Documents cleared
4 Forest protection and
information
| (31372)
7060/10
+ ADD 1
COM(10) 66
| Green Paper on Forest Protection and Information in the EU: Preparing forests for climate change
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Document originated | 1 March 2010
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 4 March 2010
|
| Department | Forestry Commission
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 15 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Report | None, but see footnotes 13 and 14
|
| To be discussed in Council | June 2010
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
4.1 Competence for forestry policy lies primarily
with Member States, the role of the EU being intended primarily
to add value to national programmes by monitoring the state of
EU forests, anticipating global trends (and drawing these to the
attention of Member States), and proposing options for early action
at EU level. Notwithstanding this, the EU's Forestry Strategy
sets out common principles for forestry, whilst its Forest Action
Plan[13] builds upon
that Strategy by coordinating forest related activities and policies
at EU level. According to the Commission, the importance of protecting
forests and managing them sustainably has also been acknowledged
globally since the United Nations adopted in 1992 the "Rio
forest principles", in addition to which the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognises the
importance of forests in the greenhouse gas balance, whilst forest
diversity is addressed through the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD).
4.2 As foreshadowed in its White Paper[14]
"Adapting to Climate Change: towards a European Framework
for Action", it has now produced this Green Paper in
order to launch a debate on the options for an EU approach to
forest protection and information, aimed at ensuring that forests
continue to perform their various functions.
The current document
4.3 The Green Paper identifies briefly the general
situation and global relevance of forests; describes the characteristics
and functions of EU forests; identifies the main challenges they
face; and presents on overview of the means available to protect
forests and of the various related information systems.
FOREST FUNCTIONS
4.4 The Commission notes that forests now cover
less than 30% of the Earth's land surface, that they are steadily
decreasing in area, and that current deforestation, mostly in
developing countries, causes about 12-15% of global emissions
of carbon dioxide. However, although EU forests account for only
5% of the world's forests, they have been expanding, and, together
with other wooded land, cover some 175 million hectares, equivalent
to some 42% of the total EU land area.
4.5 It adds that forests are among the most biodiverse
of the terrestrial ecosystems, and that they serve multiple and
inter-related social, economic and environmental functions. In
particular, they:
- provide jobs, income and raw materials for renewable
energy, and for a large number of industries, their economic importance
being especially high in rural areas;
- are a key component of the European landscape,
and, by preventing landslides and avalanches, make many mountain
areas habitable;
- help to preserve soil fertility, and to prevent
erosion;
- play a major role in the storage, purification
and release of freshwater supplies;
- have a key role in conserving biodiversity.
The Commission also highlights the role of forests
in climate regulation, in that they remove carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere (and subsequently act as a "sink"), are
an important source of raw materials for the production of renewable
energy, and have a direct impact on wind and weather patterns.
At the same time, however, it notes that deforestation can cause
substantial greenhouse gas emissions, due to fires and biomass
decay.
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FORESTS
4.6 The Commission observes that, although forests
have in the past developed together with a naturally changing
climate, the rate of human-induced climate change is now overcoming
the natural ability of ecosystems to adapt. In particular, it
suggests that the increase in temperatures now forecast by 2100
would alter the suitability of whole regions for certain forest
types, particularly in southern Europe, forcing a shift in species
distribution, and increasing the risk of storms and forest fires,
thus making it likely that increased human intervention as regards
species choice and management techniques will be required in order
to maintain viable forest cover and functions.
FOREST PROTECTION
4.7 The rest of the Green Paper looks at ways
in which forests within the Community can be protected. It notes
that all Member States have national (and sometimes regional)
legislation on forest use and management, some of it — including
National Forest Programmes — being sector-specific, and
some deriving from other legislation: likewise, the mechanisms
available at EU level include both the Forestry Strategy and Action
Plan and a range of other related policies, the latter including
measures in relation to climate change, agriculture and rural
development, sustainable production and consumption, Cohesion
Policy and the EU Solidarity Fund, and the Seventh Research Framework
Programme.
4.8 In particular, it suggests that sustainable
forest management, based on the principles defined by the
Ministerial Conference on the Protection on Forests in Europe
in 1993, should include afforestation, fire prevention, planning
the adaptation of forest species, the sustainable harvesting of
wood, encouraging those trees likely to be better adapted to future
climatic growing conditions, preserving endemic genetic resources
likely to be best adapted to future growing conditions, and preventing
the introduction of new pests and diseases by international trade.
