House of Commons - Energy and Climate Change

The proposals for national policy statements on energy - Energy and Climate Change Contents

Memorandum submitted by the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates

EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WASTE FROM NEW REACTORS DO NOT EXIST

Acronyms


AoS	Appraisal of Sustainability
C-14	Carbon-14
CoRWM (i)	Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (i) 2003-07
CoRWM2	Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (ii) 2007-present
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
DEFRA	Department of the Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs
DoT	Dept of Transport
DSS	Disposal System Specification
DTI	Dept of Trade and Industry (now part of DBIS—Department of Business, Innovation and Skills)
EA	Environment Agency
EBS	Engineered Barrier Systems
EDZ	Excavation Damage Zone
EPR	Reactor type
EU	European Union
GDF	Geological Disposal Facility
GRA	Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation
HLW	High Level Wastes
HPA	Health Protection Agency
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILW	Intermediate Level Waste
IPC	Independent/Infrastructure Planning Commission
ISA	Isosaccharinic acid
JRC	Joint Research Centre
Kd	Sorption
MKG	Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review
MOX	Mixed Oxide fuel
MRWS	Managing Radioactive Waste Safely
NAPLs	Non-Aqueous Phase Liquids (section 9.2)
NDA	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency
NWAA	Nuclear Waste Advisory Alliance
NPS	National Policy Statement
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
PAMINA	Performance Assessment Methodologies in Application to Guide the Development of the Safety Case
PI	Public Inquiry
Pu	Plutonium
R&D	Research and Development
RCF	Rock Characterisation Facility
RWMD	Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (NDA)
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
STUK	Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 This memorandum examines the evidence for the Government's assertion that effective arrangements will exist for waste produced by new reactors.

1.2 We note that four former members of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM (i)) have written to the the Secretary of State to express concern that the Committee's recommendations have been seriously misrepresented in the Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation, and state that: "It is unknowable whether or not effective arrangements will exist..."

1.3 Nirex's application to begin excavation work at their proposed disposal site near Sellafield in the 1990s—the so-called "Rock Characterisation Facility" (or "RCF" proposal) was rejected on generic scientific grounds (as well as for site specific reasons). The implications of this rejection have still not been fully examined or resolved.

1.4 Technical problems and uncertainties described by the Environment Agency (EA), and the European Union Joint Research Centre (EU JRC), as well as the uncertainties regarding radionuclide properties detailed in this memorandum, such as their solubility and sorption—or even their presence as a gas—could mean estimted contamination levels calculated for a deep geological disposal facility are in error by a factor of 10,000 to 1,000,000 which clearly has implications for the risk estimates.

1.5 Resolution of the problems raised at the Nirex RCF Inquiry, and more recently by the EA and EU JRC, is not a simple matter of providing sufficient funding for researchers over the next few decades. It may, in fact, not be possible to resolve all of the issues. Further research may not produce the required answers or it may identify further serious problems that simply had not previously been realised. Therefore it may not be possible to make a safety case for deep geological disposal. So, the Government's confidence that effective arrangements to dispose of waste from new reactors will exist is premature.

1.6 The task at hand for a waste disposal applicant is to demonstrate that the resultant dose would be less than 20 micro sieverts[100] per year. This memorandum addresses the current status of the nuclear industry's ability to utilise reliable and meaningful data in order to forecast the likely health impact of placing nuclear waste in a deep underground disposal facility—in order that such a project would not recklessly endanger people in the future.

1.7 We conclude that achieving such a dose target is simply not scientifically demonstrable or achievable in practice. It is in the nature of chemical elements and geological and biological systems to behave in a variable and hence unpredictable manner such that they make reliable risk/time calculations into the far future not only difficult but virtually impossible.

1.8 The Government's evidence (produced as part of the Nuclear National Policy Statement consultation) refers very specifically to the Finnish disposal project. It claims that the Finnish Regulator ("STUK") "did not identify any reason why the project couldn't move forward".[101] But this does not provide an accurate representation of the STUK evidence base.

1.9 New reactor fuel would be "high burn up" fuel which is hotter and more radioactive than spent fuel from existing reactors and unlike anything generated in the UK before. Such waste fuel would require longer storage at the reactor site and would be more fiercely radiotoxic. The Government is relying on disposability assessments of this new type of fuel carried out by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to reach its conclusions. But these assessments have still to be reviewed by the Environment Agency (EA). However, the EA review is not due until Spring 2010 and therefore the results of this project will not be available to be fed into the Government's Public Consultation on this matter, thereby denying consultees access to crucial information.

1.10 The Nuclear industry has failed to present independent information to either the Nuclear NPS or the Justification process on conditions for workers and the public in the countries that mine and process uranium for new reactors. Two previous public inquiries into new reactor construction in the United Kingdom (UK) have recommended that an evaluation of these impacts should be carried out. Without a full evaluation of these impacts, including a Sustainability Appraisal, the Nuclear NPS is not fit for purpose

1.11 In short, the Government's conclusion "…that effective arrangements will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that will be produced from new nuclear power stations" is not supported by the evidence. The Nuclear NPS is, therefore, not "fit for purpose".

