12 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
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| Council Joint Action amending Joint Action 2007/749/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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| Legal base | Article 14 and 25 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration |
Minister's letter of 23 December 2009
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| Previous Committee Report
| HC 5-i (2009-10), chapter 15 (19 November 2009)
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| Discussed in Council |
1 December 2009 Justice and Home Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment |
Politically important |
| Committee's decision |
Cleared (decision reported on 19 November 2009); further information received
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Background
12.1 The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH); established BiH as a state comprising two
Entities, each with a high degree of autonomy — the Republika
Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH) — and designated the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) to oversee the implementation
of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the
international community and coordinate the activities of the civilian
organisations operating in BiH.
12.2 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) —
55 countries and international organisations that sponsor and
direct the peace implementation process — and a PIC Steering
Board (SB) oversees all this. On a day to day basis, a Board of
Principals, chaired by the HR, serves as the main coordinating
body. Its permanent members are the OHR, EUFOR,[41]
NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the Commission. International
financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the
UNDP are also regular participants.
12.3 The longstanding goal has always been for BiH
to work its way towards European accession. The most recent step
was the signing in June 2008 of BiH's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement. Then, according to plan, the OHR would be wound up
and there would then be only the EUSR. But things have not gone
according to plan. Prior to transition, the BiH authorities need
to deliver Five Objectives (well established, approved by the
PIC SB and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations)
revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based State, and to fulfil Two Conditions — signing
of the SAA (achieved), and a positive assessment of the situation
in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton
Agreement (so far not achieved).
12.4 In March 2002, the then Committee cleared two
draft Joint Actions and one draft Council Decision that, between
them, established an EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) and appointed its Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, as
well as the EU Special Representative (EUSR), to whom he was to
report. The Special Representative was to report to the Secretary
General/High Representative, Javier Solana. Lord Ashdown was expected
to be (and duly became) the new UN High Representative in BiH.
The General Affairs Council agreed that he should also be appointed
EU Special Representative and the draft Joint Action on this appointment
noted that the two were expected to be one and the same person.
The EU Police Mission (which took over from the UN's International
Police Task Force) was expected to improve high-level management,
develop the rule of law and, to quote the then Minister, "take
the politics out of policing" in Bosnia. EU Foreign Ministers
agreed the Joint Action taking the decision to launch the EU Police
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BOSNIA) at the General
Affairs and External Relations Council on 11 March 2002. It was
the first European Security and Defence Policy mission.
12.5 Since 2002, progress in developing sustainable
policing arrangements and raising policy standards under BiH ownership
and significant BiH improvement in its cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) paved the way
for the opening of Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)
negotiations, which brought BiH into line with the other countries
of the region and marked a milestone on its path to EU integration.
But specific challenges remain to be addressed, including tackling
organised crime and implementing police restructuring. Bosnia's
state-level law enforcement agencies were not yet functioning
adequately and EU troops still remained to maintain a safe and
secure environment.
12.6 Three years ago the Committee cleared a revised
mandate, which extended the mission for a further two years with
reduced staffing levels and a refocused mandate, concentrating
on building capacity within the senior ranks of the state-level
agencies and taking a leading role in assisting the fight against
organised crime.
12.7 Two years later, the Committee cleared a further
Joint Action to extend the mission for a further and final two
years until 31 December 2009. During this mandate, a joint co-ordination
mechanism was to be established to facilitate the transition to
Community assistance to meet remaining police and rule of law
development needs.
12.8 The then Minister noted that police reform
was the key remaining condition for Bosnia and Herzegovina to
initial and sign its Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)
with the EU, and thus to move further along its accession path,
and the Government's full support for "the EU membership
aspirations of the Western Balkans countries", which the
mission supported through its focus on reforming Bosnia's police
structures.
