The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace - Defence Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160 - 179)

TUESDAY 16 JUNE 2009

SIR BILL JEFFREY KCB, SIR PETER RICKETTS KCMG AND DR NEMAT "MINOUCHE" SHAFIK

  Q160  Linda Gilroy: When will the report be ready to which you have referred on the wheat example because that presumably will give some more detail about which bits have contributed towards the success of that?

  Dr Shafik: I do not know that but I can find out for you.

  Q161  Linda Gilroy: Thank you. Again, you have already discussed very much the strategic development and planning in the Comprehensive Approach and you have given us a pretty positive picture, but if it is now established in the right direction of travel what things are standing in the way of it becoming even stronger? What are the barriers to the Comprehensive Approach being better routed, more successful in the future? Perhaps each one of you could say one thing you would change about how your work and the work of ministers is done on the Comprehensive Approach that would deliver results that will be sustainable over time.

  Sir Peter Ricketts: To be honest with the Committee budgets are something that we have to work to overcome. My own observation is that Comprehensive Approach works best of all in the field. If you want to see it really working well then Lashkar Gah or Basra is the place to go, or Kabul. We are learning to make it work in Whitehall and I think it is a lot better than it was, as colleagues have said. The fact that we do still all have accounting officer responsibilities to this Parliament and we are all responsible for our own departmental votes means that we have to pay attention to how each department's money is spent, and that means that pooling money, working across departmental boundaries is an excellent thing to do but is not always an easy thing to do. Certainly in the case of the FCO we have struggled to find the budget to do the sorts of deployments in Afghanistan that we have wanted to make, and we are now making the pools work better jointly but the accounting officer structure of government accounting does not make that easy.

  Q162  Linda Gilroy: Are there ways in which that can be changed or is it just a feature of it?

  Sir Peter Ricketts: Unless we ever got to a point of having a single budget for the Afghanistan operation, which is somehow jointly owned by the three departments, we will have to make the current system work where we are each individually responsible for our own budgets, and yet we want to work collaboratively together. We are making it work but the system is not ideal.

  Q163  Chairman: You were arguing against that earlier, were you not?

  Sir Peter Ricketts: In what respect, Mr Chairman?

  Q164  Chairman: In respect of a single budget with perhaps a single minister in charge of it.

  Sir Peter Ricketts: I was not talking so much about a single minister; I was talking about a single pot of money, which would make life easier in terms of across departmental working.

  Q165  Linda Gilroy: Sir Bill?

  Sir Bill Jeffrey: I think I would say that although we have made progress we are still not where we need to be in terms of being able to deploy the right numbers of the right kinds of civilians, appropriately trained, as rapidly may be needed for the purpose. We are a lot closer to it than we were but that is one of the remaining tasks.

  Dr Shafik: It is much easier when you do not have to coordinate with dozens of other allies. So Sierra Leone was the situation where the UK military intervened in 2002; we had an integrated HMG effort; we had to sort out the Comprehensive Approach among us but it was not among 32 allies, each of whom had their own Ministry of Defence and Development Ministry and Foreign Ministry. The variable geometry gets very complicated in Afghanistan, if I may say. Ultimately the Comprehensive Approach can be made to work in a Sierra Leone case where it is one country doing the Comprehensive Approach, or maybe a small group of partners, but I suspect if you were dealing with very complex situations with large numbers of participants you need to multilateralise the problem and that is where I think that the work we are doing collectively to get the UN to be a much more effective deliverer of the Comprehensive Approach itself is probably a very important piece of work.

  Q166  Linda Gilroy: I think we will probably be coming on to the international links in a moment, so thank you for that. Can I move on to PRTs and how well they do their work? Does their success depend too much on the personalities of those involved? What can each of your contributions do to mitigate against that, starting with Dr Shafik?

  Dr Shafik: In terms of the effectiveness?

  Q167  Linda Gilroy: Yes and how dependent are they on the leader person and the personality, the leadership of the group? And what are you doing in one way both to encourage that but also to mitigate it?

  Dr Shafik: There is no doubt that leadership matters and I think we have seen when we have had good leaders of PRTs that they are more effective. Having a cadre of people who are experienced in these situations is quite important. The future head of the PRT in Helmand, for example, is somebody who used to be head of DFID's office in Iraq, was head of DFID's programme in Afghanistan and is now going back to run the PRT in Helmand and has a strong track record of working in conflict environments. That is good to build up a cadre of leaders who can do that. I think that the FCO also now has a cadre of people who have that experience. But leaders cannot be the whole story and so the work that we are doing through the Stabilisation Unit and building up the civilian cadre and having other people in the PRT who have experience working in this comprehensive inter-departmental way will reinforce the fact when you do not have the strongest leadership. So I think you have to work on both fronts—the leaders as well as the worker bees that are also need to be embedded with a comprehensive spirit.

