APPENDIX K
WAR CHILD
Paper prepared by Mark Waddington, Chief Executive
Officer and Nivi Narang, Campaigns Director, WAR CHILD
SUMMARY
This paper seeks to provide written responses
to each of the questions put forward by the National Audit Office's
enquiry into the Comprehensive Approach on behalf of the Defence
Select Committee.
Examples from War Child's experience in the
field, complimented with references from key elements of the relevant
body of literature are presented.
In summary, it is War Child's view that the
Comprehensive Approach is not currently effective, and that its
development is confined by the dominant military agenda that underlies
it. Recommendations are suggested to address this.
OVERVIEW AND
CONTEXT
War Child is an international award winning
charity that has worked for over 15 years to help protect children,
realise their rights and rebuild their lives in conflict and post
conflict situations.
War Child has previously delivered major humanitarian
projects, primarily emergency feeding, in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our focus is now on building a protective environment for marginalised
children in some of the worst conflict affected countries, including
Afghanistan, DRC, Uganda and Iraq, where we remain the only international
child protection organisation in the south of that country. In
addition, War Child has experience of operating in Palestine,
East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda.
War Child is also part of the War Child International
family, which collaborates on projects to maximise the benefit
of our collective efforts for children living with the effects
of war. War Child International currently operates in Sudan and
Sri Lanka.
War Child UK has worked in Iraq since 2003 in
Thi Qar and Basrah, and in Afghanistan since 2001 in Herat.
War Child works with some of the most marginalised
people in these countries—children who are affected simultaneously
by insecurity, extreme poverty and social exclusion. They are
often overlooked and hard to reach. They include street children,
children in prison, child soldiers and child mothers.
"The recruitment of children as suicide
bombers is an increasing threat and often involves significant
cajoling and trickery. UNICEF indicates that children as young
as six have been recruited to carry out such attacks. Many of
these children are from destitute families in volatile regions
of the country and are more easily persuaded to join the insurgents
for protection."
It is children like this that War Child is
working with in Iraq.
Our work, however, is not limited to working
with children. We work with families, local government, national
ministries, the judiciary, the police, the education system, local
religious organisations and local community based organisations
as well as with other NGOs. It is through the relationships we
build with these groups as well as with the local staff we employ
in these locations that we have a deep understanding of the context
on the ground, the needs and views of communities, their local
structures and cultures.
We also work closely with DFID and the FCO,
both of which have funded work in Afghanistan and DRC respectively.
We have liaised with the MoD directly and via the Humanitarian
Office for Coordination in Kuwait.
Theme 1: From a UK perspective, what does
your organisation understand by the term "Comprehensive Approach"?
War Child understands that the Comprehensive
Approach refers to an integrated approach across relevant government,
public and possibly private sector and/or non-governmental agencies
for the purpose of assessing, planning and implementing crisis
management and peace support operations.
War Child understands that its primary elements:
We understand that this is currently being driven
by the MoD. This clearly implies a dominant military agenda, which
reflects War Child's experiences on the ground.
Theme 2: Has the MoD and/or the UK Government
effectively communicated what it understands by the Comprehensive
Approach and the merits of such an approach?
No.
War Child operates in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
as well as in DRC and Uganda. We routinely work through civil-military
liaison organs. Our staff have worked in numerous conflict and
post conflict environments, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Gaza, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Rwanda and so on. Our
advocacy team works closely with UK Government departments as
well as with politicians. However, no staff member has heard of
the Comprehensive Approach.
In seeking to understand what the Comprehensive
Approach is, the primary source documents we found were:
— The Joint Discussion note 4/05, January
2006, promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff. The definition
of the Comprehensive Approach provided by this document is, at
best, vague and open to a variety of interpretations. As a means
of communicating the concept it is poorly written and has very
little substance.
— The Stabilisation Unit's "core
script" on the Comprehensive Approach. This paper scopes
out a clearer purpose, with a focus on joined up planning. However,
it is not a paper that would be accessible unless a specific search
was being made on the Comprehensive Approach. In other words,
you would have to know about the Comprehensive Approach before
being able to have found this paper.
Both documents are very limited in terms of
communicating the merits of a Comprehensive Approach:
— There is no reference to evidence,
success or failures, or even an example of how the Comprehensive
Approach has or might be employed in practise.
— There are huge gaps, including:
— how the Comprehensive Approach might
be used to prevent conflict occurring in the first place, and
— the duration of commitment of the
Comprehensive Approach,
— There is no consideration of a cross-government
capability to deliver it.
— There is only a limited assessment
regarding the status of its development as a concept and the challenges
to its practical implementation.
