Government response
The Government welcomes the Committee's report on
the Ministry of Defence - Readiness and Recuperation of the Armed
Forces: looking towards the Strategic Defence Review (HC53). The
Government's response to the conclusions and recommendations,
which were contained in the Committee's Report, is set out below.
Readiness
1. (Recommendation
2) We recognise that the Armed Forces have for some time been
operating above Defence Planning Assumptions. We consider it unsatisfactory
that readiness levels have been allowed to fall to the extent
that they have. There are encouraging signs that readiness has
improved since the withdrawal from Iraq. But the Strategic Defence
Review will have to determine how the readiness of the Armed Forces
should be balanced with the importance of maintaining a broad
range of defence capabilities which are appropriately resourced.
(Paragraph 16)
Defence Planning Assumptions are a tool used by planners
to describe what the Armed Forces should be capable of doing and
guide the development of capability over the medium to long term:
they are intended neither to constrain nor describe precisely
the actual pattern of operational commitments at any one time.
The UK Armed Forces have been operating above and beyond Defence
Planning Assumptions since 2003, with consequent impact on our
contingent capability and the readiness of our forces. We
have told the committees that forces cannot be engaged in current
operations and at the same time remain ready for the full
range of potential contingent operations for which we routinely
plan.
Readiness levels are monitored and adjusted regularly
in accordance with our Main Effort in Afghanistan. We are determined
to use the Strategic Defence Review to drive the next round of
change in Defence. The Strategic Defence Review will consider
how we shape our Armed Forces and the requirement for Defence
capabilities and their associated readiness.
2. (Recommendation 3) The Strategic Defence Review
must address the procurement, capabilities and personnel issues,
including harmony guidelines, arising from the resources which
the Navy has been contributing to operations in Afghanistan. In
particular, the Strategic Defence Review must determine whether
further delays to procurement of essential equipment for the Royal
Navy, such as the Future Surface Combatant, can be justified and
whether the recent improvement in recruitment and retention should
be used to reduce the level of undermanning in pinch point trades.
Furthermore, consideration must be given as to whether the number
of Royal Navy commitments should be reduced. (Paragraph 23)
The Strategy for Defence states clearly that success
in operations in Afghanistan is the Department's Main Effort and
we have prioritised our outputs accordingly. However, we recognise
the need to plan for the future, whilst succeeding today. The
Strategic Defence Review will consider our future Defence programme,
our major capabilities and their personnel and equipment implications.
3. (Recommendation 4) The Army has been working
at full stretch. If readiness is to be improved, then the Army
must return to being deployed within harmony guidelines as soon
as practicable. (Paragraph 31)
All three Services recognise that harmony is an important
element of Service life that can adversely effect the expectations
of their personnel. Considerable efforts are taken to reduce breaches
and to maintain an acceptable work life balance. Currently, the
Army endures the highest rate of breaches particularly among pinch
point trades and individuals who, due to the nature of their role,
are frequently deployed away from their home base.
Within the Army much work has been done to reduce
the level of separation, (and therefore breaches of the harmony
guidelines) experienced by soldiers between operational tours.
For example, the chain of command applies controls to the deployment
of personnel by prioritising training support tasks, synchronising
career and professional development courses and managing operational
deployments.
At the micro level operational pinch points are monitored
closely to ensure manning levels are brought to a level where
harmony does not have to be breached in order to meet operational
demand. Where necessary additional resources are used to
improve recruiting and retention of pinch points. It should
be noted that where demand increases dramatically in the short
term, for specialist trades, there is often a lag before the recruiting
and training pipeline can produce sufficient soldiers to match
the requirement.
Factors that will improve harmony include achieving
Full Strength (currently the Army is at 99.2% of liability), encouraging
applicants who show an interest and have the right skills and
aptitude to join pinch point trades and the current low Voluntary
Outflow rate.
