Carbon budgets - Environmental Audit Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Global Commons Institute

1.  SUMMARY

    1. The UK budgets came from Contraction and Convergence via the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] 2000 report "Energy—The Changing Climate". The report recommended C&C but applied it at rates that are too slow to keep within the 2° limit.

    2. To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be based on a global emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction may still stay constant @ 50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing @ 0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be 450ppmv.

    3. By not taking account of the "new" Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modelling in IPCC AR4 Chapter 10 [2007], the UK Climate Change Committee models and the assumptions used by the Committee on Climate Change are not valid in setting carbon budgets.

    4. There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the Earth system (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evidence that the CO2 airborne fraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate change.

    5. Until about 1800 the overall climate system was at equilibrium. The very sudden rise of the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 since then shows that the system is no longer in conditions of homeorhesis, it is going out of control.

    6. Joke Waller Hunter, Executive Secrearty of the UNFCCCCOP-9 in Milan in 2003 said, "Achieving the goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change inevitably requires contraction and convergence."

    7. The basis on which the UK Committee on Climate Change arrived at the UK's share of the global effort to cut emissions was the RCEP and their advocacy of Contraction and Convergence.

    8. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally for example by 2020, would reflect the C&C principle where, "if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity."

    9. There appears to be an emerging consensus for Contraction and Convergence as the UNFCCC-compliant global framework for climate mitigation, as evidenced in the reference material attached to this memorandum.

    10. There is real danger of not doing enough soon enough to avoid dangerous rates of climate change.

2.  Question: Where did the UK budgets come from? Are they adequate to keep within the 2° limit?

    1. whether the UK's statutory targets for greenhouse gas emissions are consistent with the Government's objective of limiting global warming to no more than 2°C and whether they are enforceable;

    2. the extent to which the Committee on Climate Change's recommended budgets to 2020 are consistent with the UK's target for 2050.

Answer: They came from Contraction and Convergence [C&C], but applied at rates that are too slow to keep within 2° limit

    1. But with sinks failing @ 0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be 450ppmv.

    2. In concert with others, the UK Government's aim is to limit overal global temperature above pre-industrial to no more than two degrees Celsius. Not exceeding 450 ppmv CO2 in the atmosphere is considered a pre-requisite of keeping within that limit.

    3. "Enforcing" the right target will be no harder than enforcing the wrong target.

Chart 1


  Presently the budgets are a function of a global emissions contraction of 50% by 2050 with convergence to equal per capita entitlements globally by 2050. The UK budget came from IPCC's "canon" of "uncoupled carbon-cycle models" assuming an airborne fraction of emissions constant @ 50% giving 500 ppmv. But with sinks failing @ an average of 0.5%/yr, the outcome will be 500 ppmv.

  To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be a function of "coupled modelling" with a global emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction may still stay constant @ 50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing @ 0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be 450ppmv. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally for example by 2020, would reflect the C&C principle where, if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

Chart 2


3.  Question: Were the climate models and the assumptions used by the Committee on Climate Change valid in setting carbon budgets?

  The suitability of the climate models and the validity of the assumptions used by the Committee on Climate Change in setting carbon budgets

Answer: No. By not taking account of the Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modeling in IPCC AR4 Ch. 10 [2007], the Climate Change Committee was not up to date

    1. Lord Adair Turner incorrectly told the EAC that "feedbacks" were in the climate models that his committee had relied on for their revision of the control figure for the UK.

    2. He said, "I mean you're absolutely right to identify that one of the things that you have to be very aware of is the process of going to two degrees or three degrees in itself produces feedback loops that which increase the chance of going to a higher level, but those feedback loops should be in the scientific models to start with. Right, so that is precisely what the scientists are attempting to get to grips with. So when the scientists say this emissions trajectory, we believe, has a 99% chance of keeping us below 4 degrees, they have embedded their best judgment of the feedback loops within it. They haven't produced a model without feedback loops and then you have to add feedbacks loops as a separate thing; those feedback loops are in there already. I think what gets very complicated is whether there is anywhere you know what people call `tipping points' or thresholds—does it become totally irreversible or do we simply have feedback loops without absolute irreversibility and I think the scientists vary on that. But we did highlight that it was possible that some of the feedback loops became very strongly reinforcing above a certain temperature and that there were some physical things which might be irreversible; you know the melting of the Greenland ice-sheets etc. So I think we have taken fairly rigorously those into account in the way that we did it, and that was... it was a sense of those feedback loops and that irreversibility that made us believe that the crucial thing is to limit the increase to two or slightly above two degrees and to make very likely that we don't go above three and almost certain that we don't go above four."

Chart 3


    3. The underlined section above is significantly incorrect. Indeed the opposite is true with regard to the modelling of carbon cycle feedbacks. This is the omission of feedbacks that was finally addressed in IPCC AR4, the modelled images here are unpacked on pages 12 and 13 of this document.