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates (NWAA) is an independent group of experts with a collective experience of nuclear issues of well over 200 years. We aim to provide information and advice on the risks posed by radioactive waste, and support to decision makers, stakeholders and communities involved in its management. Our membership includes former members of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM(i)) and several members who worked for environmental organisations during the Public Inquiry into Nirex's application to build a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) in Cumbria.[102]

2.2 Part Three of the Draft National Policy Statement (NPS) for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6) concludes that:

the Government is satisfied that effective arrangements will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that will be produced from new nuclear power stations. As a result the

IPC need not consider this question

103

2.3 Paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41 of the Consultation Document [104] are also relevant. These refer consultees to Annex G of the consultation document [105] for a description of how the preliminary conclusions on waste have been reached, and also to a document called "The arrangements for the management and disposal of waste from new nuclear power stations: a summary of evidence",[106] which gives further background on the evidence. Not referred to in the Consultation Document, but also relevant, is the Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS): Radioactive and Hazardous Waste report, which is also called Annex K of the AoS Main Report.[107]

2.4 In this memorandum, NWAA examines the evidence for the Government's assertion that effective arrangements will exist for waste produced by new reactors, and concludes that the issue of dealing with nuclear waste already created (legacy waste) is far from resolved. Furthermore, this document reports the Environment Agency's view that further research cannot be relied upon to resolve the outstanding issues. This means that Government cannot assume that waste produced by new reactors can be safely disposed of in a deep geological disposal facility. Therefore the assumption that adequate arrangements for the long term management of radioactive waste from new reactors will exist when required is unfounded and therefore renders the NPS invalid at this point in time. Co-disposal of legacy and new build wastes was neither examined by CoRWM(i) nor considered within the extensive public consultation held in conjunction with CoRWM(i).

2.5 Given that there are acknowledged significant scientific, technical and ethical hurdles to the problem of disposing of nuclear waste, then the Draft NPS for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6) is not fit for purpose. The Government should, therefore, return to the position espoused in the February 2003 Energy White Paper that there are "important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved" before new reactors can be built.[108]

2.6 We also examine whether the contention that "no new issues arise that challenge the fundamental disposability of the waste and spent fuel expected to arise from operation of the EPR and AP1000 reactors" [109] is correct, and conclude that there are in fact new issues associated with the waste fuel that would be produced by waste fuel from these reactors designs and that much further examination of the evidence for the Government's contention is required, as is an associated programme of relevant and appropriate research.

3. CORWM(I)

3.1 Four former members of CoRWM(i) have written to the Secretary of State to express concern that the Committee's recommendations have been seriously misrepresented in the Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation.[110] The letter states:

"It is unknowable whether or not effective arrangements will exist …"

3.2 The CoRWM (i) recommendations called for:

"…an intensified programme of research and development into the long-term safety of geological disposal aimed at reducing uncertainties at generic and site-specific levels, as well as into improved means for storing wastes in the longer-term".

The former CoRWM members say that because the scientific and technical requirements have not yet been met, it is not possible to conclude that effective arrangements for the long term disposal of waste "exist or will exist".

3.3 In addition CoRWM (i) was quite clear that its recommendations do not apply to waste arising from new reactors. This is because, in addition to the far more burdensome physical attributes of the much higher heat output and fission product content, the political and ethical issues raised by the creation of an unknown inventory of new build waste, with an indefinite time-scale for management, are quite different from those arising due to the waste burden we currently face following decisions and actions of our predecessors.[111] What is currently being put forward by Government is the proposal that we should create more wastes—knowing as we do that we have no credible strategy for its long term handling. The Secretary of State has ignored the recommendation by CoRWM(i) that the management of radioactive waste from new reactors should be subject to a separate process of examination. Therefore the social requirements for new build wastes have not been met, and thus again, it is not possible to conclude that effective arrangements "exist or will exist"

4. NIREX INQUIRY

4.1 In addition to concerns raised by CoRWM (i), there are far more fundamental concerns that were originally raised at the 1990s Public Inquiry into Nirex's application to begin excavation works at their proposed disposal site. The project was known as a "Rock Characterisation Facility" (or "RCF"). This proposal was rejected on generic scientific grounds (as well as for site specific reasons). The implications of this rejection have still not been fully examined or resolved nor has the necessary programme of research to address the inadequate scientific justification been implemented.

4.2 On 17 March 1997, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, John Gummer, rejected Nirex's planning application. He based his rejection on the evidence reported to him by the Inquiry Inspector, Mr C S McDonald, and the Technical Assessor, Mr Colin Knipe. Although much of the evidence dealt with site-specific issues, a very large amount of information pertaining to generic issues was also reported. Overall, the Inspector concluded that the Nuclear Industry should not be given the go-ahead to begin their planned programme:

"...in

current state of inadequate knowledge.

