Supplementary memorandum from Professor
Theo Farrell, Department of War Studies, King's College London
1. This memorandum follows up on a key theme
that emerged in my oral evidence before the Defence Select Committee
on 9 June, namely, the degree of support amongst serving British
officers for the Comprehensive Approach. In my testimony, I cited
from memory two surveys that I had conducted which provided some
data on this question. This memorandum provides that data.
2. Both surveys were designed by myself
and Professor Terry Terriff (University of Calgary) to test officer
attitudes to military transformation. This was for a project on
European military transformation funded by the UK Economic and
Social Research Council (Grant RES-228-25-0063).
3. The first survey was of British officers
at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), Shrivenham,
from March to May 2007. 138 officers responded to the survey;
60% of these were Army officers and 66% were middle ranking officers
(major or equivalent). The second survey was a larger survey of
European officers at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany,
from 2007-2008. 2464 officers responded to this survey (again,
most were middle ranked), of which 146 were British[106].
4. Each survey asked 15 questions about
military transformation. One question asked about the effects
based approach to operations. Officers were asked for their views
on the proposition that the future of operations would involve
an "holistic approach", involving a "mix of military
and non-military instruments", and directed towards "strategic
effects". In the NATO survey, 86% agreed with this proposition,
including 86% of British officers[107].
In the JSCSC survey, 88% of officers agreed with this proposition[108].
This is an extraordinarily positive result.
5. Finally, I should like to emphasize what
I said in my oral evidence, that British officer attitudes to
the Comprehensive Approach need to be viewed in the context of
the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). Hence, our surveys
asked officers for their view on EBAO but in so doing it also
tests their view on the Comprehensive Approach.
6. EBAO concepts and doctrine developed
in Britain between 2004-2008, driven by two factors: (1) lessons
learned from operations in Bosnia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1999),
Sierra Leone (2000-01), and Iraq (2003 on) which highlighted the
need for a more integrated multidisciplinary and multi-agency
approach to operations; and (2) new effects-based operations (EBO)
ideas and doctrine emerging from the United States in the early
2000s.
7. US EBO doctrine sought to develop a scientific
approach to operations, incorporating systems of systems analysis.
This scientific and staff intensive approach conflicted with British
military culture (and especially command culture). Hence from
2005 on, the British began to develop their own EBAO which de-emphasised
the systems of systems approach, and emphasized the imperative
to integrate kinetic and non-kinetic activities in a coherent
approach to operations. Since many of these non-kinetic activities
would be resourced and conducted by non-military partners, this
provides the underpinning logic (from the military's perspective)
of the Comprehensive Approach.
8. In August 2009, US Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) formally abandoned EBO doctrine. This is because the
new commander of USJFCOM, General James Mattis, felt that the
attempt to develop a scientific approach to operations was a dangerous
illusion and damaging to joint command and operational effectiveness.
The UK's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), also
under a new commander, Major General Paul Newton, has likewise
abandoned Britain's EBAO doctrine, in part because of the unhelpful
association with the now discredited EBO doctrine. However, the
underlying philosophy from EBAO, of the need to focus on generating
and measuring non-kinetic as well as kinetic effects, and to integrate
kinetic and non-kinetic activities in a coherent approach to operations,
has been retained. Indeed, it lies at the heart of DCDC's new
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, "Security and Stabilisation:
The Military Contribution."
106 See Ev 153. Back
107
See Ev 154. Back
108
See Ev 155. Back
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