43. In our earlier work on readiness and recuperation,
we had already considered the Defence Planning Assumptions; the
future size and structure of the Army; the size of Special Forces;
and the Defence Strategic Guidance. Policy in all of these areas
had been substantially opened up by the announcement of the Green
Paper and the Strategic Defence Review. The latest position with
regard to each of these areas is discussed below.
44. On 7 July 2009, the Secretary of State announced
the start of a Strategic Defence Review:
the modern day requirements on and aspirations
of our Armed Forces personnel.[45]
45. On 27 October 2009, the Secretary of State wrote
to us setting out the MoD's Strategy for Defence which was being
promulgated within the Department.[46]
This is a new strategy paper which aims to give greater focus
on the main direction of the Department for all staff—unlike
Defence Strategic Guidance which as a classified document is not
available to all staff. The MoD told us that the primary reason
for the Strategy for Defence was to meet the recommendations of
the Cabinet Office Capability Review. It was not intended to pre-empt
the Strategic Defence Review but to cover the period until 2014
before the Review comes into play.[47]
Defence Planning Assumptions
46. The Armed Forces are funded and structured to
be prepared for contingent tasks set out in the Defence Planning
Assumptions. These Assumptions currently state that the Armed
Forces are to be configured to carry out one enduring medium scale
operation (involving some 5,000 personnel) plus one enduring small
scale operation (with a battle group of between 600 and 700 personnel)
and, in extremis, one other small scale non-enduring operation
routinely and without overstretch.[48]
The Armed Forces have been operating above the level set out in
the Defence Planning Assumptions for over seven years. The Assumptions
impact on funding insofar as they suggest at what scale the Armed
Forces need to be maintained. While the Treasury pays for most
of the additional costs of actual operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
from the Reserve, the MoD funds the cost of maintaining the Armed
Forces at that scale as well as paying for all standing tasks.
47. The MoD Defence Board revisited the Defence Strategic
Guidance in 2008 in order to reflect the differing pressures placed
on the Armed Forces by the nature of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.[49] The
Board added a new military task: Military Aid to Stabilisation
and Development.[50]
General Lamb reflected that the Army had been operating at some
three times the level at which Defence Planning Assumptions would
put them.[51] He clearly
found the Assumptions less than useful when working at the current
level and tempo of operations.[52]
48. We questioned the then Secretary of State in
April as to whether the Defence Planning Assumptions needed to
be fundamentally reviewed and Afghanistan treated as a standing
commitment. His view was that the Assumptions should not be seen
as a straitjacket to constrain the sorts of contingency for which
the Armed Forces prepared but something upon which they based
their planning and force generation work. As with any good plan,
their planning work had to be capable of adaptation and flexibility.[53]
He acknowledged that the MoD might have to look at the Assumptions
in the future but he thought them reasonable:
I do not think the problem, with respect, is
about our ability to deploy forces into Afghanistan. The problem
is the implications that has for other contingent tasks that we
have agreed we should plan and prepare for. It does not matter
how you would characterise the Afghanistan operations—as
a standing military task, for example, or anything else—the
simple reality is that on an operation of that scale it is going
to affect the other contingent operating capabilities that you
might want to have for your Armed Forces. Changing the designation
of the operation in Afghanistan is not going to make the slightest
difference to that.[54]
49. We also questioned the new Secretary of State
for Defence in November as to whether the Defence Planning Assumptions
needed to be reviewed and if the operation in Afghanistan should
be treated as a standing task. The Secretary of State acknowledged
that the Armed Forces were still operating above Defence Planning
Assumptions as the operation in Afghanistan, with 9,500 personnel,
was almost twice the size envisaged of a medium scale operation.[55]
He did not, however, think that making Afghanistan a standing
task would help in managing the operation in Afghanistan:
I do not know to what degree that would get us
out of the situation that we are in. At what level should it be
a standing task? In the spring we had 8,100 in Afghanistan. This
is only in the spring. We then put a couple of hundred counter-IED
capability in there. We then agreed to an election uplift of 700,
which we have agreed to make enduring since. We are on the verge
of, I hope, committing another 500. At what level would it be
a standing task and to what degree would making it a standing
task assist us? Of course, we would have to renegotiate our budget
with the Treasury but that would not manufacture pound notes to
pay for defence particularly, would it? So how we do the sums
ought to be a secondary consideration. … The UOR situation
must prevail, the Treasury must continue to pay for those additional
costs, but we, after all this time in theatre, have a duty to
bend our own core programme, in my view, in the direction of a
very important operation. We need to look, even in the difficult
financial circumstances that we are in, at what degree we can
actually do that, and that is what we are doing.[56]
50. Defence Planning Assumptions are planning
guidelines in support of force generation work. Nevertheless,
since they form an important part of the calculations leading
to the structuring and resourcing of the Armed Forces, we are
concerned that they have become so out of step with what has been
happening in reality. The MoD should review the Defence Planning
Assumptions as part of the Strategic Defence Review This will
provide the opportunity to review the utility and definitions
of the Defence Planning Assumptions and of readiness in the light
of current and continuing high level of sustained deployment.