A brief online search yielded a wider, specialist
narrative on the Comprehensive Approach, such as conference reports
and official military documents, which provided a fragmented body
of literature. This body of literature presents significant inconsistencies
regarding the definition and purpose of the Comprehensive Approach,
which raise serious concerns for its humanitarian intentions on
the one hand, and the transparency of interests underlying its
use in any given situation on the other.
So, there does not appear to have been any substantive
effort by the MoD and/or UK Government to communicate the concept
of the Comprehensive Approach, the status of its development,
an acknowledgement of current limitations and/or gaps in its understanding
to anyone other than some internal stakeholders.
Theme 3: Does your organisation see the Comprehensive
Approach as an effective way of addressing international crises?
There are potentially several very significant
positives that might be gained through the use of a Comprehensive
Approach in addressing international crises:
— It recognises the links between humanitarian/development,
political and economic issues to security.
— It creates improved conditions for
a more inclusive consultation of key stakeholders in a way that
could make an intervention more responsive to the needs of civilians
on the ground.
— It improves the potential for having
clearer and more transparent objectives for an intervention, which
would enable non-state actors such as NGOs to more effectively
position themselves with regard to humanitarian, development and
advocacy needs, while having been explicit about intent the MoD
and/or UK Government could be more robustly held to account.
— It creates the possibility of a civilian
led intervention with military elements, rather than an intervention
that is defined and led primarily on military terms.
— It presents the opportunity to establish
the conditions in which conflict can be prevented through the
use of economic and political assets alongside the option of military
force in supporting governments which legitimately and to the
best of their capability represent the interests of civilians,
but which are at risk of coups, insurgencies or rebellion (see
the work of Paul Collier in War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in
Dangerous Places, 2009, Bodley Head).
However, according to Para 103 of the Joint
Discussion note 4/05, "the CA is a conceptual framework which
could be used to reinvigorate the existing, Cabinet Office-led
approach to coordinating the objectives and activities of Government
Departments in identifying, analysing, planning and executing
national responses to complex situations."
It is therefore by definition a whole government
approach and so is inherently politically motivated. This is inevitable
and necessary. However, International Humanitarian Law dictates
that humanitarian assistance, which is currently seen as an element
of the Comprehensive Approach, should be given regardless of the
political affiliation of a person, their ethnicity, religion and
so on. So while there may be alignment with humanitarian objectives
from time to time, the delivery of humanitarian action cannot
remain independent of government policy wherever it falls within
the scope of the Comprehensive Approach.
If humanitarian action is sourced in a "whole
government" owned strategy and subsequently delivered through
a Comprehensive Approach then it is not impartial. Consequently,
the humanitarian delivery agents will not be perceived to be neutral
within a conflict or post-conflict situation.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Approach is established
within the Joint Discussion Document as the "more extensive
employment of the Effects Based Approach"[64],
that is, its military aspect. The Comprehensive Approach is, therefore,
fundamentally seen through a military lens and driven by a military
agenda.
Four examples of a military dominance within
the comprehensive approach are given below:
1. Language use and misuse is at the heart of
much of the confusion surrounding civil-military relations. During
the Kosovo crisis, NATO's Chief Press Officer made reference to
"humanitarian bombing" and a "humanitarian war".
War Child believe that the term "humanitarian" should
not be used to describe any military operations.
2. Military sources close to War Child have stated
that senior military personnel are referring to the campaign in
Iraq as the "British defeat in Iraq", indicating two
things:
2.1The comprehensive approach has failed.
2.2Couching the description in the language of
defeat (and by default, victory) is not consistent with the Stabilisation
Unit's paper on the Comprehensive Approach.
3. ISAF have recently been distributing teddy
bears to the local population (via kindergartens, children's centres
and orphanages) in Herat, Western Afghanistan, which feature the
ISAF logo and words along the lines of "caring for the Afghan
people". This attempt to behave as an NGO and encourage goodwill
amongst the community following military action is hugely detrimental
to War Child and other NGOs. The lack of distinction between NGOs
and the military is likely to occur amongst ordinary people, which
will result in lack of goodwill, lack of trust and lack of security
of NGOs.
4. Within the frame of a military agenda, the
Comprehensive Approach has been neither able to deliver aid in
the volumes required nor without shaping it according to military
and political interests:
— Since 2001, $25 billion has been spent
in Afghanistan building local security forces. An equal
amount was pledged in aid but only $15 billion has been delivered.
Of that $15 billion, 40% has flowed back to the donor countries
through contractors and other foreign staff. In the mean time,
the security situation continues to deteriorate.
— Much of the money "follows the conflict",
It is disbursed in areas where the conflict is fiercest, suggesting
it is being used to achieve military and political aims rather
than the humanitarian or development needs of people.