112

4.3 Mr McDonald reported, for example, that the chemical containment system the industry proposed was:

113

4.4 Similarly Colin Knipe, stated that:

"The evidence suggests that considerably more experimentation and model development is needed on radionuclide solubility, sorption

114

115

He continued:

"There is a general need for the Nirex science programme to be advanced on all fronts."

116

4.5 This generic concern was even confirmed in the September 2001 Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) consultation document which initiated the 'MRWS' programme. This document stated that:

"In March 1997 the then Secretary of State for the Environment decided not to give Nirex planning permission for the RCF. This decision called into question whether at that time an underground repository for the disposal of radioactive wastes could be scientifically justified or publicly acceptable. This led to a completely new look at radioactive waste management policy in the UK."

117

5. FURTHER RESEARCH CAN IDENTIFY NEW PROBLEMS

5.1 The Inspector at the 1990s "RCF" Inquiry concluded:

"The expansion in scope of the work over the last five years or so has also been very impressive, but does indicate amongst other things that the practical difficulties of the deep disposal option were originally underestimated by the international consensus."

118

5.2 In November 2009 Professor Francis Livens, Professor of Radiochemistry at the University of Manchester, and also a member of the current CoRWM (ii) committee stated:

In recent years we have recognised where we do not have relevant expertise,

and that is a first step towards dealing with these pressing problems. We are starting at a very low base along what will be a long and complex journey."

119

This indicates that very little further work has been done in the intervening period.

6. THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EA)

6.1 In November 2005, UK Nirex Ltd produced a paper for CoRWM (i) on the 'viability' of a planned deep disposal facility.[120] Any such future project would need a licence from the Environment Agency (EA) (in England and Wales and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland). Thus, the EA produced a commentary response to Nirex' "Viability" documents—which was also published in November 2005.[121] In this report the EA said Nirex:

"...has not provided a good technical overview of many remaining key technical challenges and how they will be resolved... we consider that Nirex present an overly optimistic view".

6.2 Whilst the EA review recognised that Nirex's report identifies a number of "viability threatening issues", it expressed particular concern about Carbon-14—a radioactive isotope of carbon.[122] Nirex was assuming that the Carbon-14 would be held underground for a very long time into the future—as they had predicted that this carbon (in the form of "carbon dioxide") would react with the cement in the disposal facility. However the EA stated:

"In our view, more confidence is needed that complete reaction of carbon dioxide will occur in cracked backfill or that the gas pathway would not lead to unacceptable consequences were this not to be the case".

Carbon-14 is discussed further at paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2

6.3 The Agency goes on to list ten key technical challenges "...where further work is needed before an acceptable repository safety case could be generated." [123] These are listed in Annex A. Note the sub-headings have been added by NWAA in order to ease comprehension of the points made.

6.4 In August 2009 the EA followed this up by producing a list of nine "major knowledge limitations on the technical issues". [124] These nine issues are listed in Annex B.

6.5 More recently, a report of a joint regulatory review carried out by the EA, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Department of Transport (DoT) states that:

"Although RWMD

has a considerable database of knowledge and research, it does not appear to have a clear picture of: (a) 'what we know enough about" (b) 'what else we really need to know' for development of a GDF

and safety case, and hence (c) what the business priorities for research are. Work in hand led by the Head of Research may remedy this and should be encouraged".

125

7. EU JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE

7.1 The EU JRC issued a report on geological disposal on 1 October 2009 with a press release which claimed the report identified no major conceptual or research gaps that would be a hurdle to deep disposal and conncluded that such an approach to radioactive waste management is "technically ripe for implementation." However this conclusion was not backed up by the evidence contained in the report.[126]

7.2 Chapter Two of the Report (pp 10-21) entitled "The Technical Concept of Geological Disposal" shows that in fact there are a very large number of conceptual and research gaps associated with deep geological disposal. Annex C lists nearly 40 technical issues, extracted from the report by NWAA, which indicate nuclear waste disposal is far from a proven technology.[127]

8. THE IMPORTANCE OF CHEMISTRY

8.1 The next three sections deal with some of the major technical issues which need to be resolved before an acceptable safety case could be made for disposal. These include issues around solubility and sorption, and specific problems associated with the presence of plutonium in combination with cellulose and also the problem of gas generation.

8.2 A key factor in the calculation of risk is the level of hazard associated with the water that seeps out of a nuclear waste burial site. This would depend on:

— How much radioactivity would dissolve in the underground water supply system—its solubility; and

— How much of this radioactivity would be taken up by the rock surfaces during the journey towards the surface.

8.3 To ascribe the appropriate chemical parameters to the solubility of each radionuclide, in order to ascertain the predicted contamination levels of ground-water that has washed through a radioactive waste burial site in advance, demands a huge amount of chemical data. At the RCF Public Inquiry (PI) it was established that the nuclear industry simply did not have the data to justify their claim that the risks arising from the burial of nuclear waste would be insignificant. (See para 3.4 above) Although this specifically refers to "chemical conditions relevant to a Sellafield repository", there would be similar difficulties in ascribing these chemical parameters wherever the proposed location.

