19 ESDP: Piracy off the coast of Somalia
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| Draft Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43 (2) EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 27 November 2009
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| Previous Committee Reports | None; but see (30982) —: HC 19- xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October 2009); also see (30724) — and (30728)—: HC 19 xxiii (2008-09), chapter 9 (8 July 2009) and (30341) —, (30348) — and (30349) —: HC 19-iv (2008-09) chapter 17 (21 January 2009); (30400) 13989/08: HC 16-xxxvi (2007-08), chapter 17 (26 November 2008) and HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 10 (22 October 2008); and (29953)—: HC16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 19 (8 October 2008)
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| Discussed in Council | 7 December 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
19.1 In response to growing international concern over the problem
of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 (2008) in June which encouraged
"States interested in the use of commercial maritime routes
off the coast of Somalia, to increase and coordinate their efforts
to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea". Then,
on 7 October 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR
1838, which was initiated by France and co-sponsored by 19 countries
(Belgium, Croatia, the US, UK, Italy, Panama, Canada, Denmark,
Spain, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Norway, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Korea and Singapore).
19.2 Our previous reports set out the history of
the European Union's endeavours to address this problem, leading
to the creation of the first ESDP naval operation, Operation Atalanta,
and subsequent developments.[61]
19.3 These include, in January 2009, an Explanatory
Memorandum from the then Minister for Europe, giving "an
overview on decisions made to facilitate the progress of Operation
Atalanta" and incorporating a Joint Action launching the
operation and two Council Decisions on Status of Force Agreements
with both the Somali Republic and Djibouti.
19.4 Subsequent reports have covered:
— an
exchange of letters between the EU and Kenya that give the right
to enter and freedom of movement within the territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of Kenya "strictly limited
to the necessities of the operation";
— a further EU-Kenya agreement on the handover
of pirates for trial;
— a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
the Seychelles, allowing the EU to freely enter territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of the Republic of the Seychelles
and the right to detain pirates in the Republic of the Seychelles
waters;
— an agreement to allow the transfer of
persons detained by EUNAVFOR in connection with armed robbery
and associated seized property to the Seychelles for the purpose
of investigation and prosecution;
— information on attempted and successful
attacks with regard to the year to 9 June 2009, noting that the
ratio of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden had reduced from
1 in 3 at the end of 2008 to about 1 in 8 for most of the year
to date and 1 in 11 in May, but also that these international
effort may have had effect of pushing pirates to operation further
South East including in Seychelles waters;
— a new piracy resolution (UNSCR 1851)
adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 2008, which called
for the establishment of an International Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), and gave details of the work
upon which the CGPCS had embarked;
— agreement in May that, having reached
Initial Operation Capacity (IOC) on 13 December 2008 and being
intended to last until 13 December 2009, Operation Atalanta should
be extended for a further 12 months, and that the revised Joint
Action to extend the operation would be prepared and submitted
to the Committee "after the summer";
— conclusions adopted by the 15 June GAERC
that:
"Operation ATALANTA had demonstrated its
ability to act effectively against piracy, that piracy off the
coast of Somalia was likely to remain a serious threat beyond
Operation ATALANTA's current end date of 13 December 2009, and
that early agreement on extending the operation would facilitate
the necessary force generation. In this context, the Council agreed
that Operation ATALANTA should be extended for one year from its
current end date"[62]
— the
previous Minister for Europe's views on the achievements, failings
and lessons learned so far in the mission's first year, which
said that a more detailed review would be undertaken at the end
of ATALANTA's first year in December 2009;
— action the Government and the EU had
taken during the year of operation to address the root causes
of the immediate problem, which looked ahead to a regional needs
assessment to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti that was to take place
in early September, to be led by the UK and with the UN, US, EC
and France also be taking part.
19.5 Most
recently, the Committee considered the Council Decision concerning
the exchange of letters between the EU and the Government of Kenya,
about which the then
Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Caroline
Flint) first wrote to the
Committee last December and which her successor (Baroness
Kinnock of Holyhead) finally
submitted for scrutiny along with her Explanatory Memorandum of
6 October 2009.
19.6 We
noted that this Council Decision had been deposited for scrutiny
only because the Committee insisted that it should be, the FCO
being under the curious misapprehension that our earlier agreement
to its adoption ahead of scrutiny constituted clearance; expressed
surprise that the then Minister had made no mention of this; and
asked her to tell us what steps she had taken to ensure that it
did not happen again.
19.7 We
said, with reference to the earlier Council Conclusions, that
we understood the benefit regarding force generation of early
agreement on extending the operation, but
presumed that the mandate would also need to be changed; we therefore
drew her attention to the need to ensure that the Joint Action
was submitted for scrutiny in good time for questions to be raised
and answered, and not in a last minute rush before the Christmas
recess.
19.8 We also noted that she said nothing of
the prospective appointment, mentioned in the Council Conclusions,
of a further EU Special Representative (EUSR) — which, if
pursued, would of course require prior scrutiny.
19.9 We also looked forward to hearing further from
the Minister about the review of Operation Atalanta's first year
and the outcome of the regional needs assessment to Kenya, Ethiopia
and Djibouti in early September to which she referred.
