Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240
- 255)
WEDNESDAY 13 JANUARY 2010 (afternoon)
MR SIMON
BULLOCK, MR
BEN AYLIFFE,
MS JEAN
MCSORLEY,
MR KEITH
ALLOTT AND
PROFESSOR ANDREW
BLOWERS
Q240 Chairman:
For the guidance of the Committee and for the witnesses, the purpose
of this afternoon's session is to look at the NPSs, in this instance
particularly the nuclear NPS, and look at the content of that
and could then critique it or otherwise as a document which is
either fit for its purpose, which is an NPS document relating
to the whole structure of the IPC and what follows from that,
and not necessarily to state a case either for or against nuclear
power. I think we appreciate that witnesses this afternoon have
in general a negative view of the wisdom of nuclear power and
indeed they have been questioned by a Member who has a positive
view of nuclear power, but if we can steer between those two poles
in terms of what are the issues concerning the NPS and its validity
or otherwise then I think we will be able to proceed constructively
and would invite you to talk about that.
Mr Ayliffe: Thank you. Yes, of
course. Our principal line on nuclear, just to reiterate it, is
that we do not think that we do need it and that is fine, but
certainly on the issue of what is in the NPS, I think it is important.
You can just see the size of the thing. There is an awful lot
of emphasis in the whole NPS process on nuclear and we worked
out that there are something like 1600 pages that somebody would
have to read to get through, to actually have an idea of getting
their head round, say, what was going on at Sizewell, comparing
what was going on there with somewhere like Bradwell, looking
at justification, which is an awful lot to get your head around.
It is a very, very complex issue. That said, the problem we have
with it fundamentally is that there are gaping holes around very
significant issues such as spent nuclear fuel and that is something
that I think the Committee really should look at because, as I
mentioned before we broke up, it strikes us that given the lack
of concrete proposals around dealing with spent nuclear fuel from
new build the IPC will be forced to accept effectively the promises
of the nuclear industry that they will at some point possibly,
they assume, find a way of safely dealing with spent nuclear fuel
on site. That is an extraordinary assumption for the IPC to have
to make and I think certainly on the issue of whether or not this
document does what it says on the tin, that is a key issue which
we think you should bear in mind.
Professor Blowers: We are going
to come to the issue of nuclear waste, as I understand it, and
I did not really want to talk about it at the moment because in
framing this debate there seems to me an issue that is relevant
to the documents and that is how these documents have been consulted
upon themselves and I wondered if you might just let me say something
on that, because I think the consultation process is fundamental
and I think it is very flawed. The NPS process so far, which has
been preceded, of course, by the Strategic Siting Assessment and
various other things, does not encourage, it seems to me, effective
and democratic participation, particularly on the part of those—and
I do represent some of those—who are at the sites themselves.
I find the documents in terms of fit for purpose are actually,
particularly the nuclear ones, tendentious, vague and they are
poorly integrated. That is a very serious problem in terms of
a consultation process because a document ultimately needs to
reflect what it has heard in terms of the consultation. If you
try and take this, instead of from the Olympian heights of parliamentarians,
down to the citizen whom you are trying to attract to be consulted
or even community groups the situation you face is that you have
got three consultations occurring at the same time. That is one
problem. Secondly, the whole process is completely unmanageable.
You have got a whole series of "blue tombstones", of
which this is just one, a colossal amount of documentation both
in weight and in volume in terms of reading and if you are going
to be knowledgeable you need all the background stuff as well,
which most people do not have, and I will not go into all of that
that you need. Now, the 1674 pages which people are saying you
have to read in my view is neither here nor there because you
cannot skim some of this stuff if you want to respond. So it is
very, very difficult to navigate and select and understand and
basically know what you are talking about. So the impression one
gets form below is that this tonne weight of stuff is being thrust
upon people, almost saying to them, "You can't possibly respond
to this, can you? It's just too unmanageable." The second
thing is, it is unfair because if you look at the documents and
read them seriously and do an analysis they are designed to achieve
an objective and that objective is to get something like ten sites
up and running as fast as possible. That is basically what it
is about and everything is designed to that. So the process is
very rapid, the process is sequential and it is cumulative, and
therefore you cannot go back on certain decisions that have been
taken, and you ought to be able to, in my judgment, it should
be iterative. The scope is more and more narrowed down so at the
point where communities are asked to communicate their feelings
already major decisions have been taken before they really get
a look in, and of course it is unresponsive. We do not know what
happens to our comments. We have made a myriad of comments. Many
of them are ignored and they come back in a sort of vague and
bland document, "Yes, we have taken this into account ...
