2 Readiness
Introduction
10. Poor performance against target levels of readiness
should not be taken to mean that the Armed Forces are not able
to carry out their current tasks. The MoD was at pains to point
out to us that the Armed Forces' primary focus has been to be
prepared for and deliver on current operations and standing tasks.
It emphasised that it was not possible for the Armed Forces to
be deployed above Defence Planning Assumptions[6]
and ready for the full range of contingent tasks at the same time.
While many force elements within the Armed Forces were not at
the appropriate level of readiness for contingent tasks, the Armed
Forces could still react to emergencies, although with probable
implications for operations in Afghanistan. The focus of our inquiry
was not on current operations but on operations which the Armed
Forces might reasonably be called upon to carry out at any time,
that is, contingent tasks.
Readiness levels of the Armed
Forces
11. The readiness levels of the Armed Forces to
perform contingent tasks are low. In 2007-08, the MoD reported
that more than half of the force elements had serious or critical
weaknesses, although the position had improved slightly by March
2009 but fell again by June 2009 (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Readiness levels of force elements
Note: As of June
2008, the readiness metric was reviewed and subsequently re-weighted
Source: Ministry of Defence
12. In June 2008, the MoD assessed its own performance
in generating forces which can be deployed, sustained and recovered
at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic
objectives as follows:
For the sixth consecutive year in 2007-08 the
Armed Forces continued to operate above the overall level of concurrent
operations which they are resourced and structured to sustain
over time. Throughout the year they nevertheless consistently
and reliably provided substantial forces at immediate readiness
for current operations, deploying them to and sustaining them
in theatre, and recovering them to their home bases at the end
of their tours. It was therefore impossible for them to be ready
at the same time for the full range of potential contingent operations
provided for in planning assumptions, and contingent readiness
levels continued to fall. The Department was consequently unable
to meet the Public Service Agreement target for readiness. The
Armed Forces maintained essential standby capabilities, such as
for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, but their capacity to
take on additional operations is currently limited. [7]
13. In our Report on the MoD Annual Report and Accounts
2007-08, we expressed our concern about the MoD's performance:
This continuing poor performance against readiness
targets is serious. As the MoD's recent Autumn Performance Report
accepts, it limits "the ability of force elements to engage
in new contingent operations and military tasks". It also
reveals the significant stresses which exist currently upon manpower,
equipment, training and logistics. This puts into stark perspective
the UK's capacity to sustain current operations into the medium
term.[8]
14. One year later, in its Annual Report 2008-09,
the MoD assessed its own performance in maintaining forces at
the readiness it deemed necessary to respond to possible threats,
assessed against the requirement set out in the Defence Strategic
Guidance and the Defence Plan as follows:
No progress. For some considerable period
now, and throughout 2008-09, the Armed Forces have operated above
the overall level of concurrent operations which they are resourced
and structured to sustain over time. Throughout the year they
nevertheless consistently and reliably provided substantial forces
at immediate readiness for current operations, deployed them to
and sustained them in theatre, and recovered them to their home
bases at the end of their tours. It was not possible for them
to be ready at the same time for the full range of potential contingent
operations detailed in planning assumptions, and, consequently,
contingent readiness levels have continued to suffer. While funding
from the Reserve covers the immediate bill for operations, it
cannot immediately address the impact on the Armed Forces of sustained
harmony breaches, the impact on their ability to conduct the full
range of training for contingent operations and any particular
pinch-points in manning, all of which affect levels of contingent
readiness. All of these impacts, and others, will take time to
improve through the process of recuperation. While the Armed Forces
continue to meet the demands of standing tasks and current operations
their capacity to ready for contingent tasks continues to be affected.
This does not impact on essential standby capabilities such as
non-combatant evacuation operations.[9]
15. In November, the Secretary of State assured us
that readiness had improved slightly as a result of the drawdown
of forces from Iraq.[10]
Readiness levels have improved since the end of March 2009, see
figure 1 above.
