Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry
of Defence
1. What are the major improvement programmes
that have been put in place to resolve the problems identified
by the NAO (National Audit Office) in relation to resource accounting?
When will these be complete? (See Q 41)
There are two major improvement programmes underway,
one to address the Military Pay issues and one dealing with inventory
and Bowman, the details of which are provided below.
MILITARY PAY
The Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) Assurance
and Compliance Working Group has been established to provide coherence
across the JPA improvement work which is addressing the problems
identified by the NAO in relation to resource accounting. The
major activities are:
— An end-to-end review of the assurance
framework to include unit, Service Personnel and Veterans Agency
(SPVA) and Top Level Budget (TLB) activity is scheduled to complete
by end 2009; rolling implementation continues in parallel, with
the introduction of a tri-Service unit assurance baseline, the
adoption of common reports by TLB staff and resolution of cross
TLB issues.
— Specific and general data validation
to improve the overall accuracy of the data held on JPA is underway
and will continue for some time. The review, investigation and
correction of anomalies in the areas identified in the 2008-09
NAO audit are complete. The reports and investigative techniques
used have been extended by the Services for regular use across
pay, allowances and charges as part of their single Service assurance
programmes.
— Work to address the complexity of
the JPA system, the JPA software upgrade and the simplification
of service pay and allowances is underway; modelling to confirm
future requirements is due to start in March/April 2010.
— The high level review of JPA training
and documentation will be complete by the end of 2009; where significant
gaps have been identified the Services and TLBs are implementing
short term solutions. An end-to-end, comprehensive training needs
analysis is underway and will report in early 2010.
— A rolling JPA Culture Change Programme
has been agreed and is underway.
— The Services review of JPA application
and infrastructure access issues is due in January 2010.
— JPA fraud will continue to be monitored
over the next two years to establish trends and improve controls
following promulgation of a zero tolerance policy of fraud by
the Services.
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
AND BOWMAN
There are separate programmes of work being
undertaken on these two areas and each will be covered in turn.
A Materiel and Financial Accounting Board has been established
to direct the short and longer term initiatives.
BOWMAN ASSET
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT
PLAN
The Improvement Plan covers the following areas:
— establishing an asset baseline for
the number of items purchased from General Dynamics;
— completion of quarterly asset reconciliations,
the first to be completed as at 30 September 2009 for audit by
the NAO as part of the interim audit programme for the 2009-10
Accounts;
— improvements in the management information
produced for items in transit; in the forward repair loop and
held temporarily by General Dynamics awaiting repair;
— determining the appropriate management
processes for the Project Team to adopt to monitor the movement
of Bowman radios for the remainder of the contract which runs
to 2025;
— work is underway to improve the regular
census process by concentrating on recording the serial numbers
of the radios held on the systems; and
— establishing a methodology to enable
the reporting of damaged/destroyed assets, particularly those
arising in operational theatres.
Progress will have been made on all these issues
by the end of financial year 2009-10 but it is unlikely that the
overall programme will be complete until the end of 2010.
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
The improvements in inventory management have
been split into two distinct areas, items held by the Defence
Storage and Distribution Agency (DSDA) and the annual census for
Merlin and Maestro assets.
Stock Held at DSDA
The following items are included in the stock
programme.
— A Stock Integrity Project Team has
been created to support the DSDA stocktaking process.
— A Logistics Optimisation team has
been created to look and review data quality and accuracy concerns.
— A programme of stock checking work
has been carried out to clear residual issues arising from the
closure of Stafford and Llangennech.
— Stock reconciliation processes are
being updated and full reconciliations are to be carried out quarterly,
the first as at 30 September 2009, and the results will be made
available to the NAO as part of the interim audit programme.
It is unlikely that the overall programme will
be complete until the end of 2010, however progress has been made
on a number of workstreams including those listed above.
Merlin/Maestro
The annual fixed asset census process for assets
held on the Merlin/Maestro systems has been revised as follows:
— The date for the return of the census
has been brought forward to September 2009 which will allow time
for any discrepancies to be investigated before the end of the
financial year. A dedicated team has been established to manage
the overall process.
— The instructions for the completion
of the census have been updated to ensure unit level staffs are
clear about the requirement when completing the returns.
— The annual assurance report on the
census results will be produced by 31 March 2010, in time to inform
the NAO year end audit.
All these activities will have been completed
in time for the audit of the 2009-10 financial accounts.