8.4 In October 2007 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a document on recent findings concerning the solubility of radioactive wastes in a burial facility environment.[128] The report states:

The capacity to model

129

all the effects involved in the dissolution

130

of the waste form, in conditions similar to the disposal site, is the final goal of all the research undertaken by many research groups over many years. As we will see in this report, this kind of investigation is far from being finished."

131

(Emphasis added)

What was the case two years ago remains so today. The fact that the research is "far from being finished" indicates that the nuclear industry is not in a position to provide the necessary underlying data required to demonstrate that it could meet the risk targets set by the EA. (See paras 12.3 and 12.4).

8.5 In order to assess the reliability of predictions of contamination levels, an experiment was carried out in 1991 at the "Pocos de Caldas" Uranium Mine in Brazil. The experiment tested whether chemical information fed into a computer model would enable an accurate forecast to be made of uranium contamination levels in underground water found at the site. In fact the computer model under-estimated the uranium levels of the underground water at the mine by a factor of 200 million.[132] Four possible explanations were advanced for this enormous error, though no definitive conclusion was reached.[133] This, in itself, indicates the extreme variability of the parameters in question and thus puts into question the whole basis for risk estimates advanced. Over 15 years later (in 2007), the nuclear industry are still quoting data ranges for uranium contamination levels that can vary by up to 100,000,000 units.[134]

8.6 While the large error range may seem extraordinary, a comparison, for example, of the solubility of carbon in a diamond with the solubility of carbon in sugar illustrates just how easily wildly inaccurate predictions can be made. Sugar is a compound, made up of three different elements, carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. Although commonly found as solid crystals, sugar is readily soluble. On the other hand, diamonds, which consist of pure carbon, are essentially insoluble. Thus, it is safe to wear a diamond ring in the shower or when washing your hands as it will not dissolve. Similarly the other types of radioactive atoms in radioactive waste can exhibit very different types of behaviour in different chemical situations. It is the radionuclide that causes the harm, but generally speaking [135] radionuclides do not "travel solo": they exist in combination with other chemical elements to form chemical compounds. Different chemical compounds can result in extraordinary degrees of variation in behaviour with respect to the specific radionuclide in question. It is therefore a mistake to attribute solubility to elements or isotopes of elements (as the nuclear industry and EA tend to do when making their estimates) when it should rightly be attributed to the compounds in which they are found.

8.7 In May 2008 the NDA's RWMD launched a consultation on its proposed research and development strategy.[136] On page 43 of the document, the NDA cites three reports concerning radionuclide solubility to indicate its current knowledge base. However each of these three reports was prepared prior to the 1995-96 RCF Inquiry and as such represent the same level of scientific and technical acumen which was a significant contributor to the Inspector's decision to refuse Nirex permission progress the proposed project. It can therefore be seen that little has advanced in terms of real evidence and research between the RCF PI in the late 1990s and the NDA Research Consultation just over a decade later.

8.8 In its consultation response, the NDA RWMD says "a response to these [technical] comments will not appear in our updated strategy document".[137]

8.9 An important factor in the forecast of the extent to which radionuclides will reach the surface is process of "sorption". Basically, in the context of the prediction of the risk associated with disposal, "sorption" refers to the extent to which radionuclides would be taken up by solid surfaces (such as cement or rock). The difficulties involved in measuring sorption emerged at a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)[138] workshop held in Oxford in May 1997,[139] when Mr Hans Wanner, of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK), stated:

"The term `uncertainty' is commonly connected with `error' in a statistical sense, but a statistical basis rarely exists for Kd [sorption] values because they depend on too many unknown parameters. Hence the assignment of an uncertainty to a Kd value is usually a priori unscientific and unjustifiable"

8.10 The EU JRC report (of October 2009) outlines this problem at some length. It says the Kd value is recognised as not reflecting in situ conditions and therefore does not "have any prediction capabilities". Nevertheless, it says, Kd values are still widely used in performance assessment calculations. "In practice", continues the report, "it is impossible to parameterise all these variables over the whole domain to be investigated".[140]

8.11 In other words, whilst sorption is regarded by the nuclear industry as a simple parameter that indicates the extent to which radioactive atoms escaping from a disposal facility will be taken up by the solid surfaces it would meet on its journey, in fact the complexity of the natural world and the sheer volume of data and computations required to quantify this parameter appropriately are beyond the capacity of current computers.

