Readiness and recuperation of the Armed Forces: looking towards the Strategic Defence Review - Defence Committee Contents

4  Recuperation

64. Recuperation is the process by which force elements are returned to target levels of readiness. It involves all the underlying components: manpower; equipment; training; and logistics support, and is distinct from 'rolling recuperation' which the Armed Forces have been conducting throughout the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—that is, procuring new munitions and replacing or repairing equipment on a routine basis.

65. The drawdown of troops from Iraq should provide the MoD with an opportunity to recuperate the Armed Forces and to reverse the fall in readiness. The Armed Forces should be able to return nearer to harmony guidelines for its troops; to increase the level of non-theatre specific training; to replenish stock; and to repair or replace worn out equipment. The MoD has agreed with the Treasury in principle which recuperation costs will be funded out of the Reserve and which will come from the MoD's core funds. Broadly, all recuperation costs will be met by the Reserve except for the incorporation of equipment procured or enhanced under the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) process into core equipment.

66. This planned programme of recuperation would not be possible if the Armed Forces were to be involved in another significant conflict or if many additional soldiers were needed in Afghanistan.[70] In April, the Secretary of State said that any increase in troop numbers in Afghanistan would have an impact on the timetable for recuperation, but he was understandably unwilling to discuss the scale of any increase in such numbers:[71]

    If that [an increase in UK forces in Afghanistan] were to happen it would clearly impact on the timescales that we are currently working to on recuperation. But our recuperation assumptions are on the basis that our commitments in Afghanistan have been broadly constant.[72]

    I think it would need to be a significant deployment. Again, I do not want to talk numbers, because I do not think that would be very sensible, but it would need to be a significant deployment to Afghanistan to interrupt the recuperation timelines.[73]

67. At the same time, the Secretary of State acknowledged that, if there were greater burden-sharing in Afghanistan by NATO Member States, then recuperation could be speeded up:

    The extent to which we can recuperate and re-acquire a better level of readiness has been and will be determined by the level of our operational commitments. If they reduce because, for example, there is a greater burden-sharing in NATO, that would speed up recuperation and readiness levels. We are making a big effort to try to make sure the burden of the campaign in Afghanistan is more widely and more fairly shared across the NATO Alliance. [….] But I think we have to be realistic. We are there, in Afghanistan in particular now, because we judge it to be vital for UK's national security. [74]

68. The Secretary of State also told us that were the UK to be involved in a new similar operation, then the burden on the Armed Forces would increase substantially and he could not guarantee that this eventuality would not happen.[75] The Prime Minister announced on 30 November 2009 that he had agreed to a new force level in Afghanistan of 9,500 personnel, an increase of some 500 soldiers. He also stated that many of the NATO allies would also be sending additional troops.[76] In particular on 1 December 2009, President Obama announced the deployment of a further 30,000 American troops. The Secretary of State was unable to say what impact the deployment of a further 500 troops would have on the readiness and recuperation of the Armed Forces.

    Mr Ainsworth It is bound to make things more difficult. To what degree I do not know.

    Rear Admiral Richards It is, but it is not going to significantly change the plans we have already shared with the Committee with respect to [the recuperation of] small-scale [operations]. While we are in Afghanistan at the levels we are at the moment, medium-scale plus, generating any further medium-scale contingent capability is more problematic, and, obviously, for reasons we have discussed with the Committee before in open session, the detail of these problems is not something that you would feel it was appropriate to share. We are able to generate certain of the medium-scale capabilities for the second medium-scale operation but they are affected by the fact that we are in Afghanistan at medium-scale plus.[77]

69. We agree that there needs to be a wider sharing of the burden in Afghanistan amongst NATO Member States, and we support the Prime Minister's efforts to achieve this. We are, however, concerned that any significant increase in the size of the UK's forces in Afghanistan, or any new operation, will destabilise the MoD's efforts to recuperate the Armed Forces. The MoD should estimate the impact of sending additional personnel to Afghanistan on both readiness levels and recuperation plans. It should identify ways to minimise such impact such that any increase in the tasks demanded from our Armed Forces does not undermine the planned programme of recuperation.