2. Could the Department provide the Committee
with further detail regarding the revised metric for readiness
targets? (See Q 68)
Readiness is the term we use for the way the
Services maintain military units at varying levels of preparedness
in order to be able to respond to the range of potential operations
envisaged in Defence Strategic Guidance. The system takes Defence
Planning Assumptions (DPAs) and assigns Force Elements (FEs) to
Military Tasks (MT) defined by them enabling the allocation of
resources and the measurement of performance. The MoD has a graduated
readiness system in place to ensure that the right force elements
(such as a ship, an Army brigade or an aircraft) are ready to
deploy to conduct the range of missions that may be required.
MoD Head Office sets requirements for the three Services in terms
of the force elements needed and the readiness at which they need
to be held, and allocates the resources required to achieve this.
Measuring and aggregating readiness is complex, not least because
it is based on a judgement of what is required to enable the Armed
Forces to respond to a wide range of potential challenges.
The Readiness at which FEs are held for MTs
is driven by the need to deliver certain capabilities in particular
timescales to achieve campaign success. The Readiness of a FE
is a combination of time and state or, put another way, availability
and quality. Measurement is considered against 4 criteria; Manpower,
Equipment, Training and Support—the METS criteria.
Readiness is graduated such that a FE at the
highest state of readiness has all the METS criteria at a level
that the FE can deploy from its normal location in an appropriate
timescale. By contrast, a FE at lower rates of readiness may have
significant deficiencies in one or all of the METS criteria but
need only be able to improve those factors to be ready to deploy
within the full time frame. In effect, holding a FE at lower readiness
is accepting some risk in military terms that the FE will not
need to be used within the readiness time but takes the benefit
in lower cost, improved harmony of personnel and so on.
Front Line Commands (FLC) are responsible for
delivering Force Elements at Readiness as detailed in the Defence
Plan (DP) Confidential Annex. Funding to achieve this is allocated
to the commands and, for the Equipment and Support aspects, to
DE&S. DE&S activity in this regard is determined jointly
with the FLC and encapsulated in a Joint Business Agreement (JBA).
CHANGES IN
READINESS REPORTING.
Readiness requirements are now detailed in the
Defence Plan Confidential Annex. Individual FE assessments are
aggregated by component (Maritime, Land, Air, C4ISTAR, Logistics
and Special Forces) using the Readiness table which comprises
a list of FEs with each having a defined percentage weighting
that reflects, broadly, an assessment of their relative importance
to Defence over the near years. The overall weighted assessment
shows the percentage of FEs that does not have either a serious
or critical weakness. The weighting means that if a FE moves from
Minor to Serious weakness, and it has been allocated 1% of value
within the table, then the overall readiness metric reported will
fall by 1%.
Within the SR04 MoD Public Service Agreement
(PSA), the overall target for Readiness was set at 73% of FEs
to have neither a serious or critical weakness. That target was
set by reference to previous achievements. Owing to the impact
of operating above DPAs this target was not renewed through CSR07
and there is currently no overall Defence percentage level target.
However this does not mean that readiness is not important, rather
that the effect of sustained operations have rendered the target
less meaningful. Readiness is reported to the DB via the Quarterly
Performance Report. While we continue to measure readiness across
the full spectrum the most useful and significant assessments
are those of Residual Capability and Recuperation.
Residual Capacity. This is one of the
most important strategic assessments as it attempts to assess
what else can be done. It presents the risk inherent in conducting
operations to our ability to conduct other contingent tasks from
an unopposed Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) (frequent,
although less demanding on Force Structure) through to Medium
and Large Scale (MS, LS) operations (less frequent but greater
demand on Force Structure).
Recuperation. Having for some time operated
well above, but now approaching, routine concurrency levels Defence
aims to recuperate the force structure to be able to deliver the
contingent tasks suggested in DPAs. This activity will take time
and significant further funding from the Reserve. Planning is
underway and initial targets have been set but no measure of progress
towards these recuperation targets has been agreed. Whilst recuperating
to defined Small Scale (SS) capabilities is a near-term and relatively
well-bounded problem, recuperating MS capabilities is more complex.
The initial target is to recuperate to specific SS capabilities
by 2011 and periodic assessments can made of the ability of the
Force Structure to deliver.
3. The Royal Navy is still undertaking the
vital task of protecting the Iraqi oil export platforms inside
Iraqi waters. When will the training of the Iraqi Navy have reached
the stage at which this task can be handed over?