19.10 In the meantime, we cleared the document.[63]
The draft Council Decision
19.11 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 27 November
2009, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) says that, in order to extend Operation
Atalanta until December 2010 and in light of experiences from
the first year of the operation, an amendment to the Joint Action
is required. He explains that since it will be adopted following
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December, the amending
instrument is a Council Decision, not a Joint Action.
19.12 The Minister notes that amendments to the existing
Joint Action include:
— monitoring
of fishing activities off the coast in Somalia;
— the need for Operation Atalanta to liaise
and cooperate with international bodies working in the region;
— assisting the Somali authorities by sharing
information on fishing activities;
19.13 He further notes that the extended EU military
operation is scheduled to terminate on 12 December 2010.
The Government's view
19.14 The Minister goes on to note that:
"although 2009 has witnessed an increase
in the number of pirate attacks, the actual number of successful
attacks has reduced significantly, especially in the critical
Gulf of Aden transit artery. The international community has shown
unity and resolve in tackling piracy — the EU mission has
ensured safe passage of over 300,000 tonnes of food aid to the
country.
"Just one ship following the agreed shipping
route and complying with industry agreed best practice has been
hijacked in the critical Gulf of Aden trade artery since last
December, which is a real achievement by our navies and the
merchant community, working together, given some 25,000 ships
use this route each year."
19.15 However, the Minister says:
"the threat of piracy has not diminished
and it continues to pose a threat to international shipping. Whilst
pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden has been dramatically reduced,
we have seen an increase in pirate attacks in the much broader
Somali basin."
19.16 The Minister also says that the UK continues
to provide a direct contribution to a number of international
efforts to counter piracy:
— provision
of frigate and Deputy Commander to the Combined Maritime Forces
(CMF);
— operation commander and operation headquarters
to the European Security Defence Policy mission Operation ATALANTA;
— rotational command of the NATO Operation
OCEAN SHIELD from a frigate; and
— leading a Working Group within the international
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) looking
at military coordination and regional capability development.
19.17 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says only that "the estimated UK share of common
costs for the second year of the operation is approximately £1.26
million but this is still to be confirmed and subject to exchange
rate fluctuations."
19.18 Finally, the Minister says that the Council
Decision will be agreed at the GAERC on 7 December 2009.
The Minister's letter of 27 November 2009
19.19 In addition to the covering some of the same
ground as in his Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister writes separately
to say that he is "fully seized of the importance of seeking
parliamentary approval" for the Council Decision. He recalls
earlier letters that "provide as much detail as was available
at the time on the proposed extension of the mandate", and
says that the negotiation process in Brussels has, however, produced
a final document incorporating other Member States' positions
only at this late stage: "I regret that this forces me to
have to agree the Council Decision by overriding the scrutiny
process."
19.20 The Minister also recalls the Committee's request
for information on what action is being taken to deal with the
circumstances that have led to the increase in pirate attacks
including within the wider Indian Ocean, and says that he will
be writing separately on this, "including the work of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the recent
meeting of Working Group 1 chaired by the UK on 16 and 17 November."
The Minister's further letter of 7 December 2009
19.21 The Minister first addresses the tardy depositing
of the earlier Council Decision (c.f. paragraph 19.6 above). He
says that is was due to a mistake by an FCO official new to parliamentary
scrutiny who later apologised to the Committee staff for this
omission. He again assures the Committee that "the FCO has
and continues to implement measures to improve and strengthen
the FCO's expertise on parliamentary scrutiny [which] includes
a series of scrutiny themed workshops, one to one briefings and
on-line guidance for desk officers on 'Parliamentary Scrutiny
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Proposals'";
and also again refers to the updating letters sent to the Committee
in the interim.
19.22 The Minister then turns to the review of Operation
ATALANTA's first year, the outcome of the regional needs assessment
to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and the latest information concerning
points raised earlier by the Committee on what action is being
taken to deal with the circumstances that have led to the increase
in piracy:
"As Operation ATALANTA has not yet completed
its first year, a formal review has not yet taken place. However,
the Operation Commander (RAdm Peter Hudson Royal Navy) gave a
presentation to the Chiefs of Defence meeting in Brussels on 4
November. Operation ATALANTA continues to be successful and has
so far conducted more than 50 transits of World Food Programme
shipping, delivering more than 300 tonnes of World Food Programme
(WFP) Aid to Somalia. It continues to contribute significantly
to the protection of shipping transiting the Internationally Recommended
Transit Corridor in the critical Gulf of Aden trade artery. Operation
ATALANTA co-chairs the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE)
mechanism, which facilitates communication and naval coordination
across a large number of international navies, and continues to
operate the Maritime Security Centre for the Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA)
as a reporting and updating service for the shipping industry.
"As Chair of the Working Group on Operational
Coordination and Regional Capability Development of the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the UK led a needs assessment
visit to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti in September. The report
of the visit was issued on 21 October and a copy has been placed
in the library of the house. The report was subsequently discussed
at a meeting of the working group in London on 16/17 November
and its recommendations were agreed as the basis for further detailed
work. A matrix of its recommendations has now been circulated
to working group participants so they can decide how to structure
their contributions. I have attached a copy of the report and
matrix for your information. We hope to compile responses from
participants of the Contact Group early in the New Year.
