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ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE SELECT COMMITTEE INQUIRY
INTO PROPOSALS FOR NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENTS ON ENERGY
DRAFT NUCLEAR NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT
SUBMISSION FROM THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE
Summary
The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) welcomes the opportunity to provide written evidence to the Energy and Climate Change Committee in relation to the draft nuclear National Policy Statement (NPS), and matters relating to the regulation of new nuclear power stations by HSE’s Nuclear Directorate (ND).
HSE welcomes the development of the system of national policy statements and the new planning regime which we believe has the potential for reducing the disproportionate burden placed on HSE and other regulators compared with the previous regime of extensive and long-running planning inquiries.
While we support the identification in the draft nuclear NPS of strategically suitable sites for nuclear generation, it will only be following detailed assessment of a specific development proposal that HSE will be able to determine whether a particular site is acceptable from the point of view of nuclear safety and security.
Along with the Environment Agency, we are continuing to undertake Generic Design Assessment of two potential nuclear power station designs. In parallel with this we are preparing to begin assessment, later this year, of an application for a nuclear site licence for a power station development at Hinkley Point based on one of the designs undergoing GDA. Granting of a licence, which is not dependent on the completion of GDA, provides
HSE
with regulatory powers and controls over activities which have
the
potential to affect the safety of
the
power station
, for example the procurement of nuclear safety related
components. HSE will liaise closely with the Infrastructure Planning Commission to ensure a mutual understanding of our respective assessment regimes and an effective working interface.
1. Introduction
1.1 In August 2007 HSE and the Environment Agency jointly began their newly-developed process of Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of four nuclear power station designs proposed as candidates for construction in the UK. Since then, two of the vendor companies have withdrawn or suspended their designs from GDA, with assessment work continuing on the Areva/EdF UK European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) and the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design. Both are latest generation pressurised water reactors. Versions of EPR are currently under construction in France, Finland and China. The AP1000 design is currently under construction in China.
1.2 In November 2009, HSE published a suite of reports on Step 3 of its
four step GDA
process for the EPR and AP1000 designs. Those reports summarised progress to date and highlighted issues to be resolved during the remaining, most detailed assessment stage of GDA, which is currently underway.
1.3
The GDA process enables the HSE and the Environment Agency to assess new nuclear power station designs before
construction commences at a time when they can have most influence over the design. Following its step 3 assessment, HSE continues to consider that both designs could be suitable for construction in the UK, subject to satisfactory progress being made in a number of technical areas.
1.4 The HSE step 3 reports were, in effect, mid-point progress reports on our assessment of both designs. Despite some initial resource shortages in some technical areas, we have made good progress on our assessment and we have identified issues that require further work. Since last November we have been engaged in discussion with the design companies, who are putting in place robust plans to resolve the identified issues.
1.5 Some complex technical issues relating to both the EPR and the AP1000 remain to be resolved, for instance the way the reactor control and protection systems are arranged for the EPR and the construction methodology proposed for the AP1000. These are issues that other international regulators are also picking up and ND is working closely with them. One of the added benefits of working closely with other international regulators is that it allows to us share information and promote a shared understanding of international standards. This not only improves levels of nuclear safety across international borders, but also promotes greater harmonisation of regulatory standards.
1.6
Once ND
is content
with
its detailed examination of the evidence given by the
GDA
safety analysis
,
it will issue a ‘Design Acceptance
Confirmation’
(DAC). T
his
will go on to form the basis for a site-specific regulatory assessment. We will set out our conclusions about the acceptability of the designs for eventual construction in the UK, in reports that, again, will be made public. In the interim, HSE and the Environment Agency continue to publish joint GDA progress reports every quarter on HSE’s website.
2. Licensing process for new nuclear power stations
2.1 A potential nuclear power station operator requires a site licence to
be
granted by the HSE’s Nuclear Directorate to use the selected site and, under conditions attached to th
at
licence,
to obtain HSE’s
permission
to
begin
construction of the nuclear safety related
parts of the plant
.
It is
planned
that a GDA DAC will underpin our regulatory permissions for the construction of a
series
of reactors that will be identical, apart for any changes to account for the specific site or operator’s preferences.
