Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's report on Helicopter Capability. We are grateful that
the Committee recognises the professionalism, dedication and bravery
of our helicopter personnel and the efforts of those in industry
and within the Department to support the provision of helicopter
capability.
We welcome the Committee's recognition of the important
role our helicopter capabilities fulfil across a range of areas,
notably on operations in Afghanistan, but also in other roles
such as the provision of maritime helicopter capability and Search
and Rescue capability within the UK.
We are pleased that the Committee commends the close
working relationship between industry, the Defence Equipment &
Support organisation and the front line commands, which has delivered
increased availability of helicopters to operations. We are also
grateful for recognition of the progress that has been made in
delivering more efficient and effective training for our helicopter
forces.
The Government's response to the Committee's conclusions
and recommendations as set out on pages 26-28 of the report is
as follows:
1. (Recommendation 1) Our visit to Middle
Wallop and Yeovilton proved invaluable and we record our thanks
to all those involved. Our discussions that day have informed
our oral evidence sessions, and indeed, this Report. (Paragraph
2)
The MOD welcomes the interest the Committee has shown
in the provision of helicopter capability and is pleased to have
had the opportunity to outline its plans and the challenges being
faced. The MOD has aimed throughout to provide the Committee with
all necessary information to support its enquiries.
2. (Recommendation 2) Helicopters provide
many vital capabilities to the modern Armed Forces and, with the
challenge of hybrid warfare, are becoming increasingly relevant
to current and contingent operations. Their status as force-multipliers
lends further weight to their value. They are a cost-effective
means of increasing the operational impact of other force elements
and therefore, of operational capability generally. As such, it
is essential that the fleet should be 'fit for purpose', both
in terms of quality and quantity. (Paragraph 5)
The MOD fully recognises that helicopters are a vital
capability for the Armed Forces, and that in order to fulfil the
full range of military tasks they are required to undertake they
need a mix of helicopter capabilities, ranging from UK Search
and Rescue to battlefield support in Afghanistan, to global maritime
patrol. As set out in the written evidence submitted to the HCDC
Helicopter Inquiry in April 2009, the Department plans its current
and future helicopter force structures on the basis of an assessment
of the capability required to achieve military success in a range
of military tasks and operational scenarios.
The Department agrees that its helicopter fleets
must be 'fit for purpose' in terms of quality and quantity, but
where possible has also strived to maximise the flexibility of
assets to support more than one role. For instance the Sea King
Mk4, which has traditionally provided a littoral manoeuvre (ship-to-shore
transport) role for the Royal Navy Commando Helicopter Force,
is currently providing vital support to operations in Afghanistan
in a land-based battlefield helicopter role following the fitting
of performance-enhancing rotor blades. In a similar fashion the
Royal Navy Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopter has adapted
to operate Afghanistan providing vital wide area surveillance
and ISTAR support to C-IED operations. Such flexibility is a key
factor underpinning the procurement of the Lynx Wildcat which,
because of the increased commonality between its Army and Navy
variants will be able to re-role quickly between the maritime
and battlefield roles to enable maximum utilisation of the assets
and provide the fleet as a whole with greater versatility.
The Equipment Programme funds the delivery of core
capabilities, but beyond this the Urgent Operational Requirement
(UOR) process has been successfully employed to tailor those capabilities
to the challenges, such as the threat and environmental conditions,
of specific operational theatres where they are to be deployed.
The Treasury has funded a wide range of UOR measures on helicopters
to support operations in the challenging conditions of both Iraq
and Afghanistan. These include modifications to the Merlin airframes
that will begin to deploy to Afghanistan in November 2009, and
installing more powerful engines to the entire effective Lynx
Mk9 fleet, which will enable those helicopters to operate in Afghanistan
during the summer months, providing for the first time a year-round
Light Helicopter capability.
We continue to keep our capability requirements under
review.
3. (Recommendation 3) Significant improvements
have been made to the availability of key assets such as Chinook.