" and almost no changes whatsoever were made to the strategic
assessment criteria. If you look at that, they are virtually the
same and the changes they made were more technical than substantive.
So people below think the whole thing is unresponsive. Lastly,
it is biased because if you look at the sources for all the material
they are basically technical, industrial consultants who are in
the nuclear game who are writing the stuff. Now, I am a social
scientist. I know a huge literature in social science. It is very
critical of the nuclear industry. Never is that cited in these
things. There itself, I think, is a bias. Then you have the situation
when you are trying to get consultations with people who are hard
pressed, who are working part-time, they are volunteers and they
are unpaid, and they are up against the totality of power that
is produced by the masses of money that go into this whole pro-nuclear
thing. Ultimately, therefore, the process is skewed. I was on
the CoRWM Committee. I was also on the RWMAC Committee. We undertook,
certainly with CoRWM, an extremely detailed public and stakeholder
engagement process and got public confidence in our proposals.
This took place over three years. What is happening now is a complete
travesty, it seems to me, of an effort to try and involve people
and you will see in the documents that are coming to you in the
written form the sheer frustration that people are feeling about
this. They are overwhelmed by it, they are frustrated by it and
they say, "Well, what the hell! This process is there simply
to outgun us and to make sure that these power stations, willy-nilly,
with their spent fuel stores, are planted in existing locations."
I want to come to the question of siting in a moment, but I do
feel you need to understand that a document in a sense cannot
be fit for purpose if it is so biased and so difficult for consultees
and therefore the consultees you will be talking to no doubt next
week are the privileged ones. They have privileged access, they
have all the power, they have all the time and do make a massive
input into this. Now, those of us, if you like, at the bottom
of the tree do not have the opportunity and there is immense frustration
out there, and I do want you to understand that.
Q241 Chairman:
Thank you for that. Bearing in mind that we are looking at these
documents themselves, what would your reflections be on what would
look like a fit for purpose document as far as these issues are
concerned? That should be the question to the panel in general.
Professor Blowers: My answer very
briefly, if I may, because I think I could give substance to that
in a moment, is that I think one needs to look at certain aspects
of these documents, the substance of it, in order to answer that
question. I do not want to give a vague answer, but I do think
the whole tenor, as I have said, is tendentious, that they are
designed for a purpose and they are designed—and it has
been designed, I think, in terms of siting—to achieve nuclear
power stations on specific sites as fast as possible and the whole
thing is limited to that. Now, that is blatantly unfair and a
document which was fairer would have opened up the process so
that people could have an input into that. The situation is totally
constrained, frankly. But then, if you had documents of the type
that I want you would not have nuclear power stations. We know
that. That is the whole dilemma that we are in. If you did the
process properly then there is no way we will get these power
stations up and running. By the way, I agree with Jean, we will
not anyway, but we certainly would not if this process was done
in a fair and equitable way.
Q242 Chairman:
But the fact of the matter is that the Government, which is framing
such policy statements, has as a general policy decided that part
of the future energy mix should be nuclear. The question then
is under those circumstances how one distinguishes between the
social steerers of policy and the rowers of policy in framing
policy in such a way that the rowers can make the most sense of
what the steer has been and that, I think, is the central question
of whether a document is then fit for purpose, whether one considers
that in reality there will be no nuclear power stations as a result
of various other constraints which may be outside the realm of
a particular National Policy Statement. So that, I think, is the
central issue and I do not know whether you have any further reflections
you may want to make, bearing in mind that framework, on what
those documents might then look like?
