10 EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA
(31133)
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| Council Common Position 2009/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures
against the Republic of Guinea
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| Legal base |
Article 15 EU; unanimity |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration |
EM of 19 November 2009 |
| Previous Committee Report |
None; but see (30721) 11429/09 HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009) and (26227) 16041/04, (29544) 7499/08 and (30446) 6543/09: HC 19-x (2008-09), chapters 7 and 8 (11 March 2009)
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| Discussed in Council | 27 October 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
10.1 Under Article 96 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement
between the EU and 77 ACP countries, either party may invite the
other for consultations if it considers that the other has failed
to respect the "essential" political elements in Article
9: human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, or
to provide good governance. Strengthening this political dimension
was one of the main changes introduced in the 2005 revision of
the Agreement.
10.2 At the end of 2003, the Commission proposed
such consultations with the government of the Republic of Guinea
(GOG), having attempted for the previous two years to resolve
various democratic shortcomings through normal Article 8 political
dialogue, but without success.
10.3 The Committee has taken a particular interest
in the Article 96 process in Guinea because the undertakings given
by the GOG were all in areas in which success, or failure, might
well have much wider lessons, or repercussions, and not just for
the Cotonou Process but also ESDP; a number of other ACP countries
were similarly challenged, against a background in which the inter-relationship
between development, security and good governance was now widely
acknowledged. As we have noted, the Cotonou Agreement is clear:
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of
law are essential elements of the partnership, with the Commission
characterising the revision of the political components in 2005
as "strengthening the political dimension by placing greater
emphasis on effective dialogue and results"; against the
yardstick set out in those last four words, we have found it difficult
to find much persuasive evidence that the Article 96 process had,
to use the then Minister for Europe's words, led to the Cotonou
provisions being taken seriously — after over five years
of Article 96 engagement, Guinea seemed to be no nearer than it
was then to a functioning democratic and law-based society.[27]
10.4 Subsequent developments are set out in the Report
referred to above and those referred to therein.[28]
As that Report notes, a bloodless coup took place on 23 December
last, following the death of the then President after a long illness,
when a military junta calling itself the National Council for
Democracy and Development (CNDD) seized power and its leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, declared himself President. In response,
further Article 96 consultations were initiated; subsequently,
the Commission proposed that they be closed, and a staged process
initiated whereby, in return for measured progress towards, and
the holding of, "free and transparent" elections, normal
relations would be restored.
10.5 In her accompanying Explanatory Memorandum of
7 July 2009, the then Minister for Europe (Baroness Kinnock of
Holyhead) explained that the Council Decision proposing the closing
of the Article 96 consultations contained a draft letter which
— if the Council adopted the Decision — would be sent
from the EU to the GOG, informing the interim authorities of the
conclusion of consultations and setting out the "appropriate
measures" to be adopted under Article 96(2)(c) of the Cotonou
Agreement. These involved a "transition roadmap" and
appropriate measures for the EU to assist the transition; in particular,
the interim authorities had committed to:
- a return to constitutional order following the
parliamentary elections on 11 October 2009 and the presidential
elections on 13 and 27 December 2009;
- the President, the members of the CNDD and the
Prime Minister not standing for election;
- effective establishment of the National Transition
Council;
- adoption of measures guaranteeing respect for
the principles of the rule of law, human rights and good governance.
10.6 The Minister for Europe supported this proposal,
arguing that it was important that the EU played a constructive
role in assisting Guinea's transition to constitutional order
and democracy. She was, however, concerned that the "broadly
encouraging undertakings" offered during the Article 96 consultations
had "not been followed up by action": the first stages
of the roadmap had yet to be completed, with voter registration
currently suspended, and the National Council for the Transition
(CNT) had not been established. She thought it wise that the Commission
had proposed that the EU continued to monitor the situation closely
over a period of 24 months, with a regular review at least once
every six months, and had reserved the right to amend the "appropriate
measures" in the light of the interim authorities' implementation
of the commitments they had entered into.
Our assessment
10.7 Sadly, we noted, there was nothing surprising
in what the Minister had to say about the continuing failure of
the interim authorities to live up to commitments and, in the
meantime, the increasing lawlessness, arbitrary arrests and detentions,
the non-functioning judiciary and the heavy curtailment of party
political activity. Past performance suggested that the first
six-monthly review would produce more of the same.[29]
The Minister for Europe's letter of 22 October
2009
10.8 On 28 September some 150 unarmed opposition
supporters, protesting at Captain Dadis Camara's intention to
run for President next year (despite having foresworn this when
he seized power) were killed by soldiers in the capital, Conakry.
