Memorandum submitted by Professor Paul
Ekins
This note gives preliminary answers to some
of the questions posed by the EAC for this enquiry. Its purpose
is to allow EAC Members to follow up orally those points on which
they feel that further evidence is necessary.
The questions posed by the EAC, together with
the responses, are as follows:
1. Whether the UK's statutory targets for greenhouse
gas reductions are consistent with the Government's objective
of limiting global warming to no more than 2°C and whether
they are enforceable;.
2. The extent to which the Committee on Climate
Change's recommended budgets to 2020 are consistent with the UK's
target for 2050;
3. The suitability of the climate models and
the validity of the assumptions used by the Committee on Climate
Change in setting carbon budgets;
4. The basis on which the Committee on Climate
Change arrived at the UK's share of the global effort to cut emissions;
and
5. The frequency with which targets and budgets
should be reviewed and updated to take account of new scientific
evidence.
It will be very difficult to limit global average
temperature rise to 2°C. The Hadley Centre model suggests
that there is an 80% chance of this being exceeded at 450 ppm
CO2e. Current (2007) levels are 396 CO2e (including aerosol cooling)
or 463 ppm CO2e without such cooling, and are increasing at 2
ppm p.a. The science of climate change has several times revised
upwards both its estimate of the extent of the temperature increase
for a given increase in GHG concentrations, and the extent of
the negative impacts for a given temperature increase. While considerable
uncertainty on both these relationships persists, the trend is
consistently and alarmingly in the wrong direction. The message
from the science is therefore to reduce emissions as much as possible,
with an emphasis on early action to reduce the cumulative emissions
by any given date. The CCC's budgets are the minimum that would
be consistent with an 80% UK (50% global) emissions reduction
target by 2050, and this is the minimum that is consistent with
any change of achieving a 2°C temperature increase target.
It might also be argued that the budgets are the maximum consistent
with policy possibility and credibility. Rather than tightening
the targets (which could certainly be justified scientifically)
the emphasis should now be on getting the UK on a trajectory to
meet those that have been set.
On the enforceability of the targets, the means
to do this are not at all evident. For the targets to be met,
actions for the 2020 target will need to be taken now. It is not
clear how the Government in 2020 can fairly be held accountable
for the failure of the present and immediate future Government
to introduce the necessary measures, should these continue not
to be forthcoming. The targets rather seem to serve as a declaration
of cross-party political intent, with arguably more credibility
than they would have if they were entirely `voluntary'. The political
danger is that target-setting will be seen as an end in itself,
rather than a preliminary to putting in place measures to meet
the target:
6. The compatibility of current Government policies
with achievement of the overall budget, how individual government
departments can ensure policies are consistent with overall carbon
budgets, and the potential role of departmental tradable carbon
allowances;
The Government will miss its 20% domestic CO2
reduction target for 2010, despite having been aided in this by
the global recession. Policy-related emissions reductions since
1997 have clearly been difficult to achieve.
There is little evidence that current policies
will bring forward the mix of demand reduction, efficiency increase
and low-carbon supply that will be necessary to meet the targets
in the 2020 budget. The government continues not to deploy in
a systematic way the price mechanism, which is a key underpinning
of all these sources of emissions reduction; there is little sign
of saturation in energy demand in key sectors (eg transport);
energy efficiency increases continue to be too slow practically
everywhere (especially in buildings and transport); the Renewables
Obligation has spectacularly failed so far to kick-start renewables
deployment in the way seen in a number of other European countries;
and there are continuing considerable uncertainties about whether
and when new nuclear and CCS plant will come on stream and what
it will cost, and, in the latter case, whether it will even work.
There are signs that the Government now recognises
the scale of the challenge before it in respect of both its carbon
emissions reduction targets and the EU renewables target in 2020.
Its strategy due out this summer will contain its conclusions
on a number of key proposals that have been floated in recent
consultation papers, including feed-in tariffs, a Renewable Heat
Incentive, and a new initiative for energy efficiency in buildings.
Whether the targets are met will depend very largely on the level
of ambition in the design of these and other instruments. If the
emphasis is on limiting the costs, as in the past, then it is
unlikely that they will be successful.
If departmental tradable carbon allowances'
refers to the emissions of actual government departments, similar
to the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme for Local Authorities,
then this could be set up quite quickly and might prove an instrument
to accelerate the currently very slow (at best) pace of emissions
reduction from the Government estate. If it refers to the sectoral
emissions for which particular departments may be deemed "responsible"
(eg the Department for Transport for transport emissions), then
this is a far more ambitious proposal. It could be worth investigation,
and this could be explored at the EAC meeting if members wished:
7. The issues around using emissions trading
(both credits from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and carbon
offset credits) to meet UK carbon budgets, including the standards
that should apply to such credits.
There are two priorities if dangerous anthropogenic
climate change is to be avoided. Developed countries must pioneer
a route to a low-carbon economy that is perceived by other countries
to be attractive enough to follow. Developing countries must act
to reduce their emissions below what they would otherwise be.
To help them do this, they will need finance from developed countries.
The EU ETS, if the cap has been set low enough
(itself a contentious question), will foster the first objective,
and there is no reason why allowances should not freely tradable.
Indeed, it would negate the purpose of the scheme if they were
not.
Carbon offsets are a very different matter.
At present, outside countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol,
they are not related to an emissions cap. There is no way that
hypothetical baseline-related emissions reductions can be made
robust. Rather, such offsets really only serve to transfer finance
from developed to developing countries. In doing so, they serve
to undermine the imperative of developed countries to move to
low-carbon economies. Indeed, their very existence seems to acknowledge
that such moves might be unacceptably costly.
For these reasons it would be highly desirable
for the measures to meet the two priorities to be kept entirely
separate. Developed countries should seek to meet their targets
through their own efforts or through trading with other countries
that have a robust cap. Finance for developing countries should
be provided through other means that are more securely tied to
strategic efforts at emissions reduction in developing countries.
6 July 2009
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