2 CSDP: Piracy off the coast of Somalia
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| Draft Council Decision on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 19 January 2010
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| Previous Committee Reports | None; but see (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2008-09), chapter 19 (9 December 2009); also (30982) —: HC 19- xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October 2009); see (30724) — and (30728)—: HC 19 xxiii (2008-09), chapter 9 (8 July 2009) and (30341) —, (30348) — and (30349) —: HC 19-iv (2008-09) chapter 17 (21 January 2009); (30400) 13989/08: HC 16-xxxvi (2007-08), chapter 17 (26 November 2008) and HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 10 (22 October 2008); and (29953)—: HC16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 19 (8 October 2008)
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| To be discussed in Council | 25 January 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; for debate in European Committee B
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Background
2.1 In response to growing international concern over the
problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 (2008) in June
which encouraged "States interested in the use of commercial
maritime routes off the coast of Somalia, to increase and coordinate
their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea".
Then, on 7 October 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted
UNSCR 1838, which was initiated by France and co-sponsored by
19 countries (Belgium, Croatia, the US, UK, Italy, Panama, Canada,
Denmark, Spain, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Norway, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Korea and Singapore).
2.2 Our previous reports set out the history
of the European Union's endeavours to address this problem, leading
to the creation of the first ESDP naval operation, Operation Atalanta,
and subsequent developments.[6]
2.3 These include, in January 2009, an Explanatory
Memorandum from the then Minister for Europe, giving "an
overview on decisions made to facilitate the progress of Operation
Atalanta" and incorporating a Joint Action launching the
operation and two Council Decisions on Status of Force Agreements
with both the Somali Republic and Djibouti.
2.4 Subsequent reports have covered:
— an
exchange of letters between the EU and Kenya that give the right
to enter and freedom of movement within the territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of Kenya "strictly limited
to the necessities of the operation";
— a further EU-Kenya agreement on the handover
of pirates for trial;
— a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
the Seychelles, allowing the EU to freely enter territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of the Republic of the Seychelles
and the right to detain pirates in the Republic of the Seychelles
waters;
— an agreement to allow the transfer of
persons detained by EUNAVFOR in connection with armed robbery
and associated seized property to the Seychelles for the purpose
of investigation and prosecution;
— information on attempted and successful
attacks with regard to the year to 9 June 2009, noting that the
ratio of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden had reduced from
1 in 3 at the end of 2008 to about 1 in 8 for most of the year
to date and 1 in 11 in May, but also that these international
effort may have had effect of pushing pirates to operation further
South East including in Seychelles waters;
— a new piracy resolution (UNSCR 1851)
adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 2008, which called
for the establishment of an International Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), and gave details of the work
upon which the CGPCS had embarked;
— agreement in May that, having reached
Initial Operation Capacity (IOC) on 13 December 2008 and being
intended to last until 13 December 2009, Operation Atalanta should
be extended for a further 12 months, and that the revised Joint
Action to extend the operation would be prepared and submitted
to the Committee "after the summer";
— conclusions adopted by the 15 June GAERC
that:
"Operation ATALANTA had demonstrated its ability
to act effectively against piracy, that piracy off the coast of
Somalia was likely to remain a serious threat beyond Operation
ATALANTA's current end date of 13 December 2009, and that early
agreement on extending the operation would facilitate the necessary
force generation. In this context, the Council agreed that Operation
ATALANTA should be extended for one year from its current end
date"[7]
— the
previous Minister for Europe's views on the achievements, failings
and lessons learned so far in the mission's first year, which
said that a more detailed review would be undertaken at the end
of ATALANTA's first year in December 2009;
— action the Government and the EU had
taken during the year of operation to address the root causes
of the immediate problem, which looked ahead to a regional needs
assessment to Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti that was to take place
in early September, to be led by the UK and with the UN, US, EC
and France also be taking part.