Drawdown from Iraq

70. The United Kingdom started to withdraw its Armed Forces personnel from Iraq in March 2009 and completed the drawdown by May 2009. The UK now has only some 150 military personnel in Iraq;[78] their role may change depending on the conditions there and the wishes of the Iraqi Government. The Royal Navy has a role in training the Iraqi navy and continues to protect oil export platforms. The Armed Forces are also contributing to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, their role is to train and educate Iraqi military officers. The MoD told us that the drawdown from Iraq gives the Armed Forces the opportunity to recuperate, and to reverse the decline in readiness levels.[79]

71. The Army has withdrawn some 3,000 troops from Iraq. This drawdown provides an opportunity for the Army to improve their harmony guidelines; and to increase training on equipment released from Iraq. It will also relieve some of the pressures on the use of equipment allowing some of it to be repaired or replaced.[80]

72. For the RAF, Air Marshal McNicoll told us that the drawdown from Iraq would enable them to withdraw the Tornado aircraft and the VC10 supporting tanker aircraft out of theatre. From the land environment, they would be able to take Merlin Support helicopters out of theatre although these aircraft might need to be deployed elsewhere. Indeed, the Merlin fleet is currently deployed in Afghanistan. In terms of manpower, the RAF would be able to reduce the workload on a large number of personnel. However, the RAF Regiment which had provided protection and guarding of Basra air station has now been deployed to increase the force protection in Camp Bastion in Afghanistan.[81]

73. Admiral Boissier said that, for the Royal Navy, drawdown would mean less than for other Services as, for example, much of the Royal Marines' involvement is in Afghanistan not Iraq. There would be some relief in terms of the naval helicopter force although much of it may be required in Afghanistan. In addition, the Navy would be providing Britain's enduring commitment to the area through their maritime presence in the Gulf and in training the Iraqi maritime forces.[82]

74. The MoD was unable to tell us what the full cost of the drawdown from Iraq was likely to be in terms of the additional expense of returning troops and equipment to the United Kingdom or to Afghanistan and the costs of write-offs of infrastructure in Iraq and of equipment given to US or Iraqi forces. The MoD has already identified some £96.5 million of write-offs and gifts in Basra, covering four protected dining facilities and their immoveable fixtures and fittings and constructive losses of incomplete construction projects of accommodation blocks and a hospital.[83] As the drawdown from Iraq is now complete, the MoD should provide us with a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs of the drawdown from Iraq.

Standard and levels of recuperation

75. In April 2009, we were told by the Secretary of State that the MoD plans to recuperate the Armed Forces to the position they were in before current operations started in Iraq and Afghanistan, that is, to the levels in 2003. Clearly, the force structure that existed in 2003 has changed over the intervening period for many practical reasons, not least in order to reflect what is happening in the world, including new emerging threats as well as operational experience across the world.[84]

76. The Armed Forces have recognised that the nature of the tasks underpinning the force elements needs to be changed to reflect changing methods of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan—for example, the way in which air and land forces are integrated. However, General Lamb expressed concern that these different operating methods and the new equipment acquired through the UOR process would not be incorporated into the recuperation levels to which the MoD aspires.[85] For example, the Army has 793 Warriors of which 97 are used in theatre. The latter are consequently equipped to a higher standard, with better operating systems and more sophisticated thermal imaging sights which were not available in 2003. Whilst it will probably not be necessary for all 793 Warriors to be equipped to this higher standard, the Army will still need to identify how many will need re-equipping for future use.[86] Brigadier Abraham told us that they had learnt many lessons in the wake of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan which had been incorporated into the future plans. For example, the MoD has recognised the need for an increased degree of force protection and has been fitting defensive aids suites to large personnel-carrying aircraft.[87] Air Marshal McNicoll agreed with General Lamb about the lessons learnt from recent engagements:

    We have learnt a tremendous amount from both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and the goal posts have moved. The way in which we now do air/land integration, the sort of equipment we fit into our aircraft, and the training that we have got with forward air controllers is completely different, so there is no point in recovering to some point in the past. Similarly, … with defensive aid suites for our large aircraft we need to keep them; there is no question of that. [88]

77. The MoD has spent some £14 billion on the additional costs of operations including urgent operational requirements on more capable kit and equipment: these costs were funded from the Reserve. It has not decided how much of this urgently acquired equipment it will incorporate into the core equipment programme although, it will always be the case that equipment will need to be procured or modified to fit the requirements of future individual operations.[89] The Secretary of State assured us that the recuperation standard which the MoD was adopting—that is, the pre-TELIC capabilities based on the Strategic Defence Review—would include expeditionary warfare capability.[90]

78. In the evidence session on 24 November, we asked the MoD if it was still intending to recuperate the Armed Forces to pre-2003 levels. We were told that the use of the pre-2003 standards for equipment was to establish a funding baseline with the Treasury. There would then be a further negotiation about what the MoD needs for the future and how the money is spent.

    The target for us is to recuperate forces that are relevant for today. In terms of establishing a funding baseline with the Treasury, we have to work in funding terms to what it would cost to recuperate vehicles and other pieces of equipment to the level that they were at pre-TELIC in 2003. It will then be for a negotiation and decision between the Ministry of Defence in respect of what we think we will need for the future and the Treasury as to how that money is spent. I do not think the Treasury or the Ministry of Defence are keen to put the money into capabilities that have either been overtaken by events or are at standards of protection and other areas that we would be prepared to put our people in as a result of our experiences on TELIC and in Herrick. [91]

79. The MoD needs to plan the recuperation of the Armed Forces taking note of the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and drawing fully on the nature of past operations and the views of senior commanders. This planning needs to be done as part of the Strategic Defence Review which will identify future threats and propose a structure for the Armed Forces to face those threats.

80. The Strategy for Defence[92] declared that the focus for the next five years will be on Afghanistan and on recuperating to be able to conduct small scale contingency operations. Other recuperation would have to wait until the Strategic Defence Review considers and agrees a timetable. We were told by the Secretary of State that if an emergency arose the Armed Forces could, with difficulty, rise to the challenge of a medium-scale operation.[93]

Costs of recuperation

81. The Treasury has agreed, in theory, to meet certain types of costs of recuperation:

  • the replacement of equipment and platforms,
  • munitions,
  • the repair of worn equipment and platforms,
  • training and exercise programmes,
  • recovery, disposal and remediation costs of equipment,
  • any continuing rolling recuperation required in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
  • the mitigation of downstream capability gaps.

The Treasury will not meet the cost of incorporating equipment acquired using the UOR process into the core programme. As part of its discussions with the Treasury as to the funding of the costs of recuperation, the MoD has broadly estimated the recuperation costs of equipment, sustainability, training and manpower to be borne by the Reserve to be between £800 million and £900 million over the next four years. The majority of these costs is likely to be taken up by munitions recovery and other equipment and support expenditure.[94] The MoD told us that it had agreed with the Treasury £300 million for recuperating equipment from Iraq needed in Afghanistan and for recuperation to readiness for small-scale operations.[95] In an answer to an earlier written Parliamentary Question, the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support stated that the estimated cost of recuperation of lost, damaged or prematurely worn out equipment from Iraq was around £300 million excluding the cost of replenishing munitions.[96] The MoD could not tell us the extent of its own liability as it had yet to carry out the detailed work necessary to identify which UORs will need to be taken into core and the costs of much of the additional work on manpower and training.[97]

82. The MoD has now reached agreement with the Treasury as to some £300 million funding for the first stage of recuperation which will provide readiness for a small-scale operation. Whilst recognising the need to determine appropriate force structures before committing significant expenditure towards recuperation, it is worrying that the MoD has plans to recuperate only to readiness for a small-scale operation within a five year period. It is as yet unclear as to the provision of funding for the remaining levels of recuperation nor when this will be decided. Recuperation that is required as a direct result of operations should be funded by the Treasury on the same basis that the operations themselves are.