"Piracy is widely judged to be a symptom
of underlying instability in Somalia. To this end, the UK continues
to work with the international community to tackle the root causes
of piracy through the provision of humanitarian and development
assistance and support for alternative livelihoods. Addressing
piracy will be a key challenge and we acknowledge that in order
to deter individuals from piracy it is essential to have legitimate
alternatives. Discussions between the UK and the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) have highlighted the need for job creation
to not only tackle piracy but to stimulate the Somali economy
through the development of a functioning security force and wider
workforce. The importance of a comprehensive approach to regional
capability to tackle piracy is one of the key themes of the UK
drafted Needs Assessment report of 21 October mentioned above.
"In this context security is a key challenge.
I am writing separately about proposals under discussion within
the EU to train Somali security forces. The African Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) will play a leading role until the Somali security
sector has the necessary capability to do so. In March 2009 the
UK provided nearly £5.7 million direct to the African Union
(AU) to support AMISOM and £10 million to the UN Trust Fund
in support of AMISOM. This is in addition to £23 million
of humanitarian and development assistance provided by DFID.
"There continues to be regular discussions
about how to further support the peace process in Somalia. The
concept of an EU Special representative (EUSR) is one idea that
has been raised but there is currently no evidence that this will
be pursued."
Conclusion
19.23 We are taking up the scrutiny issues separately
with the Minister.
19.24 In this instance, we acknowledge his predecessor's
endeavours to keep the Committee informed of ongoing developments
and accept that, had the Committee not been on its customary visit
to the incoming Presidency, to discuss its priorities, in the
week of 30 November, it would have been possible for this scrutiny
over-ride to have been avoided. In these circumstances and on
this occasion, we do not object to the Minister having agreed
to the adoption of the Council Decision on 7 December.
19.25 We have read with interest the information
provided by the Minister about efforts to address the underlying
causes of this dangerous activity, which has now directly affected
UK citizens. Against this background, we draw his attention to
a relevant letter published by "The Times" on 5 December
from the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia, which we reproduce at Annex 1 to this chapter of our
Report. Though it would seem that a response to his first point
is under discussion, it is not clear to what extent the other
two — restoring and enforcing Somalia's economic exclusion
zone and a large scale civil affairs programme — are being
addressed.
19.26 We therefore ask that, in his promised further
letter, the Minister includes his assessment of the extent to
which:
— the
activity to which he refers in his letter of 7 December;
— the proposals under discussion within
the EU to train Somali security forces; and
— what is contained in the Council Decision,
particularly with regard to fishing activities
responds to the points that made by the Prime
Minister of the Transitional Federal Government in his letter.
19.27 We would also like to know how much the
UK has paid so far towards the cost of the operation, i.e., the
UK share of common costs thus far and the cost of the "direct
contribution to a number of international efforts to counter piracy"
to which the Minister refers (see paragraph 19.16 and 19.17 above).
19.28 In the meantime, we clear the document,
which we are drawing to the attention of the House because of
the widespread interest in the situation that it is endeavouring
to tackle and the UK role in it.
19.29 For the same reasons we are drawing it to
the attention of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.
Annex 1: Letter to The Times
from the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia
"Sir, Clare Lockhart's article ("At last.
Obama's vision offers hope for all sides", Opinion, Dec 3)
marks a sea change in international support to troubled countries.
What is so startling is that all the conclusions are as true about
Somalia as they are about Afghanistan.
"We accept that after 20 years without government,
the situation in Somalia will appear beyond repair but the reality
is very different. Piracy and the growth of Islamic extremism
are not the natural state of being. They are but symptoms of an
underlying malaise — the absence of government and hope.
"Regional stability is increasingly at stake
as Islamic extremism and the piracy problem grows and my government
is working hard with your Foreign and Commonwealth Office to present
and initiate our Somali lead strategy that will help the Somali
people themselves to bring Somalia back from the brink.
"The help we need is first in the restoration
of both effective government and the training of national security
forces required to secure peace and enforce laws.
"Second, in restoring and enforcing Somalia's
economic exclusion zone so that Somalia can use its vast potential
wealth in fish, oil and gas to fund its own future. Our fishermen
currently watch as other countries plunder our waters. While we
condemn it outright, it is no wonder these angry and desperate
people resort to "fishing" for ships instead.
"And third, in launching a large scale civil
affairs programme to train our young people and establish legitimate
commercial livelihoods.
"You have employed these same principles to
great effect in other conflict-ridden countries (that harbour
terrorists threatening UK national security) such as Northern
Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, so why not here too? The irony
is that it would cost only a quarter of what is being spent right
now on the warships trying to combat piracy, to fund our plan
and actually solve the problems rather than simply chasing them
round the Indian Ocean.
"Omar Sharmarke
Prime Minister, Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia"
61 See headnote. Back
62
See Council Conclusions at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108452.pdf
Back
63
(30982) -: see HC 19- xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October
2009). Back
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