16. We recognise that the Armed Forces have for
some time been operating above Defence Planning Assumptions. We
consider it unsatisfactory that readiness levels have been allowed
to fall to the extent that they have. There are encouraging signs
that readiness has improved since the withdrawal from Iraq. But
the Strategic Defence Review will have to determine how the readiness
of the Armed Forces should be balanced with the importance of
maintaining a broad range of defence capabilities which are appropriately
resourced.
THE READINESS OF THE ROYAL NAVY
17. In its Annual Report for 2007-08, the MoD summarised
the readiness of the Royal Navy as follows:
The Royal Navy had met all its operational commitments
in 2007-08, both at home and overseas, despite a high level of
operational activity, and continuing significant challenges in
managing ship support and sustainability. The readiness of the
surface fleet Force Elements continued to be affected by the decision
to reduce support resources (the Reduced Support Period) in 2004-05
and 2005-06, and personnel shortages in a few specialist areas
also affected the readiness states of certain force elements.[11]
18. In information provided to us, the MoD said that
reductions in the resources for maritime logistic support to redirect
funding elsewhere in 2004-05 and 2005-06 had led to deficiencies
within sub-systems, equipment and manpower in individual units
from which recovery is slow. Vice Admiral Boissier, Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of Fleet Command, told us that the reduction in funding for maritime
support had taken a lot of managing. The reduced funding had forced
them to use the spare parts off the shelf from which the Royal
Navy was still recovering. They had also had to delay investment
in more reliable equipment to replace those ships which are becoming
old and increasingly fragile. For example, there were four mine
countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) in the Gulf with engines not as
reliable as the Navy would like.[12]
19. Admiral Boissier said that any delay in the delivery
of future platforms had an impact on readiness and the amount
of work needed to make sure that ships are maintained and sustained
at sea, for example, the replacement for the frigate force:
I think the real example of this is Future Surface
Combatant which is the replacement for our frigate force, which
I think is due in service by 2016, or something like that. That
is taking over from the Type 23 frigates which are the sort of
mainstay workhorses of the fleet. The Type 23s were designed for
a 16-year life but are going to be running for about 30 years.
We can do that but there is a cost in financial terms and, also,
in terms of the sheer effort in making sure they are ready to
fight.[13]
20. Admiral Boissier emphasised that the Royal Navy
had been focusing on current operations. It has been providing
appropriate, sustainable equipment staffed with adequately trained
personnel but only at the expense of readiness for contingent
operations and recuperation to medium scale operations. For example,
the Royal Navy was able to meet the current demands for destroyers
and frigates but only at the expense of readiness for contingent
tasks.[14] Admiral Boissier
was also concerned about manpower shortages in 19 operational
pinch point trades[15]
such as senior ratings for strategic weapons systems in Trident
submarines.[16] He explained
that readiness was a complex issue and was dependent on many factors
such as the current high tempo of operations and on getting procurement
right but also on recruiting and retaining the right staff and
training them properly.[17]
21. In its most recent Annual Report for 2008-09,
the MoD summarised the readiness of the Royal Navy as follows:
The Naval Service was particularly heavily committed
throughout 2008-09. All directed military tasks were completed
including a substantial deployment of Royal Marines and Royal
Navy personnel to Afghanistan. 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines
provided the command Task Force Helmand and overall the Naval
Service provided 29% of UK personnel committed to operations in
Afghanistan. Royal Naval assets were deployed to the Horn of Africa
to counter the growing threat of piracy and also provided the
command element of the European Union counter piracy initiative.