Mr Ayliffe: I guess we might get
into the details of it here a bit. One issue again—and I
sound a bit like a broken record, so I do apologise, but this
issue of spent fuel. All the nuclear NPS says is that the Government
is convinced that arrangements exist or will exist for the management
of spent nuclear fuel that could arise from new reactors. Now,
that is all very well and good on the face of it. However, it
is obviously a rather more technical issue than just saying arrangements
will exist and signing it off. So if the IPC is going to have
confidence that it will make a correct decision on allowing these
things to go ahead at certain sites and the public will have confidence
that whatever is put down in an application that goes to the IPC
is safe and answers all the worries they have, then for things
like spent fuel it should say how exactly will it be, how long
will spent fuel be kept on site. There should be something in
here on that. There should be stuff about whether the spent fuel
will be conditioned on site and whether it will be encapsulated
on site, whether it will be put in wet or dry storage, where the
end place for this spent fuel will be. There has to be something
in here which actually gives some meat to the bones of a rather
bland assertion that arrangements will exist. So that sort of
thing should be in there, because without that knowledge I think
it is very, very difficult to say with confidence that we are
happy that we can build these things.
Q243 Chairman:
Okay, so that is one clear. We certainly had the intention of
moving into the issue of discussing radioactive waste, but before
that, John, do you have any further questions on this issue?
Ms McSorley: Could I just add
that another issue which would be discussed by the IPC, we believe,
is the agreement signed between EDF when it bought British Energy
and the deal was struck in Government over the order in which
land sales would take place. If you look at that agreement—and
if you permit us we will give further evidence on this to the
Committee in written evidence—you can see that there are
specific arrangements, for example that the Bradwell site will
not be sold until EDF is satisfied that it will get planning permission
at Sizewell. Hinkley—it is not until they get planning permission
for two reactors there that they will have to sell Dungeness or
Heysham, although in theory Dungeness is now out of the running.
It is not until EDF gets planning permission for Hinkley and Sizewell,
two reactors at each site, that they have to release the final
land at Wylfa and we know that that has already caused issues
because the NDA gave them the last of its money for land sales,
and these are timing issues and they do not just go to the heart
of whose technology is first cab off the rank, it goes to the
heart of also how it ties in with their transmission issues, what
other projects might be held up and the impact of transmission.
This was why we talked earlier about a holistic view, but in particular
this deal and how it impacts on the IPC processes and the timing,
who does what, what happens if Hinkley and Sizewell gets held
up, what happens with Wylfa, Heysham, Bradwell, that is not discussed
in here. That happened in 2008 and we are not looking back at
that. That took place in another place. That is a key issue, absolutely
crucial for the planners, crucial for the IPC, and it should be
discussed. So it is an area where there is a serious omission
in this document.
Q244 Chairman:
I think we can take that as a suggestion of what a good document
might look like.
Mr Bullock: Just a very brief
point on this question about the steerers versus rowers issue
about whether new nuclear is definitively the direction in which
we should be steering. In the Strategic Environmental Assessment
legislation there is a requirement that reasonable alternatives
are proposed and in the assessment of sustainability for the nuclear
NPS there is, as a reasonable alternative, no nuclear build alongside
a nuclear build. I am not expert on this, but my understanding
is that the decision on whether it is reasonable or not hinges
on whether the case has been made adequately that nuclear waste
can be dealt with safely. So it feels to me that that is definitely
an issue that is up for discussion and scrutiny.
Chairman: Well, let us just turn to that
in a little detail now.