— Because much of the aid flow into Afghanistan
is tied to a military two-thirds of assistance bypasses the Afghan
government, which raises serious question marks over the timing
of efforts to support the establishment of an elected government.
— Consequently, there is poor donor coordination
and communication, and so the Afghan government does not know
how 1/3 of the aid disbursed since 2001—$5 billion—has
actually been spent. This brings into question accountability
to Afghan civilians as well as to the western, tax-paying public.
ACBAR, Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, 2008
Because humanitarian assistance delivered within
the Comprehensive Approach has an inherently political basis (not
least as a result of the military drivers) its delivery will be
subject to partiality, and there will be a lack of neutrality
on the ground. Consequently, there are significant implications
for:
— Access to those civilians who require
humanitarian assistance.
— The space independent humanitarian
actors have to operate within, as defined by the parameters of
impartiality, neutrality and independence and, therefore, capability
to deliver.
— The security of independent humanitarian
agencies as a result of humanitarian actions being perceived as
non-neutral.
This leads to a number of unanswered questions:
— Where does the military role start
and end within a Comprehensive Approach?
— How does the military role relate
to the humanitarian role?
— How are local actors/NGOs involved
in a Comprehensive Approach, and how are prospective beneficiaries
able to input?
— Are all agencies/actors "in-theatre"
perceived as assets within the Comprehensive Approach and, if
so, what does this mean for the delivery of humanitarian assistance
to the very people who need it?
— How can the integrity of "campaign
authority"[65]
within the Comprehensive Approach be maintained given the dominance
of the Effects Based Approach?
— To what extent are military actors
able and/or willing to work with other actors toward a common
humanitarian language that does not utilise or spin alternative
meanings in order to cloak the negative consequences of military
actions, or service an agenda that is not always reconcilable
with humanitarian work?
These are all questions which need answering
in the planning phase of a Comprehensive Approach for a specific
crisis and then reviewing throughout the delivery of it. Full
transparency regarding the answers to these questions will be
vital to ensure that the purpose of a Comprehensive Approach is
fully understood and so that the key actors can be held to account
for it. It is on this basis that more effective coordination with
independent actors will be enabled and its legitimacy more deeply
rooted among civilians. And so finding the answers to these questions
must involve the consultation of civilians, their organisations
and NGOs.
In the mean time, within the frame of a Comprehensive
Approach people are perceived as objects, the vessels of attitude
and motivation, the holders of hearts and minds, allies or enemies.
They are not perceived, as they would be through an impartial
humanitarian lens, as human beings with rights, the actual subjects
of a humanitarian intervention. Consequently, within the four
primary elements of the Comprehensive Approach—political,
economic, military and humanitarian—the humanitarian needs
of people play a muted fourth fiddle.
Thus, humanitarian action is likely to serve
the political, economic and military objectives of foreign policy
rather than the requirements of international law, especially
international humanitarian law. This closes the loop in a way
that creates a partial, non-neutral frame for humanitarian assistance
that is not always in the interests of those who need help.
Humanitarian assistance is one of the St Petersburg
Tasks that form the mandate of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force.
There are major concerns about the effectiveness of humanitarian
assistance when delivered by the military within the frame of
a Comprehensive Approach. For example:
— Aid delivered by the military is
often short term and unsustainable. For example, during the Rwandan
crisis British forces established an army field hospital which
was open for only six weeks, which they demolished during a serious
Shigella outbreak.
— Also during the Rwandan crisis, the
RAF quoted cargo rates for the transport of humanitarian supplies
six times higher than those of a civilian airline.
— In Afghanistan, the US Army spent
$40m on food airdrops weighing 6,000 tonnes, equivalent to $7.50
per Kg. This compared with the World Food Programme's average
of $0.20 per Kg.
— Also in Afghanistan, the food packets
air dropped by the US military were the same colour as cluster
bombs, which they also dropped in over 235 locations.
— Most armies are not equipped to provide
health services for civilians. They are geared up to provide medical
care to a predominantly male, adult, healthy population. However,
80% of all displaced people are women and children.
It is worth noting that humanitarian aid is
not limited to food drops and field hospitals. It has crucial
social elements that are linked to both food security and health,
but which are also wider in scope such as child protection and
transitional justice. Neither the army nor DFID have this type
of expertise. For an NGO to do this work under the auspices of
a Comprehensive Approach would create challenges of access, security
and the actual humanitarian space required to ensure all the civilians
in need were assisted regardless of their ethnicity, religion,
age or gender.