Chart 4


    4. It comes from Ch 10 WG1 IPCC AR4 [2007]:—http://ipccwg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_Print_Ch10.pdf

    5. Lord Turner refers to the Hadley Centre models. It is the Hadley Centre coupled model in the image where the difference in the future weight of global carbon emissions between the "uncoupled" models ["b"—where feedbacks are largely omitted] and the "coupled models" ["c"—where feedbacks are considerably represented] is greatest [as shown in "d"—where the differences are weighed]. In a phrase, the contraction events are accelerated [or shrunk by more than 40%] when the carbon-cycle feedbacks are included. Lord Turner's committee appeared to be unaware of this.

    6. In concert with others, the UK Government's aim is to limit overal global temperature above pre-industrial to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. Not exceeding 450 ppmv CO2 in the atmosphere is considered a pre-requisite of keeping within that limit. As things stand that we will fail in that aim.

    7. The contraction events for 450 ppmv modeled in the image on the bottom of page seven were published for the first time by IPCC AR4 in 2007. They come from the Hadley Centre and are "uncoupled" [without feedbacks] compared with "coupled" [with feedbacks].

    8. With the effect of "positive-feedbacks" now understood as an issue of urgency, the "coupled" emissions contraction event has been shrunk to only 60% of the earlier "uncoupled" event. In weight terms, 2000-2100, it is the difference between around 550 and 330 Gtc.

    9. In percentage terms, this is the difference between the 50% and the 80% cut in emissions globally by 2050 shown. Note the 80% cut by 2050 was called for at WEF/DAVOS [p 24 point 1].

    10. A full-term global emissions "contraction-and-convergence-event" at sufficient rates is the strategic necessity to keep within the 450 ppmv limit. With a global cut of emissions by 50% by 2050 and international convergence to equal per capita by that date, these rates of contraction & convergence [C&C] are the stated basis of the UK Climate Act as things stand. For reasons of urgency and equity, these must be accelerated to for example the rates in lower graphic page 6.

    11. C&C came from GCI via the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] report 2000. C&C requires rates sufficient to solve the problem. RCEP accepted the principle that the rate of global convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction of greenhouse gas emissions required for to achieve the 550 ppmv they advocated 550 ppmv.

    12. Lord Adair Turner, Chairman of the independent Committee on Climate Change, wrote to Ed Milliband, the Minister for Energy and Climate Change [07/10/08]. He confirmed acceptance of the original RCEP C&C target of a 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050, and justified its revision to the RCEP figure of an 80% cut by 2050 inside a 50% cut globally for 450 ppmv, on the grounds of urgency:—"the dangers of significant climate change are greater than previously assessed;"

    13. Being, on the grounds of equity, equal per capita globally by 2050, telling an enquiry by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC);—"The core [of the Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal which is both doable and fair which doesn't end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capita to emit and that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has been saying."

    14. The House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (ECCC) then told Lord Adair Turner that;—"[your] pragmatic support for Contraction and Convergence, on the record from a meeting with the EAC [04/02/09], is very welcome."

    15. Then, referring to the call in January 2009 from World Economic Forum for an 80% cut globally by 2050 on grounds of increased urgency, [see pages 24/25] they asked him;—"Would you accept that as the speed of Contraction accelerates, the speed of the acceleration of Convergence will also have to pick up? There's always been a presumption at the International Climate Change negotiations that Developing Countries will be allowed to increase temporarily their emissions to help development. But that's going to be a concertina'd process—is that really how you'd see it?"

    16. Lord Adair Turner replied;—"While this raises a complex issue of international negotiations, you are right."

IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL EMISSIONS ON HOMEORHESIS ON CO2 & CH4 FROM LONG PAST

    1. Noting the "heat-trapping" properties of carbon dioxide [CO2] and methane [CH4], they are known as "greenhouse gases" [ghgs].

    2. The record of these ghgs in ice-core samples collected around the world, now extends to one million years before the present. Measurements have been made of flows between their sources and sinks.

    3. The correlation between the varying temperature and atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 is apparent from the data charted opposite through four ice-ages over the last 450,000 years.

    4. What is also observable is that the overall climate-system was at equilibrium. In conditions that were clearly "homeorhetic",—in other words, overall self-correcting—the correlation between the varying temperature and atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 was in "band-widths" of [a] 180-280 parts per million by volume [ppmv] CO2 [b] 300-700 parts per billion by volume [ppbv] CH4, with [c] Temperature varying between 5-15 degrees Celsius.

    5. This is fundamental to understanding the circumstances we are now in. The very sudden rise of the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 since 1800, shows that while the correlation is still there, the system is no longer in conditions of homeorhesis, it is going out of control.

    6. John Knaess who led the US delegation to the 2nd World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 1990, made the key points at a news conference receiving the IPCC First Assessment Report [FAR]. When he was asked if this "global warming stuff" was really happening, he said:—"Its simple sophomore physics; the questions are only how much change and how soon?"

Chart 5


OBSERVED CO2 IN TODAY'S ATMOSPHERE [MOUNA LOA; US GOVERNMENT]

    1. Since 1974 and from Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii, the US Government has coordinated a world programme making direct measurements of rising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and other gases.