Q245 Colin Challen:
Before I ask the question, I certainly agree with Professor Blowers's
analysis of how vested interests may have influenced this planning
process and I wonder if there are any published citations that
could be made available to Members, because I think that is an
area which tends to get brushed under the carpet because we are
not supposed to talk about the role of vested interest in these
processes. I am just wondering and I am very concerned about this
fast track process that nuclear is going to benefit from, possibly,
if they can find the money to do it, and how that will influence
the networks that we have, distribution and transmission networks,
and the impact it would have on other technologies and whether
this planning process and the IPC is able to take into consideration
those sorts of issues, because if you say you are going to stick
with this old-fashioned, what I describe as a hub and spoke, centralised
power generation system—which I think should be consigned
to history but vested interest says not—you can determine
the whole transmission arrangements for the next 50 years by just
saying, "We're going to go straight for these ten or so big
points of electricity generation." Can the IPC under the
NPS actually consider those sorts of national issues, or are they
really going to be treating themselves as jumped up local planning
committees where they are just more parochial? Are they forced
to be parochial in that sense?
Ms McSorley: I think it is quite
difficult for them, because as we speak there is a discussion
about new power lines going from Hinkley and anybody who has seen
the local media would know that they have said the two communities
are very much up in arms about the two proposals and they have
joined together to fight that. That is happening under the National
Grid. There was an agreement signed some time ago with EDF to
get the upgrade. Meanwhile, somewhere else is the IPC perhaps
considering the issues of the electricity networks' NPS, but how
much it can have power or really take into account what is happening
on the ground under processes being pursued by the National Grid
and its processes with local people and the stages they are at—are
these stages running parallel? Will National Grid get to its point
of destination before the IPC can? What is the impact of that?
These are issues actually also raised by industry, it is not just
the NGOs raising them. So again there is another example of disconnect
where there does not seem to be an overview, but what powers,
if any, does the IPC have to—intervene might be too strong
a word, but to kind of call that in and say, "Look, what
does it really mean if you are doing this now for what decisions
we make? Does it tie us in when we don't want to be tied in to
a planning decision?"
Mr Allott: I would just make the
wider point about the grids. I agree there is a huge issue around
the potential for decentralised power which may be being foreclosed
by this focus on the big kit which is kind of implicit across
the NPSs, as I understand it. I confess I am one of the people
Professor Blowers referred to. I have not been able to read the
nuclear NPS as I have been kind of busy with other things as well
and the sheer size of it is daunting, but looking at the overall
issues to do with the grid, I think this raises the wider question
about looking at alternatives and alternative models for moving
towards a new system for the way we operate our energy systems
in the current century rather than just inheriting a continually
upgraded version of what we inherited from whatever happened last
century. One of the examples would be looking at options for greater
interconnection and super grids connecting with Europe, which
is a rapidly growing narrative, which would allow and enable a
much greater flexible network, not just as the UK, a set of islands,
but actually linking to other renewable sources across Europe
and having a more balanced system. That is an alternative. I do
not see that anywhere in the framing that I have seen of the NPSs.
Meanwhile, we are being driven to a particular route because there
happen to be a few old pylons in that place. That may not be the
most strategic option. It may be an option, but where are the
other alternatives in the framing of this?
Mr Ayliffe: The concern I had
with the way this was all being framed was that the IPC, certainly
on nuclear, does seem quite narrowly focused. It is almost as
if somebody in Hinkley Point could have a discussion in front
of the IPC about whether they wanted the gates painted blue, green
or yellow, or the reactor dome pink, but actually these major
issues, weighty issues around nuclear spent fuel I have touched
on, would probably be outside of the remit. It would be interesting
to put it like this, a question to the IPC. Take the theoretical
position, which could happen. In 2010 EDF come forward to the
IPC later in the year and say, "We'd like to press ahead
with an application for Hinkley C." Their plans for spent
fuel storage remain as hazy as they are at the minute. The regulatory
position is that the Health & Safety Executive with the GDA
process has not signed off on plans for back end waste storage
and possible disposal. At the same time the Department for Energy
and Climate Change has not finalised plans for the funded decommissioning
programme, which will look at costings and, you know, the actual
nuts and bolts of managing spent fuel. Will the IPC have the weight
and the power to turn round and say to EDF, "Okay. Hold on.
We're going to freeze this application until all these other things
are sorted out," or will they be effectively toothless and
be able to say, "Well, sorry, we can't do it. The Government
says, `We think these arrangements will exist,' and we will have
to carry on and perhaps muddle through in the future," because
it seems to me that if you wanted to get the best out of the IPC
they would have to have the ability to turn round and say, "Okay,
hold on. We're not satisfied at this point that these arrangements
exist or will exist, so freeze things and let's get them sorted."
