The contribution of ISTAR to operations - Defence Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 81-114)

MR VICTOR CHAVEZ, MR PETER EBERLE AND MR JOEL GRUNDY

20 OCTOBER 2009

  Q81  Chairman: Good morning. Welcome to our evidence session on the contribution of ISTAR to operations. There are two parts to this evidence session and the first is from industry, and you are most welcome. I wonder if you could introduce yourselves, please.

Mr Grundy: Thank you, Chairman. My name is Joel Grundy; I am Head of Defence and Security for Intellect, which is the UK trade association for the technology industry.

  Mr Chavez: Victor Chavez, Deputy Chief Executive, Thales UK.

  Mr Eberle: Peter Eberle, Business Development Director for UK business within General Dynamics UK Limited.

  Q82  Chairman: Thank you all very much for coming to give evidence to us, some for the second time. This being an inquiry into ISTAR I think it would be only polite to everybody to say, tell us what ISTAR is?

  Mr Chavez: I think it is very important that actually we look at that in simple terms. We have been working with Intellect and MoD to actually clarify the use of language around some of this technology; because it is an area, I am sure you would agree, which has a tendency to disappear into acronyms and so on. ISTAR in clear layman's terms would be the function by which we can collect intelligence, by which we analyse that intelligence and by which we share that intelligence with the potential users using communications mechanisms. Even though we talk about ISTAR—and the strict definition of the word is intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—inherent in that is actually very clearly a very strong need to communicate that information around the battle space. I think we all need to work very hard at actually clarifying this and communicating the benefits that accrue from having this very important capability.

  Q83  Chairman: The last report we did on this was on unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, and I came to the conclusion while we were doing that inquiry that we were doing an inquiry into the wrong thing, namely, simply the platform; and actually the most important thing is to look at the entire system as a whole. I wonder if you could answer this question: do you think the Ministry of Defence pays enough attention to the direction and the processing and the dissemination of these intelligence issues, rather than to the platforms themselves; or do they make the same mistake that I think we made?

  Mr Grundy: Chairman, as you know from both our submission last year and the evidence we gave to that inquiry and this year, it is a longstanding concern of industry to make sure that there is balance across the sense, the understand, the share and the decide functions within the wider information security envelop. What I would say is, since that last inquiry last year, and as a result of some of the relationships we have had with the MoD this year and clarity around the programme and strategies, the MoD has very much recognised and put in place a number of things in the forward programme specifically to boost capability in the DPD environment. However, the caveat to that from industry's point of view is that whilst they are currently in the programme, in the future capability space, up until there is a point where they are commissioned, signed off and funded I think industry will retain some element of scepticism, if you like, until we actually reach the point of delivery for reasons you are very familiar with.

  Q84  Chairman: We will be coming on to funding issues in a moment or two.

  Mr Eberle: I think I would like to add a little bit more on the wider system and the use of the human in the whole process. ISTAR is not a stand-alone activity, it is something that actually supports every operation that is carried out; and of course there is a need for appropriate personnel and skills to ensure that the system runs well. That is a significant element of the capability.

  Q85  Chairman: Is it possible to answer this question: what would be the best balance of resources between the collecting platforms and all the other aspects of ISTAR; or is that a meaningless question? You are allowed to say it is a meaningless question!

  Mr Grundy: I think it is a very difficult question to answer without more context, Chairman.

  Q86  Chairman: What a polite way of putting it!

  Mr Grundy: The differences in terms of operational scenario or use case or the type of ISTAR that one would use in a maritime capability is going to have a very different balance from that on current operations, say, because of density and all sorts of things.

  Mr Chavez: I think current operations certainly make you re-evaluate the mix potentially. If you look at the current completes, the shift to asymmetric warfare has created a huge increase in the burden, the requirement and the challenge of ISTAR; because you have moved from an environment where in conventional warfare you are talking about identifying an enemy tank, or identifying an enemy platoon of soldiers; the ISTAR challenge of Afghanistan and Iraq is about identifying the terrorist, the terrorist in the crowd at the market, the terrorist with an AK47. These things are much more difficult to identify. Therefore, the ISTAR challenge and the capability that is required in Afghanistan and Iraq is significantly different, in my opinion, to that required for conventional warfare.