— a Council Decision amending the existing
Joint Action to extend Operation ATALANTA for a further 12 months
until 12 December 2010 and to include:
- monitoring of fishing activities
off the coast in Somalia;
- the need for Operation Atalanta to liaise and
cooperate with international bodies working in the region; and
- assisting the Somali authorities by sharing information
on fishing activities;
2.5 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 25 November 2009 on this most recent Council Decision, the
Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris
Bryant) went on to note that, although 2009 had witnessed an increase
in the number of pirate attacks, the actual number of successful
attacks has reduced significantly, especially in the critical
Gulf of Aden transit artery; but also that the threat of piracy
had not diminished, continued to pose a threat to international
shipping, and had resulted in an increase in pirate attacks in
the much broader Somali basin. The Minister also illustrated ways
in which the UK continued to provide a direct contribution to
a number of international efforts to counter piracy.
2.6 The Minister also subsequently sent the Committee
two letters, of 27 November and 7 December 2009, which in various
ways sought to respond to the Committee's request for information
on what action was being taken to deal with the circumstances
that had led to the piracy problem, and both of which are set
out in detail in our most recent Report.
Our assessment
2.7 Against this background, we drew the Minister's
attention to a relevant letter published by "The Times"
on 5 December 2009 from the Prime Minister of the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (which we again reproduce at Annex
1 to this chapter of our Report). Though it seemed that a response
to his first point — "The help we need is first in
the restoration of both effective government and the training
of national security forces required to secure peace and enforce
laws" — was under discussion, it was not clear to what
extent the other two — restoring and enforcing Somalia's
economic exclusion zone and a large scale civil affairs programme
— were being addressed.
2.8 We therefore asked that, in his promised
further letter, the Minister included his assessment of the extent
to which:
— the
activity to which he had referred in his letter of 7 December;
— the proposals under discussion within
the EU to train Somali security forces; and
— what was contained in the Council Decision,
particularly with regard to fishing activities
responded to the points made by the Prime Minister
of the Transitional Federal Government in his letter.
2.9 We also asked for information on how much
the UK had paid so far towards the cost of the operation, i.e.,
the UK share of common costs thus far and the cost of the "direct
contribution to a number of international efforts to counter piracy"
to which the Minister had referred.
2.10 In the meantime, we cleared the document,
which we drew to the attention of the House because of the widespread
interest in the situation that it was endeavouring to tackle and
the UK role in it. [8]
2.11 For the same reasons we also drew it to
the attention of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.
The Minister's letter of 9 December 2009
2.12 In his further letter, the Government had
been discussing with partners how the EU could increase its commitment
to Somalia in a variety of areas, including reinforcement of Somalia's
capacity to manage security challenges; this, he said, was reflected
at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 November
2009 where a crisis management concept was adopted concerning
a possible CSDP training mission for the Somali security forces.
Closer analysis was, he said, currently being undertaken with
research and planning expected to continue into next month. He
continued as follows:
"A CSDP mission could make a useful contribution
to increased international action on Somalia. We believe that
the UK should work with the international community and regional
partners and welcome further planning of this possible EU mission.
However, we have been clear that our agreement to continue planning
should not prejudice any future decisions regarding whether or
not to agree to the Mission. We need to be fully convinced that,
if launched, it will be workable and contribute to progress in
Somalia."
2.13 The Minister then went on to note that:
"Somalia is a failed state and has been for
nearly two decades. A protracted conflict has been caused by a
breakdown in the rule of law and frequent conflicts at national
and local level. This has resulted in an humanitarian crises,
increased migration, and the growth of terrorism and piracy. There
is no 'easy fix' and no state can deliver progress in Somalia
alone. The UK Government therefore believes that the international
community (including regional actors) needs to engage effectively
and develop a common approach. A CSDP mission could make a useful
contribution to increased international action on Somalia."
2.14 Finally, the Minister said that the Government,
the EU as a whole and the UN fully supported the UN-led Djibouti
process,[9] which he believed
must provide the basis for a lasting and stable political settlement:
"We support the efforts of the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and welcome signs of progress
made to achieve peace and stability. Progress towards peace and
security in Somalia must be a Somali-led process, but the UK coordinates
closely with the UN and the rest of the international community."
