4 EU restrictive measures against the
Republic of Guinea
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| Draft Council Decision and a Council Regulation modifying certain restrictive measures in respect of Guinea
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| Legal base | Council Decision: Article 29 TEU; unanimity
Council Regulation: Article 215 TFEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 11 March 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None, but see (31133) —: HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10, (25 November 2009); also see (30721) 11429/09 HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009) and (26227) 16041/04, (29544) 7499/08 and (30446) 6543/09: HC 19-x (2008-09) , chapters 7 and 8 (11 March 2009)
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| To be discussed in Council | 25 March 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
4.1 Under Article 96 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the
EU and 77 ACP countries, either party may invite the other for
consultations if it considers that the other has failed to respect
the "essential" political elements in Article 9: human
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, or to provide
good governance. Strengthening this political dimension was one
of the main changes introduced in the 2005 revision of the Agreement.
4.2 At the end of 2003, the Commission proposed such
consultations with the government of the Republic of Guinea (GOG),
having attempted for the previous two years to resolve various
democratic shortcomings through normal Article 8 political dialogue,
but without success.
4.3 The Committee has taken a particular interest
in the Article 96 process in Guinea because the undertakings given
by the GOG were all in areas in which success, or failure, might
well have much wider lessons, or repercussions, and not just for
the Cotonou Process but also ESDP; a number of other ACP countries
were similarly challenged, against a background in which the inter-relationship
between development, security and good governance was now widely
acknowledged. As we have noted, the Cotonou Agreement is clear:
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of
law are essential elements of the partnership, with the Commission
characterising the revision of the political components in 2005
as "strengthening the political dimension by placing greater
emphasis on effective dialogue and results"; against the
yardstick set out in those last four words, we have found it difficult
to find much persuasive evidence that the Article 96 process had,
to use the then Minister for Europe's words, led to the Cotonou
provisions being taken seriously — after over five years
of Article 96 engagement, Guinea seemed to be no nearer than it
was then to a functioning democratic and law-based society.[19]
4.4 Subsequent developments are set out in the Report
referred to above and those referred to therein.[20]
As these Reports note, a bloodless coup took place on 23 December
2008, following the death of the then President after a long illness,
when a military junta calling itself the National Council for
Democracy and Development (NCDD) seized power and its leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, declared himself President. In response,
further Article 96 consultations were initiated; subsequently,
the Commission proposed that they be closed, and a staged process
initiated whereby, in return for measured progress towards, and
the holding of, "free and transparent" elections, normal
relations would be restored.
4.5 The then Minister for Europe (Baroness Kinnock
of Holyhead) supported this proposal, arguing that it was important
that the EU played a constructive role in assisting Guinea's transition
to constitutional order and democracy. She was, however, concerned
that the "broadly encouraging undertakings" offered
during the Article 96 consultations had "not been followed
up by action": the first stages of the roadmap had yet to
be completed, with voter registration currently suspended, and
the National Council for the Transition (CNT) had not been established.
She thought it wise that the Commission had proposed that the
EU continued to monitor the situation closely over a period of
24 months, with a regular review at least once every six months,
and had reserved the right to amend the "appropriate measures"
in the light of the interim authorities' implementation of the
commitments they had entered into.
4.6 Then, on 28 September 2009, unarmed opposition
supporters, protesting at Captain Dadis Camara's intention to
run for President next year (despite having forsworn this when
he seized power) were killed by soldiers in the capital, Conakry.
In a letter of 22 October, the subsequent Minister for Europe
(Chris Bryant) said that this had been condemned by the EU, the
US, the AU and ECOWAS; the latter two had taken the lead to resolve
the political crisis and prevent further violence; Member States
had argued strongly that the EU should stand ready to support
any sanctions imposed by the AU or ECOWAS in order to demonstrate
broad international commitment to resolving the crisis. Against
this background, he believed that the UK should support EU restrictive
measures to bolster any AU/ECOWAS sanctions on Guinea. On 20 October
he had received a draft Common Position and list of names drawn
up by EU Heads of Mission in Conakry, with proposed sanctions
that would impose an arms embargo as well as travel restrictions
targeting members of the military junta and individuals associated
with them who were responsible for the violent repression of 28
September or the political stalemate in the country. He explained
that, given the ECOWAS action, the ongoing political stalemate
in Guinea and the need for the EU to send a coordinated and strong
message that it condemned the violent crackdown, it was likely
that the EU would agree to impose sanctions at the 26-27 October
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC); he hoped
that the Committee would understand that he might have to agree
to the restrictive measures before scrutiny had been completed;
he concluded by undertaking to send the text, along with an Explanatory
Memorandum, as soon as a final version was available.