4. (Recommendation 5) We are aware that the Ministry
of Defence was unable to bring back the Harrier fleet and replace
it with the Tornado as originally planned because of problems
with the apron and the runway at Kandahar. We are pleased to see
that this issue has been resolved and that the Harrier force has
been returned to the UK. We expect the Ministry of Defence to
use the opportunity presented by the return of the Harrier Force
to return to training the required number of pilots to fly off
the carriers. (Paragraph 34)
While Joint Force Harrier was fully committed to
Operation HERRICK up until mid 2009, carrier training was reduced
to the minimum sustainable level. Now that Joint Force Harrier
has returned to the UK from Operation HERRICK, its carrier capability
is being regenerated to support contingent operations in line
with the Strategy for Defence.
5. (Recommendation 6) The Ministry of Defence
should, both in advance of and through the Strategic Defence Review,
focus on regaining balance in the RAF, reducing the pressures
on pinch point trades and reinstating essential training and exercises.
(Paragraph 36)
There remain challenges in maintaining manning levels
and there continues to be some shortages / pinch points in specific
areas. Such shortages are positively managed and considerable
effort is made to reduce all pinch points either through growth
or retention.
Measures to grow personnel in pinch point trades
are wide ranging and include: increased training capacity and
reduced course duration; reduction in course wastage; rebalancing
of trade structures; regular reviews of Out of Area deployments;
focussed marketing, and; Golden Hellos and increased contracted
services of non-deployable activities. Timely retention measures
also help to prevent already trained and experienced Service personnel
from leaving the Armed Forces. These measures include Financial
Retention Incentives, streamlined promotion, increasing promotion
flows and focussed career management. These are all part of a
wider package of professional and social reforms, which include
improvements to family and single housing and welfare. All measures
are targeted in order to achieve best and most timely effect.
Overall, recruitment to all three Services continues
to improve, while, voluntary outflow is reducing, undoubtedly
partly because some personnel have decided to remain in the Armed
Forces as a result of the global recession.
In terms of the RAF, manning levels increased during
the third quarter of 2009/10 such that the deficit in trained
strength against requirement had improved to 2.7% by 1st January
2010. Strength is forecast to continue to rise such that the
deficit at 1st April 2010 will have improved further to 1.2%.
Whilst this recovery in strength is encouraging, there is still
much to be done to ensure we achieve the right balance of trained
personnel within each Branch and Trade specialisation as the RAF
drives towards full manning. In addition, the Armed forces and
specifically the RAF are endeavouring to reinstate exercises and
training to regenerate capability in line with the Strategy for
Defence.
The Strategic Defence Review will look at how we
can make the best use of Service Personnel in Defence and the
formation of our Armed Forces, in order to manage strength against
requirement.
Some examples of financial incentives include:
An incremental financial incentive exists for all
services other ranks, payable to those who reach 4 years service
and increases each year of service up to 8 years (i.e. £3,750
at 4 years, £5,500 at 5 Years, £7,500 at 6 years or
£15,000 at 8 years.)
Qualified Aircrew within the Senior Officer Career
Stream (both Navy and RAF), who have reached their immediate pension
point, are eligible for £50,000 in return for 5 years
return of Service.
6. (Recommendation 7) We fully support the policy
of offering continued productive employment to those injured on
operations who wish to continue their careers in the Armed Forces.
Whilst the Ministry of Defence is content to fund continued employment
and the cost of replacing those injured and killed on active service,
we consider that it should apply for support from the Reserve
as the number of personnel so employed increases and the costs
of training replacements rises. We further call upon the Ministry
of Defence to ensure that all those injured while on operations
have a real choice, after an appropriate period of rehabilitation,
as to whether to remain with the Armed Forces or to seek employment
elsewhere. We also recommend that, as part of its consideration
of the size and structure of the Army, the Ministry of Defence
factors in an increase in the required size of the Army to enable
continued employment of injured personnel without diminishing
the capability of the Army to conduct operations within harmony
guidelines. (Paragraph 39)
The Ministry of Defence policy has recently
reaffirmed its policy that: "The Armed Forces will discharge
all those medically unfit for military service. However, the
Armed Forces may retain those injured, if they wish to stay, for
as long as there is a worthwhile role, or if it is judged to be
in the interest of the individual and the individual Service to
which they belong."