However, in the longer term, increased availability will be no
substitute for additional capacity. Adequate capability is also
a question of numbers of airframes. (Paragraph 11)
The MOD is pleased that the Committee has acknowledged
the great strides it has made in improving the availability of
its helicopter assets and hence the volume of flying time that
is available to front line commanders. The Department has made
logistics support to aircraft in theatre a key priority and serviceability
rates in theatre are consistent with the operational requirement
and the measures that we have taken have contributed to significant
increases to the flying hours available on operations
As the Department has set out in its evidence to
the Committee, the key measure by which the delivery of helicopter
capability is assessed is the provision of helicopter flying hours.
The Department recognises that generating sufficient airframe
numbers is inevitably a factor in delivering the required level
of capability, but just as crucial is maximising the availability
of those assets. Our aim is to deliver the maximum capability
from the asset pool, within the bounds of sensible resource management.
Maximising the efficiency of our fleets will increase the percentage
of the overall aircraft fleet that can be deployed on operations
at any one time and allow for those aircraft to fly more hours
when they are deployed.
Furthermore, the individual capability of the helicopters
within our fleet will be increased through planned improvements
to our existing aircraft. For example, the introduction of new
engines on Chinook and Puma will increase their load carrying
capability over a typical mission scenario by some 20% and 60%
respectively.
4. (Recommendation 4) We do not believe that
the question of helicopter capability can be properly answered
without reference to the size of the fleet. We are concerned that
operational commanders in the field today are unable to undertake
potentially valuable operations because of the lack of helicopters
for transportation around the theatre of operations. We are also
concerned that operational commanders find they have to use ground
transport, when helicopter lift would be preferred, both for the
outcome and for the protection of our forces. Furthermore, we
are troubled by the forecast reduction in numbers of medium and
heavy lift battlefield helicopters, which will make this worse.
We have an additional concern in respect of the apparent lack
of training that is taking place for amphibious operations. (Paragraph
21)
Helicopters play a critical role in Afghanistan,
offering commanders a capability that the insurgents cannot match.
Our helicopter assets have a wide range of utilities from finding
and destroying enemy targets to the tactical and operational movement
of troops and freight. Unfortunately though they are not a panacea.
Every commander knows that predictability kills and that helicopters
simply add to their planning options. Commanders need to have
a variety of vehicles and helicopters at their disposal and they
will select the most appropriate asset for the task at hand. Helicopters
expand our planning options and make us less predictable but they
cannot fulfil the most fundamental role of all, engagement with
the local population, which requires our troops to mix with the
local population on the ground.
UK commanders in Afghanistan have made clear that
they have enough helicopters to conduct key tasks, but that they
would always welcome more—and we continue to work
flat out to deliver increased capability in theatre. After the
challenging summer of 2006, we increased the flying hours available
from the helicopters (Apache and Chinook) that were already in
theatre. In late 2007 the newly modified Sea King Mk 4s arrived
in theatre further increasing capacity. All in all, by April 2009
we had increased the number of UK airframes available to commanders
in Afghanistan by over 60%, and the number of helicopter hours
by 84%.
We plan to make further increases to our deployed
capacity—by Spring 2010 helicopter hours are forecast to
be more than 130% higher than November 2006. This will be achieved
primarily through a number of key platform improvements. This
includes the re-deployment of the Merlin fleet to Afghanistan,
with the first airframes entering theatre in November this year.
The six Merlins purchased from the Danes have expanded the fleet
by 25%, which will allow us to deploy more Merlins to Afghanistan
than would otherwise have been possible. We are also converting
eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters to a support helicopter role for
deployment to Afghanistan. The first increase in deployed Chinook
numbers is planned to take place from summer 2010. Our Lynx Mk9s
are being re-engined so that from October 2009 they will be able
to operate in the extreme Afghan summer conditions, delivering
a year-round Lynx capability for the first time.
Increasing helicopter capacity is very complex. It
is not just about buying more helicopters—which we have
done—it is also about manpower, training and support. We
cannot have all our helicopters in Afghanistan. Some are required
for operational tasks here (eg Search and Rescue), while others
are unsuitable for Afghanistan (eg Gazelle). Of the fleets that
are suitable for deployment to Afghanistan, a significant proportion
of their number will be required for pre-deployment training and
to maintain aircrew skills when they are not deployed, while others
will be undergoing the depth maintenance required after intense
operational usage or modified to increase their performance and
survivability. There is also a constant commitment of aircraft
to 'equipment and tactics trials' that will help to save lives
in Afghanistan.
