Dairy Farmers of Britain - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180 - 190)

WEDNESDAY 14 OCTOBER 2009

MR GORDON BROWN, MR PETER PEARSON AND MR JOHN GREGORY

  Q180  Chairman: They were the accountants of the company at one time, were they not?

  Mr Brown: They were corporate advisers. I do not think they were accountants as such to the company.

  Q181  Chairman: I know they got replaced by PwC in the endgame.

  Mr Brown: They were the corporate advisers. Philip Moody was asked by someone, a farmer Council member, "Are we going to buy ACC?" and his response was, "If I knew anything I couldn't tell you and if I didn't know anything I'd have nothing to tell you". That was all we had to go on. We talked about it. I can only speak for myself here, I am not speaking for the Council of DFB. My view was we were a Council of 80 farmers and it was out of the question that we could undertake due diligence as ourselves. What we did was we appointed a board who had responsibility for the strategy of this business and it was for them to take the decision and if they got it wrong then by implication we had got it wrong as well by appointing those people. That was where the accountability—political and democratic accountability—lay with the business. I trusted them. As a Council member I have a share of responsibility in it all. The actual purchase was in the middle of August and the Sunday before it went through we had small meetings round and about, and we had one with Malcolm Smith, the then Chief Executive, in Clifton near Penrith, and Lord Grantchester was there and Michael Oakes, and they said, "This is what we are going to do". It was ambiguous at that point as to whether or not we could have stopped it. I thought we could not and they said we could. We had the discussion with them, they went through it and we asked the obvious questions: "Are we paying too much? What is the strategy? What is the competition going to do?" There was no sense that it might go wrong, they were super confident. A couple of days later we had the Council meeting and took a vote and it was as near as damn it unanimous by the Council to buy it on the strength of the recommendation that came from the board.

  Q182  Chairman: Mr Gregory, as a keen outside observer of the scene, what is your take on all of this?

  Mr Gregory: Obviously the build-up to it all was kept very hush-hush, it was not discussed and nobody seemed to be getting any outside information. We were a customer of Dairy Farmers at the time because we were purchasing our raw milk from them and we had done through Milk Marque and Zenith previously. We were getting little bits of rumours. We were speaking to our area rep, Stuart Richardson, and we said, "Do you not think it's a bad idea?" and you got the feedback, "The board is confident that it's going to work" and we never ever thought it would work.

  Q183  Mr Cox: You run a business.

  Mr Gregory: Yes. We have grown our business. We are a family business. In 1996 our business was doing 1,200 litres per day and we are currently doing 120,000 litres per day. That is all through growth, partly by the collapse of Dairy Farmers. We doubled our volume when Dairy Farmers collapsed in June. Prior to that the growth was being made by being able to give customers service, quality and produce and also pay farmers a very fair price. As part of our contract we are paying the farmers over two pence a litre greater than the middle ground price that Gordon had. That was our benchmark and still is. Desperate farmers who we took on when the receivers were appointed who had lost their month's pay check, lost the first three days of June also from the receivers being appointed, needed to know that somebody would collect the milk. Some of them were outlying, some of them had already put their notice in and were 11 months into their notice period to leave. These people went straight on to our standard contract which was giving them around about 24 pence per litre, which was way more than the 18 pence they had previously been receiving from Dairy Farmers. Some of the outlying farms that had not put a contract in, we put them in on 21 pence per litre. In November they will roll on to our standard contract so they will be receiving 24 pence plus a litre for their raw milk. That is the biggest key to making the farmers confident in the product. You have had previous conversations with the NFU about terms of contract and notice periods and stuff like that. I do strongly believe that as a dairy, and also as a farmer, the dairy and farmer needs confidence in at least a 12 months' notice period because we have got to purchase raw milk for the contracts so if we have not got enough raw milk to supply our customers' needs we have got to go and look for that. If a farmer gives us a month's notice to leave where do we go and find that milk from? Have we got to pay a spot milk price which two months ago was low but today is 27 pence, 28 pence per litre?