The Naval Service provided the last personnel of the UK 2* command
element in Iraq, as well as training teams in support of the Iraqi
navy. While commitment to operations was the main effort during
the period, the Royal Navy continued to provide considerable resources
to meet its standing military tasks in support of broader Defence
aim, the principal focus being provision of the nuclear deterrent.[18]
22. A list of the Royal Navy's standing tasks is
given below and we note that some of these tasks are not fully
resourced:
- Fleet Ready Escort (UK waters)
- Atlantic Patrol (South)
- Atlantic Patrol (North)
- Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf
- Security Capacity Building in the Northern Arabian
Gulf
- Offshore Patrol in the Falklands Islands
- Ice Patrol Vessel to the Antarctic
- Maritime Patrol support to Oman
- Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 1 (North
Europe)
- Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe
and near East)
23. The Strategic Defence Review must address
the procurement, capabilities and personnel issues, including
harmony guidelines, arising from the resources which the Navy
has been contributing to operations in Afghanistan. In particular,
the Strategic Defence Review must determine whether further delays
to procurement of essential equipment for the Royal Navy, such
as the Future Surface Combatant, can be justified and whether
the recent improvement in recruitment and retention should be
used to reduce the level of undermanning in pinch point trades.
Furthermore, consideration must be given as to whether the number
of Royal Navy commitments should be reduced.
THE READINESS OF THE ARMY
24. In its Annual Report for 2007-08, the MoD summarised
the readiness of the Army as follows:
The continuing commitment of ground manoeuvre,
light and specialised brigades on current operations inevitably
meant that the Army was unable to hold units at readiness for
medium scale contingent operations. The Spearhead Land Element
was available at high readiness for Contingency Operations throughout
the year, culminating in a deployment to Kosovo in May 2008. Many
'enabling' assets were also double-hatted in support of more than
one of the Contingency Reserves. In addition, the implementation
of the BOWMAN programme continued temporarily to reduce the pool
of deployable units. The increasingly challenging recruiting climate
also has a substantial impact. Overall, the Army continued to
run close to the limits of the level of operational activity it
is able to sustain.[19]
25. One year later, in its most recent Annual Report
for 2008-09, the summary of the readiness of the Army had been
revised to this:
The Army again continued to be committed in excess
of the planning assumptions throughout 2008-09, the focus for
operations and support has been on Afghanistan, as a medium-scale
plus operation and on Iraq at medium-scale. As the operational
requirements in Iraq have reduced we have been able to move to
a more sustainable basis by ensuring that the majority of personnel
have at least a 24-month tour interval. Unfortunately, this will
not be possible, as yet, for some specialist personnel. Future
operational demand is, however, likely to move closer to Defence
Planning Assumptions. As a result of high operational demand,
the specialist brigades and most contingency forces, including
16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade (Royal Marines),
have been rostered for operations in Afghanistan. Towards the
end of 2008-09, the Army successfully rostered the Spearhead Land
Element and the small-scale Contingency Battle Group (SSCBG).
The tasks that the SSCBG could conduct were constrained by equipment
availability. All contingency forces continued to share many enablers.
[20]
26. General Lamb, Commander Field Army, told us that
the Army was focused on current operations and operating above
Defence Planning Assumptions:
The reality is that the Army, on the current
operations we are running, is about three times above the levels
at which the assumptions place us. […] Our current commitment
sees us running well in excess of two medium scales, so the Army
is preparing for the current fight. The reality of where we are
is not about contingency; it is actually ensuring that not the
risk but the liability of the full command that comes with us,
in my case for soldiers, is met, that we do whatever is necessary
to ensure that we have the right manpower, of the right quality,
that they are properly trained, that they are properly equipped
and able to stay in the current fight. The Army is focused on
this. The idea that current operations impact on readiness from
an Army perspective is completely the wrong way round. We are
committed to current operations.[21]
27. General Lamb believed that it was important to
look to the future but stated that his primary focus was preparing
for and sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[22]
The MoD told us that a small scale focused intervention, power
projection and peace enforcement could only be done at the expense
of current operations.[23]
28. To deliver on current operations, the Army has
been forced to break harmony guidelines for many soldiers; we
understand that, while the Army is generally breaking harmony
guidelines, the Royal Artillery is doing so by 55% and the Infantry
by 53%.[24] In addition,
there are operational pinch point trades which are significantly
undermanned resulting in the breaking of harmony guidelines—for
example, weapons intelligence specialists and emergency and intensive
care medical specialists.[25]
In 2008-09, 10.3% of Army personnel were exceeding the guidelines
of no more than 413 days separated service in any 30 month rolling
period (which accounts for a 6 month tour and a 24 month tour
interval).[26] As at
1 July 2009, the percentage of Army personnel breaking harmony
guidelines remained at 10.3%.[27]
Not only does the breaking of harmony guidelines impact on the
readiness of the Army for contingent operations, it also puts
a considerable burden on soldiers and their families.