In his letter, the Minister (Chris Bryant) said that this had
been condemned by the EU, the US, the African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the latter
two had taken the lead to resolve the political crisis and prevent
further violence — the AU had threatened sanctions if Dadis
Camara refused to agree not to stand in future presidential elections;
ECOWAS had agreed to impose an arms embargo — and Member
States had also "argued strongly that the EU should stand
ready to support any sanctions imposed by the AU or ECOWAS in
order to demonstrate broad international commitment to resolving
the crisis." Against this background, he believed that "
the UK should support EU restrictive measures to bolster
any AU/ECOWAS sanctions on Guinea. However we seek to ensure that
any sanctions are targeted and do not have a disproportionate
effect on the general population, or UK interests."
10.9 The Minister then noted that on 20 October he
received a draft Common Position and list of names drawn up by
EU Heads of Mission in Conakry, with proposed sanctions that would
impose an arms embargo as well as travel restrictions targeting
members of the military junta and individuals associated with
them who were responsible for the violent repression of 28 September
or the political stalemate in the country. Given the ECOWAS action,
the ongoing political stalemate in Guinea and the need for the
EU to send a coordinated and strong message that it condemned
the violent crackdown, the Minister said that was likely that
the EU will agree to impose sanctions at the General Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERC) on 26-27 October; in the light
of this, he hoped that the Committee would understand that he
might have to agree to the restrictive measures before scrutiny
had been completed; he concluded by undertaking to send the text,
along with an Explanatory Memorandum, as soon as a final version
was available.
Common Position 2009/788/CFSP
10.10 On 27 October 2009, the GAERC adopted Common
Position 2009/788/CFSP imposing sanctions on the Republic of Guinea.
These sanctions include an arms embargo and a travel ban targeting
members of the National Council for Democracy and Development
(NCDD) and individuals associated with them. [30]
The Government's view
10.11 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 19 November
accompanying the Common Position, the Minister for Europe at the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) says that in view
of the lack of progress made by the military junta following repeated
calls to restore the rule of law, he "strongly agreed that
restrictive measures were necessary to reaffirm those calls, and
as a sign of international resolve and support to ECOWAS and AU
efforts to mediate."
10.12 The Minister explains that:
— in order to adopt sanctions as swiftly
as possible, the Common Position limits restrictive measures to
those within Member State competence — a travel ban and
arms embargo;
— individuals are listed only where evidence
exists that they are members of the NCDD or associated with them;
— individuals subject to a travel ban would
be entitled to challenge the implementation or application of
such a ban in the Member State's courts; and
— the draft Common Position provides that
Member States may grant exemptions from the travel ban for specified
reasons including, inter alia, where travel is justified on the
grounds of humanitarian need.
10.13 He "assesses that these measures send
a strong signal to the military junta that the EU disproves [sic]
of the violent crackdown." He also notes that, although the
Common Position applies for a period of 12 months, "the EU
intends to review the measures in the coming months against any
steps taken by the military junta to restore the rule of law",
and that "if no positive steps have been taken, the EU will
consider imposing further restrictive measures."
Conclusion
10.14 We do not object to the Minister's action
on this occasion and in these particular circumstances, and clear
the document.
10.15 In so doing, however, we wonder how effective
the Common Position is likely to be. Guinea is the world's largest
bauxite exporter and has significant deposits of gold, diamond,
uranium and iron ore — resources that allowed Lansana Conte,
the former dictator, to survive periods of international isolation.
And its oil prospects have recently drawn attention after discoveries
in nearby countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone.
According to media reports, oil and minerals deals are under negotiation
between Guinea's military government and the China International
Fund, who would provide the lion's share of finance for about
$7bn worth of projects, ranging from power-generation to the creation
of an airline.
10.16 Two EU courses of action — this Common
Position and the action taken under the Cotonou Agreement —
are to be reviewed in the coming months. It would seem likely
that further action will be proposed under one or the other, or
both. In any event, when any Explanatory Memorandum is put forward
on such subsequent action, we should be grateful if the Minister
concerned would ensure that it takes into account this wider perspective
of China's activity in the country and the region, and its impact
on the effectiveness of EU action.
27 (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08; see headnote. Back
28
(30721) 11429/09; see headnote. Back
29
Ditto. Back
30
OJ No. L 281 28.10.09, pp.7-11. Back
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