Humanitarian assistance delivered through a
Comprehensive Approach diverts funds away from the established
humanitarian aid architecture. This prevents independent humanitarian
actors from doing their job effectively and so establishes the
conditions in which they will fail. Consequently, a pretext is
provided for humanitarian assistance to be delivered through a
Comprehensive Approach (rather than through independent humanitarian
actors) and the shaping of it by political and military interests.
For example, in Kosovo only 3.5% of total funding
from the top six EU contributors went to UNHCR. In overstepping
UNHCR's mandate and bypassing UNHCR's role as coordinator, governments
unilaterally (and through NATO) started to run the humanitarian
operation.
Finally, whenever military actors are involved
in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, very little effort
is made to learn and evaluate effectiveness.
For example, feedback from field staff on NATO's
Response Force involvement in the response to the Pakistan earthquake
raised concerns "about mission creep which occurred with
NATO contingents getting involved... in rehabilitation and other
longer term programmes, which could have been led by civilian
agencies. The NATO deployment also became politically controversial
in Pakistan; leading to the expedited withdrawal of NATO troops.
To date, no surveys have been conducted to assess the implications
of NATO involvement in the flood response for perceptions of International
NGOs, longer term rehabilitation assistance and humanitarian space.
Furthermore, despite the wider investment in "humanitarian
reform", policy makers also appear deaf to proposals that
donor nations might resource alternative civilian options for
providing such air-lift capacity."
NGO Seminar on Civil-Military Relations, February
2008, VOICE
Theme 4: Has the MoD and/or UK Government
worked effectively with the international community to adopt a
Comprehensive Approach?
In the Joint Discussion Document and the Stabilisation
Unit's paper on the Comprehensive Approach there is no consideration
of how adopting the Comprehensive Approach will require the buy-in
and commitment, as well as capability development among other
nations, not least NATO and EU member states.
As a consequence, there appear to be significant
inconsistencies across a variety of key international actors.
For example, the US military's Army Modernisation
Strategy establishes the Comprehensive Approach as a means of
ensuring full spectrum dominance. This can be reasonably interpreted
as total victory (see p.12 of http://downloads.army.mil/docs/08modplan/Army_Mod_Strat_2008.pdf),
which is not consistent with statements by the UK Government's
Stabilisation Unit core script on the Comprehensive Approach:
"The term "success" is now supplanting
the term "victory" in conflict-related operations, even
those in which military force is deployed and encompasses the
much wider requirement to ensure that the object of our engagement
is left in a viable condition—politically, economically,
socially and militarily."
This leads to a cloaking of vying interests
and creates distrust, conflicting interpretations of key terms
and inevitably, a lack of coordination with regard to humanitarian
activity. Consequently, humanitarian activities become even more
vulnerable to exploitation by political and military requirements,
threatening the core parameters of humanitarian space, not least
impartiality and neutrality.
This has been starkly illustrated during the
course of 2008 in Afghanistan where the consequences of military
activities on civilians do not appear to have been considered
as a particular factor in working effectively across the international
community's efforts.
High levels of civilian casualties undermine
the achievement of the objectives and/or strategic aim of the
Comprehensive Approach. With this in mind, neither the MoD nor
any other element of the UK Government in Afghanistan has sought
to monitor the excess mortality of Afghan civilians as a result
of the occupation, nor has this been championed as a necessity
to ensure informed policy and decision making within the delivery
of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan. Therefore, there
have only been limited efforts to mitigate the consequences of
military activity on civilians across the international community,
which challenges the local perception of legitimacy and so undermines
the Campaign Authority element of the Comprehensive Approach:
— "...it is virtually impossible
to get a clear and uncontested account of Afghan civilian deaths...
No organisation has undertaken sustained and consistent data gathering
and presentation, and so there is no agreed authoritative record,
nor any widely respected body able to authenticate future claims
to such authority."[66]
— "UNAMA Human Rights recorded
a total of 2,118 civilian casualties between 1 January and 31
December 2008. This figure represents an increase of almost 40%
on the 1523 civilian deaths recorded in the year of 2007. The
2008 civilian death toll is thus the highest of any year since
the end of major hostilities which resulted in the demise of the
Taliban regime at the end of 2001. Of the 2,118 casualties reported
in 2008, 1,160 (55%) were attributed to antigovernment elements
(AGEs) and 828 (39%) to pro-government forces. The remaining 130
(6%) could not be attributed to any of the conflicting parties
since, for example, some civilians died as a result of cross-fire
or were killed by unexploded ordinance."[67]
— "In 2007 Afghan security forces
and IMF [International Military Forces] supporting the Government
in Afghanistan were responsible for 629 (or 41%) of the total
civilian casualties recorded. At around 39% of total civilian
casualties, the relative proportion of deaths attributed to pro-government
forces remained relatively stable for 2008. However, at 828, the
actual number of recorded noncombatant deaths caused by pro-government
forces amounts to a 31% increase over the deaths recorded in 2007.
