APPENDIX J
TEARFUND
Paper prepared by Tearfund
OVERVIEW AND
CONTEXT
To set the scene please provide an overview
of your organisation's involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan or other
areas of conflict, and engagement you have with the MoD and /or
other UK departments in these conflict zones?
Tearfund is a Christian relief and development
agency. We have over 40 years' experience of working in over sixty
countries with local partners and through disaster management
teams, supporting them to respond to the needs of local communities
and to ensure that governments and international policy-makers
listen to the voices of the powerless.
The Disaster Management Teams are currently
operational in South Sudan and Darfur, the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Afghanistan. Our operational team in Afghanistan
has current field bases in Kandahar, Kapisa, Jawzjan and Kabul
since 2001 with nine expatriate and 113 Afghan staff managing
projects of up to £2 million. This programme has DFID funding
from 2005-08 for Disaster Risk Reduction work across three provinces
and from 2007-11 for innovations in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
(WASH). In Afghanistan, Tearfund is a leader amongst the humanitarian
community in the areas of Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction,
household water treatment through BioSand filters and Community
Led Total Sanitation.
Tearfund staff have contributed to Mission Training
exercises for NATO as Subject Matter Experts for the civilian
cells for Regional Command South. Our UK staff have provided an
NGO perspective for three Commando Brigade, 19 Light Brigade and
11 Light Brigade during study weeks as they prepare to go to Helmand.
Our civil focal point has attended the Peace Support Operations
week at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham in 2008 and 2009 and
contributed to the CIMIC course taught at Longmore Camp with Lt
Col Dr Stuart Gordon.
Theme 1. What does your organisation understand
by the term the "Comprehensive Approach"?
Tearfund understands the Comprehensive Approach
to describe the approach taken by the MoD, DFID and FCO when approaching
conflict or post conflict scenarios in which they are involved.
The aim of this cross government work is to ensure collaboration
and close coordination of HMG objectives, strategies, and activities
in the military, development, and diplomatic spheres. The work
of the Stabilisation Unit largely contributes to this as well.
The work of the MoD within the Comprehensive Approach uses the
language of "civil effects"that is, activities carried
out with and for the civilian population and civil society that
are in line with the Commanders' objectives for the mission. These
include Quick Impact Projects; "hearts and minds" activities
for consent winning, reconstruction of infrastructure and capacity
building of government ministries including security sector reform.
Theme 2. Has the MoD and/or other UK Government
effectively communicated what it understands by the Comprehensive
Approach and the merits of such an approach?
Tearfund is not aware of any formal communication
from the UK Government setting out the adoption of this approach.
Tearfund's understanding of the Comprehensive Approach is based
simply on being aware of these policy developments due to our
membership of various coalition groups: NGO Military Contact Group,
BOND Conflict Policy Group and British Agencies in Afghanistan
Group (BAAG) etc. The merits of such an approach are little communicated
and little evidence has been offered to support them. Tearfund
would recommend a more concerted communication by HMG, possibly
through DFID, of the benefits of the Comprehensive Approach and
how they envisage NGOs and humanitarian agencies are to engage
effectively.
Theme 3. Does your organisation see the Comprehensive
Approach as an effective way of addressing international crises?
Tearfund recognises that there is a vacuum,
especially in settings like Afghanistan, which must be filled
by the building of government and political institutions. Addressing
this vacuum will require coordinated security, development, and
diplomatic work, and is not within the mandate or expertise of
humanitarian agencies. At the same time, there is an on-going
debate between military and some humanitarian agencies about the
appropriate level of security needed for NGOs to operate after
the `take, hold and develop' activities of the forces and a more
fundamental debate about the appropriateness of NGOs to operate
in this way given their commitment in the Red Cross Code of Conduct
"not to act as instruments of government foreign policy."
Tearfund believes that the Comprehensive Approach is a valid experiment
to address the political process and bridge the gap between insecurity
and security in order to create a stable environment in which
to conduct humanitarian aid and development activities.
This approach needs to be closely monitored
for its effectiveness and the extent to which it could severely
impact on the safety, security and independence of humanitarian
agencies existing operations. The close coordination of development
objectives and strategies with military and diplomatic ones should
not mean that humanitarian funding is limited to those areas or
populations which are foreign policy priorities for the MoD and
FCO. There needs to be an understanding that the aims of the British
Government are not necessarily in line with the humanitarian objectives
of the NGOs and therefore NGOs will not necessarily follow the
military after it has "taken and held" a location. It
is imperative that the proponents of the Comprehensive Approach
do not see NGOs as "force multipliers" of HMG's strategy
in conflict areas.