29. Training is also a significant constraint on
readiness. Much of the training of the Armed Forces has, of necessity,
become theatre-specific for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The training machine has in the past been diverted from regular
training for operations in general to training specifically for
personnel about to deploy or redeploy to Afghanistan or Iraq.[28]
The MoD told us that it had also had to cancel a number of large-scale
and joint exercises.[29]
30. As Chinook helicopters are central to the Army's
operations, we asked General Lamb what the effect was of having
so many Chinooks on deployed operations. He explained that out
of a fleet of 49 helicopters, 30 were forward ready of which 10
were committed to operations. The remainder were going through
modifications or were available for training. The Army was working
the fleet hard and getting a high number of flying hours out of
them. He would have preferred to have more Chinooks but the Armed
Forces could manage with the current number. For example, another
five Chinooks in Helmand would enable the Commander of the Task
Force to manoeuvre in a different way giving more flexibility.
The shortage had an impact on the training fleet, with forces
not as air-aware in the Army as in previous years, relying on
what they learn during operations.[30]
31. The Army has been working at full stretch.
If readiness is to be improved, then the Army must return to being
deployed within harmony guidelines as soon as practicable.
THE READINESS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE
32. In its Annual Report for 2007-08, the MoD summarised
the readiness of the Royal Air Force as follows:
The RAF continued to meet its enduring Military
Tasks and contingent overseas commitments successfully during
2007-08, contributing forces to UK-based operations and to theatres
around the world. However, the high operational tempo had led
to the majority of force elements reporting a weakness in their
ability to meet planned readiness targets; in the main due to
a combination of a lack of training opportunities, personnel and
equipment outside of that committed in direct support of current
operations. In addition, aircraft availability pressures, arising
from operational losses and planned modification and maintenance
programmes, and a temporary manning imbalance caused by the final
phase of drawing down RAF personnel numbers have further reduced
the RAF's ability to meet readiness targets.[31]
33. When asked in February what concerned him most
about levels of readiness, Air Marshal McNicoll, Deputy Commander-in-Chief
(Operations) Air Command told us that not all of the Royal Air
Force (RAF) was as heavily committed as the land forces although
there were a few exceptions such as the C-130 [Hercules aircraft].
A particular difficulty was that "in relation to readiness
… in the air environment you need to train continually to
keep any readiness at all. You cannot take a holiday from it and
still maintain some extended readiness easily." His solution
was "a manpower placement plan and that means that some of
the forces which are heavily committed … are manned to over
100% in order to sustain current operations, and others of course
have to be undermanned in order to free up the manpower to go
and do it. The C-130 force is heavily committed in current operations
and clearly has more manpower assigned to it."[32]
34. Air Marshal McNicoll and Admiral Boissier agreed
that one of the challenges the RAF faces in terms of contingent
operations was getting access to equipment to train pilots properly.
Many of the fast jets and helicopters had been tied up in Afghanistan
and Iraq and were, therefore, unavailable for pilot training.
