Adapting to Climate Change - Environmental Audit Committee Contents


Supplementary memorandum from Water UK

1.  Ofwat rules covering water leakages require companies to bring down leakages to a level where the cost of saving another unit of water through fixing a leak is the same as the cost of providing a unit of water through a new supply. What is your view of Ofwat rules covering leakages? Should the rules by revised, and, if so, how?

  Water UK participated in a recent Ofwat-led series of studies to review and improve approaches to leakage management within the regulatory framework. This included best practice guidance on including external costs and benefits in the sustainable economic level of leakage (SELL) calculation. All companies follow this guidance, which does provide an acceptable framework for companies to take account of a broad range of costs and benefits (including environmental and carbon impacts, traffic disruption from detection, repair and mains replacement work, etc). Companies do therefore identify the most cost-beneficial and sustainable leakage management strategy within a broader water resource management and strategic business plan.

However, there are some aspects of the current regime that we feel could be improved.

  First, the SELL depends crucially on the value of water, which in turn depends on the balance of costs and benefits between leaving water in the environment and abstracting water. Ensuring that the abstraction regime is sustainable is primarily a matter for the Environment Agency (EA). The EA has a responsibility to demonstrate any cases where existing levels of abstraction are unsustainable (unduly impacting the environment) and to agree a process for remedying these cases. Where the EA demonstrates that a catchment is over abstracted, the SELL should fall.

  Second, water companies have undertaken a great deal of customer research to inform their PR09 business plan submissions and recent 25-year Strategic Direction Statements. This research clearly demonstrates that leakage management is important. Many companies have long-term targets to reduce leakage, very significantly in some cases. However, in Ofwat's final determination of prices for PR09, economically justified leakage programmes for many companies were cut back. As a result, leakage levels are expected to remain stable or fall only slightly over the next few years, a situation which falls short of company ambition and customer expectations.

  Third, the current approach to setting targets for leakage leads many companies to a sub-optimal approach. The regulator can (and does) impose penalties for failing to meet targets, but does not provide equivalent incentives for out-performance. This leads companies towards a risk-averse approach, avoiding penalties by allocating additional (uneconomic) expenditure to leakage management. This occurred in 2008-09, the coldest winter for many years in most of the country. We would normally expect leakage to rise in such circumstances, but additional effort and investment (taking many companies beyond the SELL) enabled all companies to meet or better their targets. Incentives and rewards for such out-performance should be part of the regulatory contract.

  Finally, we believe there is a need for more consistent communication around leakage. Companies are required to follow the SELL approach, but many of the industry's key partners and stakeholders argue publicly that leakage levels should be lower than this. This sends a confused message to the public and undermines the broader case for water efficiency. We think that a common and consistent communication strategy, led by government, would deliver significant benefits.

2.  What role should the Adapting to Climate Change Programme take in getting organisations to work together in the first place? Is the Adapting to Climate Change Programme well-placed to fulfil its role?

  We have argued that water companies cannot deliver many of the actions needed to adequately adapt water systems to the impacts of climate change alone. Examples include diffuse pollution, surface water management and water efficiency.

  We agree that the ACC programme, which will be co-ordinating adaptation work across government departments, is ideally placed, through the national Climate Change Risk Assessment and other projects, to lead and co-ordinate this work. The Climate Change Committee adaptation sub-committee should also have a (more limited) role, eg reviewing overall government adaptation plans.

  Given the very different size, structure and regulatory framework of different sectors, it is equally important that government departments and regulators also work together and co-ordinate responses to climate change. An example is catchment management work to tackle diffuse pollution, primarily from agriculture. Ofwat will not allow direct funding from water company customers to the agricultural sector, even where this may be the most cost-beneficial solution overall. This therefore requires other arms of government and its agencies to work with the agricultural sector to address diffuse pollution and ensure the impacts and costs of one sector's activities on another sector are fully taken into account.