  Mr Eberle: In a former life I was in the Royal Navy and I was a predecessor of Air Commodore Gordon in the Ministry of Defence and balance of investment studies were a fundamental element of what we were doing at the time to try and determine what the correct balance was. I can agree with Mr Chavez that it was difficult enough looking back at that stage when we were at just the end of the Cold War going into the new paradigm; and, I have to say, with current operations and this asymmetric threat, that is a very significant change which needs to be evaluated and is being evaluated by the MoD at the moment.

  Q87  Mr Crausby: Mr Chavez, Thales in its memorandum says that "commercial sensitivity acts as a barrier to interoperability", and we picked up here other issues in the United States. What are the main barriers to ISTAR interoperability?

  Mr Chavez: I think this again is a growing problem that is brought about by the need for ever-increasing levels of integration between different ISTAR systems. In the past collectors operated in their own domain and there was not actually the communications and intelligence mechanisms to share that information in a sensible way; now that opportunity is open to us and MoD and most of the governments have moved forward by standardisation. With UAV systems there is a NATO-agreed standard for the imagery intelligence format that needs to be produced; and then you can share that between different nations. Ultimately, there is the prospect of integration. All of that intelligence comes down and is shared across, and that is what programmes like DABINETT are there for really, to take different information share it and make one and one equal three, for example. The issue around the commercial sensitivity is the fact that, because these things have operated previously in independent stovepipes, industry has been able to just define their own specifications for interfaces and so on. Really the commercial sensitivities are as much about the ownership of programme interfaces as anything else. Going forward, therefore, one of the key evolutions that MoD is in the process of making is moving to an overall system architecture; and an overall system architecture in which it, MoD, owns the interfaces. It is really about extending that standardisation process down to the point that if Thales makes the system it has an MoD interface—an MoD-owned interface in terms of the intellectual property around that interface—so MoD can give that interface to any other company that it wishes to integrate its systems with. There is a transition towards an overall systems architecture and a much more open systems approach to definition of integration.

  Q88  Mr Crausby: How effective has the MoD been in achieving interoperability across all of the ISTAR platforms? What more could they do? What more could industry do?

  Mr Chavez: I think the MoD evidence on this is quite good in that we are getting to the point where we have compatibility; so UAVs produce information in the same format and that information exists within those systems. The next step is to actually put the cross-cutting projects in place that allow that information not just to exist in that individual stovepipe, but to be shared around the place. They are the set of projects that are now being delivered I think under urgent operational requirement and through the DABINETT programme. The importance of DABINETT, the centrality of DABINETT to actually making the most of all the information that has been gathered, cannot be understated.

  Q89  Mr Crausby: Can you tell us generally, how important is the issue of data standardisation?

  Mr Eberle: If I may, Mr Crausby, the UK plays a very major role in the standardisation in NATO, something that Air Commodore Gordon mentioned when he gave evidence; and part of that activity is trying to establish—and successfully in the past, although it sometimes take a little while—those key definitions which are going to be used for the exchange of data and for interoperability purposes. Clearly when the UK is operating a coalition of many, many nations, not all of which are in NATO, it is still NATO standards that build the bedrock on which everybody will interact. As I say, it does sometimes take time, but by and large the UK and the US work very closely together to make sure that evolving technological standards are actually introduced into the standardisation process as soon as possible so they actually lead into an evolutionary approach to interoperability.

  Q90  Linda Gilroy: Apart from the discussion you just had with Mr Crausby about interoperability, to what extent is the equipment deployed capable of doing more than it currently does; is it held back by cumbersome procedures and lack of training or awareness; or is the greatest restriction in fact technological?

  Mr Eberle: I think that many of the systems we talk about—whether in ISTAR or in a more general sense—have the ability to do multiple jobs: especially fast jets, fast fixed-wing aircraft, have the ability to do a number of missions, including a certain element of reconnaissance which feeds into the ISTAR domain. Many of these systems have other capabilities which emerge when they are actually used that are not necessarily part of the requirement when they are designed; and subsequently the ability to use them to better effect and experimentation, which the MoD is taking ahead in a very meaningful way, is part of the way to actually make sure that you can find out these capabilities that you might not have necessarily foreseen, especially when you bring together multiple capabilities and achieve a better effect overall. Within industry, within GD for instance, innovation (and we have an innovation centre called the EDGE) is part of actually trying to make sure that those evolving capabilities actually end up in operational use.