9. CELLULOSE AND PLUTONIUM

9.1 In 1989, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified a specific problem relating to the increase in the solubility of radionuclides caused by organic breakdown products that were sufficient to increase the radiological impact of a repository above the regulatory target dose.[141] A likely source was thought to be decomposition products of "cellulose"—the woody compound used to make paper. Cellulose break-down products have been observed to increase radionuclide solubility by up to 10,000 fold,[142],[143] with plutonium being a particular problem.[144]

9.2 In July 2003, isosaccharinic acid (ISA) was reported as the most important breakdown product of cellulose. A plutonium/"ISA" chemical species was identified as amongst the most stable of the "complexes" studied.[145] However, the research did not appear to offer any answers but instead to merely express the same problem in more elaborate language. So, although the plutonium/paper mix has important implications for radioactive doses in the long term, the nuclear industry appears to have focussed its effort on describing the problem rather than resolving it.

10. THE GAS PROBLEM

10.1 In February 2006[146] (and also in the earlier November 2005 "Viability" Report[147]), Nirex identified the need to carry out more research on the potential for large doses due the production and release of methane gas from decaying radioactive waste emplaced in a backfilled repository. The possibility was examined that Carbon-14, instead of being lodged in the cement backfill, would be able to escape from the facility as methane gas (CH4) by travelling quickly upwards through fractures and pores in the overlying rocks until finally reaching the surface environment and entering the food chain. If this were to happen, then the impact on risk according to Nirex[148] could reach a figure as high as one in a thousand (ie one person in a thousand contracting a fatal cancer, a non-fatal cancer or inherited genetic defect as a result of such exposure as opposed to the target of one in a million). Furthermore, this particularly high risk could occur just 40 years after the burial facility had been backfilled and closed as opposed to the thousands of years currently predicted to allow decay of the waste products to lower and "tolerable" levels. It was concluded that if calculations confirmed that methane could indeed act in this manner over such a short period of time, then there may be a need to adjust the site selection criteria.

10.2 Clearly, if methane were to be a problem in this way, site selection criteria would need to be adjusted to make sure that gas would not be allowed to escape. But a contradictory site selection criterion arises in relation to the hydrogen gas issue. When the iron present in steel corrodes under "anaerobic conditions" (conditions in which oxygen is not present), hydrogen gas is released. Because of the need to avoid a build up of underground pressures from gas generation, the requirement for a route to release hydrogen gas has been central to calculations carried out by Nirex on the "viability" of disposal.[149] The requirement to contain methane gas, yet to ensure that hydrogen is allowed to escape, are contradictory criteria which seriously undermine the radioactive waste disposal concept.

10.3 When Nirex carried out an initial review of their research programme in 1985-86, the significance of the "gas issue" was identified.[150] Twenty year later, in a March 2008 report[151] for the European Commission's project on the "Performance Assessment Methodologies in Application" to Guide the Development of the Safety Case (PAMINA), Simon Norris from the NDA called for more research on the gas issue. Similarly, the October 2009 "EU JRC"[152] report referred to: "gas generation and migration… as an important study subject." Both reports indicate the underlying concerns of 20 years ago are far from resolved. The implications of this contradiction in criteria are not dealt with in the Government's (June 2008) "Implementation" White Paper.[153]

11. TECHNIQUES USED IN CALCULATION OF RISK

11.1 When the nuclear industry refers to the "parameters and equations" used in their risk predictions, one imagines a calculation which is similar to a straight-forward piece of algebra. In fact the methodology actually adopted is generally based on the use of "probability density functions" (pdfs) and the so-called "Monte-Carlo" approach. A "probability density function" is used to set out a statistical description of the range of possible data points for one given radioactive element and also the likelihood that a given parameter (for example radionuclide solubility or sorption) will possess this value.

11.2 The true range of data points is, quite routinely, extremely large (of the order of "one to10,000" units—or even "one to 100,000,000" units).[154] Furthermore, the distribution of the parameter value within this range is, generally speaking, not set out as "normal distribution" commonly found in statistics. The selection of data from this large range is fed into the computer used to calculate the predicted risk using the "Monte Carlo" method, ie almost randomly[155] from between the two points.

11.3 Much of the data used is not actually measured, but is obtained through "data elicitation by expert judgement". "Expert elicitation" refers to a method of "synthesising data"[156] based on the judgement of experts—in other words "educated guessing." The Dutch research organisation "RIVM" in a report specifically on data elicitation, concluded:

With respect to the evidence base, it seems obvious that, at some point, the scientific evidence base would be so thin as to render quantitative expert judgement useless.

157

Thus, if the data isn't there—it simply isn't there.

11.4 The fact that such methodologies are quite routinely used by the nuclear industry in order to produce predictions is alarming and demands an examination of whether the previous and existing work that has been carried out to predict repository safety actually has any sort of reliable basis under which a disposal license could be applied for.

12. PROBLEMS MAY NEVER BE RESOLVED

12.1 Resolution of the problems raised at the Nirex RCF Inquiry, and more recently by the EA and EU JRC, is not a simple matter of providing sufficient funding for researchers over the next few decades. It may, in fact, not be possible to resolve all of the issues. Further research may not produce the answers or it may identify further serious problems that had not been previously identified. As implied by the Nirex Inquiry Inspector, it may be a case of "the more you know, the more you realise what you don't know".