The recuperation timetable

83. The MoD was planning to complete the recuperation of the Armed Forces over a prolonged period. Much of the work is time sensitive and cannot be hastened as the additional resources required to do so would be substantial.[98] At the time of our earlier evidence sessions, the MoD had a clear timetable for returning to readiness. The recuperation targets were for the Armed Forces to be able to conduct the following scenarios introduced in stages over a number of years:

i.  Small-Scale—focused intervention

ii.  Lead Armoured Battle Group

iii.  Medium-Scale—focused intervention and peace enforcement

iv.  Large-Scale intervention[99]

84. In the evidence sessions on Tuesday 3 and Tuesday 10 February 2009, the witnesses made it clear that many crucial decisions have still to be made as to the fine detail of what recuperation involves and to what exact levels and targets the MoD is recuperating.[100] The MoD intended to start work on producing a directive detailing timetables and plans when it had reached agreement with the Treasury as to the extent of the available funds for recuperation. It had hoped to produce the directive setting out its detailed plans by the end of May 2009.[101]

85. The timetable for recuperation has clearly slipped significantly from that originally planned. The recuperation to readiness for a small-scale operation will be completed considerably later than originally planned with no timetable at all for further levels of recuperation. The MoD issued a recuperation directive for this lowest level of recuperation in June 2009. It seems likely that there must be elements of recuperation to readiness for medium and large scale operations which could be started before the results of the Strategic Defence Review are known. As the MoD made clear to us, recuperation could be derailed very easily by any additional commitment of Armed Forces personnel. We add that it could also be seriously affected by financial decisions designed to reduce the budget deficit. It is worrying that the timetable for recuperation has already slipped to accommodate the Strategic Defence Review.

The practical aspects of recuperation


86. The MoD told us that manpower was an important component of recuperation. The Armed Forces would struggle to carry out complete recuperation if they were to lose experienced personnel at this time. More people are coming forward to join the Armed Forces but the Army is not yet at full strength. However, the crucial need for recuperation is to retain experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen otherwise the MoD would struggle with some of the recuperation targets it has set itself. The MoD has noticed a recent reduction in the numbers of those leaving the Armed Forces (see Table 1), in particular, in terms of voluntary outflow.[102]Table 1: Outflow rates from the Armed Forces
Exit rates For the year ending 31 March 2007 For the year ending 31 March 2008 For the year ending 31 March 2009


Other ranks




Other ranks




Other ranks


Naval Service 6.4 107 9.56.4 10.2
RAF8.9 11.18.3 11.37 9.3
Army8.1 128.4 11.68.1 10.2

Source: The Ministry of Defence[103]

87. Air Vice-Marshal Leeson told us that medical manpower would continue to be a significant stress for the MoD and would impact on the ability to recuperate to a medium-scale capability with full medical coverage.[104] In April, the Secretary of State also told us that, in addition to shortages of nurses and other medical specialists, there were shortages in other trades in the Army and Air Force which will need to be addressed as part of the recuperation effort.[105] We recognise that the MoD is conscious of the need to tackle problems with retention and recruitment in pinch point trades. However, we are very concerned at the extent and range of operational pinch point trades—in particular, those in the operational medical service where the Armed Forces are already very dependent on the use of Reserve Forces. The MoD should, as a matter of priority, identify solutions to the shortages of emergency medical personnel and ensure that such shortages do not hamper recuperation targets.