Professor Blowers: I think what
we are trying to do is answer your question as to what would this
document look like. It is obviously quite difficult, but I do
understand your problem, which is that you may want to say something
on this. What I would say is that it is a question of alternatives.
In a sense the thing is tied up now. There are no alternatives.
The sites were chosen for purely pragmatic reasons. The land was
there, there is a bit of infrastructure and the argument was,
"Well, it's been there before. People don't mind." Actually,
I can tell you and give evidence that that is not the case, because
we have done surveys and work which demonstrate a great deal of
hostility on existing sites. Be that as it may, do not be fooled
by the normal assumption. But if you look at the criteria—and
I think this is where we are looking at the nuts and bolts of
these documents and I would just like to mention two criteria,
because the criteria are either exclusionary or they are discretionary.
One of the exclusionary criteria is demographics. Now, if you
read the bit on demographics in the early papers I challenge you
to tell me you understand it, because I do not. I have tried very,
very hard and the whole thing is based on some kind of calculation
of weighted population and distance, but they come up with the
answer that the location has got to be semi-urban. Now, how daft
is that? It is neither remote nor urban. So either it is not safe
and therefore it really should be remote and not semi-urban, or
it is perfectly safe and why don't you put it in an urban area
where at least you can use the waste heat and make the thing much
more efficient? The whole semi-urban criterion, if you look at
it, was designed solely to make sure that the existing sites come
above the threshold and everything in that document seems to be
to the same purpose. That is why I think the document is an unfair
document and actually not fit for purpose because it has been
constrained in that way. If you take the discretionary criteria,
and the important one I want to latch onto here is flooding and
the coastal processes because these sites are all on the coast.
Some of them are on sites which we know are going to get inundated
and yet the projections do not go beyond the year 2100. We know
there is going to be stuff on the site for about 160 years, probably
up to 2,000. Nobody can make or dare make any predictions beyond
2100, but even then on some of those sites the situation is pretty
precarious; in other words, we have a policy where the sites on
the whole are going to be located possibly ultimately in the sea.
This is the most crazy idea. Only one site has dropped off the
map so far and that is Dungeness. I would say there are other
sites like the one that I represent that any sensible IPC would
simply write out of court because Bradwell is very, very low lying.
There are big problems with cooling water in the estuary and there
are problems with evacuating the local population, and so on.
These are things which nobody in their right mind would put forward
in a document to try and get the IPC to justify. Going back to
my previous point, they are only there because they are bankrupt
in terms of sites. There was a siting alternative. They looked
at 270 possible sites. How many of those did it think would be
possible? Three. So we are back now to the ten sites. We may have
fewer, we may not get any of them, but I think, to finalise the
point about that criterion, if you look at the question of flooding
it seems to be totally nonsensical to allow it. I will quote you
one bit of substance from the NPS which I think indicates just
how shabby the whole document is. It talks about the EA and it
comes up with this sentence: "The EA has said it is potentially
reasonable to conclude that a nuclear power station within the
nominated site could potentially be protected against flood risk
throughout its lifetime, including the potential effect of climate
change." What kind of sentence is that? That is no guidance
to anybody. What you really should have in this is a statement
which says, "You cannot build a site"—it makes
it exclusionary—"if it is liable to inundation under
certain scenarios in the near future." That is not said because
the argument is overriding national interest, which means we have
got to have nuclear. The only places we dare nominate are the
existing ones. We are going to stick it on there come hell or
high water—and high water is what it will be! I do think
that is where the NPS is such a fraudulent document, the nuclear
one in particular, and really that ought to be redressed.
Q246 Colin Challen:
Just following on from that, they mention that three other sites
were considered, new sites, which I presume were not anywhere
near existing sites?
Professor Blowers: They are three
non-nuclear sites, yes.