  Q91  Linda Gilroy: That sounds very much like the human interface is just as important as the technological interfaces you were talking about. Can you give us some sense of the balance in what may be a barrier to us getting the most out of what we currently have deployed?

  Mr Eberle: As far as the first part of the question is concerned, human factors and human interface is absolutely vital, because if the human interface is overly complex then you have to make up for that in extended training and education; and therefore clearly it is in the best interests of everybody to make sure that interface is as reasonable as can be to minimise the training burden. In doing so there is an interaction required between the Ministry of Defence in its requirement setting and also industry, where we have quite a considerable capability across industry and human factors to make sure that we actually converse in a proactive way to make sure that we actually take that interface in the right direction.

  Q92  Linda Gilroy: Mr Chavez, I do not know if you want to comment? Is that human interface as much about awareness of where the technology is going as anything else?

  Mr Chavez: I think the technological dimension is still there and will develop. If we look at some of the most challenging threats in theatre at this point in time, IEDs for example, we do not have a 100 per cent reliable mechanism sensor system for detecting and identifying IEDs. It is very, very difficult in terms of the physics of the challenge and so on, and work is in train to look at—and Thales and various other companies are looking at—new sensor types and so on and new processing to help in that area. At some point there will be technological uplifts to platforms at our own theatres, I would hope. The human dimension—again, I come back to the point I made about the huge upsurge in ISTAR requirement—we are generating more ISTAR imagery than ever before. I think the UK is now the third largest user of UAV systems in the world. Our system, HERMES 450, has flown 25,000 hours; Reapers are probably about a fifth of that. There is a massive amount of data there. What we have seen is MoD managing a very significant upskilling in terms of numbers of people and the skills that are required to actually do the imagery analysis on that. Industry has played a part in that: for example, on the Hermes 450 we fielded that as a service initially so that we could actually get it to theatre and have it flying in service in a very short time; so we actually had trained pilots provided by Thales. As we have gone on, 32 Regiment of the Royal Artillery have picked up that burden and so on; and the numbers of people going through and learning are continuing to grow on a regular basis, so that as we look towards WATCHKEEPER we will have additional capability there. The challenges of delivering these capabilities on a day-to-day basis are absolutely as much about having the skills and the humans trained to do the job as they are about the technology dimension, certainly.

  Q93  Linda Gilroy: In the questions between Mr Crausby and myself have we identified where the focus needs to be in getting the most out of what we have deployed, or are there other things that we should be looking at?

  Mr Chavez: I think in general terms MoD recognise the skills and the skills gap. There is a skills gap and I think MoD believe that it is a skills gap today and an anticipated skills gap in the future. I think recognition of that need is at the heart of making good progress. I think there has to be continued effort on the human and skills dimension before we can say that the job is 100 per cent done. The challenge is of course that these are not stable situations. As we move forward, we look to ever more increasing levels of ISTAR production: the recent additional tasking line for Hermes 450, for example, has been requested. There is a desire for increasing amounts of ISTAR, and with that comes a sliding scale of challenge as well.

  Q94  Mrs Moon: I am always intrigued with technology about how fit for purpose it is by the time it is actually in the marketplace. You said that some of the equipment we now have has ability to have other capabilities that were emerging as it is actually in theatre. How much are we in danger of always going for new kit rather than actually developing and exploiting the potential of what we have got; and how much of what we have got is out-of-date the minute it arrives? I am interested in that boundary.

  Mr Eberle: Let us take ASTOR for an example. It is a system that has been in development for some considerable time and is now out there in theatre and, by all accounts, seems to be operating extremely well. That was a system that was originally designed, of course, quite some considerable time ago for conducting operations against the mass armour of the Warsaw Pact, and actually it is showing today that it is very, very relevant for today's operations: however it has come about that way, that is indeed the case. Its ability to detect moving targets through its radar system, which is its main sensor, is absolutely vital because operations are taking place now in very extended areas, and where—certainly in Afghanistan—there is not the same amount of movement, for instance, as you would expect normally within the UK. Therefore the ability—and this is this queuing thing again—to say, "Actually I see a vehicle moving along there that's not what I'd normally expect this time of day; don't normally see that over there, and actually there are two or three of them. Let's get some more eyes on the case"; and because the sensor systems have their own strengths and weaknesses—with radar you can see something moving but you cannot necessarily identify it—so then you want to get a video sensor on there, a full motion video, so you can actually see what is going on and identify it and work out whether it is of interest or whether it is an appropriate target, for instance, for an operation. Actually those systems that have taken some time in gestation—the Sea King Mk 7, the mission system produced by Thales, which has many of the same attributes—are also contributing significantly, I understand. Actually serendipitous or not, the actual systems that have been introduced recently are providing meaningful capability.