The responsibility for protecting the Iraqi
offshore oil platforms will transfer incrementally, as and when
the Iraqis have the capability to take over. This will ultimately
depend upon the progress that the Iraqi Navy make during their
training. However, on current plans, the first oil platform will
be handed over to Iraqi control by the end of this year and the
remaining platform will follow towards the end of 2011.
4. Could the Department provide further information
regarding voluntary outflow levels; the percentage of personnel
on deployment; and levels of medical fitness for deployment in
the Army? ( see Q 95—99)
Voluntary Outflow is calculated from figures
for Service Personnel who apply to leave the Armed Forces outside
any formal career break points. The average annualised Voluntary
Outflow rate for each of the services is shown in the table below:
| | 2006-07
| 2007-08 | 2008-09
| Q1 2009-10 | Q2 2009-10
|
| RN Officers | 3.1% |
4.3% | 4.0% | 4.1%
| 4.0% |
| RN Other Ranks | 6.3% | 6.3%
| 6.0% | 5.7% | 5.2%
|
| Army Officers | — | —
| — | — | —
|
| Army Other Ranks | — |
— | 5.4% | 5.1%
| 4.6% |
| RAF Officers | 2.9% | 3.0%
| 2.9% | 2.6% | 2.3%
|
| RAF Other Ranks | 4.6% | 5.1%
| 5.5% | 5.0% | 4.2%
|
| |
| | | |
Voluntary Outflow reflects the level of personal satisfaction
which can be affected by factors such as work/life balance, housing,
spouse's career, family stability, pay etc. Measures to counter
such factors are taken to reduce Voluntary Outflow and in particular
for Pinch Point trades through Financial Retention Incentives.
The current levels are lower than average which is largely attributable
to the economic situation. The challenge is to maintain these
historically low levels as the economy improves.
Data on reasons for leaving the Army have not been available
on JPA since 1 April 07. This is due to; data being poorly entered
onto JPA; problems processing outflow and incomplete Queen's Regulations
on JPA, which prevented the correct codes being entered. These
issues are being dealt with by Army Personnel Centre, Service
Personnel and Veterans Agency and Defence Analytical Services
and Advice but further work is required until they are fully resolved.
Voluntary Outflow for Army Other Ranks for the 12 months to 31
March 2009 onwards is now included.
The percentage of personnel on deployment
While it is acknowledged that the overall deployment rate
for the Armed Forces is around 10%, the precise number of personnel
in each theatre fluctuates on a daily basis for a variety of reasons,
including mid-tour rest and recuperation, temporary absence for
training, evacuation for medical reasons, the roulement of forces,
visits and a range of other factors. We do not therefore publish
actual figures for personnel deployed in theatre.
The endorsed force levels for UK military operations are
set out in the following table by location.
| Location | Endorsed Number (at 26 October 2009)*
|
| Afghanistan | 9,500(1)
|
| Iraq | 100(2) |
| At sea | 1,050(3) |
| Falklands/South Atlantic | 1,500
|
| Qatar | 250 |
| Cyprus | 300 |
| Kuwait | <50(4) |
| Kosovo | <50 |
| Bahrain | 150(5) |
| Oman | 150 |
| Bosnia | <50 |
| Other(5) | 100 |
| * Rounded to 50 | |
(1) On 14 October 2009, the Prime Minister, announced an increase in the number of troops deployed on Operation HERRICK to 9,500. This new force level will be put into effect once three conditions are met: the Afghan government demonstrates its commitment to bring forward the Afghan troops to be trained and to fight alongside our forces; UK troops are fully equipped for the operations they are asked to undertake; and that our commitment is part of an agreed approach across the international coalition, with all countries bearing their fair share.
(2) On 15 June, the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons (Official Report 15 June 2009, Column 21) the current number of UK military personnel we expect to remain in Iraq to conduct Navy training and Maritime support after the withdrawal of the bulk of our forces from southern Iraq and Baghdad. The UK/Iraq agreement has been ratified by the Presidency Council, and upon exchange of Diplomatic Notes between the UK and Iraq Governments, the UK will reinsert up to 100 personnel into Iraq to deliver its mandate.
(3) Numbers at sea in support of Operations TELIC and CALASH.
(4) In support of UK's mandate in Iraq.
(5) Small scale deployments in support of EU and UN missions, headquarters liaison officers and capacity building activities.
| |
In addition, for each person deployed there will usually
be at least two other people committed, either preparing to deploy
or recovering from deployment. There are also large numbers of
personnel in direct support of military operations and tasks which
equates on average to another 8% of personnel.