It should also look again at whether operations in Afghanistan
should be treated as a standing task or at least whether account
should be taken of the existence of enduring contingent commitments
and the need to factor these into defence planning.
Defence Strategic Guidance and
the future size and structure of the Army
51. The Secretary of State told us in April that
the MoD was to issue new Defence Strategic Guidance later in the
year based on work carried out in 2008. In addition to this work,
the MoD had been actively engaged in the development of the second
iteration of the National Security Strategy.[57]
He also told us that several strands of work were to be brought
together in the Autumn:
The other elements that you referred to, the
Defence Strategic Guidance, Adam Ingram's work on countering insurgent
capabilities, the work that CGS [Chief of General Staff] is doing
on future arms structures: these are all essential elements of
work that is going on. […] I think the autumn is when I have
got in my mind the idea of bringing together some of these strands
of work, but I think the important thing is to get the work done
and to get all of the ducks in a row and then to have something
to publish. I am not looking to publish individual little bits
of the jigsaw as free-standing pieces of work, because I do not
think that would make sense.[58]
52. The new Secretary of State told us in November
that he will not be publishing the Defence Strategic Guidance
or any other of these "strands of work" referred to
by his predecessor this year but that a revised set of guidance
would flow out from the Strategic Defence Review.[59]
53. General Lamb told us that work was going on in
the MoD to look at the structure of the Army, its size and whether
the Army and, in particular, the Engineers, the Artillery and
some parts of the Infantry need to re-role in response to the
nature of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. His view was
that the Army needed to increase its size. An army of 112,000
soldiers, compared to the current size of some 102,000, was the
number talked of by senior officers in the Army. Such an increase
would enable units to be deployed without being backfilled by
large numbers of personnel from other units. The practice of backfilling
could undermine unit cohesion and make it more difficult to monitor
harmony guidelines for individual soldiers. General Lamb also
told us that increasing the size of the Army would allow the Army
to deliver proper career management and better education for its
soldiers.[60] The work
to refine the Army's structure was underway under the aegis of
the Chief of the General Staff. It drew very heavily on the experience
of Iraq and Afghanistan and the changing nature of the campaign
in Afghanistan.[61] We
were told at the time that this work would not necessarily prevent
the practice of using soldiers from other units to backfill units
going on operations but could reduce the need for the practice
and the number of personnel having to go on operations with units
other than their own.[62]
54. The Secretary of State told us in April that,
before increasing the formal size of the Army, the first task
was to recruit to the Army's authorised strength which would provide
an additional 3,500 soldiers over what it currently had at its
disposal—a substantial number. The second priority was to
make sure that the operational pinch point trades were recruited
up to strength. When recruitment was up to strength, then was
the time, in his view, for a debate, if necessary, about whether
the Army was the right size.[63]
55. We asked the new Secretary of State six months
later how the work on the future size and structure of the Army
was developing. He told us that this work and a value for money
study looking at which officer posts were needed would await the
Strategic Defence Review. These decisions could not be taken until
decisions had been reached as to the nature of the threat faced
by the nation and how the Armed Forces should be structured to
face them:[64]
We will flag up the big decisions in the Green
Paper so that they can properly be taken in the Strategic Defence
Review. That is not to say there are not other strands of work
going on in the Department. There is a value for money study going
on that looks at whether or not all of these posts and other things
are needed. We should not be looking to change the shape of our
Armed Forces. I think we would wind up with a great kickback if
we tried to change the shape of the Armed Forces without the serious
work that is needed through the Green Paper process and through
the Strategic Defence Review. So we will try and tee up these
issues in big handfuls and make sure that they are dealt with
within the Green Paper. [65]
56. We understand that the MoD wishes to analyse
the issues concerning the size of the Army thoroughly and in depth—and
to await the Strategic Defence Review—before making
decisions about the configuration of the Army. However, given
the high tempo of operations over the last eight years, it is
not surprising that some senior Army officers think that there
needs to be a bigger Army. This could limit the extent to which
harmony guidelines are broken and permit the deployment of more
complete units on current operations. It would also ensure that
the Army was able to meet its future tasks and commitments.