The draft Council Decision
2.15 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 19 January
2010 — which he says "sets out the legal basis for
this EU action, an explanation for why this is being carried out
at an EU level and why this is believed to be a positive contribution
to the Somali peace process" — the Minister for Europe
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) says that,
since the decision to adopt a crisis management concept, planning
work has been undertaken, including the development of a military
strategic option and a reconnaissance mission to Uganda. He then
goes on to outline the proposed EU military mission set out in
the draft Council Decision as follows:
"The proposed mission, EUTRA Somalia, would
contribute to strengthening the Somali Security Forces through
the provision of military training. The mission would be time-limited
(one year) and would enhance an ongoing Ugandan training mission.
It would train 2,000 Transitional Federal Government troops in
Uganda and it would focus on initial training, training for leaders
and training for units up to and including platoon level to complement
the existing training programmes. The EU would provide instructors
for specialist training. These instructors would come from several
Member States and rotate over a period of one year.
"The EU Headquarters, intended to perform the
functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters,
would be based in Uganda, with a liaison office in Nairobi and
a support cell in Brussels. The Mission would need partners (including
the US) to assist the EU by providing (in particular lethal) equipment
and pay."
2.16 The Minister notes that the Decision is
in draft form and is still being discussed by the Commission's
External Relations Directorate, DG RELEX, and that discussions
will continue on 21 January. He says that he does not expect any
significant changes to be made to the draft text, but draws attention
to Article 1, which is set out below:
"Article 1
"Mission
"1.The European Union (EU) shall conduct a military
mission, hereinafter called ["…"] in order to contribute
to strengthening the TFG as a functioning government serving the
Somali citizens. In particular, the objective of the EU military
mission shall be to contribute to strengthening the Somali Security
Forces through the provision of military training and to contribute
to a holistic and sustainable perspective for the development
of the Somali Security Sector, without prejudice top other security-related
actions, and the other actors in the international community,
in particular, the United Nations, the African Union and the United
States.
"2.The EU military training carried out to that
end shall take place mainly in Uganda, in accordance with the
political objective of an EU mission to contribute to the training
of Somali Security Forces, as defined in the Crisis Management
Concept approved by the Council on 17 November 2009. An element
of this EU military mission will also be based in Nairobi."
2.17 The Minister says:
"The key issues on which discussions have focused
are: expanding the objectives set out in Article 1 to include
reference to how the Mission supports Ugandan training efforts;
detailing the specialist nature of the training aimed at troops;
and discussing the need for further thought to be given to the
Mission's end date or end state, retaining the need for some flexibility.
The UK would support the inclusion of these points."
2.18 The Minister then addresses the question
of Subsidiarity , as follows:
"The EU, working with the wider international
community, is seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government
able to deliver basic services to the population.
"Despite some differences of emphasis, the international
community shares a broad analysis of Somalia's problems and possible
solutions (for example, the need for the process to be Somali-led,
the need for political outreach, support for the TFG and the African
Union's peacekeeping force: AMISOM). EU Member States, with a
significant Somali diaspora, are increasingly interested in Somalia
and are looking for ways in which to positively engage with the
peace process.
"This CSDP Mission presents EU Member States
with the opportunity to share costs and to work together to create
a Mission with a greater effort and enhanced result than if each
country was working towards the same goal individually. For the
UK the ability to leverage international resources for an area
we are interested in has benefits for our foreign and security
policy. We have worked with the international community and regional
partners to influence and shape this mission, ensuring that it
is a wellorganised initiative with an increased chance of
delivering positive results.
"This CSDP Mission is an example of how the
Lisbon Treaty will allow the EU to be a more effective international
player. This approach is fully in line with the intentions behind
the European External Action Service to have a foreign policy
structure which is more coherent and able to develop policy on
a more consistent basis — getting the collective voice of
the EU heard throughout the world — and supports the UK
objective to develop effective international organisations, above
all the UN and EU."
The Government's view
2.19 The Minister says that Somalia is a high
priority for the UK:
"We have concerns about migration, terrorism
and piracy and a large Somali Diaspora living in the UK. Instability
in Somalia is a severe threat to regional and international peace,
security and development, and it exacerbates the suffering of
its people. The UK is already involved in EUNAVFOR, operation
to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia."