2.
2
Before
granting a licence, we need to be sufficiently assured, amongst other things, about the proposed management arrangements, resourcing of the licence applicant, siting aspects, and the overall safety of the proposed type of activities to be conducted on the site. The information needed to support the application for a site
will
be much less than that needed to secure
the GDA DAC.
2.
4
The site licensing process
can overlap
the last stages of
GDA and
is expected to take
HSE
between 6–12 months
to complete
. If
granted, the licence and the attached standard licence conditions would apply throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation. This
period covers
on-site c
onstruction, nuclear component
manufacture and
installation, commissioning,
operation, modification and
eventual
decommissioning
of both
the nuclear generating plant, and any interim radioactive waste or spent fuel stores
.
We may grant a nuclear site licence before we have completed assessment of all of the features of the proposed development. This would not constitute our regulatory "approval" of the proposal, and
design changes
could be required before permission was given for the start of construction of nuclear safety related plant under licence conditions. The grant of a licence would provide us with regulatory powers and controls over the licensee's activities which have potential to affect the safety of the proposed power station, for example the procurement of nuclear safety related components intended for installation at the plant
.
3. HSE/ND engagement with the Development Consent process for new nuclear power stations
3.1 The Sizewell B and Hinkley Point C planning inquiries in the 1980s were extensive and long-running. For Sizewell B, design safety and HSE’s regulatory role and processes occupied almost a third of the 340 Inquiry’s sitting days, which necessitated the diversion of a significant fraction of HSE’s small nuclear specialist resource to address that demand. Nuclear safety and its regulation again featured highly in the considerations of the Hinkley Point C inquiry with a smaller but still significant demand on HSE’s specialist resource. There has been no really substantial change to the nuclear regulatory system since, and the Governments’ various policy papers and consultative documents in this area confirm the robustness of the UK nuclear regulatory regime. Furthermore, the IAEA has concluded two international peer reviews of the UK‘s system and nuclear regulatory arrangements during the last four years.
3.2 HSE notes the statements in the draft nuclear NPS that the IPC should make its decisions in relation to a development consent application on the basis that:
o
the relevant licensing and permitting regimes will be properly applied and enforced
o
it does not need to consider matters within the remit of the nuclear regulators
o
it should not review or revisit any regulatory decision that has already been made in relation to the proposed development
3.3 The draft nuclear NPS acknowledges, however, that where the regulatory approvals processes in relation to a design or a site specific application are incomplete at the time that the IPC is considering its decision on a development consent, then the IPC may need to seek a "letter of comfort" from the regulators on the anticipated timing of regulatory approvals and any conditions that may be attached to such approvals. The draft nuclear NPS also suggests that there will be need for the IPC to liaise with the regulators before granting development consent to ensure that any conditions which the IPC intends to add do not undermine the regulatory approvals process.
3.4 HSE agrees that understanding of the mutual expectations of the regulators and the IPC is important, and we will work with the IPC to ensure that our regulatory regime and the development consent process can work effectively and efficiently together.
3.5 The new planning consent process does not mean that nuclear regulatory matters are subjected to any less public scrutiny than they were previously. Since the 1980s, HSE has adopted a policy of increasing openness and transparency in all its workings and a great deal of information relating to its regulatory processes and decision making is now made publicly available. This should help to underline our independence from government and from the nuclear industry and to reassure the public that the safety and security implications of the designs are properly considered. The Government’s publications and IAEA reviews referred to above emphasis this.
3.6 With regard to new nuclear power stations, the GDA process was designed to be open and transparent from the outset, and decisions were taken early on to encourage the vendor companies to publish their safety, security and environmental submissions and to invite comments from the public on those. This led to an unprecedented amount of nuclear power station design and safety case information being published on the vendor companies’ websites. Summaries of the public comments received on that design information are published by HSE in reports on the public involvement process at the end of each step of the GDA process.
3.7 As well as publishing general information and our GDA guidance and technical assessment reports, we have started publishing a range of other documents, including quarterly reports that summarise our progress and highlight the key challenges we face going forward, and the regulatory issues we have raised against each of the designs we are assessing. We also make ourselves available to speak at regional, national and international events, and have organised seminars for key stakeholders. During GDA step 3, this included two events for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and two for potential operators. This engagement will continue throughout the GDA process.
