Dairy Farmers of Britain - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Contents


Supplementary memorandum submitted by Milk Link (DFoB 36a)

INQUIRY INTO THE FAILURE OF DAIRY FARMERS OF BRITAIN

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS IN IGNACITY PAPER TO EFRA SELECT COMMITTEE[7]

1.  Introduction

  1.1  Milk Link notes the memorandum submitted by Ignacity and wishes to comment on two aspects of this paper.

  1.2  The first is to respond to several criticisms of Milk Link's accounts and business practices made in the paper. There has been no correspondence between the parties and the writer of the Ignacity paper has not sought to confirm the accuracy of his assertions. The criticisms are:

    — treatment of contributions to Member Capital Accounts;

    — treatment of intangibles;

    — revaluation of fixed assets;

    — the Profit & Loss account overstates the actualite; and

    — Milk Link has a generous bonus policy.

  1.3  The second is in relation to the suggestion that a new form of commercial paper would be necessary to allow members of a co-operative to trade their asset. Milk Link believes this is actually possible under present arrangements as it itself has done and continues to do.

2.  Contributions to MCA

  2.1  Milk Link's policy, which has been applied consistently, is clearly set out in its accounts under Accounting Policies. On page 47 of the Report and Accounts 2009, note "s" (Member Reserve Loans) states "Under the Society's rules, the Member milk price consists of a "headline" price and a distribution of profits, currently 0.5 pence per litre. This amount is withheld from payments to Members to create a reserve which is then distributed to Members, who have agreed to lend the amount to the Society as a Member Reserve Loan. The amount of each Member Reserve Loan is credited to the relevant Member's Capital Account." The treatment has been thoroughly reviewed and agreed both by Deloitte LLP (Milk Link's current auditor) and by Grant Thornton LLP (the previous auditor).

  2.2  The amount credited to Members Capital Accounts is set out at the foot of the P&L account, which also shows the cumulative profit and loss reserve carried forward.

  2.3  It is clearly set out on Milk Link's Balance Sheet that these contributions are separate from General Reserves as they are shown as a separate caption under Funds provided by Members whereas both the Revaluation reserve and Profit and loss reserve appear in a different section of the Balance Sheet headed Capital and reserves. It is thus perfectly clear that Milk Link is treating Member Capital Accounts as a liability on the Balance Sheet—not (as Ignacity asserts) "treating money that belongs to individual members as part of its own assets".

3. Treatment of Intangibles

  3.1  The Goodwill on Milk Link's balance sheet arose in relation to the acquisition of its processing businesses and represents the excess of consideration over the fair value of the tangible assets acquired. This begs the question as to why Milk Link should have paid greater than tangible asset value? The reason is clear—Milk Link believed (and subsequent trading has confirmed) that the income generated by the assets acquired justified a higher value. UK accounting rules state that such excess value must be treated as Goodwill and amortised over the expected life of the business stream with a maximum of 20 years. This is Milk Link's policy and is clearly set out on page 45 of the Annual Report & Accounts 2009 as Accounting Policy "d".

  3.2  Milk Link regularly reviews whether any impairment is appropriate (as required by Accounting Standards) on the basis of achieved profit from the businesses acquired compared to that expected at the time of acquisition. To date no impairment has been necessary (other than in respect of businesses which have been sold).

4. Revaluation of Fixed Assets

  4.1  Milk Link commissioned King Sturge, a firm of Chartered Surveyors, to carry out a valuation of all the Group's properties as at 4 April 2009, in accordance with the principles adopted by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. This revealed a surplus over book value of £11.3 million and was recorded in the accounts as at 4 April 2009 in accordance with accounting standard FRS15. For the record, the gain did not arise through the Profit & Loss Account but in the Consolidated Statement of Total Recognised Gains and Losses and it should be stressed was not as suggested by Ignacity a factor in determining any executive bonus. The surplus is recorded as a separate caption on the balance sheet and not as part of the Profit & loss reserve. FRS15 requires the gain to be amortised over the remaining useful lives of the assets and this cost is charged to the Profit & Loss Account.

  4.2  The Milk Link Board took the view that, following various acquisitions and disposals, the Group's asset base was now stable and accordingly, it was appropriate to update the value of its processing facilities to reflect more accurately their value to the business.