12.2 A consequence of the fact that there are still major technical issues to be resolved is that, as Clive Williams of the EA specifically stated in November 2009:

"…work may or may not indicate that an acceptable safety case can be made"

158

12.3 In other words, it may not be possible to make a safety case for deep geological disposal. So the Government's confidence that effective arrangements to dispose of waste from new reactors will exist is premature. The fact that money and effort invested in future research may not indicate that safe disposal is possible was referred to extensively in the EA's response[159] to an NDA RWMD consultation on its research strategy launched in May 2008.[160] Annex D lists some of the EA's comments.

13. HEALTH RISKS

13.1 What is critically important to realise is that the technical problems and uncertainties described by the EA, the EU JRC and in particular the uncertainties regarding radionuclide properties detailed above, such as their solubility and sorption—or even their presence as a gas—could mean estimted contamination levels calculated for a deep geological disposal facility are in error by a factor of 10,000 to 1,000,000 which clearly has implications for the risk estimates.

13.2 In March 2008 the Health Protection Agency (HPA) held a consultation on Radiological Protection Objectives for the Land-based Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste.[161] In response to the consultation one NWAA member said:

t is imperative that the HPA takes full cognizance of the difficulties to be expected in actually reaching the targets that they set out. If the HPA do not do this, it would be very easy for the Nuclear Industry, or the Government, to imply that these standards had been met although it was very clear that it was not the case.

HPA's response to this point was that it is the responsibility of the developer of the disposal facility to make a sufficiently robust safety case.[162] It does not offer any advice on how to deal with the technical problems and uncertainties described above.

13.3 Under present legislation, the nuclear industry would require authorization from the EA in order to be able to go ahead with the burial of nuclear waste. The Agency published its Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation (GRA) in February 2009.[163] This sets a limit on the risk that may be caused by the burial of radioactive wastes of 10-6 (ie one in a million).[164] This means a risk of one in a million per year, for the person at greatest risk, of either non-fatal cancer, fatal cancer or inherited defects.[165]

13.4 The EA calculates the radiation dose which it believes will result in this level of risk. If the probability of receiving the dose of radioactivity is one, then the amount of radioactivity that would lead to a risk of "one in a million" (per year) would be approximately 20 micro sieverts[166] per year (20µµSv/yr).[167] But risk is related to the chance of something happening, so if the EA can be persuaded that the probability of receiving a particular radiation dose from the waste facility would be less than one, then the EA would be prepared to authorise a dose greater than 20µSv/yr.[168]

13.5 The EA's GRA goes beyond radiological protection issues, for example, by explaining the regulatory process and describing what is expected in an environmental safety case from the developer and operator of a disposal facility. Central to the GRA is the notion that it is feasible to generate a reliable calculation of the risk that would arise from the disposal of radioactive waste, and, therefore, that it is possible to ensure that the risks that would arise from the burial of radioactive wastes would be at or below "one in a million"

13.6 However it can be seen that the forecast of disposal risk is subject to errors of many orders of magnitude, and that demonstrating that the EA target would be met is simply not scientifically demonstrable or achievable in theory or practice. It is in the nature of chemical elements and also geological and biological systems to behave in a variable and hence unpredictable manner such that they make reliable risk/time calculations into the far future not only difficult but virtually impossible. Thus is hard to see what information could be used as a basis for the claim that the radiological impact from a repository would not exceed the target.

14.0 FINLAND

14.1 The Government states that:

The reference design currently being used by NDA for the purposes of estimating the costs of a GDF

envisages spent fuel being packaged in copper canisters prior to disposal

169

14.2 The Government's evidence (produced as part of the Nuclear NPS consultation) refers very specifically to the Finnish disposal project which is heavily based on the use of copper.[170] For example, paragraph 121 of the Government's summary of evidence states that STUK, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, presented their preliminary safety assessment for the expansion of the Finnish disposal facility to accept spent fuel in June 2009. Posiva is the Finnish nuclear waste company, jointly owned by the two Finnish nuclear utilities. It is responsible for implementation of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and the related research, technical design and development activities.

14.3 Dr Johan Swahn, the Director of MKG[171] in Sweden wrote (in December 2009):[172]

There is no way that anyone can honestly claim that Posiva has a completed robust safety case. The Posiva safety case has not been developed independently, but relies entirely on the Swedish safety case work. The final test of the Swedish safety case will not be done until the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority gives an approval of the safety analysis…This will not be the case before 2013-14.

Already now there is concern from the authority about the barrier systems of copper and clay. It is not clear if all relevant copper corrosion processes are known and the risk for clay erosion is still not understood. So an approval is not at all certain. And nothing can today be claimed to be robust.