88. The MoD told us that the drawdown from Iraq should give the Armed Forces the possibility of returning the level of deployments to within harmony guidelines. Current operations have meant that many parts of the Army and some key trades in the Royal Navy and RAF are operating well in excess of harmony guidelines (see paragraphs 20 and 27 above). The MoD recognises the impact of breaking harmony guidelines on Armed Forces personnel and their families. However, we sense that the work so far on recuperation has focused on equipment and sustainability. We expect to see the recuperation of personnel put at the forefront of future planning for recuperation and likewise to see improvements in the achievement of harmony guidelines, especially for those sections of the Armed Forces most severely affected to date. The MoD should update us regularly with information about improvements made in returning to deploying Service personnel within harmony guidelines.


89. In April, the Secretary of State told us that training is a very important element of readiness and recuperation.

    I think training is one of the most important elements of readiness and recuperation and we have not been able to train a lot of our people because of their obligations to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is the missing piece of the jigsaw that has to be put right. [106]

90. There has been no large-scale joint exercise since Saif Sareea II in October 2001. Brigadier Abraham told us that there was an intention to hold such a large-scale joint exercise in 2013 although this intent was not yet as firm as a plan. The Armed Forces have had to cancel a number of exercises at the next level below that. Part of the recuperation process will be to reinstate many of those cancelled exercises.[107] In his statement to the House of Commons on 16 December, the Secretary of State announced that "we intend temporarily to reduce some aspects of Army training that are not required for current operations".[108]

91. In April, the Secretary of State acknowledged that there had been problems with providing sufficient equipment, procured under the UOR process, to train personnel. He gave us an example where he was trying to address this; the training fleet for vehicles to be procured under the Protected Mobility Package is to provide vehicles in the UK for personnel to train on prior to deployment.[109]

92. It is predictable, given the high tempo of operations, that non-theatre specific training would suffer. These gaps in training have resulted in falls in readiness levels and certain capability gaps, for example, in the training of fast jet pilots to fly off carriers. The MoD has acknowledged that there are difficulties with providing training on equipment procured under the UOR process. Notwithstanding both the Secretary of State's recent announcement on reducing training for the Army and the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, the MoD should make training for those capabilities which have not been exercised in recent or current operations a priority for recuperation. We expect to see detailed plans for such training reflected in the further recuperation directives likely to be produced after the Strategic Defence Review.


93. Vice Admiral Soar, Chief of Materiel (Fleet), said that it was crucial for the MoD to recover the current underperformance of the Navy; many ships require more work than planned for because of the heavy use of the fleet. The Maritime Change Programme should, by changing the relationship with industry, help deliver improved and more effective support to the fleet. The Programme should maintain capacity and the necessary skills base in industry. [110]

94. The Armed Forces are facing some difficult decisions as to which UORs they are going to incorporate into their core equipment especially as incorporation has to be funded out of core MoD funds. The MoD also told us that managing fleets within fleets (equipment where only part of the fleet has been upgraded for operations) was also challenging in terms of their recuperation.[111] In April, the Secretary of State told us that the MoD always looked very carefully at what was coming out of the UOR programme and, this year, had absorbed £43 million worth of kit into its core equipment programme including military vehicles and medical equipment.[112] The UOR process has produced some very capable equipment, most of which is not so theatre-specific that it would not be useful elsewhere. The MoD should make value for money decisions about which UORs to incorporate into core equipment and should not be overly influenced by short-term funding difficulties. Recuperation plans should address the problems of managing fleets within fleets.

95. The Royal Navy and the RAF accepted that cannibalisation, whereby parts are taken off one piece of equipment to repair or enhance another one, was a very unfortunate practice. This doubled the work to remove and then fit such parts and it made planning and deployment of such capabilities more difficult because fewer pieces of equipment were ready.[113] We were told that recuperation and the resultant reduction in pressure on equipment might reduce the incidence of cannibalisation but would not prevent it.[114] The practice of cannibalisation is inefficient and poor value for money. The MoD should make strenuous efforts to stop the practice.