Q247 Colin Challen:
In this process—and I have not read all the stuff either
so I am quite ignorant in that regard—at what stage would
other sites have to be considered, because it may well be the
case that the IPC will reject some of the ten sites already considered,
so how is that catered for in this process?
Professor Blowers: I think it
makes the whole thing so much more absurd. I do agree with you.
I think it is quite possible that the IPC—
Q248 Colin Challen:
I will rephrase the question. Is there any provision in the NPS
for bringing on other sites?
Professor Blowers: No, because
with the NPS the IPC is only allowed to look at those sites that
are nominated and those are the ten sites, so it is restricted.
This is up to the point of 2025. Beyond that, if they want further
nuclear power stations it is up for grabs, but they are saying
that only those ten sites are potentially deployable within that
time constraint.
Q249 Colin Challen:
So you would probably agree with me in saying that the IPC has
got a built in predilection, a predisposition to approve these
sites at whatever cost?
Professor Blowers: This is what
I call a case of premature legitimation of a predetermined policy
and the IPC is hog tied, except that even so, bad as that document
is, there is still, it seems to me, sufficient discretion for
a sensible IPC to deny some of those sites if it feels they are
outrageous, so further sites might well fall off, but then what
happens?
Q250 Chairman:
I think that is a point of clarification, therefore, that if the
IPC has discretion to the extent that it may reject particular
sites, for example on the grounds of likely inundation, then what
appears to be the case, as the documents stand, is that there
is then no plan B for alternative sites, that actually existing
sites may be rejected but no other sites under the terms of that
particular NPS can then come into consideration?
Mr Ayliffe: Not until 2025.
Professor Blowers: That is absolutely
true, but I would just caution you on the first thing you said,
and that is if you look at the way the document is written every
effort is expended to get the IPC basically to allow those sites
because there is this thing called overriding national interest.
However bad the damage and however much mitigation is appalling,
you can still appeal to overriding national interests and they
are told, "We need this stuff. You've got to find the sites,"
and that is why I think the NPS is absolutely fundamentally flawed.
That should not be said because that so balances the thing you
might as well not plan at all. You might as well say, "These
are the sites," which is virtually what is being said, "You're
going to have them," and that means dumping on a whole load
of communities now and in the future. But if you are going to
address that question, that is where I would start actually.
Ms McSorley: Again very quickly
on sites, when British Energy was sold it was sold to a company
on the understanding that it would probably get new build on a
number of these sites and also have to sell some of the sites
to other potential nuclear operators, and the Government is tied
into a deal with EDF on that. Westinghouse is not in the frame
on that one. So there are questions around that decision being
made some time ago and how that might influence the IPC's decisions,
because if it says no to Bradwell, for example, EDF again ends
up, as it might have done with Dungeness, with something that
is pretty worthless in terms of nuclear development. It is a much
less valuable plot of land and that is why that issue has to be
discussed in terms of what the IPC feels it can say no to as well
as its powers to say no to things.
Q251 Colin Challen:
Shall we turn to radioactive waste? Obviously we have heard a
bit already about that subject this afternoon and I am just wondering
if you think you have characterised the adequacy of the Government's
plans to deal with radioactivity as they stand today and I am
just thinking of the Finnish development. The way the Finnish
new nuclear power station was sold to the Finnish Parliament and
the people of Finland was that they already had control of that
issue. The solution had been found and that was the condition,
no nuclear power without that condition in place, and then of
course they started and discovered that they had not got a solution
to that problem. Are we in the same boat in relation to that question?
Mr Ayliffe: Yes, I think we are.
I think the Government's position on final disposal or not is
wholly inadequate. There are vague promises that we would have
a solution to nuclear waste, a full geological disposal, and if
you take this as face value in the nuclear NPS it seems that there
is no problem, but realistically we are no further towards finding
a long-term solution to waste disposal. I would just say for the
record that Greenpeace do not believe that there is an environmentally
acceptable way of dealing with high level radioactive waste, but
the way the Government has framed it makes it seem that there
are solutions, that we can crack on and go ahead with this stuff.