14.4 Annex E includes a summary of key points to emerge from the latest review of the Posiva Safety Case on behalf of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The STUK consultants conclude that Posiva seem to have no sense of the utility of the data that they have gathered within a reliable prediction of disposal risk. Clearly when the Government claims that:

STUK did not identify any reason why the project couldn't move forward

173

14.5 It is particularly worth noting that recent research suggests corrosion of the copper canisters may prove to be more of a problem than previously expected.

According to a current concept, copper canisters of thickness 0.05 m will be safe for nuclear waste containment for 100,000 years. We show that more than 1m copper thickness might be required for 100,000 years durability

174

Clearly, if such thicknesses of copper were required to ensure safe long term isolation of canisters, the cost and availability issues alone would render the entire disposal concept unviable.

15. SPENT FUEL FROM NEW REACTORS

15.1 Spent or waste nuclear fuel generated by new reactors currently looks unlikely to be reprocessed (ie subjected to a plutonium separation process). The nuclear industry plans to operate the proposed "New Build" reactors in such a way that more electricity is generated from a given tonnage of uranium. As a result, the waste fuel produced (known as "high burn up fuel") would be physically hotter, and also far more radiotoxic. As a result, such fuel would have to be stored for around 100 years to cool down after removal from a reactor. Consequently, as the new reactors are planned to have a life of 60 years, the sites designated for new reactors would probably also be required to act as nuclear waste sites for up to 160 years.[175]

15.2 Little information has been given about how spent fuel would be stored and managed at the reactor sites over this length of time. For example, it is not clear whether a spent fuel packaging plant would need to be built on site at some point in the future. On-site spent fuel management arrangements may not be acceptable to the local communities, and may also be unsafe due to weather effects that may arise due to climate change.[176] The nuclear industry has not necessarily agreed with the Government's base case of on-site storage, and therefore spent fuel could start to be moved off-site to a central interim facility sooner than in 100 year's time with storage or processing imposed on some other unsuspecting community.

15.3 The Government is relying mainly on the NDA's so-called "disposability assessments" to reach its conclusion that it is "satisfied that effective arrangements will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that will be produced from new nuclear power stations. As a result the IPC need not consider this question."[177] These disposability assessments will be submitted to the Generic Design Assessment process for review by the EA. The EA review will not be available for public comment until the Agency carries out its Part 3 consultation exercise which is expected in Spring 2010, long after the National Policy Statement and Justification Consultations have closed on 22 February.

15.4 There will, as current planning arrangements stand, be no opportunity for communities selected for new nuclear power stations to consider whether they wish to volunteer to host a long term radioactive waste facility for up to 160 years: it would simply be imposed upon them. Therefore the social conditions (the principle of volunteerism) recommended by CoRWM (i) would not have been met.[178] This is a further reason why it is not possible to conclude that effective arrangements will exist.

16. RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM URANIUM MINING AND PROCESSING

16.1 The above discussion has focused on radioactive wastes arisings from the so-called back end of the nuclear fuel chain, ie radionuclides created following the irradiation of nuclear fuel in reactors. In so doing it follows the course set out in the Nuclear NPS. But the largest amounts of radioactive wastes also arise in the mining, milling and processing of uranium, as well as in its enrichment and fabrication into fresh nuclear fuel. The Nuclear NPS, specifically Section 3, makes no mention whatever of this front-end waste management burden.

16.2 Given that all the uranium used in non-military nuclear fuel is imported into the UK, it is important—on equity and sustainability grounds—to assess the environmental, radiological and other health impacts of the source of this uranium. Inexplicably, the 200 page Appraisal of Sustainability: Radioactive and Hazardous Waste[179] makes no mention of the dangers and management challenges of uranium procurement and processing.

16.3 In comparison in another report,[180] which has been presented as technical support to the Justification decision documents, this issue is addressed. Thus, although the Government themselves did not see fit to consider the Uranium issue, their Consultants did think that it was relevant.[181] The authors report an analysis performed for Sizewell and include a table showing the potential dose impact from the whole of the nuclear fuel chain. The figure quoted as the contribution from uranium mining and milling is almost 92% of the total health detriment from the nuclear fuel chain (expressed in terms of years of life lost).[182]

16.4 The UK has not examined fully within any major forum the issues arising from uranium mining. Calls were made by the Planning Inspectors at both of the last two Public Inquiries into proposed nuclear reactors (Sizewell B 1983-85[183] and Hinkley Point C 1988-89[184]) that such an analysis should be carried out, given that:

(a) uranium mining carries the highest average occupational radioactive exposure in the nuclear energy industry;

(b) uranium mining and processing is a major source of radioactive wastes;

(d) the mining and processing of uranium not only affects this generation but will affect many future generations.