96. Air Vice-Marshal Leeson told us that ammunition for operations was replenished on a rolling basis and kept at the levels needed. The costs are charged to the Reserve. General Applegate told us that replacing capital munitions such as Javelin, Hellfire and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) would present a greater challenge. The missiles were unlikely to be replaced on a like-for-like basis as technology developments have meant that more effective variants are available which are in some cases cheaper than existing ones. The estimated costs for the recuperation of such munitions alone—effectively their replacement—is some £500 million. Decisions have yet to be made about the exact requirements for some missiles but these need to be made soon if they are not to delay recuperation as many of them have long procurement and production lead times.[115] We recommend that the MoD should determine a timetable for the recuperation of necessary missiles.

97. Helicopters have been used intensively in both Iraq and Afghanistan and are considered a crucial element of capability. To maximise their availability and use, the Armed Forces have found ways to extend their flying hours and have often had to remove spares from the fleet back in the UK. A number of helicopters have also been modified using the UOR process. There are a number of challenges facing the MoD in recuperating helicopters. The MoD assured us that helicopters were under constant review to ensure that their intensive use does not result in safety problems. These issues were dealt with in our Report into helicopter capability.[116]

98. Our inquiry found that there were a number of particular challenges with equipment for the Armed Forces shown in Table 2. These issues will need to be addressed as part of the recuperation process. Table 2: Challenges faced by the Armed Forces in the equipment and sustainability element of recuperation
Equipment Challenges for recuperation
Destroyers and frigates in general As set out in paragraph 20, it is crucial that the fragility of the fleet caused by heavy use in current operations is reduced [117]
Merlin helicopters The Merlin fleet in Iraq has now been deployed in Afghanistan. The forward fleet of 24 Merlin helicopters has been achieving high levels of availability, above 75%, and has allowed the Armed Forces to fulfil many functions but there is a problem of sourcing spare parts from industry to keep the fleet going—50% of the spares have been used on 20% of the fleet. These issues need to be dealt with to ensure that Merlins are sustainable on deployment in Afghanistan[118]
Type 45The Type 45 will be more reliable than its predecessor the Type 42, so any delay to the Type 45 programme will exacerbate the level of unreliability of the Type 42 and the costs of running on this older equipment. The MoD has reduced the number of Type 45 to be procured from eight to six.[119]
Future Surface Combatant programme The frigates from this programme are due in service by 2016 and will replace the Type 23 frigates which were designed for a life of 16 years but will run on for 30 years. The number of frigates has been reduced from 32 to 25.[120]
Warrior Ensuring that these armoured fighting vehicles are returned to a state that we can use them more fully. Some Warriors have been used in theatres and equipped to a higher standard with a better operating system and thermal imaging sights. Decisions have to made as to how many of the more sophisticated ones the Army needs. [121]
Bowman communications Bowman was cited as a particular challenge for the Army especially in equipment likely to be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan.[122]
Electronic counter-measures Electronic counter-measures were cited as a particular challenge for the Army especially in equipment likely to be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan [123]
HarriersNeed to return them to UK given the exceptional operational workload for over four years and the breaking of harmony guidelines and to enable pilots to train to fly off carriers, in particular, at night.[124]
Vector Pinzgauer vehicle The then Secretary of State said that the Vector vehicle had been the least successful of all the vehicles procured under the UOR process and agreed to provide more information about the shortcomings of the vehicle. Vector was ordered in 2006 and the first vehicles were delivered in March 2007. When initially ordered, defence against large landmines and improvised explosive devices was not a priority as the assessed threat was seen as coming from small arms fire and anti-personnel mines displaced by seasonal rain. The vehicles were then used for significantly longer patrols than originally envisaged leading to failures of wheel hubs and axles with an adverse effect on their availability. The MoD told us that, given the greater prevalence of improvised explosive devices, it had ordered better protected vehicles and would withdraw the Vector from Afghanistan once the new vehicles had been deployed.[125]