The Ministry of Defence is committed to ensuring
that those who have been injured or become ill while serving receive
the care and support that they need during recovery and beyond.
Injured personnel can elect to remain in service where productive
employment is available, even if that involves a transfer to a
different branch, but those incapable of ever fulfilling a military
appointment on account of illness or injury will be medically
discharged. In discharging personnel who are unfit for military
service, the Ministry of Defence will do all that it can to ensure
that these men and women, and their families have the care and
support they require to take them to a point where it is right
for them to be discharged, however long that takes. The Ministry
of Defence and the Department of Health are in the process of
implementing new procedures to ensure that there is a coherent
handover of medical and social care arrangements for those being
medically discharged.
In terms of the suggestion of creating additional
posts for personnel with limited employability - this is inconsistent
with an Armed Forces and specifically an Army that must be able
to deploy on all types of operations, at all times. However, the
overall structure and size of the Armed forces will be examined
as part of the upcoming Strategic Defence Review.
Please also see response to serial 10.
7. (Recommendation
8) The Ministry of Defence was unable to tell us how long it would
take before the Armed Forces return to satisfactory levels of
readiness. As we expect the Ministry of Defence to have now further
developed its recuperation planning, we invite the Ministry of
Defence, in response to this Report, to show us the expected trajectory
for improvements in the readiness of the Armed Forces and the
point at which it believes readiness levels will be satisfactory.
We recommend that the new methodology and system adopted for the
reporting of readiness should provide the same level of transparency
and accountability to Parliament and the public as obtained in
the past. (Paragraph 42)
A satisfactory level of readiness equates to having
recuperated to achieve specific aims. The Ministry of Defence
briefed the Committee in closed session on the expected timescales
for recuperation. We explained the strategy for graduated recovery,
focusing on the least discretionary scenarios that we might be
engaged in. The trajectory towards this nearest target remains
intact. As we also explained, any time-scale for recuperation
of wider capabilities is dependent almost entirely on success
in Afghanistan and subsequent drawdown. That remains the case
today and until that point we continue to do all that we can.
Future reporting will match our strategy and will
analyse Force Elements committed to operations, those available
for standing tasks and those directed to be available for the
contingent tasks we may be engaged in. The new system will provide
greater transparency and will be more meaningful as it relates
directly to specific contingent capability, but as a consequence
significant elements of it will hold a higher security classification.
The Strategic Defence Review
8. (Recommendation 9) Defence Planning Assumptions
are planning guidelines in support of force generation work. Nevertheless,
since they form an important part of the calculations leading
to the structuring and resourcing of the Armed Forces, we are
concerned that they have become so out of step with what has been
happening in reality. Ministry of Defence should review the Defence
Planning Assumptions as part of the Strategic Defence Review This
will provide the opportunity to review the utility and definitions
of the Defence Planning Assumptions and of readiness in the light
of current and continuing high level of sustained deployment.
It should also look again at whether operations in Afghanistan
should be treated as a standing task or at least whether account
should be taken of the existence of enduring contingent commitments
and the need to factor these into defence planning. (Paragraph
50)
Defence Planning Assumptions are a key part of our
force generation process and they will therefore form a key part
of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Both the Prime Minister
and Secretary of State have made clear the priority attached to
our objectives in Afghanistan and the Strategy for Defence states
clearly that success in operations in Afghanistan is the Department's
Main Effort and takes account of the enduring nature of the operation.
We agree that a key task of the Strategic Defence Review will
be to consider whether the current planning assumptions continue
to reflect our interests and the likely demands on our Armed Forces.