12.9 On the Resource Implications, the then Minister:
— recalled
that funding for Common Costs (HQ, in-country transport, office
equipment etc) is met from the CFSP budget, to which the UK contributes
approximately 17%: the budget for 2008-09 had not yet been agreed
but the mission was, he said, likely to cost approximately €12
million, of which the UK would contribute an estimated €2
million (£1.4 million at that time);
— noted that the UK aims to contribute
between 11 and 14 personnel to the mission, which will be funded
from the Whitehall Peacekeeping Budget "which is a call on
the Treasury's central contingency reserve".
12.10 A little over a year ago, on 20 November 2008,
the Committee considered a further Council Decision which provided
€12.5m funding for EUPM BOSNIA for 2009.
12.11 The then Minister for Europe (Caroline Flint)
noted that BiH had signed its SAA with the EU on 16 June 2008;
the continued presence of EUPM in 2009 would " support further
reform of Bosnian police structures to uphold the rule of law
in line with European standards."
12.12 On the Resource Implications, the Minister
also noted that:
— of
this confirmed 2009 budget of €12.5 million, the UK would
contribute an estimated €2.13 million (then £1.68 million);
— the UK had 12 secondees in the mission.
The draft Joint Action
12.13 This Joint Action extends the mandate for EUPM
Bosnia for two years until 31 December 2011. The Joint Action
also provides funding for the mission until December 2010.
The Government's view
12.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 November
2009, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) said that, over the current mandate until
30 December 2009, the mission had made progress against the objectives
agreed by Member States, EUPM BOSNIA and BiH police managers and
Ministers of Interior at state and entity level, and that the
work of the mission and the BiH police had led to improved public
relations and trust in the police force.
12.15 He explained that this Joint Action, for the
third extension of EUPM BOSNIA from January 2010, focused the
mandate on the fight against organised crime: it aimed to improve
law enforcement cooperation and coordination through promoting
links between the police, judicial and penal sectors, whilst ensuring
local ownership, and would have six key tasks:
— To
strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of Law
Enforcement Agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime
and corruption;
— To assist and support in the planning
and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime
and corruption in a systematic approach;
— To assist and promote development of
criminal investigative capacities of BiH;
— To enhance police-prosecution cooperation;
— To strengthen police-penitentiary system
cooperation;
— To contribute to ensure a suitable level
of accountability.
12.16 To achieve these tasks, the mission would have
strategic advisers working closely with BiH personnel at State
and entity level, as well as advisers and experts working with
local counterparts along the full length of organised crime and
corruption investigations, from the initial intelligence development
through prosecution to prison. The mission was setting benchmarks
for each of these processes, to be agreed with State and entity
level Ministers of Interior. The mission would liaise closely
with the EUSR and provide him with information and strategic advice
on law enforcement and the rule of law, as well as actively seeking
his local political guidance and support. EUPM would also work
closely with the Commission to enable the transition of mission
elements to Community Instruments.
12.17 The Minister also discussed the Mission's performance
under its present mandate, which is set out in detail in our previous
Report. He noted that:
"… despite some headline developments,
such as the adoption of a new strategy for fighting corruption
2009-2014 and the implementation of elements of the UN convention
on transnational organised crime, much still remains to be done.
Even with international assistance, 2009 has been a year of only
limited progress for the Bosnians in their fight against organised
crime and corruption. During the next mandate period, the support
of EUPM will be essential if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to reach
accepted European standards."
Our assessment
12.18 As the Minister noted, his predecessor had
informed the Committee in July (in a "round up" letter
about all the ongoing ESDP missions) of the likelihood of this
proposal, noting in particular concern in the country about organised
crime. However, it was envisaged two years ago that the mandate
now coming to an end would be the last one. While we had no wish
to take issue with this further extension per se, we had expected
him to have said a good deal more about the wider context, other
than police agencies in BiH remaining capable and confident "despite
political challenges".