In the case of forest information, it notes that the EU
has reporting obligations under the UNFCCC and CBD, but that information
on forests is held at several different levels. These include
national inventories; the integrated administration and control
system (IACS) used under the Common Agricultural Policy and rural
development fund; the monitoring of forest fires; the monitoring
of forest conditions under the LIFE+ programme; and the forest
classification developed by the European Forest Data Centre.
THE NEXT STEPS
4.9 In the light of the information set out in
the Green Paper, the Commission has invited interested parties
to comment by 31 July 2010, and in particular has posed a number
of specific questions (see Annex A).
The Government's view
4.10 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 15 March
2010, the Minister for Marine and Natural Environment at the Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Mr Huw Irranca-Davies)
says that the Green Paper offers a fair assessment of the general
situation for forests, addresses key challenges facing them in
the future in relation to climate change, and rightly recognises
the need for improved data and information in order to increase
understanding of climate change and inform policy decision making.
However, he also observes that it fails to address the diverse
nature of forests and forestry across the EU, including ownership
and governance structures.
4.11 He adds that the UK welcomes the opportunity
to continue working with the EU on forests through its continued
delivery of the Forest Action Plan, and the fact that the Green
Paper recognises the role of forests in providing a major contribution
to climate change. However, he warns that the forestry community
and Member States are conscious that, whilst the role of the EU
is at present limited to adding value to national forest policies
and programmes, this debate could open the door for the Commission
to take a step further and propose an EU Directive on Forests.
In particular, he comments that an increased role on forest policy
for the EU would create competency issues, including in external
relations on the global forest dialogue, and could potentially
undermine national strategies, policies and action. He says that
the UK does not wish to see a "Common Forest Policy"
or other approach which would infringe on responsibilities at
national or devolved level.
4.12 The Minister also refers to a recent report
"Contributing to Climate Change: A Role for UK Forests",
which he says provides a useful assessment of the potential of
forests to adapt to climate change, and will inform the development
of policy in the UK. He adds that EU Member States are
mindful that the Green Paper may also have a considerable impact
on other relevant work ongoing under the FOREST EUROPE (Ministerial
Conference on the Protection of Forest in Europe) process, which
covers the whole of Europe, including Russia and involves 46 countries,
to explore the possibility of a legally binding agreement on forests
in Europe.
Conclusion
4.13 As this Green Paper makes clear, the
main responsibility for forestry policy within the EU currently
rests with Member States, and, to the extent that the document
seeks to draw attention to the various issues which need to be
considered in relation to climate change and other matters, it
does not in itself appear to raise any issues requiring further
consideration by the House. We are therefore content to clear
it. Having said that, the Government has drawn attention to the
possibility that the discussion generated by the Green Paper could
lead the Commission to seek a greater role in future for the EU
in this area, and we therefore think it right to draw it to the
attention of the House.
Annex A: Questions Posed by the
Green Paper ~
Question 1:
Do you think maintaining, balancing and enhancing
forest functions should be given more attention? If so, on what
level should action be taken, EU, National and/or other?
How should it be done?
Question 2:
To what extent are EU forests and the forest sector
ready to address the nature and magnitude of the challenges posed
by climate change?
Do you consider particular regions, certain countries
more exposed/vulnerable to the effects of climate change? What
sources of information would you base your answer on?
Would you see the need for EU-level early action
to ensure all forest functions are maintained?
How could the EU contribute to add value to the respective
efforts of Member States?
Question 3:
Do you consider that EU and Member States policies
are sufficient to ensure that the EU contributes to forest protection,
including preparing forests for climate change and conserving
biodiversity in forests?
In what areas, if any, do you think further action
may be necessary?
How might this be organised, under the given policy
framework or beyond?
Question 4:
How could the practical implementation of sustainable
forest management be updated in order to upkeep the productive
and protective functions of forests and overall viability of forestry,
as well as enhance the resilience of EU forests in view of climate
change and biodiversity loss?
What steps are required to ensure that the gene pool
in forest reproductive material can be successfully conserved
in its diversity and adapted to climate change?
Question 5:
Taking into account the various relevant policy levels,
is available forest information today sufficient to assess with
sufficient accuracy and consistency the health and condition of
EU forests; their productive potential; their carbon balance;
their protective functions (soils, water, weather regulation,
biodiversity); the provision of services to society and their
social function; overall viability of forestry?