2.20 He describes the UK approach to Somalia
as "supportive of the UN-led Djibouti Peace Process which
resulted in a new Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in
January 2009 and looks to take the peace process forwards towards
elections in 2011", and continues as follows:
"The UK is committed to supporting the Transitional
Federal Government, encouraging and supporting the political progress
on an inclusive and peaceful solution under the Djibouti Process,
and the international community to build a peaceful and stable
Somalia. Now is an opportune time to take action — the Transitional
Federal Government has maintained its position, resisting challenges
from armed groups in Mogadishu, and has made head-way in efforts
at political reconciliation and outreach. The CSDP Mission would
develop the ability for the Transitional Federal Government to
manage its own security in the longer term and to focus on building
up infrastructure and government institutions within a more secure
environment."
2.21 The Minister then turns to the question
of timing:
"The timing of EU support is crucial —
the next training programme of Somali Security Forces in Uganda
begins on 1 May. By agreeing to the launch the EU will be able
to further plan and prepare work for the Mission and the UK will
be able to continue shaping the Mission, ensuring that it makes
a positive contribution. We remain concerned that the absorption
arrangements, including payment and command structure, have not
yet been fully addressed. The UK will give a strong political
statement at the FAC on 25 January, committing the EU to resolve
outstanding concerns before training begins and we will work with
EU Member States, the Commission and other interested states to
ensure full arrangements are in place before the training commences."
2.22 On the Mission itself, the Minister says:
"The Mission is small, looking to support and
enhance existing Ugandan-led training. The Ugandans, veterans
of Mogadishu, have a clear idea of what will work in Somali culture
and are in an excellent position to work alongside EU trainers.
The Mission supports the African Union's peacekeeping mission
to Somalia (AMISOM). By focusing on the need to 'train the trainer'
the benefits of the training are extended beyond the Mission's
timeframe as trainers are given the capability that will endure
beyond the end of the mission. The training will take place outside
Somalia, taking account of the security situation and its impact
on the safety of EU instructors."
2.23 With regard to the wider picture, the Minister
says:
"Constructive and co-ordinated engagement in
Somalia as part of a comprehensive approach is critical. The UN
takes the lead internationally on Somalia. Action to be undertaken
in relation to Somalia needs to respect the resolutions of the
UN Security Council and the measures that it has put in place.
This CSDP mission would involve close EU cooperation and coordination
with the African Union (AU), the UN and other relevant partners
and is consistent with wider work on Somalia Security Sector Reform.
The Mission would meet the emerging recommendations from the Joint
Needs Assessment on Security Sector Reform. The Transitional Federal
Government, the UN Political Office of Somalia (UNPOS), the EU,
the United States and other international actors were all involved
in producing this Needs Assessment."
2.24 Finally, on the Financial Implications,
the Minister says that an accurate assessment of costs is still
being finalised:
"However, the reference amount for this ESDP
training mission, covering the operation's specific requirements,
is estimated at 4.8 million euros for a 12 month period. This
cost estimate can be broken down as 1.3 million euro towards the
HQ, 1 million euros towards infrastructure for EU instructors,
0.7 million euros towards medical services, 0.2 million euros
towards medevac, 1.1 million Euros towards training facilities
(if this is not eligible for funding under the Africa Peace Facility),
and 0.5 million euros towards additional infrastructure.
"The UK share from Assessed Costs would be around
£700,000 for 2010/11 under the Athena mechanism (or about
£550,000 subject to access to the Africa Peace Facility to
cover a proportion of the costs intended for infrastructure).
Athena costs would be taken from Tri-Departmental Peacekeeping
Budget. Our work to influence the shape, size and length of the
mission should help to minimise costs."
Conclusion
2.25 We have no wish to stand in the way of
this process. But a number of questions arise:
— In
his 9 December 2009 letter, the Minister said that he would need
to be fully convinced that, if launched, a CSDP mission will be
workable and contribute to progress in Somalia. Given the general
impression that the TFG does not control the whole of Mogadishu,
let alone the country, the question inevitably arises as to whether
it is possible to be thus convinced.