This increase occurred notwithstanding various measures introduced
by the IMF to reduce the impact of the war on civilians."[68]
Theme 5: Has the MoD
and/or the UK Government built the UK's capacity to engage in
a Comprehensive Approach to a crisis? What more could be done?
No
Because:
— A truly comprehensive civilian agency
is not in place nor capable of leading the planning or delivery
of a Comprehensive Approach;
— The lack of DFID's institutional
muscle to influence outcomes in a Comprehensive Approach. If DFID
were to be made a part of the FCO this would have catastrophic
consequences for the department's capability to champion the importance
of humanitarian an development issues outside a military agenda,
thereby significantly limiting the scope of a Comprehensive Approach;
and
— of the limiting attitude of the military.
For example, Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely,
Director of the UK Defence Academy and, therefore, ultimately
responsible for the training of all military personnel, limited
the purpose of a Comprehensive Approach to "driving a wedge
between the insurgent and the people".
US Government Counter-Insurgency Conference,
Washington, 28-29 September 2006
— The focus on crisis management only
and not prevention, or post-crisis follow up.
— Lack of capability to consult and
genuinely enrol the support of local stakeholders.
— Inadequate commitment of humanitarian
resources.
Theme 6: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the planning of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might the MoD/UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges?
The current decision making architecture utilised
throughout the Comprehensive Approach is very difficult to penetrate.
Therefore, the potential of NGOs to influence the planning of
the Comprehensive Approach is negligible.
For example, the federal and decentralised structure
of NATO operations in places like Afghanistan means that trying
to engage in planning is challenging and often fragmented. "Many
of the fundamental questions regarding civil military interaction
in Afghanistan, like the military's involvement in development
and reconstruction activities, are decided upon at a political
level. Debates between NGOs and junior military staff and policy
makers at the working-group level have little impact on these
decisions."[69]
This massively constrains NGOs ability to engage in planning.
Even where NGOs are able to engage with planning
processes, it is rarely a meaningful exercise and can be obscured
by vested military interests.
For example, without exception every meeting
held by War Child staff with ISAF on security trends in Afghanistan
have been on a one to one basis, in order to promote confidence,
candour and transparency. In all cases, including during 2008,
War Child was specifically told that the security situation in
Afghanistan was improving. This calls into question the point
of actually seeking to use resources in engaging the planning
process in a comprehensive approach if it is going to be predicated
by the avoidance of vital facts for the purpose of portraying
a more positive situation than actually exists. It also undermines
confidence in the integrity of information shared.
Theme 7: What are the challenges faced by
NGOs in engaging in the delivery of a Comprehensive Approach to
a particular crisis? How might the MoD/UK Government assist NGOs
in addressing these challenges?
Because NGOs are unable to influence the planning
of a Comprehensive Approach, the effects on delivery are likely
to be catastrophic.
Although NGOs are, for the most part, the primary
champions of civilian consultation, inclusion and rights—the
escalation in the number of deaths, kidnappings and intimidation
of humanitarian workers,[70]
has massively affected humanitarian access to large numbers of
people in Afghanistan thereby compounding existing challenges
to civilians. This is a huge problem to NGOs and is, in part,
attributable to their perceived and sometimes actual engagement
with the Comprehensive Approach.
In Afghanistan, the Comprehensive Approach is
led by military interests and objectives. It is not, therefore,
balanced, based on the needs of local civilian populations, and
so lacks legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans. Consequently, security
continues to deteriorate nationally.
Human Rights Watch raises "concerns as to
whether the attacking forces acted in accordance with their obligation
under the laws of war to exercise `constant care to spare the
civilian population' and take "all feasible precautions"'
to minimize loss of civilian life."
"There has been a massive and unprecedented
surge in the use of airpower in Afghanistan in 2008. In response
to increased insurgent activity, twice as many tons of bombs were
dropped in 2007 than in 2006. In 2008, the pace has increased:
in the months of June and July alone the US dropped approximately
as much as it did in all of 2006. Without improvements in planning,
intelligence, targeting, and identifying civilian populations,
the massive use of airpower in Afghanistan will continue to lead
to unacceptably high civilian casualties."
"NATO lawyers involved in investigating?
airstrikes told Human Rights Watch that in some TIC [Troops in
Contact] situations in which airstrikes have been called in, US
and NATO forces did not know who was in the area they were bombing.