9. (Recommendation 10) We understand that the
Ministry of Defence wishes to analyse the issues concerning the
size of the Army thoroughly and in depth—and to await the
Strategic Defence Review—before making decisions about the
configuration of the Army. However, given the high tempo of operations
over the last eight years, it is not surprising that some senior
Army officers think that there needs to be a bigger Army. This
could limit the extent to which harmony guidelines are broken
and permit the deployment of more complete units on current operations.
It would also ensure that the Army was able to meet its future
tasks and commitments. (Paragraph 56)
The current troop requirement for operations in Afghanistan
is 9,500. If the usual Harmony cycle is followed, there
must be five soldiers in the FORM cycle for every one deployed.
Assuming that the entire effort in Afghanistan was met by the
Army, which is not the case, in order to avoid breaking Harmony,
the size of the Army would need be a minimum of 47,500. The
Army's current strength of around 100,000 is more than sufficient
to meet the Harmony requirements, although there are 'pinch
points' in some key trades which the Army is actively seeking
to address.
Initial scoping work on the size and structure of
the Army is underway with the aim of ensuring Defence's requirements
are met in the most efficient and effective manner. As part
of this work, many different ideas are being discussed, but the
final decision will be made as part of the upcoming Strategic
Defence Review.
10. (Recommendation 11) The Ministry of Defence
is now delaying much of the work promised to us in its earlier
evidence sessions until after the Strategic Defence Review. We
accept that many areas such as decisions concerning the future
size and structure of the Armed Forces will now await the Strategic
Defence Review. However, we see no reason why the Ministry of
Defence cannot provide us with the current Defence Strategic Guidance
and related material on national security. The Ministry of Defence
should provide us with the results of its current work on the
future size and structure of the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 57)
We submitted our defence planning assumptions to
Parliament through a Written Ministerial Statement on 11 Feb 09
and also provided a confidential briefing to the Committee at
around the same time. The Secretary of State wrote to the Committee
on 27 Oct 09 providing the Ministry of Defence's Strategy for
Defence which sets out the Department's strategic priorities.
We made Committee members aware that we were reviewing our planning
process and briefed the Committee on 13 Oct 09 and 9 Feb 10 on
the Green Paper. We look forward to continuing to brief the Committee
on defence planning as we progress through a Strategic Defence
Review.
11. (Recommendation 12) It is vital that the Strategic
Defence Review is set in the context of a coherent UK Strategy,
reflecting long-term strategic interests, encompassing UK foreign
policy and the National Security Strategy. The Review needs to
take full account of the Ministry of Defence's relationships with
other relevant Government Departments such as the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development
and the Home Office. (Paragraph 61)
We agree, it is our intention to carry out such engagement.
12. (Recommendation 13) The Strategic Defence
Review needs to cover the use of the Comprehensive Approach including
the need for an augmented capability to promote stabilisation
and post-conflict reconstruction. In this area, it will have to
encompass the role of the Stabilisation Unit and relationships
with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for
International Development. (Paragraph 62)
The Strategic Defence Review must consider how we
could more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider
efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability.
We agree that more needs to be done to build on the major strides
we have made with the Comprehensive Approach and the improved
ability of the Stabilisation Unit to direct activities in fragile
and failing states, including countries emerging from conflict.
The recent Defence Green Paper made clear that we need to ensure
that the potential role and contribution of all key and supporting
actors are considered carefully at the early stages of planning.
The Government is also developing a Conflict Strategy to bring
together different departments and agencies to maximise our effectiveness
in preventing and responding to conflict.