  Q184  Mr Cox: I do not think the NFU was suggesting notice periods should be reduced, it was only in a circumstance where the farmer could not agree a contract with which he was happy and which he considered to be fair.

  Mr Gregory: The dairy needs the confidence that the farmer is not going to pull the plug on him in a month's time. On the question you asked earlier regarding the tendering processes, when you submit a tender you have got to enter into a minimum of a six to 12 month price guarantee for that tender so you have got to know six to 12 months in advance that you expect your costs to be roughly what they are when you enter into the contract period. If you have got to go out and purchase milk at a higher price because farmers have left it puts you in a bad predicament serving the needs of the contract.

  Q185  Chairman: One of the things that intrigued me, bearing in mind the Co-op's central part as a major purchaser from DFB, was as I understand it they were not able to satisfy the Co-op in terms of the tender process and were beaten by Wiseman. Given that so much depended on keeping the customer base intact, how did they get it so wrong?

  Mr Pearson: Chairman, as I understand it the Co-op is one of the five major retailers that does not have a farmer direct supply system. I would imagine what was going through the directors' minds, although you should never take anything for granted, was that two companies with the same ethos would get together and form a direct supply system. The Co-op is in competition as everybody else is in the retail market place.

  Mr Brown: Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) have come out of this very well indeed. Not only did they offload the assets onto DFB at a good price, they have not got a dedicated supply pool, they are the largest purchaser of milk that does not have a dedicated supply pool. We all watch the adverts on the telly saying how wonderful they are, how ethical they are and how caring and sharing they are, but I have to say I do not see it as a UK farmer.

  Q186  Chairman: Whilst that is a fair observation it still does not quite answer my question as to how it went wrong. In other words, was it the DFB's perception that everything would be all right because they were like for like in ethos or was it they just had not realised that the Co-op were going to be ruthlessly commercial?

  Mr Brown: I was asking the same questions in 2004: "What are our customers going to do? What are all the other stakeholders that we are going to be dealing with going to do to us?" The board seemed assured that it would be fine, that we could just run the business. I am not sure what more I could have done. They had seen the due diligence and we, as a Council, placed our trust in them.

  Mr Pearson: There was a lot of information floating around not only in the previous 12 months as to the future viability of DFB and as a purchaser of milk you might be quite concerned as to where your milk was coming from. I think in the receiver's report he said there were 320 people under notice, something like that.

  Q187  Chairman: I think it was 322.

  Mr Pearson: Of course, one of the reasons that we ceased milk production was because we would have had to have given 12 months' notice to leave and I could not see that our business could sustain that sort of loss so we pulled out of milk production. That was before the receivers allowed everybody to go to various other places. In fairness, some members have gone to an increased milk price. As I tried to point out earlier, there is a lot of money involved and you can soon swing either way. Gwyn pointed out one of the original factors was the splitting up of the co-ops in that Milk Link had the bottom section, First Milk had the middle and DFB had the top section.

  Mr Brown: Geographically.

  Mr Pearson: Thank you, Gordon. I always felt that we had the most marketable region for the reasons that environmentally we had the smaller farmers and we had those farmers in the Peak District and the Lake District that tended be smaller producers but had increased haulage costs because of the very nature of the business. I think you asked earlier what Defra should do and I think what people have to do is realise what they want out of the UK milk industry: are we Europeans or are we UK? A lot of the products can come from outside the UK but the liquid milk industry is sacrosanct to the UK. Certainly we seem to be getting a two-tier milk supply system at this moment in time in that the liquid milk men are moving on fast and the commodity men if they can produce at a lower cost are surviving but probably further away from the market place. That is the first thing I would say to you. Environmentally it is a big issue. I know people will argue that the environmental payments are paying them to maintain the environment, but as a farmer myself I would sooner be paid to keep livestock and work than I would to be a park keeper. I only have 36 years of agriculture, I have not got 400 years which some farming families have. There is definitely an environmental issue there. I would also say that DFB's members, as has already been pointed out, put £67 million in, and DFB's members have rationalised the liquid milk side of the UK milk industry and paid for that on their own. They have paid for it out of the retention. This leads me to more issues in terms of NVZ requirements. I know Hayley Campbell-Gibbons has already indicated that is beyond the remit of the NFU, but another reason why we gave up milk production is because of satisfying the EU NVZ regulations coming in. There is also a matter which has escaped me, I am afraid.

