field but can also increase
the risk that the NGO and its UK staff are seen domestically as
"selling out".
Islamic Relief has been operating in Iraq since
the 1990's. After 2003, Islamic Relief reduced its presence in
Baghdad because of concerns over the safety of its staff who,
for example, had received threatening messages and were being
watched. Its main office in Iraq is now in a more stable location
in the North. Islamic Relief has not highlighted the level of
work it has been doing in Iraq as this can endanger its staff.
For example, if Islamic Relief is viewed in Iraq as a large NGO
which may have substantial resources, this increases the chance
of its staff being kidnapped so a ransom request can be made.
Islamic Relief does not seek funding from the
UK Government, or other western governments, for its work in Iraq
as it does not wish to increase the risks to its staff, or be
seen to be an organisation which has benefited from the conflict.
Islamic Relief was operating in Afghanistan
before the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2001, Islamic
Relief has undertaken a range of work in Afghanistan. This work
was initially focused on the south of the country but it has now
extended its operations more in the north. Islamic Relief has
received funding from DFID for some of its projects in Afghanistan.
Theme 1: From a UK perspective, what does
your organisation understand by the term "Comprehensive Approach"?
The Comprehensive Approach is a development
of the 3Ds approach. In Afghanistan, it uses hearts and minds
activities to try and buy-in local community support for the central
government as well as military operations that are taking place
within the country. The Comprehensive Approach seeks to demonstrate
to the local population that there are benefits (eg such as reconstruction)
to be gained by the international community undertaking activities
in their country.
Theme 2: Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
effectively communicated what it understands by the Comprehensive
Approach and the merits of such an approach?
Islamic Relief has not received any communications
from the UK Government defining the Comprehensive Approach and
its merits. It was not aware of MoD guidance on the Comprehensive
Approach.
Theme 3: Does your organisation see the Comprehensive
Approach as an effective way of addressing international crisis?
Islamic Relief does not see closer cooperation
with the military as desirable. Rather there is need for greater
clarity on relations between NGOs and the military in conflict
situations (such as Afghanistan and Iraq). NGOs need to be (and
be perceived to be) neutral, independent and impartial where there
are conflicts between warring parties. NGOs should not be asked
or encouraged to take sides with one or other of the parties in
a conflict. One of the drawbacks of the Comprehensive Approach
has been that western governments and their militaries (in particular,
the US military) have implemented the Approach as if NGOs are
either `with us or against us'. NGOs wish to be impartial and
neutral and provide services to poor people independent of where
those people reside.
The risks to NGOs of operating in unstable countries
are significantly increased where overseas military are involved
and, especially, where this involvement leads to a blurring in
the roles between military organisations and NGOs. For example,
when military organisations get involved in the provision of aid
it is very difficult for local people to separate this from activities
undertaken by NGOs.
Islamic Relief provided examples of the risks
their staff have faced when working in countries where the Comprehensive
Approach was being applied. These examples included Islamic Relief's
then Head of Emergencies being arrested and tortured by the Sadam
Hussein regime in Spring 2003. The regime accused the Head of
Emergencies of acting as a spy and he was lucky to get out of
the situation alive.
In general, the level of funding available from
governments to support humanitarian and development work in Afghanistan
has increased significantly since 2001. However, the environment
for delivering that work has become more difficult as the security
situation, including general law and order, has deteriorated.
Theme 4: Has the MoD and/or UK Government
worked effectively with the international community to adopt a
Comprehensive Approach?
With respect to NGOs, the UK Government's engagement
with the wider international community has been inadequate and
sporadic. NGOs are viewed and governed in very different ways
by the UK, by other European countries and by the US. A more consistent
or standard approach would yield significant benefits for governments
and NGOs.