    2. The wavy blue line is the aggregate of measurements, going up and down on a rising average, reflecting seasonal flux in the "carbon-cycle".

    3. Compared with the straight line [the dotted line], the overall trend curvature [the solid as the average of the blue] shows "acceleration" in the rise of the concentrations of CO2.

    4. This reflects the first and probably already as well, the second of two things:—[a] acceleration in the source-rise of human CO2 emissions globally and [b] declining "sink-capacity" for these extra CO2 emissions in the natural sinks of CO2.

    5. In geological time, as shown by linking to the graphic above, this rise is very sudden. It is like "an explosion in slow motion' and represents a complete loss of "homeorhesis".

UNCOUPLED CLIMATE MODELS TO ASSESS FUTURES WITH SUDDEN LOSS OF HOMEORHESIS

    1. Since the 1980s "climate models" have been developed to help predict the future atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 under various forest and fossil-fuel burning "scenarios". With that, the implications of this array of potential "futures" on global temperature and climate change have been assessed.

    2. A main focus of these has been on the "carbon-cycle" through the oceans, atmosphere and biosphere, but as influenced by the impact of the emissions of these gases from human sources as a result of the start of burning forests and fossil fuels [coal, oil, gas] with the onset of industrialisation.

    3. The principal carbon cycle model used to help answer this question was the "Berne Model" and output from it was first published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] in 1994. Five "scenarios" were published; these were future carbon-emissions "contraction-events" or "budgets" for outcomes of 350, 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv atmospheric CO2 concentration in the global atmosphere.

Chart 6


    4. These reflected a judgment given in the IPCC's "First Assessment Report" [FAR] from 1990. In 1990 the atmospheric CO2 concentration was 353 parts per million by volume [ppmv] or 25% above the pre-industrial maximum value of 280 ppmv. IPCC's judgment was that an immediate 60-80% cut in human emissions of CO2 would be needed if the upward rise in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 in that year were to be halted immediately. They didn't say it had to be done and they didn't say it didn't; but two things were crucial.

    5. First: It was apparently not the 100% cessation of emissions that was required. Continuing with 40-20% of emissions was judged to be consistent with atmosphere CO2 "stabilisation". This view came from observing human emissions and global concentrations of CO2 since 1800. Measurements covering those 200 years showed [a] roughly half of any year's emissions from human sources returned to the apparently enlarging natural "sinks" for CO2 and [b] the other half remained in the atmosphere—where a pattern seemed to have emerged of what became misleadingly known as the "Constant Airborne Fraction" [CAF].

    6. Second: The "airborne fraction". Whether this fraction was in reality constant or not, it was cumulative because the human emissions that stayed in the atmosphere added up over time as a rising "stock". That explained the rise in ppmv of atmospheric concentrations of CO2. By June 1992 the UN had agreed a Climate Convention, the objective of which was to stabilise the rise of ghg in the global atmosphere below a value that was "dangerous". The probability of "positive-feedback" where natural "sinks" ceased to enlarge, shrank and even turned to sources, so accelerating the rates of climate change was largely ignored, as they were "speculative" and difficult to model.

    7. Fossil fuel dependency had become fundamental to modern economic activity and the correlation of GDP to CO2 from fossil fuel burning has been and remains at nearly 100%. The heat-trapping implications of rising CO2 had serious implications for the future. The climate change questions "how much how soon" became "will the benefits of global growth gradually be outweighed by the damages caused by global climate changes".

    8. All the questions about UK carbon budgets in the Climate Act asked by the EAC relate to that global question. In this "battle-of-the-rates" the C&C propositions offered by GCI for the last 15 years relate to feedbacks and fighting that battle by answering that question rationally.

    9. With the 350 ppmv budget removed and one for 1,000 ppmv added due to pressure from industry lobbyists in Working Group Three of IPCC, the IPCC re-published these Berne-Model-type results from 1995 onwards. As is shown below, for the IPCC 1995 Second Assessment Report [SAR] the 2001 Third Assessment Report [TAR] and the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report [AR4], these scenarios were repeated and have remained the standard reference set for the "climate-policy" community for more than 10 years until the present time.

    10. It is of note that over 300 years of future time with CO2 concentrations theoretically stabilising "safely" at up to 1,000 ppmv, on the back of finding, extracting and combusting an inventory of up to two trillion tonnes of future fossil fuel resources, these scenarios all modelled contraction:concentration events that, ignoring the positive feedbacks not-too-mention the rapid depletion of reserves of oil and gas, ludicrously assumed the airborne fraction of emissions in these scenarios would all remain constant at around 50% right up to 1,000 ppmv.

Chart 7


COUPLED CLIMATE MODELS TO ASSESS FUTURES WITH SUDDEN LOSS OF HOMEORHESIS

    1. However, in Chapter 10 of IPCC AR4 [2007] Working Group One [WG1] an important contribution from the "Models Inter-Comparison Group" was included which addressed this feedback issue openly for the first time. All the carbon-cycle emissions scenarios were revisited comparing the past "Uncoupled" model runs with the new "Coupled" model runs, with IPCC saying:

    2. "There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the Earth system (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2."