Civilian casualties increase when forces on the ground do not
have a clear picture of the location and number of combatants
and civilians in an area. Such gaps in knowledge, when combined
with fear and the `fog of war' at times mean that forces resort
to airstrikes when options less likely to cause civilian loss
are available."
"Air-strikes remain responsible for the
largest percentage of civilian deaths attributed to pro-government
forces. UNAMA recorded 552 civilian casualties of this nature
in 2008. This constitutes 64% of the 828 non-combatant deaths
attributed to actions by pro-government forces in 2008, and 26%
of all civilians killed, as a result of armed conflict in 2008.
Nighttime raids, and `force protection incidents' which sometimes
result in death and injury to civilians, are of continuing concern.
Also of concern is the transparency and independence of procedures
of inquiry into civilian casualties by the Afghan Government and
the IMF [International Military Forces] |and the placement of
military bases in urban and other areas with high concentrations
of civilians which have subsequently become targets of insurgent
attacks."
Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths
in Afghanistan.
The delivery of NGOs' humanitarian and development
efforts are greatly compromised in Iraq due to the lack of funding
available. This has been acknowledged by several members of a
coalition of NGOs who work together to advocate for Iraq. A recent
War Child Iraq Appeal provides an example of how War Child believes
the current weak Comprehensive Approach in Iraq has affected our
funding. Our appeal was launched to raise money for children affected
by the war in Iraq. Despite having a significant communication
campaign[71]
we only raised tiny amount of money from the public. We believe
that the dominance of MoD messages in the media could have contributed
to this. In addition to government messaging about the urgency
of military operation, if DFID had given equal priority to communicating
the reality for civilians on the ground—their poverty, displacement,
lack of access to basic services, etc, the public may have been
persuaded that the need to donate to children in Iraq was important.
Aid provided to fragile states rarely lasts
long enough to help stabilise a country/region after conflict.
Development investment is not always forthcoming due to the fear
that conflict will resume or that conflict is universal. This
is known as the conflict trap—the less development, the
more chance of conflict.[72]
Similarly, the higher the chance of conflict, the lower the chance
of development. The huge resource gap for post-conflict situations
affects many NGOs, including War Child.
When NGOs apply for funding, we are asked to
provide evidence of the problems we describe. There is a dearth
of data about communities in conflict locations, partly because
of security issues but also due to a lack of commitment to invest
in obtaining it. This gap in information affects not only War
Child's ability to raise much needed money, but also the understanding
and acknowledgement of specific issues on the ground. These combined
issues have a significant affect on the delivery of humanitarian
and development programmes.
The stabilisation unit's description of the
Comprehensive Approach mentions the need for "state-building"
A NATO article acknowledges this and the need for building institutions
including the judiciary and police.
"Experience in Afghanistan and the Balkans
has demonstrated the importance of contributing to the International
Community's Comprehensive Approach for the success of operations,
which are increasingly of an integrated civilian-military character.
NATO is therefore trying to build closer partnerships with other
international organizations that have experience and skills in
areas such as institution building, development, governance, judiciary
and police"
The delivery of War Child's work on the ground
in Iraq and Afghanistan is often hindered by the judiciary and
police, who are more frequently a cause rather than a solution
to the problem. For example War Child's experience of the weak
judiciary in Afghanistan includes witnessing the impunity for
perpetrators of child abuse and children being kept in prison
alongside adults, often for crimes they have not committed. Similarly
War Child has evidence of a weak police. Rather than protecting
children, the police in countries including Iraq and Afghanistan
often display brutality to street children.
For the UK government to assist NGOs in addressing
this problem, there needs to be a greater emphasis on building
the capacity of institutions such as the judiciary and police,
which would include training on human rights, child rights, juvenile
justice, etc.
Theme 8: What are the challenges faced in
moving between different stages of a Comprehensive Approach, for
example from stabilisation to reconstruction?
The primary challenge is that military actors
do not know how to do this.
Firstly, the humanitarian sector has learned
from decades of experience that stabilisation—relief—reconstruction—rehabilitation—development
is not a sequential continuum. These elements are inter-dependent
and often occur concurrently.
Secondly, many civilians already have coping
strategies with regard to each of these elements. To impose solutions
without recognition of this can undermine these often life saving
coping strategies. For the most part, military actors take charge,
define problems and contrive solutions with little or no consultation.
This further undermines the inter-dependence of these elements.
Without investment in people and their ability to address their
own humanitarian needs, even administer support given to them,
dependency will be inevitable and sustainability will not have
a chance.
Thirdly, the military agenda which dominates
during the conflict/stabilisation elements of a Comprehensive
Approach have long term consequences for the way in which humanitarian
actors are perceived by civilians, which can create huge challenges
to legitimacy, participation and effective aid delivery.