16.5 Michael Barnes QC (the Inspector at the Hinkley Inquiry) recommended that if future proposals were put forward:

the applicants should use their best endeavours to present information to any future inquiry on conditions for workers and the public in the countries concerned who might be affected by the mining and processing of uranium for the project

185

Moreover he noted that he was echoing the conclusion by Sir Frank Layfield in the Sizewell B Inquiry report, and said he shared Layfield's tentative disquiet on uranium mining. Layfield had also recommended that applicants present information in respect of the conditions for workers and the public who might be affected by mining and processing of uranium

16.6 As the Government has changed the planning process with the introduction of the Planning Act, we believe the Nuclear NPS itself, as well as the proponent companies in their Justification documentation, should have included such material (importantly based on independent sources), as recommended by the two inquiry inspectors. Indeed, one of our associates made a 74,000 word submission[186] to both the Strategic Siting Assessment and Justification consultations, both making this point, and filling in the information gap. It remains a major omission of the Nuclear NPS and its associated documentation.

16.7 The price that would be paid for uranium is not only financial. Many additional costs such as people's health and environmental degradation have been externalised and are not taken into account. These need to be included in a full evaluation of the use of uranium as a fuel. Without a full evaluation of the impact of uranium mining, including an Appraisal of its Sustainability, the Nuclear NPS is not fit for purpose.

17. CONCLUSIONS

17.1 Neither the scientific nor the social requirements included in CoRWM's recommendations have been met. Therefore it is not possible to conclude that effective arrangements "exist or will exist" to manage and dispose of nuclear waste from new reactors.

17.2 The Nirex application to begin excavation work at the site of their proposed nuclear waste disposal site was rejected following intense scrutiny at a Public Inquiry held in 1995-96. The proposal was rejected in large part on generic scientific grounds. These scientific and technical problems have yet to be resolved.

17.3 A very limited amount of progress appears to have been made since the work that was carried out for the 1990s project.

17.4 Both the EA and the EU JRC have listed a series of major knowledge deficiencies with regard to a series of technical issues. These issues include problems identifying the correct parameters for radionuclide solubility and sorption; specific problems related to cellulose increasing the solubility of plutonium; problems with gas generation and conflicting aims of, on the one hand limiting the escape of radioactive gases, and on the other allowing gases to escape to avoid a build-up of pressure.

17.5 Some of the methodologies used in risk calculations are highly questionable.

17.6 Further research may not serve to produce the required answer, in fact it may identify further serious problems that simply had not previously been thought of. It is also possible that further work may indicate that an acceptable safety case cannot be made.

17.7 Approval of the Finnish nuclear waste repository is by no means certain and cannot be used to support the Government's case.

17.8 The EA's review of the "disposability" of the new type of waste fuel likely to be produced by new reactors will not be available for public comment until May 2010. Therefore, there will be no opportunity for communities selected for new nuclear power stations to consider whether they wish to volunteer to host a long term radioactive waste facility. Under Government proposals nuclear stations would act as radioactive waste sites for over 160 years into the future thus bolstering the conclusion that the social requirements of CoRWM (i)'s recommendations have not been met.

17.9 A full Appraisal of Sustainability of uranium mining and processing has not been carried out.

17.10 In short, the Government's conclusion "…that effective arrangements will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that will be produced from new nuclear power stations" is not supported by the evidence. The Nuclear National Policy Statement is, therefore, not "fit for purpose".

January 2010

100 micro = one millionth. A Sievert is a measure of radiation dose. It's units are energy-per unit weight-of exposure ; and it can be thought of in terms of the overall "punch" associated with the bombardment. Back

101 The arrangements for the management and disposal of waste from new nuclear power stations:a summary of evidence, DECC November 2009 para 121 https://www.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/nuclear/managementdisposalwaste/summary evidencepaper/ Back

102 See http://www.nuclearwasteadvisory.co.uk/default.asp Back

103 Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6), DECC, November 2009 Paragraph 3.8.20
http://data.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/documents/npss/EN-6.pdf Back

104 Consultation on Draft National Policy Statements for Energy Infrastructure, DECC November 2009.
http://data.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/documents/condoc.pdf Back

105 Also available here: https://www.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/nuclear/managementdisposalwaste/annex/ Back

106 The arrangements for the management and disposal of waste from new nuclear power stations: a summary of evidence, DECC November 2009 http://data.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/documents/wasteassessment.pdf Back

107 Appraisal of Sustainability: Radioactive and Hazardous Waste, DECC, November 2009. http://data.energynpsconsultation.decc.gov.uk/documents/aos/wastematrices.pdf Back

108 Our Energy Future-Creating a low carbon economy, Energy White Paper, DTI, DoT, DEFRA. February 2003, paragraph 1.24 http://www.decc.gov.uk/media/viewfile.ashx?filepath=publications/white_paper_03/file10719.pdf&filetype=4 Back

109 Draft Nuclear NPS para 3.8.10 Back

110 A copy of the letter, signed by former chairman Professor Gordon MacKerron, Professor Andrew Blowers OBE, Mary Allan and Pete Wilkinson, dated 20 November 2009 can be found at http://www.nuclearwasteadvisory.co.uk/uploads/5647CoRWM1_Letter_201109.pdf Back