    3. Published in a non-headline-grabbing manner with a complexity of graphic information that discouraged interpretation, the graphic [exactly as below] appeared on page 791 where:


    7. Because of the density of this overlay, but especially because of the significance of the acknowledgement of the positive-feedback issue being modeled and published by IPCC for the first time, GCI wrote to the Technical Support Unit [TSU] of IPCC Working Group One [WG1] to get confirmation that the information as shown in the graphics on page 13 had correctly disentangled the IPCC graphic on page 12. With thanks, TSU confirmed this saying, "we wish out authors had been this clear."

    8. The principal reason for this enquiry was the quite extraordinary discovery that in all the coupled-uncoupled comparisons and unclearly shown in the images published in the AR4, two different paths for emissions globally were being shown prior to 2000, as is shown by following the dotted lines.

    9. The reason for this was finally given by the Hadley Centre who said that when "coupling" to reflect feedbacks was calculated, the revision of source:sink relations in the carbon-cycle showed that sink-function in the models had certainly been over-estimated prospectively and retrospectively as well.

    10. In other words, with the "weight-record" of concentrations and past fossil fuel emissions well documented, the modelers concluded that the recent historic emissions from deforestation had also been overestimated, throwing their estimates of the strength of sink-function into further doubt.

4.  Question: What was the basis on which the Committee on Climate Change arrived at the UK's share of the global effort to cut emissions?

  The basis on which the Committee on Climate Change arrived at the UK's share of the global effort to cut emissions.

Answer: The basis was the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] and their advocacy of GCI's Contraction and Convergence [C&C] who made C&C a key recommendation of their report "Energy—the Changing Climate" [2000]

  Key RCEP recommendations:

    — The UK should continue to play a forceful leading role in international negotiations to combat climate change, both in its own right and through the European Union. The gov-ernment should press for further reductions in the greenhouse gas emissions of devel-oped nations after 2012, and controls on the emissions of developing nations (4.68).

    — The government should press for a future global climate agreement based on the contraction and convergence approach, combined with international trading in emission permits. Together, these offer the best long-term prospect of securing equity, economy and international consensus (4.69).

    — The government should now adopt a strategy which puts the UK on a path to reducing carbon dioxide emissions by some 60% from current levels by about 2050. This would be in line with a global agreement based on contraction and convergence which set an upper limit for the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere of some 550 ppmv and a convergence date of 2050 (10.10).

"ENERGYTHE CHANGING CLIMATE RCEP" [2000] CHAPTER 4—PROSPECTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: CONTRACTION & CONVERGENCE

    "The government should press for a future global climate agreement based on the Contraction & Convergence approach, combined with international trading in emission permits. Together, these offer the best long-term prospect of securing equity, economy and international consensus (4.69).

    4.47  Continued, vigorous debate is needed, within and between nations, on the best basis for an agreement to follow the Kyoto Protocol. Our view is that an effective, enduring and equitable climate protocol will eventually require emission quotas to be allocated to nations on a simple and equal per capita basis. There will have to be a comprehensive system of monitoring emissions to ensure the quotas are complied with. Adjustment factors could be used to compensate for differences in nations' basic energy needs. Those countries which regularly experience very low or high temperatures might, for instance, be entitled to an extra allocation per capita for space heating or cooling.

    4.48  A system of per capita quotas could not be expected to enter into force immediately. At the same time as entitling developing nations to use substantially more fossil fuels than at present (which they might not be able to afford), it would require developed nations to make drastic and immediate cuts in their use of fossil fuels, causing serious damage to their economies.

    4.49  A combination of two approaches could avoid this politically and diplomatically unacceptable situation, while enabling a per capita basis to be adhered to. The first approach is to require nations emission quotas to follow a contraction and convergence trajectory. Over the coming decades each nation's allocation would gradually shift from its current level of emissions towards a level set on a uniform per capita basis.

    By this means `grandfather rights' would gradually be removed: the quotas of developed nations would fall, year by year, while those of the poorest developing nations would rise, until all nations had an entitlement to emit an equal quantity of greenhouse gases per head (convergence). From then on, the quotas of all nations would decline together at the same rate (contraction). The combined global total of emissions would follow a profile through the 21st and 22nd centuries that kept the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases below a specified limit.

    4.50  The upper limit on the concentration of greenhouse gases would be determined by international negotiations, as would the date by which all nations would converge on a uniform per capita basis for their emission quotas, and the intermediate steps towards that. It would probably also be necessary to set a cut-off date for national populations: beyond that date, further changes in the size of a country's population would not lead to any increase or decrease in its emission quota.