  Mr Grundy: If I may add two points, Chairman. One in terms of legacy and obsolescence and upgrades, again from an Intellect point of view we would very much come back to the earlier point about architectures; about the ability to incrementally uplift to bring in non-traditional ISTAR assets and so on and upgrade those capabilities within a common framework which, by and large, is intended to be cheap and easy and faster. The second point is certainly about the initial requirement-setting process, which is something industry, as I am sure you know, has been reasonably vexed about over a period of time. To report some positivity there specifically over the last year in this communications and intelligence arena, we have had a number of projects brought to industry at very early stages for consultation on an open basis about requirements, about concepts and about end use cases which, hopefully, has helped flush out some of these issues a little sooner.

  Mr Chavez: I think we have all, as MoD and industry, got better at actually designing much more modular solutions than in the past. Things like Hermes 450 and WATCHKEEPER, the ability to plug and play with different payloads is very important; and the ability to bring on new sensor types as those sensors are developed without having to dramatically change the systems architecture, we are all getting much better at that. We can all draw lessons going forward from the introduction of some of those early capabilities, such as Hermes 450 into WATCHKEEPER. That modular design means that we can field a low risk off-the-shelf sensor today and then incrementally improve that performance at a later date without taking the capability out of service and so on. That modularity of design is really important. I think the other aspect is really around having the UK sovereignty over those technologies. Peter made reference to the Sea King Mk 7 which is a helicopter with a radar on board, and that system was designed to provide indigenous radar surveillance for an aircraft carrier; so not really designed for the purpose that it is being used in Afghanistan at all; and that has only been made possible by the fact that Thales as the designer of that radar has the ability to change the radar parameters to actually suit the purpose of use in Afghanistan. That is a key sovereign capability in terms of having that intellect in the UK and having that intellectual property; that has allowed us to do that quickly without recourse to any other offshore company, without recourse to ITAR and those sorts of issues. Having the ability to modify and tweak and tune ISTAR assets is really important; because it is that tweaking and tuning that allows you to achieve interoperability; it is that tweaking and tuning that allows you to increase the probability of detecting specific threats that are threats to you today; so that is a very important point.

  Q95  Mr Havard: I get to one of the sort of university questions here which is, and we saw this in America: technology deployed in theatre is more capable than is apparent from many current outputs. Discuss. In the discussion what it came down to was, how much of this is a problem in relation to the technology; and how much of it is about procedural awareness and training issues and the human exploitation of the information? We have started to do some of the human stuff, can I just go back to a couple of the techie questions about the technology. My understanding is the increasingly scarce and expensive commodity bandwidth is a problem behind a lot of technology exploitation; but there is also the question about standardisation, or lack of standardisation in relation to data, and data transfer and so on. The question about mandated standards from the MoD, and whether those mandated standards are the same for Europe, USA, whatever coalition environment and your problem about intellectual, all of this is wrapped in this general discussion. Is the barrier really technology, or are there some smart boys and girls at various universities who are going to solve that relatively quickly; or is it really about—and the place we should concentrate our fire is on the other part of it—the exploitation awareness training and so on; which is it?

  Mr Eberle: Chairman, it sounds like a standard answer but it is very, very complex; and each of these elements clearly plays a role.

  Q96  Mr Havard: I am a simple boy from the Valley so explain it simply!