The Flowers Report in the 1970s said that you should not
create more waste until you have a solution and we think that
still stands. We do not see the solution and the way that the
managing radioactive waste safely programme which the Government
has developed to try and sort this problem out is, of course,
predicated on the principle of voluntarism, so that there will
be a community somewhere that comes forward, that they will be
able to then bury all this waste in. This is fraught with danger,
I think, because although I believe three communities have come
forward in Cumbria to say that they are interested in having a
waste dump, there is no guarantee that the geology will be suitable,
and I would remind the Committee that Nirex in the 90s and the
80s spent a lot of time digging and drilling in Cumbria, that
region of Cumbria, only to find that it was not suitable. So betting
the house on finding a solution for geological disposal I think
is risky. There are huge issues of whether or not there will be
a geologically suitable site. We do not know whether the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority will be able to make a safety case,
even if they do find a site, and the NDA itself has gone on record—and
this is in our submission—as saying, "There is no guarantee
that the process will succeed in Cumbria. We need to bear in mind
that the community has the right of withdrawal at any time and
they do not need to justify their decision." So although
the Government does start mentioning, "Well, if voluntarism
does not work then we might have to start strong-arming people,"
but that was one of the reasons why Nirex did not work. People
do not like being told that they are going to have a radioactive
waste dump on their doorstep.
Q252 Colin Challen:
The Government, I think, at least within the Press, has suggested
paying communities, which would be in any reasonable definition
a bribe. In planning law, of course, these things are taken very
seriously. Is this process two party? If you come along and you
say you are going to have a fair and objective planning assessment
and you find that the local community believes that it may be
rewarded financially for going in one particular direction, that
is going to completely disrupt the planning process? If you are
having local meetings, and so on, it is going to surely be a big
problem?
Professor Blowers: As I say, I
was a member of the CoRWM Committee and actually drafted a lot
of the policy that we are now talking about. It is, of course,
the case that if there was a community that wanted to participate
in the process some support would be given in various ways, it
would have to be in terms of information, and so on, and ultimately
if a repository were to be constructed then what we will call
packages might well be designed. But that was not seen as a bribe
or an incentive, it was seen as a necessary element of improving
the community's wellbeing because of the negativities that surround
that. But that aside, I would just like to say something about
this evidential base. I, as a member of the committee, along with
the past chair of the committee and two other members, wrote to
the Secretary of State last November—and despite two prompts
I have yet had no reply, I am still waiting for a reply—pointing
out the problem with the statement in the NPS, and it is back
to this question of is this fit for purpose. The statement is
that effective arrangements have or will be made. You will remember
that particular statement as part of your question. What we said
in that letter was that we felt that was a serious misrepresentation
of the situation because in fact it is unknowable whether effective
arrangements will be in place. You simply cannot know that. There
are three reasons for this. One is the scientific, in that the
recommendation was for deep disposal after a long period of research
and development and on storage. No such research and development
has been undertaken and the science is being heavily contested
at the moment. I hope you will look at the submission by the NWAA
which is coming to you, which I think does give a very, very good
scientific critique of the situation. It is one of those situations
where we may never know and where the science, as we begin to
learn more, begins to throw more doubt, even on the Baltic solution
which the Finns are so fond of. There are no discussions about
copper canisters, and so on.
Q253 Colin Challen:
But we know that we have to deal with this radioactive waste,
the legacy?
Professor Blowers: Indeed. I am
coming to that point.
Q254 Colin Challen:
The industry will say, "This is not such a big issue now
with new nuclear build because it will create so little in comparison
with the old previous generation. So given that we know that we
have to solve the problem and it may be added to by, as they say,
a very small, almost barely noticeable amount of nuclear waste—
Professor Blowers: I wanted to
come to that point, though, because the first plank is the site,
which is in doubt. The second is the social side. We talked about
voluntarism. There is no guarantee that there will be a community
that comes along with it, and even if it does that the site could
be necessarily proven at that point. But all of that policy applies,
as you hint, to legacy waste, it does not apply to new build.