Chart 10


    4.51  In table 4.1 we have applied `Contraction & Convergence' approach to carbon dioxide emissions, and calculated what the UK's emissions quotas would be in 2050 and 2100 for four alternative upper limits on atmospheric concentration. We have assumed for this purpose that 2050 would be both the date by which nations would converge on a uniform per capita emissions figure and the cut-off date for national populations. If 550 ppmv is selected as the upper limit, UK carbon dioxide emissions would have to be reduced by almost 60% from their current level by mid-century, and by almost 80% by 2100. Even stabilisation at a very high level of 1,000 ppmv would require the UK to cut emissions by some 40% by 2050.

    4.52  The UK-based Global Commons Institute has taken the lead in promoting `Contraction & Convergence', and has developed a computer model that specifies emission allocations under a range of scenarios. The concept has been supported by several national governments and legislators. Some developed nations are very wary of it because it implies drastic reductions in their emissions, but at least one minister in a European government has supported it. Commentators on climate diplomacy have identified contraction & convergence as a leading contender among the various proposals for allocating emission quotas to nations in the long term.

    4.53  The other ingredient that would make an agreement based on per capita allocations of quotas more feasible is flexibility of the kind already provided in outline in the Kyoto Protocol. Nations most anxious to emit greenhouse gases in excess of their allocation over a given period will be able and willing to purchase unused quota at prices that incline other countries to emit less than their quota, to the benefit of both parties. The clean development mechanism, which allows developed nations to claim emission reductions by sponsoring projects that reduce emissions in developing nations to levels lower than they would otherwise have been, can also be seen as a form of trading.

    4.54  In the longer term trading by companies in emission permits, drawn from national emission quotas determined on the basis of a contraction and convergence agreement, could make a valuable contribution to reducing the global costs of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations while transferring resources from wealthy nations to poorer ones. Trading needs to be transparent, monitored and regulated, and backed by penalties on nations that emit more than they are entitled to. If it became merely a means of enabling wealthy nations to buy up the emission entitlements of poor countries on the cheap, thereby evading taking any action at home, trading would not serve the cause of climate protection. Nor would it if developing countries that had sold quota heavily went on to emit in excess of their revised entitlements."

5.  C&C METHODOLOGY FOR A FRAMEWORK-BASED MARKET—HOW IT CAME INTO RCEP

    1. From 1990 GCI argued for the notion of the future sharing of permits to emit ghg on an equal per capita basis globally. It was seen as a general expression of "global equity". When the results of the Berne Model were first published in 1994 GCI uniquely created the rational calculating model that we called "Contraction and Convergence" [C&C] that calculates any rate of achieving equal rights, subject to the limit that achieves the objective of the UNFCCC. Following the lead given by the Bern Model, in this order C&C calculates and integrates:—[a] any global path-integrals of future emissions [Contraction:Stable-Concentration-events] with [b] any rate of arriving at the globally/internationally equal per capita sharing of such events [Contraction:Convergence] with linear convergence and an optional population base-year function.

    2. The model includes:—[c] historic data for emissions of all countries 1800-2000 [CDIAC] and [d] population projections for 50 years [UNSTAT] and the "base-year" function can be invoked for any one of those years as desired by users. As C&C is integrated in spread-sheet architecture, internationally comprehensive graphic output demonstrating different rates of C&C is quite easy to generate and the trend rates of growth for the economy, emissions, concentrations and the damages caused by climate changes can be compared to this, as follows for example:

Chart 11


    3. The costs of continuing to cause the problem faster than we respond to avoid it are incalculable. The key is to calculate and demonstrate futures where we understand communicate and organise to solve the climate problem faster than we cause it. C&C is a tool for that purpose. The UK Climate Act is a globally defined, national response to what it now accepts is a C&C-based engagement with that international dilemma.

    4. GCI displayed large graphic output of C&C to the UN climate negotiations from 1996 onwards and C&C immediately became fundamental to the UNFCCC's equity-debate on QELROs [Quantified Emissions Reductions Limitations Options] and it came close to being adopted at COP-3 in Kyoto in 1997: http://www.gci.org.uk/temp/COP3_Transcript.pdf [p 43].

Chart 12


    5. In 1999, as a result of all this, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] requested GCI to provide Contraction and Convergence [C&C] input to the report they were preparing based on the Berne model. GCI presented them with material resembling the three scenarios along-side. GCI's "rule" was as shown; where contraction was accelerated, convergence was accelerated relative to that.

    6. As shown on pages 14 and 15 of this document, in their report to Gov-ernment "Energy—the Changing Climate" [2000], the RCEP adopted C&C at rates for 550 ppmv with convergence to per capita equality by 2050 and this gave the figure of a 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050. RCEP made C&C and minus 60% for the UK, a "key recommendation" to Government. While the Government wavered on the adoption of C&C, the figure of minus 60% for UK emissions by 2050 derived from it became the initial basis of the UK ghg control.