4. Specific issues raised in evidence to the Committee
4.1 Certain of the issues raised in written and oral evidence provided to this inquiry of the Energy and Climate Change Committee, relate to matters which are within HSE/ND’s area of regulatory interest. As with any other relevant stakeholder comments, we will take note of these and where appropriate take them into account in our regulatory assessment. However, in order to assist the Committee, we provide below a commentary on the issues that have been raised with it most frequently during this inquiry.
(i) Radioactive waste and Spent Fuel Storage
4.2 In GDA we place less emphasis on the specific design details, and more on the vendor’s evidence that the assumed storage/ encapsulation/ disposal concept is viable and suitable. However, the design detail we require at the GDA stage needs to be enough to demonstrate credibility of the storage options proposed, including robust estimates of the required capacity and identification of knowledge gaps and any necessary R&D. We concluded last November in our step 3 reports that there was sufficient evidence to show that credible storage options exist for both nuclear power station designs.
4.3 Some evidence to the Committee has questioned whether spent fuel encapsulation will take place on- or off-site. For the purposes of the Generic Design Assessment, the vendor companies have been asked to assume that all spent fuel will be encapsulated on-site prior to transport to a disposal facility. With regard to waste and fuel storage lifetimes, we require the vendor companies to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the stores can be adequately monitored and maintained throughout their anticipated lifetime, and where necessary that the stores can be refurbished or rebuilt.
4.4 At the site stage, potential site operators will wish to optimise their proposals for interim storage and encapsulation which could lead to alternative proposals to those in GDA. These details will need to form part of the site specific safety case submitted to HSE.
(ii) Vulnerability to terrorist air attack
4.5 We examine both accidental and non-accidental impact of aircraft onto nuclear facilities as part of our assessment work.
Our assessment of the risk of accidental impact of aircraft onto nuclear facilities is undertaken using established procedures and processes. These take account of recent statistics on air crash rates, proximity to airfield operations, airways and military tactical training areas. For such considerations the normal risk standards can be
readily
applied.
4.6 For
non
-
accidental aircraft impact, the use of statistical data is
un
suitable, given the inherent uncertainties. Each of the
vendor companies
has given clear assurances that their designs can accommodate the direct and indirect threats posed by impact from modern commercial airliners. As part of the assessment under
GDA
,
N
D
will examine these claims and reach a view on their validity, and ensure that the residual risks posed are as low as reasonably practicable.
The threat assessments used as the input to the development of the Site Security Plans are subject to regular review by various
G
overnment
agencies and co-ordinated by JTAC (the Joint Terrorist Assessment Centre). JTAC has access to information generated by different governments around the world.
(iii)
Protection from Climate Change consequences
4.7 Although, as some witnesses have commented, climate predictions beyond 100 years are inherently less reliable, HSE/ND has no reason to assume there will be a sudden acceleration in effects beyond 100 years. The periodic safety review process, required as a condition of every UK nuclear site licence, ensures that every 10 years a comprehensive review of the flood hazard is undertaken and assessed by HSE and necessary improvements undertaken. The initial licensing of a nuclear power station site will consider an extreme flood event (1in 10,000 years), as well as the consequences of levels beyond this to ensure that there is no disproportionate increase in risk. In addition, the adaptability of the flood defences will be reviewed as part of a future proofing of the site.
(iv) Strategic Site Assessments
4.8 Some witnesses have questioned the validity of some of the strategic siting assessments of the sites listed in the draft nuclear NPS. With regard to matters on which DECC consulted HSE during their strategic assessment process (demographics, proximity to hazardous installations, flooding and coastal processes, size of site to accommodate operation) we are satisfied that the draft nuclear NPS conclusions accurately reflect our advice. On other matters in which we have a regulatory interest (e.g. the seismic risk posed to the site and the practicability of off-site emergency planning) which DECC has designated as "flag for local consideration", we will consider each of these in undertaking our regulatory assessment of the acceptability of any site specific development applications which may come forward.
HSE
February 15th 2010
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