Specifically in relation to the Army, as at 1 September 2009,
the strength of the Army was approximately 100,500. Of this total,
36,000 personnel are not available for deployment for reasons
such as specific job roles ie training, supporting the deployed
force or are temporarily medically downgraded. Once the elements
have all been taken into account, a total of 64,500 are left—the
Land Generated Force Strength.
Of the 64,500 Land Generated Force Strength, 52,500 are available
for programmed operations, within this figure are personnel who
will either be on deployment, pre-deployment training, post operational
leave or decompression. The remaining 12,000 are largely split
between standing commitments at home (such as Military Aid to
the Civil Authority) and overseas, training support and `lifed'
posts (those which are terminated after a definite length), our
NATO commitments to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Battlegroups.
The Strength of 52,500 needs to be split into 5 in order
to maintain a 24 month gap between tours to accord with Harmony
Guidelines, which leaves around 10,000 available for deployment
at any one time.
Levels of medical fitness for deployment in the Army
| Arm/Corps/Service | Liability
| Held Strength (HS)
| Fully Deployable
| Limited Deployable (% of HS)
|
Total Non Deployable (% of HS)
|
Medically Non Deployable[1] (% of HS)
|
| Army Air Corps | 2,344
| 2,321 | 1,715 | 19.73%
| 6.38% | 3.62% |
| Infantry | 24,776 | 23,547
| 18,682 | 9.16% | 11.5%
| 5.2% |
| Intelligence Corps | 776 |
775 | 620 | 11.61%
| 8.39% | 4.77% |
| Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers |
3,196 | 2,891 | 2,086
| 17.57% | 10.27% | 6.95%
|
| Army Medical Services[2]
| 2,840 | 2,432 | 1,826
| 16.57% | 8.35% | 6.66%
|
| Royal Regiment of Artillery | 7,903
| 7,819 | 6,119 | 11.86%
| 9.87% | 5.63% |
| Royal Armoured Corps | 5,679 |
5,524 | 4,426 | 11.84%
| 8.04% | 3.96% |
| Corps of Royal Engineers | 9,411
| 8,812 | 7,021 | 12.38%
| 7.94% | 4.02% |
| Royal Logistic Corps | 10,486
| 9,539 | 6,966 | 15.53%
| 11.45% | 7.72% |
| Mixed[3]
| 3,396 | 2,937 | 2,256
| 15.08% | 8.1% | 4.87%
|
| Royal Military Police | 1,170
| 1,087 | 873 | 10.86%
| 8.83% | 5.61% |
| Royal Signals | 6,126 | 5,255
| 4,087 | 13.43% | 8.79%
| 4.95% |
| Army Total | 78,103 | 72,939
| 56,677 | 12.39% | 9.90%
| 5.38% |
| | |
| | | |
The above figures are very simple extractions from the raw
data provided by units for the 1 October 2009 LFSO 3210 Deployability
Return and should be regarded as guideline figures only.
The Army Physical Training Corps (APTC), Chaplains (RAChD)
and the Corps of Army Music (CAMUS) are not included as they
do not `own' deployable units. However, there will of course,
be personnel from these Corps included within all the units above,
for example, those in the CAMUS typically have a medical role.
Those of limited deployability are considered as deployable
to main operating bases where there are appropriate medical facilities
to meet their needs (although this may not necessarily be in their
primary role).
5. Given the Department's lack of progress against targets
for readiness and the continued failure to deliver equipment to
time and cost, what are the grounds for making further cuts to
staff numbers in order to improve efficiency?
In recent years, where the Armed Forces have been called
upon to commit to operations above those levels envisaged in Defence
Planning Assumptions, it has not been possible to remain "ready"
for the full range of contingent tasks articulated in Defence
Strategic Guidance. Consequently reported contingent readiness
has decreased. This is an entirely expected picture. Improvements
across 2008-9 have been driven largely by new equipment entering
service and by the rectification of some defects that had suppressed
the metric during the previous year. The rise is not related to
the drawdown from operation TELIC (Iraq) and it is considered
that a full recovery is constrained by the impacts of supporting
an enduring operation at beyond medium scale. We will shortly
be publishing our Autumn performance report which will show an
anticipated increase in the percentage of defence showing no serious
or critical weakness. his is as a result of the predicted increase
in readiness of specific elements and some benefits from the conclusion
of operations in Iraq.