For example, current training for Harriers to fly off carriers
was very weak and this situation could not be allowed to continue
indefinitely. The Harriers had also been in theatre for four and
a half years creating breaches of harmony guidelines and reducing
core capability particularly at supervisory level. There was also
little capacity for training on Tornados given their extensive
use in Iraq. Air Marshal McNicoll told us that they intended to
replace the Harrier fleet with the Tornado fleet in Spring this
year.[33] We are aware
that the MoD was unable to bring back the Harrier fleet and replace
it with the Tornado as originally planned because of problems
with the apron and the runway at Kandahar. We are pleased to see
that this issue has been resolved and that the Harrier force has
been returned to the UK. We expect the MoD to use the opportunity
presented by the return of the Harrier Force to return to training
the required number of pilots to fly off the carriers.
35. In its most recent Annual Report for 2008-09,
the MoD summarised the readiness of the RAF as follows:
The RAF continued to meet its standing military
tasks and contingent overseas successfully during 2008-09, contributing
forces to UK-based operations and to theatres around the world
including the Gulf, the south Atlantic and Afghanistan. However,
the enduring high operational tempo has led to the majority of
force elements reporting weaknesses in their ability to meet planned
readiness targets, due in the main due to a combination of the
pressures on personnel and equipment, in direct support of current
operations and reduced training opportunities. In addition, aircraft
availability pressures, arising from planned modification and
maintenance programmes and returning to manning imbalance have
further reduced the RAF's ability to meet readiness targets.[34]
36. The MoD should, both in advance of and through
the Strategic Defence Review, focus on regaining balance in the
RAF, reducing the pressures on pinch point trades and reinstating
essential training and exercises.
PERSONNEL INJURED ON OPERATIONS
37. We asked who funded the costs of the Armed Forces
personnel injured in Iraq and Afghanistan and consequently unfit
for further deployment but retained in service. The MoD detailed
its policy of offering employment to those injured on operations
who wished to remain in the Armed Forces:[35]
It is a concern, and I cannot pretend we have
got an easy answer to that because we have to treat these people
sensitively considering the commitment they have made to the nation.
At the moment, we are committed to employ those people as much
as we can in-service doing particular jobs which would make sense,
in the sense of self-worth and enabling the recovery process.[36]
As an Army issue it is very much a concern for
us because, as you will appreciate, we have got to try and maximise
the ability of the resource we have (the human resource) to deploy
on operations. If there is a limit to that, and we are finding
increasing numbers are unfit, that can only put pressure in those
who are required to deploy. I do not know quite where we will
find ourselves over this, but this is a very important issue.[37]
38. The costs of the medical treatment of personnel
injured on operations, overseas and back in the UK are borne by
the Reserve. However, the costs of retaining those personnel in
service and the cost of replacing those who have died or left
are traditionally borne by the MoD. The costs of employing injured
personnel are often offset by the cost of employing a civilian
or other military person to do the job. Training replacement personnel
is expensive and time consuming but these costs are considered
part of the general running costs of the Armed Forces. The number
of personnel seriously injured or wounded in Afghanistan is growing
with 158 injured in 2009 compared with 169 in the previous eight
years. Nevertheless despite this increase, the MoD considers that
the current costs are manageable. In the longer term, the MoD
considers it may have to seek money from the Reserve for this
and for continuing support to injured Armed Forces personnel.
In particular, the Army is under pressure to maximise the number
of personnel available for deployment on operations.[38]
39. We fully support the policy of offering continued
productive employment to those injured on operations who wish
to continue their careers in the Armed Forces. Whilst the MoD
is content to fund continued employment and the cost of replacing
those injured and killed on active service, we consider that it
should apply for support from the Reserve as the number of personnel
so employed increases and the costs of training replacements rise.
We further call upon the MoD to ensure that all those injured
while on operations have a real choice, after an appropriate period
of rehabilitation, as to whether to remain with the Armed Forces
or to seek employment elsewhere. We also recommend that, as part
of its consideration of the size and structure of the Army, the
MoD factors in an increase in the required size of the Army to
enable continued employment of injured personnel without diminishing
the capability of the Army to conduct operations within harmony
guidelines.