If it is insufficient, how should forest information
be improved?
Are efforts towards harmonised data collection of
forests sufficient?
What can the EU do to further develop and/or enhance
forest information systems?
5 EU Relations with Fiji
| (31371)
6963/10
COM(10) 63
| Draft Council Decision amending and extending the period of application of the measures in Decision 2007/641/EC concluding consultations with the Republic of Fiji Islands under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and Article 37 of the Development Cooperation Instrument
|
| Legal base | Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement and Article 37 of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation; QMV
|
| Document originated | 26 February 2010
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 3 March 2010
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 17 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (30874) 12744/09: HC 19-xxvii (2008-09), chapter 25 (14 October 2009); also see (28857) 12379/07: HC 41-xxxiii (2006-07), chapter 17 (2 October 2007)
|
| To be discussed in Council | 29 March 2010
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
5.1 Fiji is a signatory of the African Caribbean
and Pacific-European Community (ACP-EC) Partnership Agreement,
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (and known as the Cotonou Agreement).
This provides a framework for relations between the EU and 77
countries of the African Caribbean and Pacific group of states
(ACP). Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement allows for consultations
between the EU and an ACP state where a breach of any of Cotonou's
"essential elements" — respect for human rights,
democratic principles or the rule of law — is perceived
to have taken place.
5.2 Article 3(1) of the Development Cooperation
Instrument (DCI) confirms these same elements as general principles
of the EU that it will seek to promote in partner countries through
dialogue and cooperation. Article 37 of the DCI details the process
where a breach of these principles is deemed to have taken place.
5.3 Fiji has been allocated €60 million
under the DCI thematic programme for ACP sugar protocol countries
for the period 2007-2010, which money was directed at reforming
Fiji's sugar sector.
Council Decision 2007/641/EC
5.4 On 2 October 2007, the Committee cleared
the Council Decision in question. It was adopted in the face of
adverse political developments in Fiji, which are set out in detail
in our earlier Report. In sum, on 5 December 2006, members of
the Fiji Military Forces staged a coup, led by Commander Frank
Bainimarama, which removed the democratically elected government,
and the Commander appointed himself briefly as President and later
as Prime Minister. In the following months the Commander sacked
many key figures, including the Chief Justice. He appointed military
figures to key positions in government ministries and put an interim
Cabinet in place. In April, the Commander suspended the Great
Council of Chiefs after they refused to accept the President's
(effectively, the Commander's) nomination for the role of Vice-President.
Many people speaking out against the coup, including those in
the media, were detained by the military and intimidated. There
were numerous accounts of human rights abuses, including two deaths
in military custody. The independence of the judiciary was also
compromised.
5.5 Against this background, the EU considered
the coup in Fiji constituted a violation of Cotonou's essential
elements and the DCI's general principles and on 27 February 2007
accordingly opened consultations with Fiji. During these consultations,
representatives of Fiji's Interim Government agreed to a number
of commitments designed to return Fiji to democracy and the rule
of law — the key commitment being to hold free and fair
elections by March 2009.
5.6 The Council accordingly agreed to conclude
consultations and adopt appropriate measures under Article 96
of the Cotonou Agreement and Article 37 of the DCI. These included:
— making the finalisation, signing and implementation
of the 2008-2013 Country Strategy Paper, for which funding would
be made available under the 10th European Development
Fund (EDF), subject to the interim government meeting agreed commitments
in respect of human rights and rule of law;
— making Fiji's 2007 allocation under the DCI
thematic programme for ACP sugar protocol countries zero and tying
the provision of assistance under this programme in 2008, 2009
and 2010 to the return to democratic government;
— certain cooperation activities already underway
or in preparation for funding under the 8th and 9th
EDFs were to continue, likewise implementation of the 2006 sugar
assistance provided under the Regulation establishing accompanying
measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of
the EU sugar regime (Regulation 266/2006);
— support for activities which would help the
return to democracy and improve governance would also be permitted,
as would humanitarian aid and direct support to civil society;
Fiji would also continue to be able to participate in regional
cooperation activities;
— cooperation with the European Investment
Bank and the Centre for Development Enterprise would continue,
subject to the timely fulfilment of commitments;
— the EU would follow the situation closely,
and enhanced political dialogue with the interim Fijian authorities
would be conducted to ensure respect for human rights, restoration
of democracy and respect for the rule of law.