5. The Profit and Loss Account overstates the actualite

  5.1  This statement is not supported by any evidence other than the writer's opinion on the treatment of Member capital contributions. Milk Link's published accounts reflect accurately the financial impact of its business transactions, including transactions with its Members. As noted above, the gain arising on revaluation of its properties was not included in the P&L Account.

  5.2  The audit process is overseen by an Audit Committee, comprising an independent director and two elected farmer directors. In this context we would point out that Milk Link regularly publishes its annual Report and Accounts on a timetable fully in line with that of comparable publicly quoted companies rather than taking advantage of the generous timetable allowed by the Industrial and Provident Societies legislation.

6. Milk Link has a generous bonus scheme

  6.1  The bonus arrangements for executive directors and senior executives were developed by the Remuneration Committee (comprising the Chairman and three elected farmers directors), which had advice from MM & K Ltd, as external advisors, to provide benchmark data and guidance on the design and implementation of short and long-term incentive plans. It should be noted that these are based on achievement of a "balanced scorecard" of objectives, directly aligned to advancing Members' interests.

  6.2  Current best practice suggests that a significant proportion of executive compensation should be contingent on performance and Milk Link's remuneration policy is in accord with that principle.

7. Raising Funds for Co-operatives

  7.1  The remainder of this note responds to the suggested proposals from Ignacity for the raising of funds by co-operatives.

  7.2  Milk Link is interested in any constructive suggestions that would facilitate raising the funds necessary to support Co-operatives' growing Balance Sheets. Any such proposal should, however, bear in mind the fundamental principle that a co-operative exists primarily to add value to its Members' businesses rather than to make profits in its own right. The principle means of returning value to Members should be through Members trading with the co-operative rather than through the payment of interest or dividends on amounts invested. These principles are best achieved if the co-operative is owned by its Members rather than by external investors, whose interests may diverge from those of the members.

  7.3  To date UK co-operatives have been subject to a restriction that no Member may hold more than £20,000 of equity in the co-operative. There is no restriction on amounts that may be lent to co-operatives and most have used the loan route to raise capital. These loans are repayable to Members when they leave or retire from the Society and this does require that such capital is replaced. It does, however, maintain the principle of the Society being owned and funded by its supplying Members.

  7.4  The Ignacity proposal appears to anticipate capital being retained by former members or even being subscribed by external investors as the writer refers to a market being created and mentions analysts commenting on the investments in a similar way to analysts commenting on PLC performance.

  7.5  Milk Link would be concerned that such a proposal would introduce a number of issues:

    — There would be a potential conflict between the interests of supplying Members and external investors, with the latter being more concerned with profitability than, in Milk Link's case, the milk price.

    — It is unclear whether these investments would be equity or debt—if the latter would they rank after bank borrowings but ahead of Member debt?

    — How would the banks that lend to co-operatives view this new form of paper and would it affect the terms on which they are prepared to lend?

    — If they are to be regarded as equity, it would suggest that the holders of this paper would be the ultimate owners of the business rather than the Members whose enterprise had created it. We think this is unlikely to be acceptable to Members, as has been evidenced by the reaction of Fonterra members to that company's proposals for a partial floatation.

    — If this paper is "quasi equity" how would the return on it be treated for tax purposes? At present interest paid to Members on loans is allowable against tax in the accounts of the co-operative. If the new paper is entitled to receive dividends these may have to be paid out of taxed profit adding a further burden to the co-operative.

  7.6  Milk Link believes it is possible to allow Members to trade their loans without creating any new type of paper and in fact introduced such a system three years ago. Since then over £1 million of Qualifying Loans have been traded between Members.

  7.7  Milk Link also considers that a preferable method of introducing external capital (if needed) would be to issue a minority interest in the share capital of a processing subsidiary. Such companies tend to be organised under Companies Act legislation and so issuing equity is a tried and trusted process. This structure has been adopted by Glanbia and Kerry and appears to work well. The top company in the organisation remains a co-operative wholly owned by its Members but the principal operating subsidiary has minority shareholders (in Glanbia's and Kerry's case the shares are listed but this is not essential).

Milk Link

February 2010







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