  Mr Eberle: The data standardisation is important, without any doubt whatsoever; because that actually is fundamental when you want to share data with other people. The position we find ourselves now in coalition operations requires us to plan to share data, and therefore puts an extra emphasis on the interoperability issue. When I spoke about NATO before, that currently—I think from an industry perspective certainly—provides the most cohesive standardisation activity on a multinational basis. As far as European interoperability is concerned, I do not think the MoD's view on this has changed; because they would wish to use NATO standards wherever possible, rather than introduce some new European standard. The major focus for the UK and the US is to introduce standards for data, standards for data transfer, and standards for communications which are dealing with the emerging technologies that are coming out of the ISTAR domain. I think from that perspective, data standards are absolutely crucial. Going back to Victor's comments earlier, it is also absolutely crucial to have a blueprint to allow you to understand where the various systems are going to interface to each other; and therefore you need to standardise those interfaces so that you understand how you actually connect to it, and then those data standards will allow you to exchange information. You need something else, which is called a data model, which allows you to interpret the data, which is not self-evident; because even linguistic differences between ourselves and our US allies lead to misunderstandings if you are not careful; which takes us into the human dimension. There is very little point in trying to achieve technical interoperability if you do not actually have standard concepts of operation, and understand what your allies are going to do with the data that you provide them with, because that is all part of the trust and confidence that the Coalition enjoys. The final element of this is security. Many of the systems in the Cold War age were designed not to share information, and security that was put into the system and around the system was put there exactly to make sure that did not happen. Now, of course, security—national security—is still an issue; sensitivities—especially if you go into some areas of intelligence—are even greater; human intelligence, for instance. Therefore, you have to understand how you are going to put the security architecture in place which will allow you to exchange the data you want to exchange, and prevent the data you do not want to exchange from getting out of your own system. It is a mixture of all those things, and they have all got to be tuned to provide a package which actually provides operational capability.

  Q97  Richard Younger-Ross: On standards, standards can be a barrier to quality; do we have a robust review process of those standards, or should we be concerned about that?

  Mr Eberle: I think it is true to say that there is a review process but there are always tensions there. Industry is always interested in working out what it can actually supply, and therefore is interested in actually executing those and putting them into implementation. The MoD takes a policy-oriented view to this much of the time.

  Q98  Mr Havard: Could I just have an answer to my question, because what I want to know is: do we spend more money on the technology; or have we got a lot of technology that we are not using well enough now and we should exploit it better first?

  Mr Chavez: In answer to your question, the missing link in terms of exploitation is the DABINET-like capability, which is the need for an integration application to bring everything together. There is always an issue around bandwidth, but having ISTAR is highly addictive: the more you have the more you want more, and there will always be challenges in that. Industry is doing a lot to make sure very smart algorithms are used to compress data, for example, to make the most of the bandwidth; but bandwidth is limited by the laws of physics.

  Q99  Mr Borrow: I have listened with interest about the way in which we could improve interoperability and no mention has been made of the MoD initiative to establish a key systems adviser initiative. Have I missed something? I would be interested in industry's views as to whether that initiative has been effective; whether it has made a difference to development of the C4ISTAR, and just the Network Enabled Capability in general; and, if it has not, what does it need to do to become more effective?

  Mr Grundy: From an across industry point of view I think the first thing to say obviously is that industry is very heavily involved in the KSA, bearing in mind that most of the people in it are industry secondees and were involved in the set-up of it. Industry as a whole is extremely supportive of the aims of the KSA programme as we understand it in terms of governance, coherence and interoperability. I think probably part of the reason we have not mentioned it as yet is that much of the work that the KSA does, as we understand it, is not directly industry facing; it is working within the MoD to aid them in going about their business rather than performing a discrete function which then interfaces with industry. Looking across the piece, one of the things that is quite encouraging for industry is that we have long said, and we said to the Committee last year, that the nature of the MoD's role as a customer across ISTAR, across communications intelligence, is changing because the boundary between industry as a supplier of big blocks of capability and the MoD as an overall architect is different than it has been historically. Because of that, industry has said a number of times, including to yourselves, that the skill set of that customer needs to change. The encouraging piece about the key systems adviser and some of the similar initiatives that are going on is that actually that represents an explicit or an implicit recognition for new skills to be brought in for a different type of function to be played by the MoD; which is a positive thing from industry's point of view, rather than continuing in the same vein that may not suit the changing pace of technology, and may not suit the greater need for integration and use of intelligence.

  Q100  Mr Jenkins: I think Mr Chavez mentioned the word "DABINETT" which I have heard now and again but I do not really understand what it is. I know it is a wide-ranging programme. Is it likely to result in significant improvements in UK ISTAR capability, do you think?