12.19 We also noted that, at our previous meeting,
we had considered the Commission's Communication on its 2010 enlargement
strategy, along with the individual Country Progress Reports;
and that, in the case of BiH, the strategy noted a year of limited
progress on the reform agenda and the urgent need to speed this
up. There were also concerns about the ongoing ethnic nationalist
rhetoric and challenges to state institutions and a marked deterioration
in the political climate. With regard to the further development
of BiH's European perspective, the Commission had referred to
the crucial role of the Five Objectives and Two Conditions for
closure of the OHR being met, and of the need for constitutional
reform, and had urged BiH political leaders to make progress on
this. We drew attention to the most recent response by those political
leaders, which we thought did not appear to be at all encouraging:
on 21 October, some 3 weeks before the Minister's Explanatory
Memorandum, the BBC had reported that what it called "crisis
talks aiming to end years of political stalemate among leaders
of Bosnia's divided communities", which were called by the
EU and US in a bid to bring in constitutional reform had been,
had ended with no tangible results, and that BiH had been left
"more fragile than ever" amidst " fears that a
new conflict could erupt."[42]
12.20 We therefore asked the Minister for his assessment
of the present position and the prospects for the wider process
of moving BiH forward. In addition, we also asked:
— if
EUPOL BOSNIA had succeeded in "tak[ing] the politics out
of policing";
— what the present position was on the
Five Objectives and Two Conditions for closure of the OHR;
— what the present position was on a revised
mandate for the EUSR;
— what his view was on the role of the
PIC at this juncture (against a background of suggestions of differences
of view among PIC members about its immediate future, with Russia
said to be arguing for its disbandment);
— what, in present circumstances, was meant
by "enable the transition of mission elements to Community
Instruments";
— if the establishment of a warehouse to
store and reuse equipment from existing ESDP missions, so as to
improve the EU's ability
to respond to crises and
provide rapid equipment deployment to existing and any new ESDP
missions, was a response to the fragility and fears referred to
above.
12.21 In the meantime, we cleared the document.[43]
The Minister's letter of 23 December 2009
12.22 The Minister's response is as follows:
WHETHER THE EU POLICE MISSION (EUPM) IN BIH HAS SUCCEEDED
IN TAKING THE POLITICS OUT OF POLICING
"One of the main problems facing the mission
is that only some (mainly Bosniak) political parties are
fully supportive of state-level institutions in BiH, whilst
others (mainly Republika Srpska political parties) often block measures
perceived to strengthen state-level agencies. This situation means
that politics and policing are closely intertwined in
BiH, and explains the difficulties facing EUPM in its attempts
to separate the two. In spite of these difficulties, the mission
has been successful in supporting several reforms aimed at protecting
policing from political interference.
"First, when EUPM took up its mandate in 2003,
it inherited from the existing UN mission the task of implementing
mechanisms designed to avoid political interference in the BiH
police. Among these, the most important was the establishment
of Directors of Police and Police Commissioners, positions which
were made explicitly separate from the politically appointed Ministers
of Interior and Security, who were left with responsibility for
the security situation, but without room to interfere in operational
police matters. Alongside this, Independent Selection and Review
Boards were established to select and appoint those Directors
of Police and Police Commissioners in a non-political manner.
EUPM mentored the establishment and functioning of these boards,
aimed at reducing political interference at the initial recruitment
stage, and assisted in supporting the position of the Directors
and Commissioners vis a vis their political counterparts (the
Ministers of Interior and Minister of Security).
"Second, EUPM was the driving force in the drafting
of the first Law on Police Officials (LoPO) in BiH, applicable
to police officials working for the newly established state-level
agencies SIPA (State Information and Protection Agency) and BP
(Border Police). The LoPO established a proper ranking system,
which allowed for a meritocratic system, leaving less room for
political interference in the process of recruitment and promotion
of police officials, even in the lower ranks — an innovation
essential for accountability and for avoiding future political
intrusion in the work of those police officials."
THE POSSIBLE TRANSITION OF SOME MISSION ACTIVITIES
AND PROJECTS TO COMMUNITY INSTRUMENTS
The Minister explains that the Instrument in question
is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance or IPA, and continues
as follows:
"In line with wider UK policy, the Government
aims to ensure that the EU uses the most appropriate tools at
its disposal to achieve its objectives in any given situation.