It is important to remember too that UK forces do
not operate in isolation in Southern Afghanistan - we are there
as part of the ISAF coalition. Helicopters are a shared asset
among our coalition partners, and we draw on helicopters provided
by our Allies just as they draw on ours. Just as Coalition helicopters
may be employed in support of UK troops in Helmand so UK helicopters
may be utilised in support of Coalition troops elsewhere in Regional
Command (South) (RC(S)). Within the coalition we are by far the
second largest provider of helicopters. Excluding the US helicopter
fleet, the UK currently provides half of the helicopters available
to RC(S) with the remainder provided by the Dutch, Canadians and
Australians combined.
The priority of tasking is decided by the 2 star
HQ on the ground—RC(S)—and is often planned many days
in advance for deliberate operations and routine tasking. In addition
a number of aircraft across RC(S) are always kept at very high
readiness (VHR) for 3 tasks: Medical Emergency Response Teams;
VHR Attack and Reaction Forces (troop reinforcement). Regardless
of the nation owning the helicopters, the most appropriate aircraft
is despatched in response to each requirement. Prioritisation
recognises that there may never be enough helicopters to satisfy
every potential task but it ensures that the essential tasks are
supported appropriately.
To further free up military helicopters, so that
they can focus on direct support to operations, we use civilian
contracted air support to move freight and supplies. NATO has
a commercial contract to deliver 600 hours per month of freight
lift, available to all RC(S) Troop Contributing Nations on a priority
basis. In addition, the UK maintains a national contract for Medium
and Heavy Lift helicopter to carry freight. This contract provides
340 hrs at a cost of around £3.9M per month, enabling us
to free up our own helicopters for higher priority tasking.
The Committee expressed concern over a 'forecast
reduction in numbers of medium and heavy lift battlefield helicopters'.
While current plans do show a slight reduction in the numbers
of lift aircraft owned by the MOD between now and 2020, while
we life-extend Puma and Sea King prior to the delivery of Future
Medium Helicopter, our analysis shows that on current plans overall
lift capacity will increase and we are examining options for improving
output even further. Much of the reduction relates to the disposal
of old aircraft that do not today provide a deployable capability,
the increased contribution of other ISTAR assets to roles previously
provided by helicopters, improvements in the performance of individual
aircraft and their support arrangements, and the provision of
non-combat capabilities (ie Air-Sea Rescue) though PFI arrangements
where the MOD will not own the assets.
It is also important to note that of our current
support helicopter fleet only our Chinook, Merlin, Lynx that are
being re-engined and those Sea King aircraft that have been fitted
with performance-enhancing rotor blades are considered suitable
for deployment to Afghanistan, particularly during the summer
months. Over the next 5 to 10 years, while overall rotorcraft
numbers are scheduled to fall, the number of support helicopters
suitable for deployment during the Afghan summer will have increased
by over 50%. This will be achieved through improvements to our
Puma aircraft and the acquisition of new, more capable, helicopters.
The Committee made comment on the level of training
that is taking place for amphibious operations, and we acknowledge
that the tempo of Land operations over recent years has had an
impact on the Department's ability to conduct amphibious operations
(Littoral Manoeuvre—LitM). Nevertheless, small scale exercises
have been achieved and a minimal level of LitM currency and competency
will be maintained.
5. (Recommendation 5) While we are grateful
to the Minister for raising with us his uncertainties about the
decision to extend the life of Puma, we do not feel that we were
given the full picture on this issue by other witnesses. We very
much regret this. (Paragraph 28)
The MOD's planning assumption has been for some time
that the Puma Life Extension Programme (LEP) would be necessary
in order to ensure the required level of medium lift capability
would be available to operations in advance of the Future Medium
Helicopter programme. As the Minister for Defence Equipment and
Support (Minister(DES)) set out in his oral evidence to the Committee
in June 2009, he requested a review of the MOD's planning assumptions
to assess whether there was a way to deliver the required capability
without recourse to the Puma LEP. The review concluded that it
would not be possible to cancel the LEP without unacceptable risk
to operational commitments. As a result Minister(DES) agreed that
the Puma LEP should proceed and a contract was signed on 18 September
2009 with Eurocopter.