In accordance with the Afghan Government's wishes,
the UK Government and other donors have increasingly moved funding
away from projects to the multi-donor funded National Solidarity
Programme. This change has the potential to increase the credibility
of the Afghan Government. However, insufficient resources have
been available to administer these large flows of aid and ensure
they are well spent and effective, and that local delivery mechanisms
do not become corrupt.
Theme 5: Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
built the UK's capacity to engage in a Comprehensive Approach
to a crisis? What more could be done?
Islamic Relief is not well-placed to comment
on the capacity of the UK Government.
From an NGO perspective, the level of engagement
with Government, including the EU, has increased significantly
on aid-related topics in general. For example, Islamic Relief
has been asked to contribute to government white papers. It has
also been asked to contribute to opposition party documents. This
increasing amount of policy work has implications for Islamic
Relief as it has to develop its own capacity and research units
so that it is able to have an intelligent discourse with UK Government.
It is difficult for NGOs to obtain funding for such policy work,
and if UK Government wants and expects a greater debate with NGOs,
then it should assist this by providing funding, for example,
through umbrella bodies which represent NGOs.
Theme 6: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might the MoD/UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges?
Islamic Relief does not engage in planning the
Comprehensive Approach as it:
(i) does not share the same overriding objectives
as UK Government. Islamic Relief is not interested, for example,
in regime change but wants to provide services to poor people
who can be hurt by belligerents and government forces;
(ii) wishes to maintain its independence, neutrality
and impartiality.
Islamic Relief may, however, have a dialogue
with the UK Government and other governments regarding particular
countries and situations. Reasons for dialogue include:
— Self preservation. Islamic Relief
may wish to make governments aware of where they are operating
within a country;
— To exchange information and knowledge
on humanitarian issues, in particular, with DFID.
Any dialogue will, however, usually take place
outside of the country concerned by, for example, bringing Islamic
Relief's in-country staff to Europe. This reduces the risk that
the nature of the contact is misconstrued.
There can be a difference between the planning
timescales of government and the time required to deliver development
objectives. Islamic Relief ran a programme aimed at reducing poppy
cultivation. This showed that to encourage Afghans to grow alternative
crops to poppies requires a long term commitment of 10 years or
more. But aid agencies may only make short term commitments of
funds to projects. Thus there are risks that projects do not get
renewed, for example, because there is a change in political leadership,
or the agency decides to channel its money through a multi-donor
pool (eg the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan) rather
than use it to fund its own projects.
Theme 7: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might MoD/UK Government assist NGOs in
addressing these challenges?
Islamic Relief does not engage in the delivery
of the Comprehensive Approach. In some countries where the Comprehensive
Approach is being applied, Islamic Relief may, however, undertake
programmes which are funded by the non-military arms of government
participating in the Comprehensive Approach. As explained in the
"Context and overview" section Islamic Relief has undertaken
work funded by DFID in Afghanistan but it has not undertaken UK
Government sponsored work in Iraq.
Where Islamic Relief is undertaking work funded
by governments involved in a Comprehensive Approach this has the
potential to create tension. Islamic Relief may not wish to make
public the identity of its funder as this could increase risks
to its staff. However, the funder may wish to generate publicity
for the projects it is supporting in the host country, and in
its own country to serve the government's domestic agenda. To
date, this problem has not arisen on DFID funded projects as the
Department has recognised the risks to NGO independence.
Theme 8: What are the challenges faced in
moving between different stages of a Comprehensive Approach, for
example from stabilisation to reconstruction?
Not addressed.
Theme 9: How can local ownership for a Comprehensive
Approach be established?
Not addressed.
Theme 10: What lessons have been learnt from
the application of the Comprehensive Approach in Iraq, Afghanistan
or other countries?
The UK Government and other governments are
now focusing on what should be done to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan.
They are not looking to evaluate how their interventions have
impacted on:
— the humanitarian and development
agendas. Would the sums spent by the West on military action have
delivered better outcomes if the money had instead been used for
humanitarian and development programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq?;
— the safety of the people in the West.
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