Our assessment
5.7 In clearing the document, the Committee noted
that its interest in the application and effectiveness of the
"Article 96" process had now been amplified by the addition
of similar "governance" provisions in the new Development
Cooperation Instrument. Given the widespread interest in the House
in EU development assistance policy and activity, and the importance
these provisions now had therein, we considered that the stage
now reached in the EU and the Government's endeavours to return
Fiji to the path of democracy and the rule of law warranted a
Report to the House.[15]
The most recent extension to Council Decision
2007/641/EC
5.8 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 24 September
2009, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Mr Ivan Lewis) said that the situation worsened again in April
2009, when the Fiji Court of Appeal declared Bainimarama's regime
illegal: the following day the President, at Bainimarama's behest,
had abrogated the constitution, suspended the courts and re-appointed
Bainimarama Prime Minister; since then, the military had restricted
public gatherings, severely censored the media and ensured impunity
for abuses by military personnel; and Bainimarama had announced
that no elections will be held until 2014 after fundamental land
and electoral reform.
5.9 The Council Decision noted that:
— the review of the current Decision, which
was due to expire on 1 October 2009, coincided with an ongoing
joint initiative by the United Nations and the Commonwealth to
mediate, to which the EU had given its full support, but which
was stalled;
— the interim Prime Minister had recently presented
a roadmap for reforms and elections; while insufficient as it
stood, it might be worthwhile to engage in dialogue regarding
it and to consider whether it might serve as a basis for new consultations;
and said that, taking into account the above considerations,
the Commission could only, at this stage, propose an extension
of the current policy.
5.10 Referring to the commitment to hold free
and fair elections by March 2009, the Minister continued as follows:
"As a result of Fiji's failure to meet these
commitments the EC announced on 18 May that it had taken the decision
to cancel the 2009 sugar allocation for Fiji (totalling EUR 24
million). This action will have serious impact on Fiji's failing
economy. The UK fully supported the EC's decision.
"The Government supports the Commission's approach
to Fiji. The Article 96 consultations have offered the opportunity
to promote a return to democratic government and rule of law in
Fiji and to demonstrate the importance that the EU attaches to
upholding the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement and
the general principles in the Development Cooperation Instrument."
5.11 The Minister also notes that the UK currently
holds the local EU Presidency in Suva and, he says, plays an important
role in monitoring progress:
"The UK will continue to use every opportunity
to press the Fiji authorities to behave transparently, respect
human rights and the rule of law and return the country to democratic
rule as soon as possible. The measures outlined in this Council
Decision will aid these efforts. We strongly believe tangible
'next steps' are necessary to avoid the current agreement continually
being extended. The discussions on what these next steps should
be will take place in Brussels over the next 6 months, with a
view to having a decision in place before the end of the extended
period."
Our further assessment
5.12 We reported these latest unfortunate developments
to the House for the same reasons as two years previously.
5.13 In clearing the document, we also asked
the Minister would write to us when he knew what the "next
steps" were likely to be.[16]
The proposed amendment and extension to Council
Decision 2007/641/EC
5.14 The Commission says that:
— taking into account the above considerations,
it can only, at this stage, propose an extension of the current
policy and appropriate measures, and is therefore proposing to
the Council to extend the current Decision for a further six months
ending on 1 October 2010;
— the Decision should continue to be reviewed
in a way that allows the EU to keep a regular dialogue and permanent
political engagement with Fiji, and therefore should be kept under
constant review.
5.15 The Commission also proposes that this Decision
should be notified to the interim Government of Fiji, on the basis
of the draft letter to President Iloilo annexed to the draft Decision,
informing him
"(a) that the EU remains committed to pursuing
the enhanced political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou
Agreement, (b) that the assessment of progress made towards return
to constitutional rule will guide the EU in the upcoming decisions
on Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries and 10th
EDF National Indicative Programme with respect to Fiji and, finally,
(c) that new consultations under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement and Article 37 of the Development Cooperation Instrument
are a distinct possibility at the disposal of Fiji."
5.16 The draft letter recalls the abrogation
of the Constitution, the very substantial delay in holding the
parliamentary elections, and human rights violations; reminds
the Fijian authorities of the commitments that it originally gave
but whose implementation has been substantially delayed, and of
the consequential losses for Fiji in terms of development funds.