We continue to assess the options available to deliver
lift capability requirements in the medium term but no decisions
have yet been made. Given the Committee's interest in the delivery
of lift capability, we will update the Committee on our plans
when we are in a position to do so.
6. (Recommendation 6) Given the age of both
Sea King and Puma and the poor survivability of the Puma, extending
their lives at considerable cost is not the best option, either
operationally or in terms of the use of public money. We do not
believe that these LEPs will provide adequate capability or value
for the taxpayer. Only a procurement of new helicopters can meet
the original objective of reducing the number of types of helicopter
in service within the UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 30)
The MOD agrees with the Committee that one of our
key objectives should be to reduce the number of types of helicopter
in service with the Armed Forces. We are aiming to deliver this
objective in the medium term but, as set out above, to attempt
to remove Puma from service at this juncture and replace them
with a new capability would lead to a reduction in helicopter
support to current operations, which we are not willing to contemplate.
The Puma LEP takes advantage of the significant investment
that has already been made in those airframes and will deliver
important lift capability until at least 2022. Although the Puma
fleet was originally procured in the 1970s, it has only flown
half of the Service Life for which the original designer, Eurocopter,
has cleared the airframe. The modifications under the LEP, in
particular the new engines, will provide 35% more engine power
delivering far greater performance in the high altitudes and hot
summer temperatures as currently experienced in Afghanistan; they
will also provide a 25% improvement in fuel efficiency providing
greater range. The new cockpit will bring the aircraft up to date
with digital displays and modern navigation and communication
equipment.
We do not agree with the Committee's comments on
the 'poor survivability' of Puma. We have a duty of care to our
people under the Health and Safety at Work Act to ensure that
the capabilities that they operate are safe and that we have reduced
the risks of any major injuries or fatalities to as low as reasonably
practicable. The more powerful, modern engines and avionics will
address the principal safety hazards associated with the platform.
Overall, our analysis indicates that following the LEP, the Puma
Mk2 will deliver a significant step change in capability, specifically
enabling the aircraft to perform very well in Afghanistan's exacting
'hot and high' environment.
No decision has been made on the nature of the investment
to be made in the Sea King Mk4 LEP and we continue to explore
our options.
7. (Recommendation 7) We welcome the Minister's
assurance that he is committed to minimising the difference between
the equipment standards on an Apache in the UK and an Apache in
Helmand. The MoD should commit to making training aircraft as
close to the theatre-entry standard as is affordable, and we realise
that this might be achieved by fitting improved systems on training
aircraft in the United Kingdom or by teaching key pilotage techniques
on unmodified aircraft. (Paragraph 35)
We aim to ensure that in all cases aircrew train
on equivalent aircraft to those they will operate in theatre.
As Minister(DES) commented at the HCDC Inquiry, we would never
ask our troops to operate equipment on operations unless they
had been adequately trained in advance. RAF Merlin did not deploy
to Afghanistan immediately on completion of their role in Iraq
precisely to allow time for crews to complete crucial pre-deployment
training on aircraft modified to the standard that crews would
experience in theatre. Although only a proportion of each Battlefield
Helicopter fleet will necessarily be fitted to Theatre Entry Standard
(TES), we will always aim to have sufficient platforms at this
standard available to support pre-deployment training (PDT). As
a result of UOR and Equipment Programme modifications, there are
'fleet within fleet' challenges to be resolved to ensure we have
sufficient aircraft 'fitted for' and 'fitted with' TES to sustain
current operations, enable PDT and provide a limited contingent
capability'
Our training capability is fit for purpose, including
for the provision of sufficient simulators. We do, however, recognise
this as an area where we can make further improvements, and all
Apache simulators are being upgraded this year to ensure they
have improved coherence with the latest aircraft sensor, display
and software standards. These upgrades will also enhance the weapons
training capability of the simulators. Some UOR modifications
have not yet been embodied within the simulators, but this does
not impact on the quality of training received prior to deployment,
because the use of such modifications is covered in live flying
training.
