Memorandum from Josh Arnold-Foster
JOINED UP
GOVERNMENT AND
THE PLANNING
OF THE
HELMAND TASK
FORCE DEPLOYMENT
This note is in response to the Defence Select
Committee's call for written evidence for their inquiry into the
Comprehensive Approach. It is based upon personal observation
as a Special Advisor of the Whitehall planning and policy development
process for the deployment of the Helmand Task Force between July
2005 and May 2006.
BACKGROUND
1. In the run up to the deployment of the
Task Force a Ministerial group was set up chaired by the Defence
Secretary to co-ordinate the different Government Departments
planning for the Helmand deployment. The three Departments most
closely involved were the MoD, the FCO and DIfD. In addition the
Home Office and the Treasury were also represented. Various questions
were considered and some were decided upon at these meetings,
including resource levels, assessments of local political, economic
and security issues, and relations with other NATO allies. There
was also communication between Government Departments at both
Ministerial and official level outside of these formal meetings.
2. Initially there was a high degree of
expertise and commitment from all Government Departments to this
process. As the scale and complexity of the challenges faced in
Helmand became more apparent that commitment was strengthened
significantly. While there are a number of criticisms that can
be made of the planning process there was no lack of will to try
and ensure that a comprehensive approach was successfully adopted
and implemented. However there are some bureaucratic and philosophical
difficulties that need to be overcome before the Government can
implement a truly comprehensive approach to national security.
PLANNING FOR
THE HELMAND
TASKFORCE
3. The Ministerial group meetings considered
issues on the basis of written or oral submissions from officials
and my recollection is that these were generally produced by individual
Departments, rather than the result of a combined effort by officials
from different Departments. The MoD provided advice on the size
and scale of proposed British forces and other military issues.
The FCO briefed on the composition and personalities of Afghan
and other relevant political figures, and DIfD produced papers
on local agriculture and other development issues.
4. These submissions provided a very detailed
analysis of individual challenges in the various fields of governance,
security, economic development etc. They also proposed a variety
of policy options to tackle these challenges. In addition there
was a general recognition that the challenges were closely inter-related.
What seemed to be lacking was a detailed, holistic and comprehensive
analysis of how the different factors that effected stabilization
were related to each other. In part this was due to the significant
shortage of reliable and current economic and sociological data
relating to Helmand. Nevertheless there could have been a more
joined up approach to analysis and recommendation on various policy
questions.
5. For instance the provision of new irrigation
systems could be used either to divert farmers away from opium
cultivation or by local warlords to grow even more opium through
indentured labour or both. In Helmand ensuring that the first
outcome is the most likely is not simply a development task but
also requires close coordination of political and security operations.
Another question is the degree to which development resources
are devoted to providing work for young men. The MoD would tend
to give this a high priority as it will help to divert them away
from insurgency, but DIfD may see this as less cost effective
in terms of long term poverty relief. Addressing these questions
cannot be done by one Department alone—it requires joint
input and analysis from a range of views from different areas
of Government. While the PCRU did provide some input on these
types of questions the bulk of advice provided to Ministers was
from individual Department.
A MORE INTEGRATED
PLANNING AND
IMPLEMENTATION FUNCTION
IN WHITEHALL?
6. While the planning process for the Helmand
deployment was efficient on reflection it may have been more effective
to have co-located most of the officials involved full time in
planning the Helmand deployment in one location and formed them
into one office or unit, preferably by integrating such a function
within the PCRU (now the Stabilisation Unit). It would have been
tasked with providing the bulk of advice to Ministers and only
those issues that had a major impact on the rest of the individual
Department would be subject to separate advice from within that
Department. Such issues could have included duty of care for deployed
personnel, allocation of major strategic assets such as helicopters,
strategic investment in staff development and so forth.
7. Evidently the Government is developing
its policy on closer inter-Departmental working arrangements.
Possible additional planning capabilities for the Stabilisation
Unit are under consideration. However if the Unit also had the
ability to provide Ministerial advice on the implementation of
proposed plans this could significantly enhance the Government's
ability to implement the Comprehensive Approach. This should not
necessarily undermine the duty of Ministerial accountability to
Parliament. The official in charge of this unit would have a slightly
more challenging task of responding to the concerns of three different
Ministers, but these difficulties would be outweighed by the advantage
of having a common analysis of the problems and a common solution.
