Annex
EN6
Part 2: Government policy on new nuclear stations
and energy infrastructure development
2.3 The need for nuclear power
2.3.1 begins "Nuclear power is low
carbon, economic, dependable, safe |" Neither of these
properties can be fully substantiated.
LOW CARBON
Nuclear's low carbon property depends on the
completion of the entire life cycle, with the possible exception
of the "back-end" (assuming the spent fuel remains in
dry casks on station sites rather than being placed in an underground
repository).
This is because the initial carbon emissions
result from the "front-end", which includes the construction
of the reactor and the manufacture of the nuclear fuel. An increasingly
significant emission results from the removal of the overburden
at the start of an open pit uranium mine.
An Areva EPR weighs around 200,000 tonnes of
which 180,000 tonnes is concrete and reinforcing. The alloy steels
in the fabrication of the major components and the non-ferrous
metals in the controls and instrumentation are all associated
with carbon emissions in their manufacture. See EN6—Figure
1 (Areva)
There is also the emissions related to the removal
of the waste rock associated with low grade ores. For instance,
an EPR has a requirement of 730 tonnes of natural uranium for
the manufacture of its initial core charge of fuel. The actual
material that has to be removed to extract this uranium, with
for instance an ore grade of 0.045% U3O8 (as is the average in
Australia), with a characteristic open pit waste rock to ore ratio
of 4:1 and a 70% chemical extraction yield, amounts to 730/0.848/0.00045/0.7*5
= 13.7 million tonnes. The removal of the overburden and the subsequent
waste rock will require diesel or electrical powered machinery.
See EN6—Figure 2 (Caterpillar)
If a series of new nuclear power plants are
built over say the ten years following the licensing by HSE/NII,
the successive emissions from the construction of the fleet and
the mining of the uranium for the initial core charges will only
be compensated by the subsequent low carbon operation if it endures
for the remainder of the life-cycle. The average operational life
of NPPs now shut down is 22 years, so as the life cycle calculations
are calculated against the 40 to 60 years claimed life, the full
benefits may ever be realised. Also towards the end of the century,
the remaining uranium ore grades will decline, increasing dramatically
the input energy to the cycle.
See EN6—Figure 3 for a five year construction
period and 40 year operational life (Storm van Leeuwen).
The claimed low carbon property of nuclear power
is dependent on too many imponderable factors to be assured.
ECONOMIC
The first EPR is proving to be far from economic,
mainly because of delays in its construction. The Olkiluoto contract
was signed in 2003 and the EPR may not be commissioned until 2013.
In a fixed price contract it is normal for a down-payment to be
made, followed by progress payments to be made at certain achieved
stages in the programme. A construction period of double the assumed
time means that the preceding cash flow calculations are invalid
and a return on the increased capital expenditure may be delayed
or never achieved.
The price of the next EPR will depend on the
outcome of Olkiluoto, which may take several years to establish
as both parties, Areva and TVO, are engaged in litigation and
counter claims.
The other factor is the ageing of the major
components of which so far around 200 reactor vessel heads and
steam generators have had to be exchanged, the life of them has
up until now been 15 to 20 years. Alternative alloys are now utilised,
but the duration of these is uncertain as with ageing only time
can tell. The exchange of the major components has been masked
by naming it "upgrading" instead of "maintenance".
As the construction of the plant and the manufacture
of the fuel is associated with carbon emissions, the levying of
a carbon tax on the suppliers will also lead to increased costs.
The alloy components, such as nickel, chromium and steel are all
dependent on the mining of ores of a decreasing grade. Also copper
and other metals in the control and instrumentation are subject
to price rises. It is inevitable that the next contracts, if negotiated
at a fixed price, will be subject to variations based on component
prices. It would be a brave trader offering fixed future commodity
prices over a perhaps 10 years contractual period.
The economic analysis in the successive White
Papers is therefore out of date and a revision may prove impossible
to conduct. The level of subsidy required by the generator will
therefore be equally impossible to assess.
British Energy is currently around 70% owned
by the French state, but half of the French fleet has to be replaced
or upgraded in the next ten years, so unless the UK government
passes some funds to the French government, the as yet undefined
costs of the UK EPR fleet will not be found, especially as both
EdF and Areva have huge debts. The regulators on both sides of
the Channel are reluctant to allow tariffs to rise to generate
the capital needed.
Without a generous subsidy from the British
government to the generators, such as British Energy, RWE or E.On
or in the case of EdF an undisclosed payment to the French state
there will be no new build in the UK.
DEPENDABLE
The security of supply depends entirely on a
100% imported fuel manufactured from natural uranium. Primary
mining provides only round 60% to 70% of the demand, the remainder
coming from uncertain secondary sources, due to come into a state
of flux after 2013. The Megatons to Megawatts US/Russian deal
will be replaced by an ability to market uranium in the US and
some supply deals have been forged.
Russian mining and demand is in parity, but
much is promised to China, India, Korea and Japan, so as Canadian
uranium mining is in severe decline, the end of the ex-weapons
deal means that the US and France will be in competition for limited
supplies.