    7. Keeping scenarios for 450 and 550 ppmv, RCEP incautiously replaced the scenario for 350 ppmv with ones for 750 and 1000 ppmv adding:

    8. "Concentration of 550 ppmv represents approximately double the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere prior to industrialisation (2.7). Some environmental groups (including the Global Commons Institute, see 4.52) regard 550 ppmv as a dangerously high concentration which is incompatible with the aim of sustainable development.8 8. Global Commons Institute's website, http:/www.gci.org.uk

    9. The institute regards 450 ppmv as an upper limit."

6.  NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY AND POLITICS OF C&C AND POSITIVE FEEDBACKS

    1. From the outset GCI had been concerned about the really problematic nature of the "positive-feedback issue" because:—[a] the threat of climate change becoming "runaway" was a reality proportional to the extent the effects of warming started feeding off each other, generating a global fast-breeder reaction the possibility of which was hard to discount though [b] the difficulties of numerically "modeling" this were nearly insuperable.

    2. There was understandably fierce resistance to allowing the questions about "how much change, how soon?" and "at what rates will the benefits of economic growth be outweighed by the costs of the damages it causes?" to entertain the possibility that all our efforts to organise a global contraction-and-convergence equivalent event may just become too little too late and so ultimately futile.

    3. Moreover, by 1996 GCI had already generated a reputation for "radicalism" because of publicly fighting and also winning a battle against "the economics of genocide" in the preparation of the IPCC Second Assessment. [IPCC SAR WG3 Chapter 6].

    4. With the C&C model's introduction in 1996, the contraction:concentrations part of calculus simply mimicked the procedures of the Berne model. These, although modeled a different way, showed a relationship between emissions and concentrations that de facto equaled and extended an airborne fraction forward over time that remained roughly constant at 50%.

    5. Indeed, all the Berne-type emissions:concentration scenarios published by the IPCC 1994 to 2007, were for all practical purposes, expressions of an airborne fraction of emissions constant at 50% and these—dangerously—have held the status of "holy-writ" since 1994.

    6. GCI's method was to go from mimicking the contraction:concentrations relationship as modeled in the Berne model [and the other models that were gradually appearing], to a method of simple mathematical trend-projection. Unlike the so-called carbon-cycle models, which whether "coupled" or "uncoupled" were opaque, GCI's method was simple, precise and transparent. As the C&C model was designed to compute any rates of contraction with any rates of convergence, at first mimicking the convention of 450, 550 ppmv and so on, GCI computed with C&C: [a] a range of emissions contraction-events, with rates and dates and carbon weighed conventionally in gigatonnes of carbon [Gtc] as flows of carbon per unit time; but then:—[b] with 1 ppmv CO2 equalling 2.13 Gigatonnes carbon, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were converted to weight, so accumulations [concentrations] were more easily computed as a fraction of emissions. The value of 280 ppmv in 1800 gave atmospheric stock of carbon in that year as 595 Gtc. and the rising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were then projected as an accumulation of various fractions of the emissions contraction-events i.e adding to the existing atmospheric stock at constant rates of of 50%, 75% and 100% airborne fractions. As the graphics opposite show, this procedure gives a frame of reference [yellow band] against which different rates of "sink-failure", eg at 0.5%/year, 1%/year, 2%/year, can be projected for comparison.

    7. Presently the budgets are a function of a global emissions contraction of 50% by 2050 with convergence to equal per capita entitlements globally by 2050. The UK budget came from IPCC's "canon" of "uncoupled carbon-cycle models" assuming an airborne fraction of emissions constant @ ~50% giving <500 ppmv. But with sinks failing @ an average of ~0.5%/yr, the outcome will be >500 ppmv.

    8. To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be a function of "coupled modelling" where a global emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction may still stay constant @ ~50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing @ ~0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be >450ppmv.

    9. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally for example by 2020 [as shown here], would apply the C&C principle where, if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, convergence should be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

    10. This rate-of-convergence of course is the principle means whereby correction of the past asymmetries of "Expansion and Divergence" can be negotiated.

    11. As noted in the Garnaut Review [2007], "The contraction and convergence approach addresses the central international equity issue simply and transparently. Slower convergence (a later date at which per capita emissions entitlements are equalised) favours emitters that are above the global per capita average at the starting point. Faster convergence gives more emissions rights to low per capita emitters. The convergence date is the main equity lever in such a scheme."

Chart 13


7.  IMPACT OF FEEDBACK ON "C&C PROPORTIONALITY-RULE" AND THE UK CLIMATE ACT

    1. In a letter to the Secretary of State [07/10/08], Lord Adair Turner confirmed acceptance of RCEP's C&C-derived target of a 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050. He then, consistent with RCEP figures for [uncoupled] C&C, [see RCEP table 4.1 row 1, page 13 of this document] justified its revision to an 80% cut by 2050 on the grounds of urgency and equity telling the Environmental Audit Committee [EAC]:—"The core [of the Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal which is both doable and fair which doesn't end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capita to emit and that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has been saying."

    2. The Energy & Climate Change Committee [ECCC] subsequently put to him that:—"[your] pragmatic support for Contraction and Convergence, on the record from a meeting with the EAC, is very welcome."