13. (Recommendation 14) The next Government will
have to accept the financial realities of the day, but we must
warn against the risk that an early stringency budget might prejudge
the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review. If the Review concluded
that the country faced a particular significant threat, the Government
would look foolish if only a few months earlier it had rendered
itself less capable of dealing with it. It is easy to lose sight
of the fact that one of the core businesses of Government is the
defence of the country and of national interests, and that is
every bit as true during difficult financial times as during more
settled ones. The thinking of easier times (when public spending
on health, education and social security was increased by much
more than that on defence) must not be allowed to continue into
these troubled times. The defence of our country must be maintained
whatever the circumstances. (Paragraph 63)
The Strategic Defence Review must be based on the
global role we wish to play, the relative role of the Armed Forces
and the resources we are willing to dedicate to them. The wider
financial context means resources will be constrained. The future
Strategic Defence Review must set priorities which are affordable.
The Review - which will run in parallel with the Spending Review
- provides the opportunity for a comprehensive reassessment of
the Armed Forces' role and structure. It would not be appropriate
to speculate about the outcome of the Spending Review.
Recuperation
14. (Recommendation 15) We agree that there needs
to be a wider sharing of the burden in Afghanistan amongst NATO
Member States, and we support the Prime Minister's efforts to
achieve this. We are, however, concerned that any significant
increase in the size of the UK's forces in Afghanistan, or any
new operation, will destabilise the Ministry of Defence's efforts
to recuperate the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence should
estimate the impact of sending additional personnel to Afghanistan
on both readiness levels and recuperation plans. It should identify
ways to minimise such impact such that any increase in the tasks
demanded from our Armed Forces does not undermine the planned
programme of recuperation. (Paragraph 69)
The top priority for defence is success in Afghanistan
and we fully support the International Security Assistance Force
strategy; a key component of which involves a large number of
additional troops. We have played our part and committed an additional
500 troops. We have evaluated the risk involved and the primary
impact on readiness and recuperation is not in this area but remains
in enduring enablers such as Air Transport. The most significant
boost to recuperation will be the success of operations in Afghanistan.
15. (Recommendation 16) As the drawdown from Iraq
is now complete, the Ministry of Defence should provide us with
a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs of the drawdown from
Iraq. (Paragraph 74)
Drawdown from a large operation such as Iraq is challenging
in terms of planning, execution and recording accurate costs.
The drawdown phase of an operation includes the in theatre activity
of transferring equipment and stores to the UK (and Afghanistan)
via ship and air; gifting of infrastructure and equipment to the
US and Iraqi Government; remediation of land used by UK forces
during the deployment; write-off of infrastructure and equipment;
and the costs associated with the impairment of equipment. Capturing
the full financial data relating to this activity is particularly
complex. Our financial systems utilise a number of categories
of expenditure across a variety of Top Level Budget holders which
are not set to capture specific costs of the drawdown phase of
an operation. The Department, therefore, will not be able to provide
any further granularity on these costs.
Our response to the HCDC Report on the 2008/09 Spring
Supplementary Estimate did set out in some detail the expected
drawdown costs for Iraq for 2009/10. Component parts of these
costs were outlined as follows:
- £13
million for hire service contracts to replace equipment returned
to the UK;
- £97
million for mechanical handling equipment (e.g. cranes) and other
equipment
- support
costs;
- £21
million infrastructure, accommodation and other costs of withdrawal;
- £56
million for transport (through Defence Supply Chain Operations
Movement and Vehicles Group; and
- £10
million stock return from theatre.
These costs were the best estimate at the time noting
that the drawdown activity was at an early stage of implementation.
We know that the costs will be significantly less than the estimated
£177m detailed above which is in line with our reduced forecast
for Iraq highlighted in both the Winter and Spring Supplementary
Estimates of 2009/10. For example, current estimates of in theatre
costs associated with service contracts, mechanical handling equipment
and other costs of withdrawal are around £21m whilst the
cost of air and sea transport for the return of equipment and
personnel is in the region of £10m. The bulk of these transport
costs are related to air. The movement of equipment from Iraq
to UK was completed using scheduled Defence shipping which was
simply diverted to Iraq at minimal cost to the Reserve.
As previously highlighted, the gifting of infrastructure
to US forces (which in turn will be passed on to the Iraqi Government)
as part of the UK drawdown, is now complete at a cost of £96.5m.