See EN6—Figure 4 which plots individual
Canadian uranium mines' production showing its progressive decline.
France supplies Sizewell B with its fuel and
with its own needs and that of its nuclear hegemony imports 13,000
tonnes a year from around 43,000 tonnes of primary mining, so
that the withdrawal of the equivalent of 10,000 tonnes from the
fuel market, will perhaps lead to some of the lights going out
in France, which is over dependent on nuclear (76%) and where
its indigenous mines are exhausted.
Areva will have to find 730 tonnes of uranium
for the manufacture of the initial core charge for Olkiluoto and
Flamanville.
Australian mining is in a less rapid decline
but is also promising supplies of uranium to China, which in turn
is becoming increasingly nervous as to its supplies for its burgeoning
fleet. The Areva supply contract for two EPRs for China is tied
to the successful opening of Areva's Trekkopje mine in Namibia,
35% of which is promised to China. Kazakhstan was due to rapidly
expand, but the Kazakh government has now announced that this
is to be restricted. In any case its output has been forward sold
to China, Russia, Korea and Japan.
The problem is that individual mines, like oil
wells, follow a Hubbert curve of build-up, plateau and decline
of output, so that to maintain national production a series of
new mines needs to be opened. If nuclear power is to be doubled
or tripled, then a succession of even more mines are needed. In
Canada the Cigar Lake mine is flooded and may never open, while
in Australia the Olympic Dam expansion will not open until 2018,
if ever, after 2 billion tonnes of overburden are removed to reach
the first ores below 300 metres of rock.
The huge building programme in China alone will
mop up any surplus uranium and with the demands of new build in
Russia, Korea and Japan a lack of supplies to the West can be
anticipated. The optimistic forecast of the OECD/NEA "Red
book" can be set aside when the experience in France is analysed.
As the French mines approached their closure, the predicted "resources"
were progressively reduced to zero.
See EN6—Figure 5 for the plots (EWG)
Nuclear power in the UK cannot depend on its
fuel supplies.
SAFE
In 1971 a hole appeared in the Swiss Beznau-1
reactor vessel head after just two years of operation. A leak
in a weld allowed boric acid, added to the cooling water as a
neutron absorber, to attack the ferritic outer shell. This incident
did not emerge until a much bigger hole appeared in the Ohio Davis-Besse
reactor vessel head in 2002, some 30 years later.
At Davis-Besse the acid ate away at the thick
outer shell, the pressure being held by the thin stainless steel
liner. Although the liner was subject to cracking, the initial
leak came from a crack in a "penetration" tube of Inconel
600 alloy steel into which a control rod is dropped. When major
components are replaced, such as reactor vessel heads and steam
generators, Inconel 690 is substituted, which has a higher chromium
content and is considered to be more crack resistant, though some
samples have exhibited cracking. The management of Davis-Besse
were fined because of lax procedures, which could have led to
a loss of cooling catastrophe, had the cracks in the liner led
to a rupture of the vessel.
See EN6—Figure 6a and EN6—Figure
6b (NIRS Wise)
See also EN6—Figure 7a, EN6—Figure
7b and EN6—Figure 7c for details of the hole in the Davis-Besse
reactor vessel head and the cracks in the stainless steel liner.
(US Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
Tritium is produced by the neutron bombardment
of boron, which then enters the grain structure of the vessel
liners and generator tubes, resulting in intergranular stress
corrosion cracking. This also leads to leaks in spent fuel pond
liners, as boric acid is also added to the pond water as a neutron
absorber. Also the irradiation of the enclosures leads to metal
embrittlement.
The industry has introduced an ageing management
practice, with internal monitoring specimens and in the case of
the EPR reactor vessel a heavy stainless steel reflector surrounds
the core. Its claims of a 60 year operational life are subject
to regular 10 year inspections and component exchange when shown
to be necessary.
MY CONCLUSIONS
During the build-up phase of new build, the
construction and mining activities will add considerably to carbon
emissions. Only after 40 to 60 years in retrospect can a nuclear
power plant be considered to be low carbon.
The delays in the construction of the Olkiluoto
EPR have shown new build to be uneconomic, especially highlighting
the lack of skilled manufacturing resources.
The decline of primary mining production in
Canada and Australia and the failure to open new mines of a significant
size shows that uranium supplies are not dependable. The diluted
ex-weapons fuel needs considerable tails enrichment facilities
predominantly owned by the Russians and likely to be offered more
widely to its nuclear hegemony.
From the moment the fission initiates, the metal
enclosures are subject to irradiation attack and the ageing process
begins. Safety depends on adequate monitoring of the ageing process
over the 60 years operational life of the new build reactors and
experience shows that this cannot be guaranteed .
The so-called nuclear "renaissance"
has been instigated by a successful PR campaign and adopted by
governments based on false claims of its low carbon nature, economic
generation, dependability and safety.
December 2009
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