4.7 The 26-27 October GAERC duly adopted Common Position
2009/788/CFSP imposing these limited sanctions. In his Explanatory
Memorandum accompanying the Common Position, the Minister said
that in view of the lack of progress made by the military junta
following repeated calls to restore the rule of law, he strongly
agreed that restrictive measures were necessary to reaffirm those
calls, and as "a sign of international resolve and support
to ECOWAS and AU efforts to mediate." The Minister explained
that: in order to adopt sanctions as swiftly as possible, the
Common Position limited restrictive measures to those within Member
State competence — a travel ban and arms embargo; individuals
were listed only where evidence existed that they were members
of the NCDD or associated with them; they would be entitled to
challenge the implementation or application of such a ban in the
Member States' courts; and the draft Common Position provided
that Member States could grant exemptions from the travel ban
for specified reasons including, inter alia, where travel was
justified on the grounds of humanitarian need. He assessed that
these measures "send a strong signal to the military junta
that the EU disproves [sic] of the violent crackdown." Although
the Common Position applied for 12 months, the Minister said that
the EU intended to review the measures in the coming months against
any steps taken by the military junta to restore the rule of law,
and that "if no positive steps have been taken, the EU will
consider imposing further restrictive measures."
Our assessment
4.8 We did not object to the Minister's action on
this occasion and in these particular circumstances, and cleared
the document.
4.9 In so doing, we said that we could not avoid
wondering nonetheless how effective the Common Position was likely
to be. We had in mind that Guinea is the world's largest bauxite
exporter and has significant deposits of gold, diamond, uranium
and iron ore — resources that allowed Lansana Conte, the
former dictator, to survive periods of international isolation;
and that its oil prospects had recently drawn attention after
discoveries in nearby countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast and
Sierra Leone, leading (according to media reports) to oil and
minerals deals being under negotiation between Guinea's military
government and the China International Fund, who would provide
the lion's share of finance for about $7 billion worth of projects,
ranging from power-generation to the creation of an airline.
4.10 We noted that two EU courses of action —
this Common Position and the action taken under the Cotonou Agreement
— were to be reviewed in the coming months, with the likelihood
that further action would be proposed under one or the other,
or both. We therefore asked that, when any Explanatory Memorandum
was put forward on such subsequent action, the Minister concerned
should ensure that it included his views on this wider perspective
of China's activity in the country and the region, and its impact
on the effectiveness of EU action.
The proposed changes to the Council Decision and
the Council Regulation
4.11 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 March 2010,
the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Ivan
Lewis) says that:
"In view of the tangible progress recently
made under mediator President Compaore towards the restoration
of constitutional order in Guinea, the Council of the European
Union has now agreed that, as a gesture of goodwill, the EU travel
ban should be lifted on the following four individuals who have
been instrumental in putting the transitional process to elections
in place: Sekouba Konate, Interim President; Mamadou Toto Camara,
Minister of Security; Keletigui Faro, Minister of Agriculture
and Kabine Komara, previously Prime Minister."
The Government's view
4.12 After reviewing the events leading up to last
September, when "156 peaceful protestors were killed and
there were reports of mass rapes and other human rights atrocities",
the Minister continues as follows:
"These events and the resultant UN Secretary
General's Commission of Inquiry report have dictated the UK and
the international community's response to Guinea. The report clearly
identifies Dadis Camara and other leading figures in the Guinean
regime as responsible for events on 28 September. The Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court is currently examining the
situation in Guinea. The Deputy Prosecutor visited Guinea in February
2010 and described the events around 28 September 2009 as crimes
against humanity.
"On 3 December Dadis Camara was shot in
the head by his Aide de Camp, Toumba Diakite, during an argument
about responsibility for the massacre on 28 September. He was
taken to Morocco for treatment and later moved to Burkina Faso
where he is likely to remain for health reasons.
"The African Union (AU) and Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), working with appointed mediator,
President Compaore of Burkina Faso, took the lead in attempts
to resolve the political crisis and prevent further violence and
appointed Sekouba Konate as interim President. An Agreement was
signed in Ouagadougou on 15 January agreeing to the establishment
of a unity transitional government. Jean-Marie Dore was sworn
in as interim Prime Minister on 26 January and his cabinet —
a coalition of 10 NCDD members and opposition members— was
sworn in on 15 February. The Agreement has provided an excellent
opportunity to restore constitutional rule in Guinea. Interim
President Konate announced on 6 March that Presidential elections
would be held on 27 June 2010.
"The UK, along with EU partners, are now
keen to recognise progress under the transition and are in favour
of lifting the EU travel ban on the following four individuals
who have been helpful in brokering the Ouagadougou Agreement and
putting the transitional process in place: Interim President Sekouba
Konate; Mamadou Toto Camara, Minister of Security: Lieutenant
Colonel Keletigui Faro, Minister of Agriculture and Kabine Komara,
previously Prime Minister."
4.13 The Minister concludes by noting that the proposal
is due to be adopted by written procedure at the Council on 25
March 2010.
Conclusion
4.14 Though the way in which the main obstacle
to progress has been removed is hardly in keeping with the sort
of transition process that the Council will have had in mind,
the rest of what the Minister describes would appear to warrant
the relaxation of the measures in the way proposed. We therefore
clear the proposal.
4.15 In so doing, we take this opportunity to
remind the Minister of our earlier request for his assessment
of the impact of Chinese activity in Guinea and more widely on
EU efforts to encourage and bolster democratic development (c.f.
paragraph 4.10 above) and ask that, the next time any change is
proposed to either this Common Position or to the action taken
under the Cotonou Agreement, this is provided along with the evidence
justifying the proposal.
19 (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08; see headnote. Back
20
(31133) -: HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10 (25 November 2009) and
(30721) 11429/09: HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009);
see headnote. Back
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