At this time we see no further gifting of infrastructure to the
US or Iraqi Government as part of this drawdown process although
there remain a number of assets that continue to be utilised by
UK forces as part of the ongoing mission in Iraq. Therefore, there
may be further costs downstream.
The main asset impairment is a charge of some £63
million for accommodation/ infrastructure (Tier Three); and there
was also a constructive loss of £48.921 million for the transfer
of four incomplete permanent structures following the Iraq drawdown.
These were reflected in our 2008-09 annual report and accounts
(HC850), along with some other equipment impairment costs. We
are continuing to assess whether any additional equipment impairment
costs associated with the withdrawal will accrue in 2009/10.
As part of the drawdown process, we can confirm that
over 8000 items of Electronic Counter Measure equipment, 500 sets
of Body armour, 15 000 kg of ammunition and 35 vehicles were moved
directly from Iraq to Afghanistan. We are not in a position to
provide accurate costs of this transfer as sea and air transport
assets that were already programmed to support Afghanistan were
simply diverted to allow delivery of equipment.
16. (Recommendation 17) The Ministry of Defence
needs to plan the recuperation of the Armed Forces taking note
of the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and drawing fully on the nature of past operations and the views
of senior commanders. This planning needs to be done as part of
the Strategic Defence Review which will identify future threats
and propose a structure for the Armed Forces to face those threats.
(Paragraph 79)
The Strategic Defence Review will consider the future
threats we face and the structure of the Armed Forces to address
them. We recognise the importance of learning lessons and adapting
accordingly. The recent Defence Green Paper highlighted this.
17. (Recommendation 18) The Ministry of Defence
has now reached agreement with the Treasury as to some £300
million funding for the first stage of recuperation which will
provide readiness for a small scale operation. Whilst recognising
the need to determine appropriate force structures before committing
significant expenditure towards recuperation, it is worrying that
the Ministry of Defence has plans to recuperate only to readiness
for a small-scale operation within a five year period. It is as
yet unclear as to the provision of funding for the remaining levels
of recuperation nor when this will be decided. Recuperation that
is required as a direct result of operations should be funded
by the Treasury on the same basis that the operations themselves
are. (Paragraph 82)
The Committee will be aware that the Armed Forces
were greatly stretched while committed to Operations Herrick and
Telic concurrently. Since our drawdown from Operation Telic and,
in preparation for a Defence Review, we have been engaged in recuperation
planning over the short, medium and long-term, and are considering
a variety of force packages. Once we have concluded a Defence
Review and received a settlement through the next Spending Review,
we will be in a position to finalise recuperation planning and
deliver those forces capable of best meeting future policy needs.
Further to the above the figure of £300 million
refers to the estimated cost of recuperating equipment (excluding
munitions) to recover to medium scale operations - not just small
scale. As stated in previous correspondence, this cost, in principle,
will be met by the Reserve. It was agreed that the funding baseline
would be established on the pre-TELIC standard but accept that
the actual expenditure and the recuperation of equipment would
be based on the lessons learnt since then, and indeed, focussed
on, in priority order, those contingent tasks that we have set
out in the Strategy for Defence. The Department needs to ensure
that resources are not invested into capabilities that have been
overtaken by events and, therefore, we continue to work with the
Treasury to identify the most appropriate funding profile for
the recuperation of equipment that will meet our future needs.
18. (Recommendation 19) As the Ministry of Defence
made clear to us, recuperation could be derailed very easily by
any additional commitment of Armed Forces personnel. We add that
it could also be seriously affected by financial decisions designed
to reduce the budget deficit. It is worrying that the timetable
for recuperation has already slipped to accommodate the Strategic
Defence Review. (Paragraph 85)
This year's Strategic Defence Review will be the
first since 1998. Given the course of global events over the
last 12 years and the potential for future global insecurity,
it is sensible to conclude a Review before agreeing upon a specific
force structure. Were we to proceed unilaterally ahead of a Defence
Review we would potentially risk not being able to meet future
policy demands.