But in "the spirit of partnership forming the cornerstone
of the Cotonou Agreement" the EU expresses its readiness
to engage in new formal consultations as soon as there is a reasonable
prospect for a positive conclusion to such consultations, noting
that the Interim Prime Minister has "declared that a roadmap
for reforms and for a return to democratic order is under preparation"
and that "the EU stands ready to engage in dialogue regarding
this coming roadmap, and is prepared to consider whether it may
serve as a basis for new consultations." Extending the existing
appropriate measures will "create a window of opportunity
for new consultations … rather than update them unilaterally
the EU prefers to further explore possibilities for new consultations
with Fiji [regarding it] …. of particular importance that
the Interim Government commits to an inclusive domestic political
dialogue and to flexibility concerning the time-frame for the
coming roadmap." While the EU's position "is and always
will be guided by the essential elements of the revised Cotonou
Agreement as well as its fundamental principles, notably regarding
the pivotal role of dialogue and the fulfilment of mutual obligations,
it is stressed that there are no foregone conclusions on the EU's
side regarding the outcome of future consultations." If new
consultations result in substantial commitments from Fiji, the
EU is committed to an early, positive review of these appropriate
measures:
"Conversely, if the situation in Fiji does not
improve, then further losses of development funds for Fiji are
set to continue. In particular, the assessment of progress made
towards return to constitutional rule will guide the EU in the
upcoming decisions on Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol
Countries and 10th EDF National Indicative Programme with respect
to Fiji. Until new consultations have taken place the EU invites
Fiji to continue and intensify the enhanced political dialogue."
The Government's view
5.17 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 March
2009, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) recalls the decision to cancel the 2009
sugar allocation for Fiji, and the serious impact on Fiji's failing
economy, along with the UK's full support for the cancellation;
and says that the decision on the 2010 allocation is due by 31
March: "as there has been no improvement in Fiji's situation
this is also likely to be withheld."
5.18 The Minister also says that the Government
supports the Commission's approach to Fiji, describing the Article
96 consultations as having "offered the opportunity to promote
a return to democratic government and rule of law in Fiji and
to demonstrate the importance that the EU attaches to upholding
the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement and the general
principles in the Development Cooperation Instrument."
5.19 He notes that the UK representatives in
Suva will continue to use every opportunity to press the Fiji
authorities to behave transparently, respect human rights and
the rule of law and return the country to democratic rule as soon
as possible, and says that the measures outlined in this Council
Decision will aid these efforts.
5.20 With regard to the "next steps"
envisaged last September, the Minister says:
"The last 6 months have not provided conditions
suitable for further negotiations. We hope that continued contact
between the Fiji regime and the EU on the conditions which would
allow a restoration of normal EU development assistance will persuade
the regime of the need for change. A further review of the Cotonou
arrangements in 6 months' time will ensure that these intractable
issues remain on the EU's agenda."
Conclusion
5.21 The door is open to the regime in Fiji
to do the right things, and to benefit from doing so; we can but
hope that, in six months' time, the Minister will have some positive
developments to report.
5.22 In the meantime, we clear the document,
which we are drawing to the attention of the House because of
the continuing importance of EU development assistance policy
and activity and the role of these "good governance"
provisions in it.
6 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(31422)
| Council Decision relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
|
| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 18 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Report | None
|
| To be discussed in Council | 29 March 2010 Agriculture Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
6.1 The NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons) is described by the UN as "a landmark
international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal
of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament"
and "the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty
to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States."
Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in
1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including
the five nuclear-weapon States. "More countries have ratified
the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement,
a testament to the Treaty's significance."
6.2 To further the goal of non-proliferation
and as a confidence-building measure between States Parties, the
Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are
used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections
conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes co-operation in the
field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this
technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the
diversion of fissile material for weapons use.[17]
6.3 The provisions of the Treaty, particularly
Article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation
of the Treaty every five years. The next such Review Conference
(RevCon) will take place in New York on 3 May 2010 and is scheduled
to last four weeks.
6.4 On the basis of the principles and objectives
set out in Article 21 TEU, the EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy is to be conducted, inter alia, by the adoption of decisions
defining the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a
geographical or thematic nature; Member States shall ensure that
their national policies conform to such Union positions.