  Q168  Chairman: How many people in your department speak Pashtu, Dr Shafik?

  Dr Shafik: None; in terms of the employees in DFID. But to be honest—

  Q169  Chairman: Not one?

  Dr Shafik: Not fluently. I think a lot of the people who have served have studied the language and can manage, but to say I have a fluent Pashtu speaker, no.

  Q170  Chairman: Is that something that you should perhaps be addressing?

  Dr Shafik: We have tended, I have to say, to rely on the FCO for being the linguists and we have tended to recruit people on the basis of their development expertise because they deploy all around the world.

  Q171  Chairman: And lots of times to Afghanistan. Should you not be addressing it?

  Dr Shafik: Clearly it would be a good thing and we encourage our staff if they are interested, but it is a weakness—it is a weakness.

  Mr Jenkin: Chairman, it is only fair to ask the Armed Forces the same question.

  Chairman: Do not worry, we will!

  Q172  Linda Gilroy: If you would like to cover that?

  Dr Shafik: The only other thing I would say is that we rely very heavily on local staff; we have more Afghan staff working for us in Afghanistan than we have UK staff, so a lot of the language issues are addressed by the fact that much of our work is actually being done by Afghans.

  Q173  Chairman: How long do you assess the military will be in Afghanistan?

  Dr Shafik: I hope the military will not be in there as long as we are, but I think for at least 20 years.

  Q174  Robert Key: Chairman, might I ask Dr Shafik how many of your locally employed staff, your Afghan staff speak English?

  Dr Shafik: Virtually all of them speak some English. Some of the more lower level administrative staff—not the administrative staff but drivers and so on will not speak very good English, but everyone will speak some; and our professional staff are excellent.

  Q175  Linda Gilroy: So the same question about PRTs and how they look and whether they are over-dependent on the leadership on the one hand but what you could do to make sure that every PRT has good leadership.

  Sir Bill Jeffrey: I agree with what Minouche said. I think the nature of this beast is such that the person you put in charge of it is going to have a profound impact on how successful this is. I think that the PRTs as entities, the kind of model that we saw when we were last in Lashkar Gah is what we ought to be aiming for with a good mix of military and civilian people with the right skills. The way to make it stronger and more consistently effective is by, as Minouche has described, growing a group of staff who have done quite a bit of this sort of thing. The woman who is about to take over in Lashkar Gah is I think known to the Committee and, as Minouche says, is on her third post of this kind; and that must help if we can get that degree of consistency into it.

  Q176  Linda Gilroy: And as far as Pashtu?

  Sir Bill Jeffrey: I would need notice about how many of our military colleagues speak Pashtu. I do not think the answer is zero.

  Chairman: I think it may be.

  Q177  Linda Gilroy: Except that presumably in terms of training the Afghan Army, whether it is zero or not it is an important aspect of what should be done. When I was over there with the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme I saw even quite junior marines sitting down with their colleagues from the Afghan Army and conducting almost mini jirgas with elders—it was put on, a presentation for our purposes. So there seems to be a great thirst at the lower levels but whether at the level of fluency where it could matter quite a bit there is sufficient paid to that, and presumably again does it rely on what the Foreign Office have in the way of Pashtu speakers. Perhaps Peter could deal with that?

  Sir Bill Jeffrey: If I could just finish off the point? I think in the military context it would certainly help—no doubt about it. What we tend to do is to rely greatly on local interpreters who certainly from my observation are usually very good.

  Q178  Dai Havard: The Gurkhas.

  Sir Bill Jeffrey: The other limiting fact inevitably with the military is that we are deploying on a six-monthly cycle quite a significant proportion of the British Army and the Marines. Having said all that, though, it would help if we had more fluent Pashtu speakers.

  Q179  Linda Gilroy: Of course some people are now serving second, third, fourth and even more terms of deployment there. Sir Peter.

  Sir Peter Ricketts: Ms Gilroy, on your point about leadership I agree with what my colleagues have said—leadership is always important in these operations and a good leader will always make a difference and make an operation better. So, yes, we need to make sure that the leader of our PRT is an effective leader and also can work well in this joint structure that we have with the brigadier who is there. But we also need to have systems in place so that it is not totally reliant on any one individual and there is a strong enough system so that cooperation will work in addition to there being a good leader at the top. I think it is very important and a very powerful signal that the next civilian leader of our operation in Helmand will be a DFID member of staff—I welcome that very much. We do have some Pashtu speakers—I would need to find out how many exactly—but I am sure we could always do with more. We certainly expect to be in Afghanistan and the Pashtu region for the long term. So we need to build up a larger cadre of Pashtu speakers. We are trying to keep some of our key staff rather longer in Afghanistan; for example, our Ambassador who recently came back did almost two years and our current Ambassador will aim to do that sort of length of time as well, to give even more continuity in experience of the country.


 
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