8. (Recommendation 8) We were concerned to
hear from industry that the Defence Industrial Strategy, so far
as it relates to helicopters, needs to be 'picked up and moved
forward again'. The loss of momentum in relation to the Defence
Industrial Strategy may lead to significant acquisitions in this
sector taking place without sufficient reference to the DIS. This
would be regrettable if it prevented greater rationalisation of
helicopter types for the reasons we set out above. We urge the
MoD to avoid this if at all possible. (Paragraph 38)
Industrial considerations are an important factor
in our decision-making on the delivery of helicopter capability
to the Armed Forces, but the overriding concern is to ensure that
the right capabilities are provided and that this is achieved
at best value for money.
Most of our support arrangements have been agreed
with industry on a long term basis, with incentive mechanisms
(eg for the delivery of improved availability) built into our
contracts. Industry plays a vital role in the effective delivery
of military capability and its support, and MOD continues, in
general, to be pleased with the aerospace industry's support to
operations (to modify existing aircraft, buy new, and improve
equipment support) over recent years. The demand that MOD is placing
on Industry to support current operations is very high and the
Department maintains a regular dialogue with key Suppliers to
ensure priority demands are met.
As the Department's evidence to the Committee set
out, many of MOD's current demands on Industry require retaining
key skills onshore (as highlighted in the DIS) , i.e. those critical
to the through-life support of the current aircraft fleet (including
technology insertion) and the verification of continued airworthiness
of military helicopters. These skills are largely resident onshore
at AgustaWestland, Yeovil, although we are pleased too that the
onshore capabilities of both Boeing and Eurocopter continue to
improve. The demands of current operations, coupled with export
business, and ongoing procurement and modification projects mean
that those critical skills are safeguarded in the medium-term.
However, beyond this the volume of new helicopters required by
the MOD dictates that Industry will need to continue to transform
its business models to focus more on new export orders and on
the through-life support to the current fleet. We regularly communicate
with industry collectively (eg via the National Defence Industries
Council), and bilaterally, about developments that might affect
how the Defence Industrial Strategy principles can be applied.
9. (Recommendation 9) On support, closer working
between the military and industry through IOS and TLCM programmes
is clearly the way forward. We were impressed by the reports we
had from companies of CONDO operations, particularly with regard
to their consequences for process improvement and cost effectiveness
through early interventions. We encourage the MoD to capitalise
upon lessons learned from the success of the Chinook Through Life
Capability Service programme. (Paragraph 41)
The Department is grateful for the Committee's recognition
of the improvements that have been made in helicopter support,
especially on operations. Our joint working with Industry colleagues,
in some cases while deployed on operations, is delivering real
benefits. As set out in the Department's evidence to the Committee,
we continue to move from traditional support arrangements to IOS-based
support solutions, which provide incentives to, for example, improve
aircraft availability. This approach is delivering higher availability
to the Armed Forces and long term value for money. We agree that
the Chinook Through Life Capability Service sets an excellent
benchmark and we are seeking to incorporate lessons from that
programme into other support arrangements.
10. (Recommendation 10) The urgent action
being taken within the MoD to improve the acquisition and delivery
of spares to all helicopters in theatre needs to be given top
priority. (Paragraph 43)
Maximising availability of helicopters to current
operations remains our top priority and our record in exceeding
expected availability on operations in Afghanistan is a testament
to the efforts of colleagues in industry, the project teams at
the Defence Equipment and Support organisation and those at the
front line commands, who have all worked extremely hard to achieve
this. Every effort is made to ensure that the demand for helicopters
spares is predicted and the spares requirement is met. Inevitably,
when conducting high intensity operations, there will be rare
occasions when the availability of some spares becomes low and,
to mitigate any negative effect on the forward fleet, spares may
be drawn from reserve or non-effective aircraft. While our focus
remains on improving the availability of helicopters in operational
theatres, we will also work to ensure adequate numbers are available
in the training fleet, which will enable us to sustain capability
on an enduring basis.
11. (Recommendation 11) Operations in Afghanistan
have now been made the highest priority, what is known as a 'campaign
footing', but this has stretched the manning of the helicopter
fleet. It is therefore unfeasible to surge helicopters into theatre.