The Council Decision
6.5 The EU has prepared such an approach to the
main issues which the Review Conference is expected to consider.
As well as reaffirming the Union's regard for the NPT as "the
cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the
essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in
accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element
in the further development of nuclear energy applications for
peaceful purposes", the preamble also recalls that:
— on 12 December 2003, the European Council
adopted a Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
in order to steer its action in this field;
— on 8 December 2008, the Council adopted a
document on "New lines for action by the European Union in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems";
— on 12 December 2008, the European Council
adopted the "Statement on strengthening international security",
reaffirming its determination to combat the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery and promoting
concrete and realistic disarmament initiatives which the EU submitted
at the United Nations General Assembly; and
— the United Nations Security Council, meeting
at the level of Heads of State and Government, unanimously adopted
Resolution 1887 (2009), resolving to seek a safer world for all
and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons,
in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international
stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security
for all, calling upon all States that are not party to the NPT
to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and calling
upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their
obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty and
to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully
strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in
all the Treaty's three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.
6.6 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 19 March
2010, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) says that, based on the three "pillars",
the EU approach will include universalisation of safeguards arrangements,
strengthening the Treaty so that it deters further proliferation
challenges and non-compliance, how to respond efficiently to a
State's withdrawal from the NPT, progress towards a Middle East
Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction, concrete steps towards
nuclear disarmament and facilitating the development of civil
nuclear energy within a culture of transparency, confidence and
high safety, security and non-proliferation standards.
The Government's view
6.7 The Minister characterises the three pillars,
of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, as a "grand bargain" of three pillars, and describes
it thus:
"Under the bargain the (then) five nuclear powers
(China, France, UK, Russia/USSR and USA) are recognised as nuclear-weapon
States. All other signatories agreed not to develop or acquire
nuclear weapons. In return these non-nuclear-weapon States have
the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and
a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to end the nuclear arms
race as soon as possible and enter into negotiations for nuclear
disarmament (without any timeframe)."
6.8 He regards the Treaty as having served the
international community well:
"However in recent years the nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament regime, and the NPT which is its cornerstone,
have come under unprecedented pressure. There are several stressors.
DPRK and Iran continue to pursue their nuclear ambitions in defiance
of international opinion. The need to combat climate change and
concern over the longer term availability of fossil fuels are
likely to spark a civil nuclear renaissance, which could in turn
see the dissemination of highly sensitive nuclear technology.
Al-Qaida has made clear its intention to acquire weapons of mass
destruction capacity at a time when nuclear know-how is increasingly
available on-line and there is evidence of an active black market
in nuclear equipment and materials. It is also clear that the
international consensus that must underpin the non-proliferation
regime if it is to be effective has frayed. The last NPT Review
Conference in 2005 failed to reach agreement."
6.9 The Minister then outlines the basis of UK
policy as follows:
"The UK's analysis of the challenges facing
the NPT and our policy response were set out by then Foreign Secretary
Margaret Beckett in a landmark speech to the Carnegie Endowment
in Washington on 25 June 2007.[18]
Drawing on analysis from four eminent former US officials (Kissinger,
Shultz, Perry and Nunn), Mrs Beckett argued the case for re-energising
international consensus by renewing and strengthening the grand
bargain and for a reinvigorated approach to nuclear disarmament.
"At the heart of 'Carnegie' is the recognition
that DPRK and Iran have attempted to muddy the waters by claiming
that the nuclear-weapon States have gone cold on their nuclear
disarmament obligations. Hence to get more on non-proliferation,
the nuclear-weapon States would need to give more, and be seen
to give more, on nuclear disarmament."
6.10 Turning to the present, the Minister then
says:
"There is clear evidence that the Government's
approach, championed in a series of speeches by the Prime Minister,
Foreign Secretary and other Ministers has gained traction. And
the priority President Obama has given to nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament has had a powerful impact on the international
mood music ahead of May's five-yearly NPT RevCon. For the first
time in fifteen years States party [sic] have agreed an agenda
and rules of procedure. But there is no room for complacency.
In particular we need to bridge the gap between the Non-Aligned
Movement and other States Party. NAM wants much faster progress
on nuclear disarmament and largely unrestricted access to nuclear
technology. Elsewhere the concern is responding to the proliferation
challenges, a gradualist approach to disarmament and ensuring
the expected nuclear renaissance doesn't sire widespread dissemination
of highly sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology.