19. (Recommendation 20) We recognise that the
Ministry of Defence is conscious of the need to tackle problems
with retention and recruitment in pinch point trades. However,
we are very concerned at the extent and range of operational pinch
point trades—in particular, those in the operational medical
service where the Armed Forces are already very dependent on the
use of Reserve Forces. The Ministry of Defence should, as a matter
of priority, identify solutions to the shortages of emergency
medical personnel and ensure that such shortages do not hamper
recuperation targets. (Paragraph 87)
Pinch Points can be caused by higher than anticipated
operational demand or by under-manning. The former can only be
reduced by routine reviews of operational requirement and the
latter through recruitment and retention initiatives, of which
there are many.
Pinch points amongst the medical trades are of concern,
and are all the more evident because they are small cohort groups
that are difficult to recruit due to national shortages and the
length of time that is required to train a qualified Medical Officer
or Nurse. Current advertising has attracted an increased interest
and the Specialist Recruiting Team is currently working with 51
Medical Officer candidates (of various specialties/experience).
Critical manning shortfalls remain in Intensive Therapy
Unit Nurses, Emergency Nurses and Operating Theatre Nurses. 'Golden
Hellos' are available and there is a £20,000 financial retention
incentive for a 3 years return of service. A Tri-Service Nurse
Pay Spine was introduced in August 2009 to establish pay comparability
with NHS nurses. The Army is the single-service supplier of Pharmacists
and a Golden Hello of £20,000 for 3 years return of Service
has been introduced to attract qualified Pharmacists. As with
many pinch points that have a high qualification requirement or
where the problem exists in the mid rank range there are few,
if any, quick fixes.
20. (Recommendation 21) The Ministry of Defence
recognises the impact of breaking harmony guidelines on Armed
Forces personnel and their families. However, we sense that the
work so far on recuperation has focused on equipment and sustainability.
We expect to see the recuperation of personnel put at the forefront
of future planning for recuperation and likewise to see improvements
in the achievement of harmony guidelines, especially for those
sections of the Armed Forces most severely affected to date. The
Ministry of Defence should update us regularly with information
about improvements made in returning to deploying Service personnel
within harmony guidelines. (Paragraph 88)
Currently the Armed Forces report their performance
against Harmony guidelines quarterly in the Ministry of Defence
Public Service Agreement Performance report which are laid in
the house library, under the title 'Levels of Individual Separated
Service'.
21. (Recommendation 22) It is predictable, given
the high tempo of operations, that non-theatre specific training
would suffer. These gaps in training have resulted in falls in
readiness levels and certain capability gaps, for example, in
the training of fast jet pilots to fly off carriers. The Ministry
of Defence has acknowledged that there are difficulties with providing
training on equipment procured under the UOR process. Notwithstanding
both the Secretary of State's recent announcement on reducing
training for the Army and the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review,
the Ministry of Defence should make training for those capabilities
which have not been exercised in recent or current operations
a priority for recuperation. We expect to see detailed plans for
such training reflected in the further recuperation directives
likely to be produced after the Strategic Defence Review. (Paragraph
92)
The Armed Forces conducts a wide variety of training
each year to ensure they are ready and able to meet Ministerial
priorities. Afghanistan is the Ministry of Defence's main
effort and we have, therefore, rightly prioritised our resources
to provide the best possible training for those forces preparing
to deploy out to theatre. Following our drawdown from Iraq
we have been heavily engaged in recuperation planning, but it
is for the Strategic Defence Review to decide the exact types
and sizes of the contingent capabilities we chose to invest in
for the future.