Defence acquisition faces significant challenges in procuring
and supporting very complex engineering projects in very harsh
environments. The Annual Report and Accounts examines 41 projects
that have passed the main investment decision. In 2008-09 the
cost overrun was £1.2 billion across all projects. Analysis
of the reasons for cost increase shows four generic causal contributors:
— issues outside the MoD's control;
— International collaborative projects;
— where the Department intentionally chooses to
impact the project to reflect changed circumstances and priorities;
and
Time slippage this year was 242 months across all projects.
Analysis of the reasons for time increase shows three generic
causal contributors:
— international collaborative projects;
— where the Department intentionally chooses to
impact the project to reflect changed circumstances and priorities;
and
— technical issues—this factor is where the
main effort is focused. This factor accounted for 178 months.
DE&S continue to drive forward the principles of Smart Acquisition.—the
projects that were initiated after the most recent reforms in
defence acquisition contributed 63 months slippage against the
total of 242 months. Achieving the balance of military superiority
in an intrinsically unpredictable environment means that many
of our projects sit permanently at the most advanced edge of technology
and are therefore inevitably technologically risky.
Our overall financial position is tight and we have had to
take some difficult decisions to balance plans and resources.
These are challenging times and like all Government departments,
we have to live within our means. We routinely review our spending
to balance priorities, focusing our spending on the highest priorities
which include our operations particularly in Afghanistan. We continually
strive to improve efficiency and whilst decisions have not yet
been made, future planning round options may involve reductions
in staff numbers.
What are the grounds for implementing such a large number of
change projects at a time when there are so many operational demands
on the Armed Forces?
The demands of current operations, principally in Afghanistan
but including other operations elsewhere in the world, do present
a very considerable challenge for the Department. But we must
not use that as an excuse to avoid the pursuit of programmes intended
to improve the way in which the Ministry of Defence delivers.
Indeed, it is arguably more important in these circumstances that
change programmes are vigorously pursued, so as to maximise the
investment that can be made in the front line. The wider challenge
does emphasise the need to have strong governance arrangements
in place so as to ensure both that the right change programmes
are taken forward by the Department, and that the programmes that
are taken forward deliver the benefits which have been identified.
But we believe the mechanisms we have in place, particularly the
strong emphasis we place on high level leadership through designated
Senior Responsible Owners and wide stakeholder engagement will
enable the Department to do this. Thus the Department will be
able to exploit the benefits available from the change programme
to maximise potentially life-saving investment in the front line
by delivering modernised and efficient supporting services, and
so provide the maximum military capability as effectively as possible
within the Defence Budget.
With savings of £650 million in 2008-09, the Department
is less than a quarter of the way to achieving Value for Money
target savings of £3.15 billion by 2010-11, but is one third
of the way through the reporting period. Given the ever increasing
costs of the equipment programme and the pressures on the Armed
Forces from current operations how confident is the MoD of being
able to meet this target?
The VFM delivery profile is not linear. In some cases this
is because costs are netted off up front, in other cases it is
because of the nature of the initiative. Our Autumn Performance
report stated MoD had achieved in the order of £1.2 billion
of VFM savings in the first 18 months. We are on track for delivery
of around £2 billion savings by the end of the current financial
year. As such, we are firmly on track for delivering the original
£2.7 billion VFM target. Further work is on-going to fully
define the extra £450 million for FY2010-11 announced at
Budget 2009, MoD's contribution to the Operational Efficiency
Programme recommendations. However, a number of studies are underway
to define these savings, some of which will be implemented through
our Planning Round 10, and we are confident of meeting the final
target.
Which areas will be targeted in order to achieve further savings?
The MoD routinely reviews its spending plans to ensure that
resources are focussed towards the highest priorities, in particular
operations in Afghanistan. The 2010 Planning Round is currently
underway and a wide range of potential measures are being considered.
Until decisions are taken by Ministers it would not be appropriate
to set out the measures in detail. However, examples of lower
priority areas include travel and subsistence, overtime, and the
use of external assistance; these have all been subject to restrictions
in recent planning rounds.
6. Is the £25 million going towards R&D enough?
Is there scope for further investment to be made? (see Q110)
The development of the Defence Technology Plan (DTP) launched
online earlier this year has produced a balanced and coherent
programme which is largely being delivered through a range of
contracts with government, industry and academia research providers.
MoD has also introduced the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF)
to assess customer's needs against a criteria of Operational Relevance,
Exploitation, Building S&T Capability, S&T Quality and
Innovation. PAF is delivering a more focussed programme that maximises
the value of our investment in research. MoD has the challenge
of balancing immediate objectives, like support to operations,
whilst also preparing for the security challenges of the future.