For example, NGOs were identified as "force
extenders" under Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
which hugely compromised perceptions of NGO neutrality and led
to reduced access to civilian populations and a massive increase
in security risks in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Fourthly, the way in which assistance is delivered
is usually as important as the substance of the assistance itself.
Alice Thomson reporting from Afghanistan in
The Telegraph noted that:
"These people don't just need a few TV dinners
that might land on their heads (ie air drops). They need water—impossible
to drop from the air. They require medicine, but also someone
to administer it; oral rehydration tablets for cholera; tents
to keep out the snow; vaccination against measles; therapeutic
feeding for malnourished babies; millions of blankets. In Herat
last winter, 500 children died from hypothermia in temperatures
of -25C and that was before the war started."
Theme 9: How can local ownership of a Comprehensive
Approach be established?
The Comprehensive Approach is defined in the
Joint Discussion document as: Commonly understood principles and
collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable
and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.
If the Comprehensive Approach is to be an effective
way of addressing international crises for civilian populations,
then we have to understand its definition more clearly and ask
the following questions.
Who decides:
— What the common principles are?
— Which collaborative processes will
enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes?
— What the favourable and enduring
outcomes should be?
— Who they should benefit?
— When and where the Comprehensive
Approach should be used?
— How long it should be employed?
For the most part, civilians are denied a voice
in helping to shape these fundamental principles in any given
situation where a Comprehensive Approach is used, thereby denying
it the traction it needs to gain local legitimacy and support.
In order to enable local influence and ultimately
support of a Comprehensive Approach participatory, field based
surveys should be undertaken in advance of any military action
with civilians, civil society and other key stake holders in order
to assess the:
— likely impact over the short and
long term, with particular regard to civilians;
— cultural appropriateness;
— likely levels of support and participation;
— implications for local economic,
political or social structures;
— favourable outcome options and who
they are likely to benefit
— strategies that will enable independent,
impartial and neutral delivery of humanitarian assistance;
— potential alternative solutions to
military action.
Ultimately, the success of a Comprehensive Approach
will be defined by the ability to enrol, engage and genuinely
work with local stakeholders, and in War Child's experience, this
will be based on the capability and support of civil society.
Without exception, in all the countries War Child has operated
civil society has established that it is best placed to engage,
franchise and enable the genuine participation of civilians in
humanitarian and development programming. Unless there is investment
in the conditions to strengthen civil society—locally and
internationally—many of the structures through which information,
representation and accountability are enabled will remain weak.
This will have a knock-on effect on the effectiveness of attempts
to promote representation, relevance and governance throughout
the course of a crisis intervention and its follow up. Furthermore,
civil society organisations are, to varying degrees, independent.
Many have the specialised skills required to deliver humanitarian
assistance effectively. Limited investment in the conditions required
to support civil society, therefore, limits the extent of delivery
of impartial humanitarian assistance.
The role that DFID has to play in enabling this
is vital. DFID should, therefore, be the primary actor in a UK
Government Comprehensive Approach.
Theme 10: What lessons have been learnt from
the application of the Comprehensive Approach in Iraq, Afghanistan
or other countries?
Based on War Child's understanding and experiences
of working in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere, we are
proposing a 16 point plan that might enable the Comprehensive
Approach to become effective in addressing international crises:
1. The Comprehensive Approach narrative
needs to be realigned with a focus on civilians and their humanitarian
and economic needs.
2. It should not be limited to response,
but should also be employed in crisis prevention efforts.
3. Wherever the Comprehensive Approach is
employed, the overall aim and objectives must be clearly spelled
out and comply with International Law and be mandated by the relevant
authorities such as the UN.
4. All military actors must be ultimately
responsible to a civilian command architecture within a Comprehensive
Approach.
5. Military action should only be countenanced
if:
— all peaceful methods of resolution
have been exhausted,
— protection by the controlling authorities
have demonstrably failed,
— the overall aim and objectives of
the Comprehensive Approach in any intervention must be clearly
spelled out, comply with International Law and be mandated by
the relevant international authorities such as the UN,
— there is proportionality to the protection
needs of civilians at risk, and
— there is accountability to the UN.
6. The military should, if at all possible,
not get involved in humanitarian aid efforts. If military actors
must get involved, this should be in support of a lead civilian
agency, where the military stays in the background. Only as a
last resort should the military get directly involved in aid delivery,
and only if the humanitarian assistance process fails (but not
if this is as a result of funds and other resources being diverted
from humanitarian agencies to military and other state delivery
agents). In such circumstances the military should have a clear
plan of what, why, how and the duration their involvement, and
a clear strategy to hand over operations at the earliest possible
time to the relevant agency.