Joint Helicopter Command is to be commended for its efforts in
delivering trained manpower to the front line, and then giving
personnel sufficient time to do all the things at home that enable
them to go back for repeat tours. However, we believe it essential
that the parent Services examine the basic manning levels to enable
personnel from all three Services to be deployed and rested on
an equitable basis. (Paragraph 46)
We are grateful to the Committee for the recognition
of our efforts to ensure the sustainment of capability in theatre,
while ensuring that required harmony ratios are adhered to. We
continue to look into ways to improve in this regard and we are
currently in the process of doing as the Committee recommends
to ensure our helicopter forces are appropriately manned.
12. (Recommendation 12) Increased joint working
between the three Services has shown benefits in the same way
that increasingly close working between the military and industry
has done. We recommend that the MoD presses ahead with its programmes
to consolidate and make more common the various schemes in place
for training helicopter air and ground crew. The MoD should take
steps to eliminate the time lag between delivery of UORs in theatre
and the upgrading of equipment at home. In this respect, it is
unacceptable for personnel to encounter new equipment for the
first time in theatre. (Paragraph 49)
Significant steps have been taken since the formation
of the Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) to harmonise training for
helicopter air and ground crews and we will continue to pursue
this strategy. Key successes include joint training on Jebel Sahara,
which helps to prepare aircrew about to deploy on Operations for
'hot and high' environmental conditions. We are also creating
further opportunities to enable joint training at all levels,
from initial phases of pilot training through to the final exercises
of Limited Combat Ready training across the 3 services within
JHC.
As set out in our response to Recommendation 7 above,
we aim to ensure that crews and maintainers are trained with the
capabilities that they will deploy with. We recognise that there
have been instances where individuals have deployed to theatre
without having used some elements of TES equipment, for instance
on communications equipment that is used on the Sea King Mk4 in
Afghanistan. In these cases we have provided training, the hands
on use of the equipment taking place after arrival in theatre.
13. (Recommendation 13) We welcome the Government's
announcement of a strategic review of defence, the need for which
has long been apparent. The case for better resourcing of helicopters
has however, already been made clear. The MoD should not use the
announcement of the strategic review to delay the important decision
which needs to be taken in relation to the acquisition of the
Future Medium Helicopter, albeit on a modified off-the-shelf basis.
The time has come to appreciate fully the role of helicopters
in modern operations. We expect the Government to stop equivocating
over the separate concepts of 'capability', 'capacity', and 'availability'.
The MoD should seize the opportunity to recognise the importance
of helicopters to current and contingent operations, and work
towards strengthening all aspects of capability: the number of
helicopters in the fleet, the support structure that underpins
their operations, manning, both in the air and on the ground,
and finally, the training for the full spectrum of capabilities
described by the review itself. (Paragraph 51)
A process for undertaking a Strategic Defence Review
in the next Parliament was set out by the Defence Secretary on
7 July 2009. While clearly we expect the Review to provide an
assessment of the full range of capabilities that are required
for the Armed Forces to achieve success in the tasks they are
asked to undertake, we are clear that where decisions are required
to support current operations there should be no delay. For that
reason, since the Secretary of State's announcement we have made
several key decisions relating to helicopter capability. This
includes committing to contracts worth around £400M for the
fitting of an enhanced cockpit capability and more powerful T55-714
engines to the full Chinook fleet, increasing their ability to
operate 'hot and high' and improving their capability in low light
levels and contracts worth around £300M for the life extension
of the Puma helicopter, which is vital to the effective delivery
of lift capability in the short to medium term.
Work continues to assess the optimum solution to
meet the Department's helicopter lift requirements in the longer
term, and as outlined in the response to Recommendation 5, we
will update the Committee when we are in a position to do so.
The Department agrees with the Committee's recommendation
that we need to ensure all the respective Lines of Development
such as equipment, support, manning and training are adequately
resourced to deliver the required levels of operational capability
and we keep our plans in each of these areas under constant review.
Our success in the Chinook TLCS programme is a clear example of
achieving additional capability through greater investment across
the Lines of Development. Specifically, by increasing numbers
of aircrew and maintainers whilst ensuring sufficient spares and
robust depth servicing, we have delivered an increase in the Chinook
Annual Flying Task by some 30% in the past two years. With the
delivery of Chinook Mk3, and continued investment across manpower,
training and support, we expect to be able to increase this provision
over the coming year. As set out in our response to Recommendation
10, we are seeking to capitalise on the success achieved with
Chinook by incorporating lessons learned on TLCS into other support
arrangements.
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