  Mr Chavez: DABINETT is effectively the creation of the software application that will allow intelligence that has been gathered from a whole range of different sources to be viewed, integrated and shared as a single whole. You will be able to look at imagery that has come off a Hermes 450 or a WATCHKEEPER, imagery off an ASTOR, human intelligence that has been put into the system and various other things so that you can actually start to look at the same problem from lots of different perspectives. As we get into these really hard ISTAR problems—and, as I say, detecting the terrorist in the marketplace or the IED—there is a high likelihood that it is not going to be solved by one single sensor. You will actually have to pull together the threads of information from different sensors, at different times, to actually generate a picture to say there is probably something here that we are interested in.

  Q101  Mr Jenkins: It sounds like a major programme. Who runs it? Who is in charge of it?

  Mr Chavez: It is the responsibility of Air Vice-Marshal Carl Dixon who was giving you evidence the other day.

  Q102  Mr Jenkins: How often do your companies meet—the people who are putting this programme together?

  Mr Chavez: That programme is at the early stages of competition. No company has been appointed to deliver that capability at this point in time; so it is pre-competition.

  Q103  Mr Jenkins: The input into the development of this wide-ranging programme which is so vital for us has no input from industry?

  Mr Chavez: There have been pre-competition initial activities, but that was run by a company, yes, that took input from a variety of industrial players.

  Q104  Mr Jenkins: Because when they are developing this sort of programme, the people who are on the programme surely they must be seeking advice from the industry as to what is possible to put in the programme before they actually carry on developing the concept?

  Mr Chavez: Absolutely.

  Mr Grundy: Absolutely, and this is something I would very much come back to again, not necessarily on the DABINETT programme per se but on a number of important programmes, including future core networks. For example, over the last year we have seen the MoD coming out to industry as a whole, as well as to discrete bilaterals with individual companies to get a sense of: what is the market's capacity to deliver the programme as currently constituted; what are the extra capabilities or technologies in the market that need to be integrated. It is by no means common across the entire estate but the fact that we have started to see that in certain areas, particularly in the networks area, we think is a big step forward for industry's ability to do some of the risk mitigation, to have a better understanding as a market earlier in the programme.

  Q105  Mr Jenkins: Firstly, there are two elements to this programme: the first is the direct, process and disseminate element; and, secondly, the collection element focussed on "deep and persistent" surveillance. You mentioned Air Commodore Gordon who said that the direct, process and disseminate element was currently still very much at a "concept phase" and "should be moving to initial operating capability in 2012". As someone who comes from the motor trade, I remember concept cars; I never expected us ever to produce a concept car—and there might be one or two bits are dropped into production models—so why should I believe that a concept was ever going to meet production? Do you actually believe that in 2012 DABINETT will be up and running?

  Mr Eberle: In fact, following on from what Victor was saying, there is actually a competition just about to be initiated or being initiated at the moment in the MoD acquisition approach. They will be going into an assessment phase. An assessment phase of the first part of DABINETT is due to start at the beginning of next year; and, as the Air Commodore said, as a result of that they hope to be in a position to contract industry to provide initial capability for 2012. That is a demanding timescale but they are moving along in accordance with their plans.

  Q106  Mr Jenkins: That is not only a demanding timescale, history will show that we have never had a programme yet which allowed the complicated nature of the programme to develop and make money for its suppliers. If you want to put your reputation on it—that it will be delivered by 2012—good luck; but I do not think you are going to do it, do you, honestly?

  Mr Eberle: What they have done in this particular case is to actually chop the requirement up into fairly small highly defined elements, and the one I just mentioned, which is called "improved ISTAR management", that is actually going to deal with one specific element of DPD; so it is actually very much focussed on one element of it; not on trying to boil the ocean, as it were.

  Q107  Mr Jenkins: You do not think the programme might be subject to budget constraints or cuts anywhere between now and 2012?

  Mr Grundy: This is the great uncertainty which all of our members are facing as an industry for everything which is not on contract.

  Q108  Mr Jenkins: Life is difficult, is it not!

  Mr Grundy: Certainly with the prospect of a defence review coming up next year of whatever colour and type, we would certainly be looking for programmes like DABINETT to fare as well as possible out of that review, given the importance we think they have to the overall system. If the nervous system is not there big fists are.

  Q109  Mr Jenkins: We can agree that in 2012 the concept phase may still be a concept phase rather than an actual production capacity.

  Mr Eberle: They will certainly have finished the concept phase within about nine months of starting, so that should be well finished by then I think.