Source: Compiled from evidence hearings on 3 and 10 February and 28 April 2009 (Ev 1-Ev 56)

99. In April 2009, we asked the then Secretary of State if Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) had the capacity to take on the additional work created by the recuperation programme. He said he had no concerns about the skills of DE&S staff and pointed to the success of the UORs programme. He also referred to the review of the whole acquisition programme that he had asked Bernard Gray to undertake.[126] In our Report on Defence Equipment 2009, we considered that support to current operations by DE&S through the UOR process had had an adverse impact on the procurement performance.[127] Similarly, in our Report on the Defence Support Group (DSG), we expressed concern that current uncertainties as to the size and timescale of the recuperation programme might create difficulties for an organisation as committed as DSG.[128] Despite assurances, we remain concerned that the additional work needed for the recuperation programme as well as the continuing UOR programme will put pressure on DE&S. The MoD should ensure that DE&S has sufficient and appropriate staff so that the work on recuperation will not adversely affect the equipment programme.


100. We welcome the Strategic Defence Review which is expected to follow in the next Parliament. However, it should not be solely a defence concern and it needs to be set in the context of a UK Strategy, reflecting long-term strategic interests, encompassing the National Security Strategy and UK foreign policy, involving other Government Departments as appropriate. The Review should take account of the current readiness levels of the Armed Forces and the need for their effective recuperation. It provides the opportunity for the utility and definitions of Defence Planning Assumptions and of readiness to be reviewed in the light of the current high level of sustained deployment. The Review should also codify the use of the Comprehensive Approach and propose an augmented capability to promote stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction. We would expect our successor Committee to take an active interest in the progress of that Review.

70   Qq 158-159 Back

71   Qq 309-311 Back

72   Q 309 Back

73   Q 310 Back

74   Q 336 Back

75   Q 338 Back

76   Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons 30 November 2009(HC Deb, 30 November 2009, col 831) Back

77   Q 411 Back

78   As at 19 January 2010, Back

79   Qq 129-133 Back

80   Qq 129-132 Back

81   Q 128 Back

82   ibid. Back

83   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2008-09, Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2009-10, HC 773, Ev 17 Back

84   Qq 144, 287 Back

85   Q 88 Back

86   Q 99 Back

87   ibid. Back

88   Q 126 Back

89   Q 288 Back

90   Qq 289-294 Back

91   Q 458 Back

92 Back

93   Q 463 Back

94   Qq 167, 182 Back

95   Qq 459, 467 Back

96   HC Deb, 22 June 2009, col 625W Back

97   Qq 200-203 Back

98   Qq 326-327 Back

99   Qq 220, 322-333, 355 Back

100   Qq 133, 138, 144-149 Back

101   Qq 282, 329, 357, 367 Back

102   Qq 197, 339-340, Ev 57 Back

103   Ev 57 Back

104   Q 233 Back

105   Q 344 Back

106   Q 335 Back

107   Qq 134-138, 366-369 Back

108   HC Deb, 16 December 2009, col 803 Back

109   Q 370 Back

110   Qq 210-215, 389-390 Back

111   Qq 200, 223, 374 Back

112   Q 375, Ev 60 Back

113   Qq 139-141 Back

114   Q 376 Back

115   Qq 224-229 Back

116   Qq 103-105, 234-238, 253-255 and Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2008-09, Helicopter Capability, HC 434 Back

117   Q 32 Back

118   Qq 64, 133, 221, 224, 232, 237, 239 Back

119   Qq 39-40, 46 Back

120   Qq 46-50 Back

121   Qq 99, 221-222 Back

122   Qq 204 (Lieutenant General Applegate), 220 Back

123   ibid. Back

124   Qq 120, 123-124 Back

125   Qq 395-398, Ev 61 Back

126   Q 378 Back

127   Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2008-09, Defence Equipment 2009, HC 107, para 58 Back

128   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2008-09, Defence Support Group, HC 120, para 33 Back

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