  Other examples where action is needed to avoid "mal-adaptation" to climate change are nitrate-intensive agricultural practices encouraged by Common Agricultural Policy incentives and the need for large quantities of water to support bioenergy crops.

3.  Has the water industry had any success in addressing differences between those who pay for action towards efficient adaptation and those who benefit from from such actions, which could arise for example if current water customers are asked to pay for adaptive action which might benefit future customers or other sectors of the economy?

  The water industry has had success in these areas. Again, the example of catchment management is useful. Ofwat has allowed funding for more than one hundred schemes to tackle upstream pollution in PR09 (although not including direct payments to farmers). Such schemes have a range of water quality, environmental and other benefits, and reduce the need for expensive, energy-intensive, end-of-pipe solutions.

  However, such schemes, in common with much of the water industry's extensive environmental and quality programmes, involve water customers paying to clean up pollution from other sectors. This issue was identified and discussed extensively in the recent Walker Review of Metering and Charging.

  In addition, water companies have long-term (twenty-five-plus) plans, which mean that many investments made today will necessarily benefit future generations. At the same time, the high and continued industry investment needs mean that companies effectively borrow from future customers to pay for investment today.

  So there is a range of cross-sector and cross-generational transfer payments in the water industry. There are good reasons for this, but there is no doubt that such payments reduce or remove the incentive for other sectors/generations to take action that might be in society's best overall interest.

  Many of the benefits of adaptation occur in the long term or to parties other than water industry customers (eg private beneficiaries of flood defence works). It is therefore difficult to justify short-term costs to the economic regulator, particularly when the benefits are uncertain or discounted over time. The government could provide clearer guidance in this area, eg through extending the Green Book on public policy appraisal to specifically cover adaptation for statutory bodies, with a clear expectation that regulators take this into account.

  We would encourage government and regulators to look for and introduce positive incentives where possible, for example by removing the automatic right of connection to the public sewer, introducing site-based charging for drainage or tackling diffuse pollution at source. Alongside this is a need for better information so that people and organizations can make more informed choices, for example better water efficiency labeling.

4.  What do you think Government should do to improve awareness of adaptation and get businesses to take action where necessary? What is the best way of providing adaptation advice to business (eg through a specialist body; through general business support organisations, such as Business Links; using climate change aware businesses to mentor SMEs)?

  There are a number of ways to improve communication and awareness:

    — Using industry groups and trade bodies such as the CBI and Water UK. We set up and co-ordinate groups on a range of issues, including climate change, which gives our members an opportunity to share information and good practice.

    — Ensuring all government departments proactively engage with their agencies, sponsored sectors and key stakeholders on the impacts of climate change and opportunities for adaptation.

    — Consistent messages from all areas of government on why climate change matters to them, the potential/likely impacts, simple measures that people and organisations can take, and the opportunities for business development that adaptation offers.

    — Extending the adaptation reporting power to other organisations and sectors that will need to take steps to address the impacts of climate change. At present, the power only covers around ninety, mainly large, organisations.

    — Utilising partnership-based organisations, especially those at regional or local level (since this is where climate change impacts will be felt). These include regional climate change partnerships, where many water companies take a leading role.

5. In Q36 we said "if you have this five-year system of operational expenditure and investment that is clawed back after five years it disincentives long-term investment and actions with long-term benefits".

  At the start of each five-year period, Ofwat makes assumptions about how efficiently companies will be able to deliver their investment programmes. Companies have a financial incentive to out-perform these assumptions. However, at the end of the five-year period, the operational expenditure element is reset and new assumptions are made. Companies only retain the benefits of out-performance for five years. In addition, choosing an operational expenditure solution tends to make companies appear less efficient according to Ofwat's traditional means of measuring efficiency.

  Operational expenditure solutions, rather than capital-intensive solutions, are generally the "softer" measures that are particularly well-suited to climate change adaptation, including catchment management and water efficiency. We think Ofwat could give greater consideration to positive incentives for operational-type schemes.

18 December 2009





 
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