    3. Then, referring to the call from WEF for an 80% cut globally by 2050, [pages 24 25] asked him:—"Would you accept that as the speed of Contraction accelerates, the speed of the acceleration of Convergence will also have to pick up? There's always been a presumption at the International Climate Change negotiations that Developing Countries will be allowed to increase temporarily their emissions to help development. But that's going to be a concertina'd process—is that really how you'd see it?"

    4. Lord Adair Turner replied:—"While this raises a very complex issue of international negotiations, you are right."

8.  THE EMERGING CONSENSUS FOR C&C

    1. Since 1992 and embracing the years of the so-called "Kyoto-Protocol" [1995-1997-2008], valuable time has been lost in negotiation of a genuinely UNFCCC-compliant global framework.

    2. At COP9, Milan, 4 December 2003, Joke Waller Hunter Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC said publicly:—"Achieving the goal of the climate treaty inevitably requires contraction and convergence."

    3. Lord Adair Turner's evidence to the EAC in Feb 2009 was encouraging and said:—"The core [of the Climate Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal which is both doable and fair which doesn't end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capita to emit and that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has been saying."

    4. After 20 years of campaigning for C&C, this was another notable example of feeding the the emerging consensus for C&C described by Kemal Dervis Chief Administrator of the UNDP. On 5 April 2008, the UK Government hosted an international Conference on "Progressive Governance" outside London. At this a paper by Lord Nicholas Stern (LSE) and Laurence Tubiana (Iddri/SciencesPo) entitled "A Progressive global deal on climate change" was presented to the conference. It stated that:—"An international agreement is essential. It must be based on the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. Effectiveness demands a long-term global goal capping global emissions and providing a long-term trajectory for investment in low-carbon technologies. This should be at least a halving of global emissions by 2050. A pragmatic principle of equity would require an equalisation of per capita emissions by then."

    5. This was immediately then endorsed by the Head of UNDP, Kemal Dervis, who was present and welcomed it as part of what he called "the emerging consensus" which the UNDP had itself described as C&C in their Human Development report for 2007-08 "Fighting Climate Change; Human Solidarity in a Divided World" in the section "Contraction and Convergence; Sustainability with Equity" [see Section 10.9 of this document].

    6. Section 10 provides some of the evidence of this "emerging consensus for C&C". The eminent persons and institutions in this only partial list is long, but from it the names, Tony Blair, John Schelnhuber, Kemal Dervis, Nicholas Stern stand out because they have been conspicuously part of a version of "the emerging consensus for C&C" that advocated minus 50% globally by 2050 with equal per capita by then.

    7. The 50% cut by 2050 globally coincided with the equalization of per capita emissions globally by that date too, involving an 80% cut in the emissions of Developed Countries.

    8. In other words part of the C&C principle where, "for reasons of equity, convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction" was accepted in this "emerging consensus".

    9. Yet a year later these people signed the statement from the World Economic Forum in DAVOS [Jan 2009] which called for an 80% cut globally by 2050 [see Section 8.2 of this document].

    10. This new position of an 80% cut globally—ie by everyone—remarkably abandoning the equity part of the principle that convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction.

    11. For reasons of "urgency", the call for the cut of 80% by Developed Countries stood and was simply extended to everyone else in Developing Countries to do likewise.

    12. The UK Climate Act applies the equity aspect of the C&C principle that "convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction". However, it is at overall rates that are too slow to achieve the UK Government's target of 450 ppmv/2 degrees.

    13. The Stern et al WEF/DAVOS position correctly accelerates contraction for reasons of urgency to a rate that could keep us within that target, but abandons the aspect of the principle where convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

    14. It is notable these people on the WEF/DAVOS list didn't pick up on the issue of feedbacks even with the arrival of the "coupled" modeling published in IPCC AR4 in 2007 and that only, finally with their publication of that WEF/DAVOS statement in 2009, would it appear that they did.

    15. However, to have abandoned "the emerging consensus for C&C" which they had become a significant part of generating, by failing to uphold the aspect that, if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity as well, it was provocative and counter-productive.

    16. In the Energy and Climate Change Committee, Colin Challen MP correctly emphasized what he called the dangers of Developing Countries being "concertina'd" as the rate of contraction inevitably "picked up" for reasons or urgency without the rate of convergence being accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

    17. He welcomed the acceptance by Adair Turner that the C&C principle was the core of the Climate Act. He then questioned him about the situation created by the WEF statement where accelerated contraction was called for asking that, "if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity."

    18. Lord Turner took Colin Challen's point and responded by saying that he was right.

    19. So the questions posed by EAC about the derivation of the carbon-budgets in the UK Climate Act are appropriate. The control figure as advocated and defended by Lord Adair Turner's Climate Change Committee is a result of being unaware of, or possibly just ignoring, the coupled modeling in the AR4, the "debut" of which was itself was years overdue.

9.  RISK:—THE REAL DANGER OF NOT DOING ENOUGH SOON ENOUGH

    1. However, all this reveals another and more serious problem and it is in this risk-context that the emissions control paradigm outlined in the UK Climate Act needs to be understood. With sinks failing and feedbacks becoming more net positive as concentrations rise, a reality becomes more and not less likely that the higher concentrations are forced to go by unrestrained emissions or even by insufficiently restrained emissions, the faster the annual rate of sink failure will become.