Theme 4. Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
worked effectively with the international community to adopt a
Comprehensive Approach
The FCO has welcomed feedback from the BOND
Conflict Policy Group on their strategy regarding the protection
of civilians in armed conflict. The MoD involved in Southern Afghanistan
have welcomed input into their pre deployment training. However
none of this has been communicated as direct involvement in the
Comprehensive Approach nor has there been, to our knowledge, a
formal launch of the approach. There is an increased drive across
government to provide more civilian assistance to post conflict
settings in order to strengthen governance and political process
with local governments such as the Government of Afghanistan.
This has been widely communicated in the media.
Theme 5. Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
built the UK's capacity to engage in a Comprehensive Approach
to a crisis? What more could be done?
The UK Government and they specifically have
included a lot more civilian personnel in their operations in
Helmand in roles such as Political Advisor and Stabilisation Advisors.
The Stabilisation Unit accesses its database of Deployable Civilian
Experts to fill such positions under the Cabinet Office. However
the aims of these posts seem to be very foreign policy and military-led
as opposed to being led by the development needs of the populations
affected. Tearfund believes it is imperative that DFID be included
at every stage of development of the Comprehensive Approach in
order to advise the FCO and MoD of the developmental agenda and
how this will contribute to a country's recovery following a conflict.
Theme 6. What are the challenges faced by
NGOs engaging in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach to a
particular crisis? How might the MoD/UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges?
There is little engagement with NGOs in the
planning stages of a Comprehensive Approach outside of the classrooms
of Shrivenham. To invite NGOs into the planning of the Comprehensive
Approach from the DFID or FCO side would yield positive insights.
However it must be remembered that NGOs need to maintain their
impartiality. Neutrality is absolutely critical in order to comply
with the Red Cross Code of Conduct's commitment not "to act
as instruments of government foreign policy" and to effectively
prioritise on the basis of need alone. This does not mean that
NGOs cannot have a healthy relationship or dialogue with government
/ military actors but this is not seen as collaboration or a convergence
of similar objectives and opinions on this engagement will vary
across the NGO sector. As a result, the most appropriate route
for NGOs to engage with the planning of the Comprehensive Approach
would be through DFID. There has to date been little outreach
from DFID to NGOs regarding this. When planning for a Comprehensive
Approach, the differentiation between the foreign policies of
HMG, the British and other international forces from the humanitarian
agencies at work in similar locations must be understood on all
sides. Again, this does not mean that NGOs cannot have a healthy
relationship, dialogue, or coordination with government and military
actors, but that NGOs must retain independence in selecting the
areas and populations with which they work, and that their humanitarian
priorities cannot be presumed to converge with the policy priorities
of the government (eg political stabilisation).
In addition, the Comprehensive Approach plan
should not over-estimate the ability of humanitarian agencies
to move swiftly into areas which may be considered "stabilised"
for purposes of military movement about the area, but in which
violence (criminal or low-level insurgent) continues to affect
civilians to a significant degree. As most NGOs do not arm themselves
and rely largely on their acceptance in communities for protection,
their perceptions of security in an area may be very different
from HMG personnel who travel armed or under armed escort. Moreover,
in cases where NGOs have witnessed the withdrawal of military
forces from areas once considered "held," and the return
of those areas to insurgent control, they may rightly hesitate
to engage in areas newly declared to be "taken and held."
Theme 7. What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might MoD / UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges?
Part of the problem in addressing the different
stages of a Comprehensive Approach is that it has not been explained
outside of Government what the agreed stages are of the Comprehensive
Approach. This makes it difficult to advise on how to overcome
the challenges. It is very hard to move from a very military led
set of stabilisation activities; physical infrastructural activities,
capacity building of political institutions for government, to
activities that will be connected to longer term development gains.
This is not because such activities are not also appropriate with
peace time activities but that those carrying them out will be
very different and their approaches with them. Stabilisation,
in a layman's understanding of it, it about influence, governance,
political process, and capacity building institutions of government.
As these activities are being done during the Hot Stabilisation
period there needs to be close analysis of how they can be tied
to longer term development and be sustainably carried out by the
people who will remain in the country for a longer time than HMG's
staff. This could be done through the ties made across government
departments and the direct capacity building of the human resources
in the civil service of the conflict affected country. Providing
good management skills to personnel is a key capacity building
a country for recovery post conflict.