  Q188  Mr Cox: Could I possibly take advantage of the losing of your thread to ask one question of both of you. You said that you were going into another co-operative. Could you explain to me why would you want to go into another co-operative? Secondly, can you give me the practical advantages of belonging to a co-operative rather than supplying Dairy Crest or one of the other major milk producers?

  Mr Brown: With respect to First Milk, it is beggars cannot be choosers.

  Q189  Mr Cox: Name me a practical advantage that a farmer has ever got out of supplying Milk Link or one of the big co-operatives as opposed to Dairy Crest or one of the other businesses?

  Mr Brown: There are not any. If I had the choice I would not, but Harper Adams is 27.7 pence. I went to see them this September and they will not have me because of where I am geographically, so you are left with the pickings really.

  Mr Pearson: Chairman, can I come back on that point. As a personal view, and it is not an ideological view, I have always believed in co-operation and not co-operatives. I have followed Glanbia in Ireland and the Kerry group and these are companies that started off as co-ops and developed into major companies. Also there is a purchasing group up in Staffordshire and if you had joined that purchasing group in 1972 and paid your five pounds, we are now paying our members who leave £1,700.[11] From my point of view it was a business decision that I hoped other people would drive that company forward and that money would come back because if you multiply it up, I did say to the chairman one day I had £54,000 capital in plus I lost a milk cheque and if you just took the £54,000 it would have turned into 13 million. As a business decision if they had increased at the same rate, and do not forget that we were employing businessmen who had been directors of Mars, professional directors, they should have seen what was coming.

  Mr Brown: As an addendum to what I said, in theory the co-operative model works. It can work the rest of the world over. As a primary producer to add value to your basic commodity makes sense, but for all sorts of practical reasons it has not worked in the UK dairy industry as yet.

  Q190  Chairman: Mr Gregory, you are on the other side of the fence. As a postscript observation, what do we need to do to try and secure future success for our dairy industry?

  Mr Gregory: I do not believe that the co-operative side of things does work. As a hands-on family business the size of DFB is not something that could be run and managed by a family structure, but to be able to pull things together where you know what is going on in the business, where you have got people who know and report to the right people to make sure the business works and the model works, making sure of your customer needs, making sure your members, your farmers are happy, this is what we have done and that is how our business has succeeded in giving people a better price for their milk and being able to give customers the service that they require at a reasonable cost. What is playing a big part in causing problems in the UK is outside competition and very aggressive canvassing by certain independent dairies in the UK. They hit dairy farmers hard in April of this year, especially in the northeast, and I do not think that has helped the business either. As a footnote, it is as well not to have too many eggs in one basket, as Dairy Farmers did with the CWS contract. That was the biggest part of the problem. As Gordon said, once that was gone that was a recipe for the downfall of the business.

  Chairman: Gentlemen, may I thank you on behalf of the Committee for your insightful and genuinely helpful observations. You have made this thing live a bit more than sometimes the cold, dry words on a piece of paper communicate. You have also given us some very important perspectives on the way that the business operated. I am most grateful to you all for coming and joining us this afternoon. Thank you very much indeed.






11   Note by witness: To be absolutely accurate this figure currently is £1,300 plus an insurance they take out which is another £600. But the principle is still correct. Back


 
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