    2. The models don't really tell us that on current trends of failure to control emissions and the momentum that is being generated by this, it is not implausible to foresee rates of net sink failure that can eventually become greater than 100% of emissions per annum. The interactive effect of positive feedbacks can accelerate and even totally overwhelm the declining of source:sink "balance" we still presently have.

    3. Runaway climate change can become unstoppable as we all go beyond a point of no-return, where all attempts of "emissions-control" become futile as we are overtaken by the damages from the momentum of what becomes increasingly catastrophic rates of global climate change.

    4. As the RCEP correctly recognised in 2000, a fully global solution is needed to this definitively global problem and that the global framework for organising the ghg emissions control to prevent this is Contraction and Convergence.

    5. The key is to bring C&C to bear as an organising principle and then apply it at rates that are fast enough to head off the threat of what the eminent Australian Government economist Prof. Ross Garnaut had already called in 2007, "the diabolical problem of climate change to which humanity may well lose." As with the UK RCEP his Climate Review for the Australian Government in 2007 was based on Contraction and Convergence, about which this year he wrote:—"Over the last 20 years, Aubrey Meyer's sustained work through the GCI with the `Contraction and Convergence'—or C&C—concept and campaign, has created a global standard that is now widely recognized as an outstanding and essential contribution to the global debate on what to do to avoid dangerous rates of climate change. This is remarkable and reflects the integrity of the argument where C&C is mathematically rooted in the science of climate change and marries the limit to future human emissions that avoids dangerous rates of climate change to the politically compelling requirement of equal shares in the use of the atmosphere subject to that limit. It embodies the economic political reality, that adjustment to equal per capita emissions entitlements will take time. It is a rational, flexible and transparent concept that holds out the best hope of all urgent proposals that might form a basis of an environmentally and economically rational global agreement on climate change mitigation. The contraction and convergence idea was at the core of the proposals for inter-national agreement that are part of the Garnaut Climate Change Review, commissioned by and presented to the Australian Prime Minister and all State Premiers (R. Garnaut, 2008, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Cambridge University Press; www.garnautreview.org.au ). Support should be given to this campaign particularly at this time as this year—2009—leads to a UN event in Copenhagen in December at which it is intended that the global plan to avoid dangerous rates of climate change is agreed and established for the long-term."

10.  REFERENCE MATERIALS SUPPORTING THE GCI MEMORANDUM1.  Garnaut "Climate Change Review" June 2008 [p 23].

2.  World Economic Forum 2008: "Shaping an Opportunity Out of Crisis—A message to participants in the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009 from Members of the Global Agenda Council on Climate Change." [pp 24/5].

3.  "Global Warming—The Complete Briefing" 3rd Edition 2004, Sir John Houghton. [pp 26/9].

4.  "Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change" CUP 2006, edited by Schelnhuber, Cramer, Nakicenovic, Wigley, Yohe. [pp 30/1].

5.  IPCC Third Assessment 2001: WGIII, Chapter 1, Page 90. [p 32].

6.  IPCC Fourth Assessment 2007: WGIII, Chapter 3, Page 214. [p 33].

7.  "Climate Protection Strategies for the 21st Century: Kyoto and beyond" 2003, German Advisory Council on Climate Change (WBGU). [p 34].

8.  "The Economics of Climate Change—The Stern Review" 2006, CUP: Part I, Climate Change, 2A Ethical frameworks and inter-temporal equity, page 47. [p 35].

9.  "Human Development Report 2007-08", UNDP, [pp 36/9].

10.  "Breaking the Climate Deadlock—A Global Deal for our Low-Carbon Future" 2008, Tony Blair and The Climate Group. [p 40].

11.  "Energy—The Changing Climate" 2000, RCEP 22nd Report. [pp 41/2].

12.  Letter from Sir Tom Blundell to GCI, 2000. [p 43].

13.  UK Government response to RCEP 2000, Recommendation 3, RCEP para 4.69. [p 44].

14.  "The Scientific Case for Setting a Long Term Emission Reduction Target" 2003, DEFRA. [p 45].

15.  "The International Challenge of Climate Change: UK Leadership in the G8 and EU" 2005, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, page 268. [p 46].

16.  "Beyond Stern: From the Climate Change Programme Review to the Draft Climate Change Bill" 2007, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee. [p 47].

17.  Links to GCI materials and information. [p 48].

18.  C&C At The Climax Of The Kyoto [Cop3] UN Climate Negotiation, 10-12-1997. [p 49].

19.  "The Incontestable Truth" 2007—DVD commissioned by the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Climate Change. [p 50].

20.  "Carbon Countdown" 2008, Global Commons Institute, Section 10, C&C Support. [pp 51/62].

21.  Tributes and awards to GCI Director Aubrey Meyer.

22.  Insurance Industry views of Contraction and Convergence.

29 April 2009





 
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