We do have to solve the problem of legacy waste and we will have
to do that in various ways, but you cannot piggyback new waste
onto that because it raises different issues about inventories,
about the ethical nature of creating something that is not necessary
to create and its implications for future generations, and there
are technical issues to do with high burn-up fuels, and so on.
All of that requires a process, a new process, to look at new
build waste. Simply to say you can dump new build waste in repositories,
if they ever come about, that were intended for legacy wastes
is, I think, misleading and something ought to be seriously said
in the NPS documents on that particular issue as well as the other
issues of the flooding because the point is in the year 2000 we
are still going to have stuff on those sites, as far as we know,
and we do not know that there is going to be any method of long-term
management by then. In other words, we are saying there is a black
hole ahead and I think this is where the Government is utterly
irresponsible and unethical. It is saying, "Okay, you communities
and all you people in the future for the next 200 years at least,
you are going to have this stuff. We don't know what we're going
to do with it and actually the situation may be far worse in the
next century when the conditions at those sites deteriorate and
when people are no longer so sort of committed to the new plants
when the new plants have disappeared, as they will do." That
is an astonishing legacy, it seems to me, to be imposing on future
generations and I am absolutely amazed that virtually nothing
is said about that ethical question in the NPSs, which in the
past has been a very, very serious issue. Now it is almost as
if we need nuclear power now. We don't give a damn what happens
in the future.
Mr Ayliffe: Very, very quickly,
just to echo Andy's point really that knowing you have to deal
with legacy waste is not a reason for producing more and you should
not conflate the two, legacy and new build, but I would just point
out to the Committee as well that dealing with radioactive waste
is not just about volume, it is of course about radioactivity
and it is entirely likely, in fact certain that the waste produced
by new reactors may be smaller in terms of volume but it will
be far more radioactive, produce a lot more heat and will subsequently
be far more difficult technically to actually deal with.
Ms McSorley: If I might just raise
an NPS issue very specifically. You have heard from my colleagues
that there are issues around disposal, on site management, issues
around how we are going to deal with spent fuel. Paragraph 3.8.20
says quite clearly: "Having considered this issue of radioactive
waste the Government is satisfied that effective arrangements
will exist to manage"—that is from now, in between
the disposal site—"and dispose of the waste that will
be produced from new nuclear power stations. As a result, the
IPC need not consider this question." That cannot stand and
that has to be struck out of this NPS. The IPC has to look at
a cradle to grave approach and not these arrangements and really
it cannot take the Government's or the industry's word on this
and for the IPC to be told not to consider it is totally unacceptable.
Q255 Chairman:
Yes, I was indeed going to and the relevant paragraph says, does
it not, "Having considered this issue, the Government is
satisfied that effective arrangements will exist to manage and
dispose of the waste that will be produced from new nuclear power
stations. As a result, the IPC need not consider this question."
May I take it for the record that that is a statement with which
you collectively do not agree?
Ms McSorley: Yes.
Mr Ayliffe: Yes.
Mr Allott: Yes.
Mr Bullock: Yes.
Professor Blowers: I think also
you might ask the Secretary of State, if you could, to give a
reply to the letter which has been submitted on this particular
issue.
Mr Ayliffe: I think it sort of
typifies the industry in that the approach to new build is that
it is almost like, you know, the triumph of hope over experience.
I still dream of playing cricket for England. It is highly unlikely
to happen, but it seems that the Government is expecting people
seriously to assume, "Well, okay, they'll find some way of
dealing with this incredibly dangerous radioactive material at
some unspecified point in the future, so we won't really need
to think about it." I mean, it is incredible.
Chairman: We have covered the areas we
wanted to cover this afternoon and we have run out of time for
our discussions. I would like to thank you very much for your
evidence this afternoon. Obviously I will look forward to the
news flash on Sky Sports that Mr Ayliffe is about to bat for England!
I might add that I think it would be very useful for the Committee
if the Committee could be supplied with a copy, Professor Blowers,
of the letter which you submitted to the Minister, assuming it
is in the public domain, for our deliberations. I would be grateful
for that. Thank you very much.
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