OVERALL READINESS
40. Our witnesses on 3 February made it clear that
the Armed Forces were stretched as a result of current operations.[39]
They fully recognised that readiness for contingent operations
has been declining which has resulted in a poor state of preparedness,
and they acknowledged the need to pay serious attention to the
problem.[40] Brigadier
Abraham told us:
In terms of our general preparedness, for contingent
operations, anything we do beyond the very, very benign will have
an effect on the enduring operations across a wide range of things—provision
of air transport with defensive aid suites to get them there,
the provision of battlefield helicopters with appropriate force
protection, and so on and so on. Our ability at the moment to
do anything with regard to the unexpected is largely only at the
expense of the current operations.[41]
41. The then Secretary of State told us in April
that success in current operations was his first priority. The
Armed Forces were not able to undertake the full spectrum of contingent
operations because of deployment on active, current operations
and the extent of the training for deployment. He stressed that
the Armed Forces were not weak operationally nor had the MoD taken
risks with UK homeland security. The Armed Forces required to
secure our borders had been fully operational and capable throughout
the entire period of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[42]
He agreed that poor levels of target readiness had developed because
of the high tempo of current operations.[43]
This position was repeated by the present Secretary of State in
November:
Just because we are not structured or planning
to run another medium-scale [operation] while we are involved
in Afghanistan to the degree that we are does not mean to say
that if an emergency arose we would not try to rise to it. We
would have to rise to it, as we do, but that would obviously involve
a stretch on our people. They have never been lacking in the past
in terms of rising to the challenge but, yes, it would be difficult
to conduct another contingency operation. It would not be something
we are able to do while we are fixed in Afghanistan to the degree
that we are.[44]
42. The MoD was unable to tell us how long it
would take before the Armed Forces return to satisfactory levels
of readiness. As we expect the MoD to have now further developed
its recuperation planning, we invite the MoD, in response to this
Report, to show us the expected trajectory for improvements in
the readiness of the Armed Forces and the point at which it believes
readiness levels will be satisfactory. We recommend that the new
methodology and system adopted for the reporting of readiness
should provide the same level of transparency and accountability
to Parliament and the public as obtained in the past.
6 The Defence Planning Assumptions currently state
that the Armed Forces are configured to carry out one enduring
medium scale operation (some 5,000 personnel) plus one enduring
small scale operation (some 700 personnel) and, in extremis,
one small scale non-enduring operation, routinely and without
overstretch. Back
7
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08 Volume
1, HC 850-I, p 48 Back
8
HC (2008-09) 214, para 59 Back
9
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-09 Volume
1, HC 467-I, p 12 Back
10
Q 406 Back
11
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08 Volume
1, HC 850-I, p 52 Back
12
Qq 30-32 Back
13
Q 46 Back
14
Q 32 Back
15
Operational pinch point trades are those trades where current
shortages have a detrimental impact on operational effectiveness. Back
16
Qq 44-45 Back
17
Q 53 Back
18
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-09 Volume
1, HC 467-I, p 43
Back
19
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08 Volume
1, HC 850-I, p 53 Back
20
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-09 Volume
1, HC 467-I, p 43 Back
21
Q 74 Back
22
Q 80 Back
23
Q 84 Back
24
Qq 129-130 Back
25
Q 83 and Ev 57-60 Back
26
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-09 Volume
1, HC 467-I, p 70 Back
27
Ev 73 Back
28
Qq 29, 83 Back
29
Qq 134-138 Back
30
Qq 103-105, 238 Back
31
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08 Volume
1, HC 850-I, p 52 Back
32
Q 106 Back
33
Qq 58-59, 120-123, 127 Back
34
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-09 Volume
1, HC 467-I, p 44 Back
35
Qq 188-190 Back
36
Q 188 Back
37
Q 189 Back
38
Qq 183-195, 204 and 315 and Ev 56 Back
39
Qq 48-49, 83-84 Back
40
Qq 26-27 Back
41
Q 84 Back
42
Q 276-278 Back
43
Q 278 Back
44
Q 463 Back
|