— There are already hints that this
mission will not be ended in 12 months time, given that the draft
text says that the Mission "shall terminate when 2000 Somali
recruits are trained up to and including platoon level, including
appropriate modular specialised and training for officers and
non-commissioned officers" — the feasibility of which
in 12 months, in all the circumstances, must be open to question.
— When the Minister says that the Mission
"would need partners (including the US) to assist the EU
by providing (in particular lethal) equipment and pay", what
does he mean? What lethal equipment? And pay to whom for what?
— As well as contributing to strengthening
the Somali Security Forces through the provision of military training,
the draft text says that the Mission's other objective will be
"to contribute to a holistic and sustainable perspective
for the development of the Somali Security Sector". It is
by no means clear what "a holistic and sustainable perspective"
is. Nor what is meant in practice by the requirement to fulfil
these objectives "without prejudice top other security-related
actions, and the other actors in the international community,
in particular, the United Nations, the African Union and the United
States."
— In his most recent letter, the Minister
said that he believed "that the international community (including
regional actors) needs to engage effectively and develop a common
approach." Are they so engaging? If so, with whom, and in
what ways? What common approach is being developed?
2.26 We note that this proposal is to be discussed
at the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 January, and no doubt the
Minister will not wish to delay progress. We also note that a
further Council Decision will be required in order to launch the
Mission following approval of the Mission plan.
2.27 We recommend that, the forthcoming Foreign
Affairs Council discussion notwithstanding, this Council Decision
should be debated in European Committee B, to give the House an
opportunity to pursue these and other questions that interested
Members may wish to raise, and the Minister to respond to those
of our earlier questions that remain unanswered (c.f. paragraphs
0.7-0.9 above). We ask that this debate be arranged before any
further related Council Decision is put forward for scrutiny.
2.28 As before, we are also drawing this chapter
of our Report to the attention of the Foreign Affairs and Defence
Committees.
Annex 1: Letter to "The Times"
from the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia
"Sir, Clare Lockhart's article ("At last.
Obama's vision offers hope for all sides", Opinion, Dec 3)
marks a sea change in international support to troubled countries.
What is so startling is that all the conclusions are as true about
Somalia as they are about Afghanistan.
"We accept that after 20 years without government,
the situation in Somalia will appear beyond repair but the reality
is very different. Piracy and the growth of Islamic extremism
are not the natural state of being. They are but symptoms of an
underlying malaise — the absence of government and hope.
"Regional stability is increasingly at stake
as Islamic extremism and the piracy problem grows and my government
is working hard with your Foreign and Commonwealth Office to present
and initiate our Somali lead strategy that will help the Somali
people themselves to bring Somalia back from the brink.
"The help we need is first in the restoration
of both effective government and the training of national security
forces required to secure peace and enforce laws.
"Second, in restoring and enforcing Somalia's
economic exclusion zone so that Somalia can use its vast potential
wealth in fish, oil and gas to fund its own future. Our fishermen
currently watch as other countries plunder our waters. While we
condemn it outright, it is no wonder these angry and desperate
people resort to "fishing" for ships instead.
"And third, in launching a large scale civil
affairs programme to train our young people and establish legitimate
commercial livelihoods.
"You have employed these same principles to
great effect in other conflict-ridden countries (that harbour
terrorists threatening UK national security) such as Northern
Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, so why not here too? The irony
is that it would cost only a quarter of what is being spent right
now on the warships trying to combat piracy, to fund our plan
and actually solve the problems rather than simply chasing them
round the Indian Ocean.
"Omar Sharmarke
Prime Minister, Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia"
6 See headnote. Back
7
See Council Conclusions at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108452.pdf.
Back
8
See headnote: see (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2008-09), chapter
19 (9 December 2009). Back
9
According to the Institute for Security Studies , the Djibouti
peace process, which began in May 2008, was started following
the failure of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to consolidate
itself into an all-inclusive national government embraced by all
Somalis, came in the midst of a deteriorating security and humanitarian
situation following the forcible ouster of the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC) by Ethiopia, and was driven by the realization that
the Somali crisis would not be resolved without a negotiated settlement
involving the Islamist groups, who denied foothold to the TFG
in most parts of Somalia. For information on the Djibouti process,
see http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=7229&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3.
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