22. (Recommendation 23) The UOR process has produced
some very capable equipment, most of which is not so theatre-specific
that it would not be useful elsewhere. Ministry of Defence should
make value for money decisions about which UORs to incorporate
into core equipment and should not be overly influenced by short-term
funding difficulties. Recuperation plans should address the problems
of managing fleets within fleets. (Paragraph 94)
The Department recognises that capabilities procured
under UOR arrangements could have utility beyond the operation
for which they were originally procured. The extant UOR process
mandates a review of each UOR 12-months after it has been delivered,
to address this very issue. UORs that are deemed suitable for
core funding are then brought into the Department's Equipment
Programme (EP) and funded in the standard manner.
23. (Recommendation 24) The practice of cannibalisation
is inefficient and poor value for money. The Ministry of Defence
should make strenuous efforts to stop the practice. (Paragraph
95)
The Ministry of Defence recognises cannibalisation
is an inherently inefficient way of supporting equipment.
Guidance to Front Line Commands makes clear that cannibalisation
is not normally to be carried out during routine training.
However, we also know that situations arise in which non-availability
of spares is significantly affecting a unit's operational effectiveness.
In these cases Operational Commanders must be able to supplement
the normal supply system for spare parts by controlled, forward
cannibalisation and salvage. In sum, our policy accepts
that there will inevitably be circumstances when cannibalisation
is necessary for operational reasons. Guidance is available
to ensure that it is carried out in a controlled way.
24. (Recommendation 25) We recommend that the
Ministry of Defence should determine a timetable for the recuperation
of necessary missiles. (Paragraph 96)
The Stockpile Planning Steering Group (SPSG) is charged
with interpreting Departmental Planning Assumptions and supporting
each of the 3 Environmental Working Groups in their review of
stockpile requirements for key munitions. Given the complex nature
of munitions procurement, including long pipeline times, recuperation
requirements are included in the process, which differs from other
lines of materiel.
The SPSG is currently identifying munition stockpile
requirements in accordance with the Strategy for Defence Technical
Instruction supplemented with evolving aspirations beyond this
strategy. The aim is to derive a stockpile requirement for predicted
worst case assumptions against which affluences and shortfalls
might be identified against the current stockpile. The timetable
for this early work is the end of March 2010.
25. (Recommendation 26) Despite assurances, we
remain concerned that the additional work needed for the recuperation
programme as well as the continuing UOR programme will put pressure
on DE&S. The Ministry of Defence should ensure that DE&S
has sufficient and appropriate staff so that the work on recuperation
will not adversely affect the equipment programme. (Paragraph
99)
Recuperation does not attract discrete funding from
Her Majesty's Treasury but is undertaken as an integral part of
enduring DE&S activity. Within DE&S, resources are matched
to procurement, support and recuperation activities, including
work on Urgent Operational Requirement equipment, based on the
current priorities. Initiatives such as Flexible Resourcing allow
the rapid redeployment of manpower between DE&S projects to
support this. Guidance within DE&S is that work should continue
on all Equipment Programme projects and activities unless it can
no-longer be undertaken in a safe and professional manner. If
a point is reached when an activity can no longer be conducted
in a safe and professional manner, either the activity will be
stopped or resource will be reallocated from a lower priority
activity. To date, DE&S has not had to stop work on any project
because it failed to meet the safe and professional criteria.
26. (Recommendation 27) We welcome the Strategic
Defence Review which is expected to follow in the next Parliament.
However, it should not be solely a defence concern and it needs
to be set in the context of a UK Strategy, reflecting long-term
strategic interests, encompassing the National Security Strategy
and UK foreign policy, involving other Government Departments
as appropriate. The Review should take account of the current
readiness levels of the Armed Forces and the need for their effective
recuperation. It provides the opportunity for the utility and
definitions of Defence Planning Assumptions and of readiness to
be reviewed in the light of the current high level of sustained
deployment. The Review should also codify the use of the Comprehensive
Approach and propose an augmented capability to promote stabilisation
and post-conflict reconstruction. We would expect our successor
Committee to take an active interest in the progress of that Review.
(Paragraph 100)
We agree with this approach. However, decisions on
specific capabilities are a matter for the Review.
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