None of this should dilute the ability of different subject matter
experts to provide clear and distinctive advice in their separate
areas of expertise. Nor should it be seen as an attempt to suppress
or discourage internal discussion and debate within Government
about the Comprehensive Approach. What is urgently required is
the ability to synthesise these different strands of thought and
advice into a coherent and convergent set of policy recommendations.
Ministers would still be collectively responsible for making decisions
on the basis of relevant advice.
CURRENT AND
FUTURE POLICY
DEVELOPMENT
The Senior Responsible Officer
9. In its Memorandum to this Inquiry the
Government reported on the conclusions of a conference earlier
this year about whether the appointment of a Senior Responsible
Officer (SRO) in theatre responsible for operational delivery
would be appropriate. Understandably questions about their remit
and authority would be difficult but what is less apparent is
why the issue of which Department should provide the SRO is as
difficult. In a speech last year the Chief of the General Staff,
General Sir Richard Dannatt, said
10. "I am completely comfortable with
putting my soldiers under command of the FCO or DFID in order
to help them deliver their effects. Indeed, it is clear to me
that we must start to develop in Defence niche capabilities against
what is now being called Military Assistance, Stabilisation and
Development tasks—MASD—and this is a new, emerging
military task." (Speech to Progress meeting, 21 July 2008)
11. This willingness to closely integrate
different parts of Government could work both ways. Why shouldn't
DIFD and FCO personnel be instructed by a senior military officer?
Obviously as they are civilians such an arrangement would not
be placing themselves "under command" as the military
understand it. That is why in some circumstances SROs may use
"influence" rather than executive authority.
12. The only consideration in selecting
the right SRO for a stabilisation operation should be whether
he or she is the best person for the task. Providing they have
the right experience and expertise it is unclear why which Department
they come from has any relevance to the selection criteria.
Funding
13. Traditionally the FCO and DIFD have
always had far smaller funds available to support stabilisation
operations. The MoD has the significant advantage of calling on
the Treasury Reserve and on the Urgent Operational Requirement
procedure to access substantial additional financial resources
from the Treasury. While the Government is altering this capability
the military will still tend to have this advantage when deployed
on stabilisation operations. This can lead to tensions over the
tempo and scale of planned activities. One way to resolve this
difficulty would be to give the FCO and DIFD access to similar
arrangements with the Treasury. If it is, in principle, right
for the military to have access to substantial additional funds
for stabilisation operations then the same principle should apply
to their colleagues in the FCO and DIFD.
Lessons learned
14. There has been considerable analysis
of the theory and practice of the Comprehensive Approach, both
in academic and political circles. Much reference has been made
to the British experience of this type of operation. However what
is currently lacking is a comprehensive official study of some
of the key examples of the UK's historic involvement in stabilisation
operations. That is why the Government should consider producing
official histories of the Malayan, Kenyan and Cyprus campaigns.
There may be political and legal questions that would need to
addressed before commissioning such works but nevertheless these
could be a very useful guide to future policy makers.
CONCLUSION
15. The British Government is likely to
be engaged in stabilisation operations in Afghanistan and probably
elsewhere for many years to come. Ensuring that different Government
Departments work together as effectively and efficiently as possible
will be a vital part of such operations. Expanding the role and
capabilities of the Stabilisation Unit is not the only answer
to this challenge. Addressing the cultural and philosophical differences,
sorting out the division of responsibilities for implementation
and so forth will all be critically important. However concentrating
all of the relevant Whitehall policy makers and advisors within
one administrative unit should make advice to Ministers more comprehensive
and therefore more likely to achieve the relevant strategic objective.
16. This memorandum is based upon relatively
limited exposure to inter-Departmental working arrangements established
over three years ago. Much has changed since then and therefore
parts of this memorandum may no longer be relevant. In addition
my perspective as a Special Advisor is inevitably limited. I should
stress that both the civilian and military personnel involved
worked very hard to plan an effective and successful operation
which was fully in line with the Comprehensive Approach.
Josh Arnold-Forster
Former Special Advisor to the Defence Secretary,
2005-2006
7 July 2009
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