7. Clear lines need to be drawn between
independent humanitarian actors and those actors which are subject
to the mandate of a Comprehensive Approach. On this basis, the
criteria for dialogue to promote coordination and, where appropriate,
information sharing can be developed and compliance monitored.
8. The probability of conflict relapse after
a military intervention is high and so the Comprehensive Approach
must ensure a long term commitment. A Comprehensive Approach would
mean that even if the military leave, other relevant government
departments would remain active until the location in question
is economically, socially and politically stable.
9. A common language (with commonly shared
meanings) must be developed between humanitarian and military
actors.
10. A Comprehensive Approach and its core
objectives must mean the same thing to all actors involved within
it, especially within multi-lateral initiatives.
11. A genuinely independent monitoring and
evaluation capability must be established to evaluate and bear
witness to the effects of military actions on civilians and the
delivery of humanitarian assistance (directly or indirectly) within
a Comprehensive Approach.
12. Official monitoring and publication
of the primary impact of the Comprehensive Approach must be undertaken.
This must include surveying excess mortality, and must conform
to internationally established epidemiological standards. Vitally,
the data in such surveys must be disaggregated by age and gender.
13. One of the essential ingredients for
a successful Comprehensive Approach must be equal power across
key UK Government and/or international "departments".
In the UK this would include DFID, MoD and the FCO. DFID does
not currently have the mandate to fundamentally influence the
planning and delivery of a Comprehensive Approach. A Comprehensive
Approach must, therefore, ensure that DFID (and its UN agency
equivalents on the international stage) has the institutional
muscle to affect outcomes positively.
14. The Comprehensive Approach needs to
be developed as an international norm. In order to be effective
it must be adopted internationally, not least by the likes of
NATO, the EU, UN and especially by the US.
15. Investment in the conditions to strengthen
civil society, both locally and internationally. This is a vital
part of crisis prevention as well as crisis preparedness. This
must be undertaken in a way that secures the integrity of civil
society's independence, impartiality and neutrality.
16. Finally, and crucially, children comprise
more than 50% of all people living in failed and fragile states,
the countries most vulnerable to the type of crisis that might
require a Comprehensive Approach intervention. The status of children
is profoundly linked to the status of women.
Research by the likes of the ODI and IDS indicates
that children are the primary demographic structure through which
poverty is transmitted across generations. Children stunted by
malnutrition now, and children unable to go to school now equates
to drastically reduced development prospects for a country in
years to come. If a Comprehensive Approach is to be successful,
therefore, it must be aligned with the long term conditions required
to promote the development of children and women. Otherwise, the
likelihood of a crisis relapse during a prolonged post-conflict
period will dramatically increase.
This can best be achieved by utilising a rights
based framework throughout the planning and delivery narrative
of a Comprehensive Approach. Reference to key treaties and conventions,
such as Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child, UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and so on, will need
to be a central part of this narrative. This will provide a deeper
human substance to a Comprehensive Approach in a way that makes
it more meaningful to both civilian populations as well as to
UK tax payers, and is more likely to result in its success thereby
providing value for money.
16 October 2009
64 The Effects Based Approach is defined as the "the
way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable
the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution
within a Comprehensive Approach". Back
65
Campaign Authority is "an amalgam of 4 interdependent factors:
the perceived legitimacy of the international mandate; the perceived
legitimacy of the authority of those conducting operations; the
degree to which factions, local populations and other actors subjugate
themselves to the authority of those conducting operations; and
the degree to which the activities of those conducting operations
meet the expectations of factions, local populations and others".
Joint Discussion Note 4/05. Back
66
John Sloboda, The Need to Acquire Accurate Casualty Records in
NATO Operations, Oxford Research Group, May 2009. Back
67
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights
Unit Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
2008. Back
68
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights
Unit Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
2008. Back
69
NGO Seminar On Civil-Military Relations. Feb, 2008. VOICE. Back
70
"Aid agencies have long criticised Western troops in Afghanistan
and Iraq for carrying out small development projects, "blurring
the lines" between military and humanitarian actors. For
instance, the Taliban issued a statement after killing four aid
workers in Afghanistan on 13 August (2008), accusing them of working
for "foreign invader forces"." An article by Humanitarian
Relief on a report by the centre for international Cooperation
and the Overseas Development Institute (see http://humanitarianrelief.change.org/blog/view/attacks_against_aid_workers) Back
71
through gigs hosted by high profile celebrities, national TV advertising
and radio coverage across Europe. Back
72
For example see Collier, The Bottom Billion. Back
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