  Q110  Mr Jenkins: The other deep and persistent surveillance element—could I move on to project cost increases and budget cuts, Chairman? One of the things I have noticed now is that we have got these trimmings and cutting off around the periphery of some of the programmes and projects, like Soothsayer, which as you know is a ground-based system; and we have spent £84 million to date and we are going to abandon it because we are going to save some money. Not only have we got Soothsayer, how about Project Eagle or the Reaper? I have heard the Reaper programme might not be made permanent; and Project Eagle looks like it has gone. Our deep and persistent surveillance with our Nimrod programme falling behind, do you think we are going to be capable of producing this information to the DABINETT programme which is at this concept phase by now and capable of making the impact we want on the battlefield? Where do you think we are going to be in two or three years' time?

  Mr Grundy: Obviously from our point of view that is partly a question for the MoD because we are not necessarily in charge of sorting out the programme and what should be in it. We have been lucky enough to have some sight of that programme going forward; and, again, industry is somewhat cheered by the recognition we have seen in that programme going forward of the need to plug some of these gaps. Our question as ever—to harp back to the previous point—is about, at the point where those programmes come to be delivered, will there be the necessary cross-departmental, cross-service commitment to them in the face of what is likely to be a fairly challenging funding requirement; and that is not something, unfortunately, that industry is able to drive.

  Q111  Mr Jenkins: Let me get this right: the ISTAR programme that we could envisage, or did envisage at one time, is now no longer possible; what the programme will produce and deliver is it, like, 90 per cent or 80 per cent?

  Mr Grundy: I am sorry, the ISTAR programme we envisaged is no longer possible.

  Q112  Mr Jenkins: Yes, I think we can all agree we are going to cut back on our costs of information collection and processing; and I do not think your concept is going to be in place in time.

  Mr Chavez: In terms of the overall programme, the industry and the sector really, as any industry would be, is concerned about the potential for future cuts to the sector—that is clear. Part of the reason why we are concerned, as much as anything, is because, with ISTAR communications etc., you do not have any platform to hang onto; it is not a tank; it is not a ship; it is not necessarily an aircraft. In the environment of a future strategic defence review there is no obvious champion for C4ISTAR and yet we believe it is absolutely critical to getting the most out of your Armed Forces in the round, and so we face uncertainty. I think in terms of the deep and persistent collection, it is quite clear that technologically it is feasible. Reaper is a perfectly good platform if the MoD chose to go that way. The MoD has yet to really raise the requirement, find the funding and get endorsement of that. There is no doubt that a deep and persistent capability is technologically achievable, and there is a whole raft of different platforms that would meet that need.

  Q113  Mr Jenkins: If I produce something that is 90 per cent capable it costs £100,000, but for every one per cent I need to improve the technology from then it doubles; so if I get to 100 per cent it is going to cost me £12 million. Do you not think your industry has done the £12 million job a few many times too often? Do you not think we really should be settling for the 90 per cent and having a much more robust system?

  Mr Chavez: I think there is a strong push from industry to actually reuse existing capabilities. If you look at things like WATCHKEEPER, the UAV is not a brand new UAV design; it is an off-the-shelf UAV which is absolutely essential in terms of proving airframe airworthiness and so on; so it is really quite important at times to meet the timeline of bringing these things into service to use military off-the-shelf sub-systems and so on. The clever part about that is actually the integration. It is about the sensors; it is about the integration and so on. We have that exact same issue arising again. As we look forward, there is an array of technologies that can meet some of these longer-term requirements. The technologies and systems thinking are mature. It is really a case of affordability and scheduling in when these things are wanted in the programme.

  Q114  Chairman: I have one final question for you, and it may be best directed at you, Mr Eberle. Would the ISTAR sector of defence capability be a particularly strong reason for suggesting to the Americans that the sooner they agree the UK/US Arms Trade Treaty the better it would be for the interoperability of the effort that Forces between our two countries make? You may answer yes to that!

  Mr Eberle: Chairman, I will just be a little bit longer than that. Yes, it would make a contribution. I do not necessarily in my view think it is going to change the exchange of information for interoperability. What it will make easier is the time which it takes to get the agreements in place to transfer the technology itself. So it will definitely make that easier. I do not think it will affect the actual information itself.

  Chairman: May I thank all three of you very much indeed for a most helpful start to our evidence session today, it is much appreciated.





 
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