57. The MoD is now delaying much of the work promised
to us in its earlier evidence sessions until after the Strategic
Defence Review. We accept that many areas such as decisions concerning
the future size and structure of the Armed Forces will now await
the Strategic Defence Review. However, we see no reason why the
MoD cannot provide us with the current Defence Strategic Guidance
and related material on national security. The MoD should provide
us with the results of its current work on the future size and
structure of the Armed Forces.
58. In October 2009, the MoD published the Review
of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence, an independent
report by Bernard Gray. In his initial response to the Report,
the Secretary of State said that he intended to published a wider,
more detailed Strategy for Acquisition Reform in the New Year,
to contribute to the related work on the Strategic Defence Review:[66]
I think we will need to talk about acquisition
in the Green Paper but we plan a separate document that will go
into more detail about our response to Bernard Gray and the measures
that are now necessary.[67]
It [the Green Paper] obviously will not go into
the detail of the other document but it will feed off the work
and try to inform the Strategic Defence Review. You have all of
the maintenance of national assets and the sovereignty issues
that we need to think about as part of our ongoing security for
defence capability.[68]
59. We are also conducting an inquiry into the Comprehensive
Approach. We asked the Secretary of State if the Comprehensive
Approach would be adequately covered in the Green Paper:
It is not completed yet and final decisions have
not been taken, but I hope that there will be a chapter in there
on lessons learned from recent operations and, of course, the
importance of the Comprehensive Approach. The progress and difficulties
that we have had with progressing that is an important part of
that.[69]
60. Given the public statements from the leaders
of the main political parties about the need to reduce public
spending both quickly and significantly after the coming election,
and the time any Strategic Defence Review would inevitably take,
there must be a chance that some financial decisions will be taken
before the Strategic Defence Review has run its course.
61. It is vital that the Strategic Defence Review
is set in the context of a coherent UK Strategy, reflecting long-term
strategic interests, encompassing UK foreign policy and the National
Security Strategy. The Review needs to take full account of the
MoD's relationships with other relevant Government Departments
such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for
International Development and the Home Office.
62. The Strategic Defence Review needs to cover
the use of the Comprehensive Approach including the need for an
augmented capability to promote stabilisation and post-conflict
reconstruction. In this area, it will have to encompass the role
of the Stabilisation Unit and relationships with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development.
63. The next Government will have to accept the
financial realities of the day, but we must warn against the risk
that an early stringency budget might prejudge the outcome of
the Strategic Defence Review. If the Review concluded that the
country faced a particular significant threat, the Government
would look foolish if only a few months earlier it had rendered
itself less capable of dealing with it. It is easy to lose sight
of the fact that one of the core businesses of Government is the
defence of the country and of national interests, and that is
every bit as true during difficult financial times as during more
settled ones. The thinking of easier times (when public spending
on health, education and social security was increased by much
more than that on defence) must not be allowed to continue into
these troubled times. The defence of our country must be maintained
whatever the circumstances.
45 HC Deb, 7 July 2009, col 39WS Back
46
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Home/ Back
47
Qq 429-432 Back
48
The Defence Planning Assumptions were first drawn up for the Defence
Strategic Review in 1998, have been subsequently amended, but
have remained basically unchanged. The Assumptions were restated
by the Secretary of State for Defence in a Written Ministerial
Statement on 11 February 2009 (HC Deb, 11 February 2009, col 59WS) Back
49
HC Deb, 11 February 2009, col 59WS Back
50
Q 150 Back
51
Q 74 Back
52
Qq 89-93 Back
53
Q 274 Back
54
Q 286 Back
55
Q 407 Back
56
Q 412 Back
57
Qq 301-304, 357-365 Back
58
Q 357 Back
59
Q 439 Back
60
Qq 80-82, 347 Back
61
Q 345 Back
62
Q 347 Back
63
Qq 341-343 Back
64
Qq 438, 448 Back
65
Q 448 Back
66
HC Deb, 15 October 2009, col 34WS Back
67
Q 451 Back
68
Q 453 Back
69
Q 457 Back