In BiH we consider that the efforts to tackle Organised Crime
and Corruption require the continued presence of the sort of hands-on
expertise that can be provided through a Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) mission. However, given the work of EUPM to date,
further support in some areas can be provided equally —
or more effectively — through a smaller in-country footprint
via financial support and expertise from the EU's funding instruments
coordinated through the European Union Delegation in country.
The Mission Implementation Plan for 2010/11 is currently being
drafted by the mission, in collaboration with local Bosnian police
and criminal justice agencies, and the local EU delegation, and
will, accordingly, include planning for any transition"
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TEMPORARY WAREHOUSE WITHIN
EUPM BIH
"The establishment of this warehouse is
not in response to the fragility of the country, nor for fear
that a new conflict could erupt as reported by some media. The
purpose of the temporary warehouse is to enable the EU to more
effectively and rapidly provide equipment to launch a new civilian
CSDP mission or to meet the urgent needs of an existing mission.
One of the main lessons from recent CSDP deployments, including
during the establishment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia,
was that the EU needed to improve its capability to provide equipment
rapidly for the deployment of missions during a crisis. This temporary
warehouse is a response to that need. For legal reasons it was
not possible to establish a stand-alone facility and, following
a cost and feasibility analysis carried out by the Council Secretariat
and endorsed by Member States, it was decided that EUPM Bosnia
represented the best location, not least because its downsizing
will release equipment to form the core stock in the warehouse.
The Commission is currently undertaking a feasibility study into
the establishment of a more permanent warehouse solution for civilian
CSDP mission."
THE CURRENT POLITICAL
SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
"The Committee is right to note that there has
been disappointing progress over the past year. Ethnic nationalist
rhetoric remains, and the political stalemate this engenders continues
to hold back reform. The UK Government remains deeply concerned
about this lack of reform progress and has been encouraging Bosnian
politicians to work together in a spirit of compromise and flexibility.
"More positively, all the main parties in BiH
are in favour of moving towards European Union and NATO membership,
and it is to be hoped that this common aim will galvanise local
politicians to work together to achieve the necessary reforms."
THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE (OHR)
"The UK Government remains in favour of transition
from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to an EU-led
international presence (EU Special Representative, EUSR) in BiH,
but has consistently maintained that this can only happen when
the '5 objectives and 2 conditions' set by the Peace Implementation
Council Steering Board have been completed. We remain hopeful
that Bosnian politicians will seize the opportunity offered by
the current EU/US initiative, begun in October this year, to reach
agreement on the necessary reforms for completing the '5+2' objectives
and conditions.
REVISED MANDATE FOR THE EUSR
"The introduction of a revised mandate for the
EUSR is dependent on completion of the 5+2 and subsequent closure
of the OHR. The nature of the revised mandate is therefore not
yet finalised."
THE PEACE IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL (PIC)
"The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was
established at the Peace Implementation Conference in London in
December 1995 to manage peace implementation and to give the High
Representative political guidance. It continues to fulfil this
important role in BiH. The most recent PIC Steering Board meeting
took place in Sarajevo on 18/19 November and a copy of its unanimously
agreed communiqué is attached to this letter.[44]"
Conclusion
12.23 We are grateful to the Minister for this
further information, which we are reporting to the House because
of the level of interest in developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the wider region.
41 The EU's military operation in BiH - Operation EUFOR
ALTHEA - deployed in December 2004, following the decision by
NATO to conclude its SFOR mission; presently 6,300 troops with
"a Chapter VII mission to ensure continued compliance with
the Dayton/Paris Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure
environment in BiH". See http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=27
for further information. Back
42
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8316773.stm for the
full report. Back
43
See headnote: HC 5-i (2009-10), chapter 15. Back
44
Which is reproduced at Annex 1 to this chapter of our Report. Back
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