Humanitarian agencies delivering services in
areas of intense conflict such as Afghanistan must take care not
to be perceived as parties to the conflict, or to be collaborating
with military forces. If NGO work is publicly "claimed"
by a government party to the conflict as a sign of stabilisation
and victory, the odds sharply increase that the NGO will come
under attack and the benefits of its work will be reduced or lost—witness
the increase in volume of attacks in 2008 by insurgent forces
against NGOs implementing the National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
in Afghanistan. Accordingly, humanitarian NGOs whose work coincides
with the Comprehensive Approach of the UK Government (and may
be funded as part of that Approach) face the primary challenge
of differentiating themselves in the eyes of the population from
an ongoing military/counter-insurgency campaign. Whether or not
HMG considers increased political stabilisation to be a de facto
result of humanitarian NGO work (for example through improved
health, food security, or income in a given area), that work should
never be made a component of an explicit "hearts and minds"
campaign, in which infrastructure or other benefits are explicitly
claimed as an achievement by one of the parties to the conflict.
HMG can assist NGOs by recognizing this differentiation and adopting
a low profile approach to monitoring and publicizing NGO projects
in conflict areas.
General insecurity is another challenge, in
areas where criminality and insurgent activity pose a risk of
violence to anyone, regardless of perceived affiliation. HMG can
continue to assist by accepting the necessary security measures
in NGO project budgets (eg staff specifically tasked with security
management and analysis; employee training in security management
and personal security; increased travel costs due to flights rather
than road travel; communications costs such as additional satellite
phones and radios; compound security measures such as blast film
and razor wire; ballistic blankets and in some cases armour for
project vehicles).
Theme 8. What are the challenges faced in
moving between different stages of a Comprehensive Approach, for
example from stabilisation to reconstruction?
It is very difficult for an agency such as Tearfund
to advise on these challenges when those outside of Government
have not been made fully aware of the different stages specified
as constituting the Comprehensive Approach. It is very hard to
move from a very military-led set of stabilisation activities
(eg physical infrastructure and the capacity building of political
institutions for government) to activities that will be connected
to longer term development gains. This is not because such activities
are irrelevant in peace time, but because those carrying them
out will be very different and vary in their approaches. As many
activities are being carried out during the Hot Stabilisation
period, there needs to be close analysis of how they can be tied
to longer term development and be sustainably carried out by the
people who will remain in the conflict affected country for a
longer time than HMG's staff. This could be done through the ties
made across the host government departments and the direct capacity
building of the human resources in the civil service of the conflict
affected country. Providing good management skills to personnel
is a key capacity building a country for recovery post conflict.
Theme 9. How can local ownership for a Comprehensive
Approach be established?
In order to garner local ownership for a comprehensive
approach in crisis situations there needs to be a clear explanation
of the merits of the approach. The primacy of a military operation
must be acknowledged as having serious limitations when it comes
to rebuilding a society immediately after conflict or even during
the `Hot Stabilisation' period. The benefits of addressing indigenous
ways of organising communities (for example through Shuras in
Afghanistan), addressing reconciliation and district level governance
need to be acknowledged, engaged, strengthened and used by HMG
Stabilisation actors in order for the Comprehensive Approach to
be valued, understood and owned locally. Greater input into the
domestic security forces of police and legal institutions is needed
further to the development of local armed forces. The value of
developing and capacity building civil servants to run the conflict
affected countries can be addressed by the Comprehensive Approach
but there must be permission of those nations to design systems
and institutions that are suitable for them not simply a mirror
image of the UK.
Better communication is needed regarding the
purpose and benefits of HMG strategy to be targeted at both local
governments, down to the lowest district/provincial level, and
at other civil society actors including the humanitarian aid community.
There will be inherent difficulties in promoting this approach
as for example the civilian casualties caused by a military operation
are carried out by the same government that is providing reconstruction
and development through the comprehensive approach. The local
population needs to believe that HMG's involvement is for their
good, their protection and the improvement of their daily lives.
If this is not actually the case, or is perceived not to be the
case then local ownership of the approach as a whole will be unlikely.
Theme 10. What lessons have been learnt from
the application of the Comprehensive Approach in Iraq, Afghanistan
or other countries?
It is difficult for an NGO to comment on anything
learnt by government but we would encourage some research into
this. A sharing of those lessons would also be welcome as the
approach continues to be used and developed in areas of conflict.
As an NGO engaged in disaster response, Tearfund has learnt the
importance of dialogue with the military forces operating in the
same environment in order to explain our organisation's mandate,
our manner of working and how the work of the military and stabilisation
impacts this.
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