The Department has to spend within its means now and in the future.
7. Why are so many data loss incidents still being reported
one year on from Sir Edward Burton's report? Have procedures really
improved? (see Q 110)
The figures reported in the Annual Report and Accounts relate
to losses of personal data between April 2008 and March 2009.
This period straddles the publication, in June 2008, of both Sir
Edmund Burton's Report and the Cabinet Office Data Handling Review.
Publication of these reports increased awareness across MoD of
the importance of personal data and the requirement to report
incidents involving its loss. The increase in figures can partly
be attributable to this factor.
Another significant cause of an increase in figures was the
measures the department took to implement the recommendations
of the two reports. For example conducting audits of holdings
of removable media brought to light instances where items that
may have contained personal data could no longer be accounted
for.
Although losses do continue to occur, the numbers in 2009
have significantly reduced both in number and severity; since
April 2009 we have only reported two incidents to the Information
Commissioner's Office, and increasingly devices involved in incidents
are fully encrypted thus minimising the risk of compromise of
any information they contain. MoD remains aware of the challenges
and continues to take the necessary steps to further reduce the
likelihood of future incidents occurring. We have completed 41
of the 51 recommendations from the Burton Report and both Sir
Edmund and the Information Commissioner are content that those
outstanding remain so only because they require longer timescales
to implement. We are working hard to deliver those outstanding
recommendations and are also working towards our long term goal
of achieving Level 3 compliance with the Information Assurance
Maturity Model by April 2012. Level 3 requires that Information
Assurance is seen as Business Enabling, implicit in which is Information
being treated as a strategic asset. We have made good progress
towards this goal by identifying Information Asset Owners for
all our information assets and ensuring that those owners understand
what their role entails.
We have made excellent progress delivering Protecting Information
training to our staff. A recent review of progress showed just
fewer than 91% of staff had undertaken the training. Within our
major personnel and vetting centres (the People Pay and Pensions
Agency, Service Personnel and Veterans Agency and the Defence
Vetting Agency), close to 99% of staff have successfully completed
training. To train such a number of personnel in a diverse and
globally dispersed organisation, many of whom are engaged on combat
operations, has been a huge challenge and we are proud of the
efforts made by our staff to enable this position to be reached.
We are committed to ensuring that those who have not yet been
able to train due to operations overseas do so when they return
from duty.
PUS as the Accounting Officer has ultimate responsibility
for Information Assurance and, along with Defence Board colleagues,
recently received training to help him discharge that duty. At
the working level the Chief Information Officer (a 2* Senior Civil
Servant) in his additional role as Senior Information Risk Owner
is the MoD lead for all matters relating to Information Assurance.
At the Ministerial level the lead is taken by the Minister for
the Armed Forces.
In addition, PUS undertook to take away the issue of what
the department does to encourage people studying medical courses
at university to consider a career path in the military.
Information about career opportunities for those who may
wish to pursue a medical career path in the military doctors is
disseminated to medical students in a variety of different ways:
through the Internet, by Careers Advisers, by Officers Training
Corps, and by each Services medical Recruiting Department which
visits Universities, Student Careers Fairs and various national
events such as the MedLink Careers Fair, which offers advice to
16-18 year-olds and which draws an average yearly attendance of
8,500. When funds permit advertisements are placed in the medical,
dental and nursing press.As a result of these measures to advertise
the medical cadetship scheme (by which the Armed Forces sponsor
medical students through the final three years of medical training
in return for a period of service after qualifying in medicine)
we have attracted more high quality applicants than we currently
have room for.For the Army, approximately 100,000 medical students
attend one of our monthly Acquaint Visits at Camberley each year
to find out more about career opportunities in medicine within
the Army.Nearly half of these go on to apply to join the Army
as medical cadets and the best 30 are awarded cadetships each
year. Other good candidates (including the best of the applicants
who were not awarded medical cadetships) are encouraged to consider
applying to join the military once they have qualified as doctors,
dentists or nurses.
2 December 2009
1
Includes pregnancy and maternity. Back
2
The Army Medical Service includes the Royal Army Medical Corps
(RAMC), Queen Alexandra's Royal Auxiliary Nursing Corps (QARANC),
Royal Army Dental Corps (RADC). Back
3
Units such as brigade HQs, where personnel are of various cap
badges. Back
| 