"The UK (and latterly the US) have been active
in engaging the NAM mainstream, and particularly heavyweight multipliers
like South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia, behind support for a
mandate from the RevCon for balanced strengthening of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty's three pillars. We want to see an outward-looking EU put
its shoulder to that wheel. However after a mention in despatches
at the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, when the EU played a central
role in thwarting Iranian mischief-making, the European Union
failed to make any impact at the 2008 and 2009 PrepComs. This
was chiefly, but not entirely, because of friction between France
and Germany over the pace and extent of nuclear disarmament."
6.11 Finally, the Minister comments on the proposed
Council Decision as follows:
"In the autumn the UK proposed a new Council
Decision which would highlight areas of convergence between Member
States and serve as a platform for EU cohesion and outreach towards
key partners in support of a successful RevCon. The draft Council
Decision produced by the Spanish Presidency and agreed by Member
States on 9 March is a helpful manifesto of practical and pragmatic
proposals on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses,
which reflect the UK's objectives and offer a credible basis for
agreement at the RevCon."
Conclusion
6.12 All the questions that may arise from
this Council Decision — for example, the illustration of
the limitations of any common approach when differing national
interests are engaged, in this instance those of France and Germany
— are for others to contemplate.
6.13 We clear the Council Decision, which
we are reporting to the House, and also drawing to the attention
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, because of the widespread interest
in nuclear non-proliferation issues.
7 EU Special Representative
for Afghanistan
| (31425)
—
—
| Council Decision appointing the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 22 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (30674) —: HC 19-xix (2008-09), chapter 14 (10 June 2009) and HC 19-xxiii (2008-09), chapter 7 (8 July 2009); and (31296) —: HC 5-x (2009-10), chapter 8 (9 February 2010)
|
| Discussed in Council | 22 March 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
|
Background
7.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed
to represent Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council
agrees that an additional EU presence on the ground is needed
to deliver the political objectives of the Union. They were established
under Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and are appointed
by the Council. The aim of the EUSRs is to represent the EU in
troubled regions and countries and to play an active part in promoting
the interests and the policies of the EU.
7.2 An EUSR is appointed by Council through the
legal act of a Council Decision (formerly a Joint Action). The
substance of his or her mandate depends on the political context
of the deployment. Some provide, inter alia, a political
backing to an ESDP operation, others focus on carrying out or
contribute to developing an EU policy. All EUSRs carry out their
duties under the authority and operational direction of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(HR (Baroness Ashton)). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget
implemented by the Commission. Member States contribute regularly
e.g. through seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
7.3 In June 2005 the Political and Security Committee
decided that EUSR mandates should in principle be extended for
12 months rather than the previous arrangement of six months.
This was put into effect in February 2006. The UK supported this
proposal, as it enables extensions to be based on a more thorough
reporting cycle. The renewed mandates now also ask EUSRs to prepare
progress reports in mid-June and mandate implementation reports
in mid-November.
7.4 The European Union currently has 12 Special
Representatives (EUSRs) dealing with: Afghanistan, the African
Great Lakes Region, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Central Asia, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Kosovo, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan.
7.5 Some EUSRs are resident in their country
or region of activity, while others work on a travelling basis
from Brussels.
Our earlier consideration
7.6 On 9 February 2010 we considered a number
of draft Council Decisions extending their mandates. In his accompanying
Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) explained that, the earlier
decision of the PSC notwithstanding, on this occasion the mandates
were to be extended, not for the usual twelve months, but only
until 31 August 2010, or until the establishment of the European
External Action Service (EEAS), whichever was the earlier; and
that the HR intended to revert to the matter in the light of further
work on the EEAS.
Afghanistan
7.7 The Council Decision that we considered then
extended the appointment of Mr Ettore Sequi as the EUSR in Afghanistan.
That mandate encompassed support to the government of Afghanistan,
in particular in the implementation of the EU-Afghanistan Joint
Declaration, support to the United Nations in Afghanistan, liaison
with regional countries in support of EU policy, supporting the
EU's work on human rights and coordination of EU work in Afghanistan.
7.8 In her accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 25 January 2009, the then Minister for Europe at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Caroline Flint) said:
— the EU and Afghanistan's partnership
is defined by the Strasbourg Declaration of 16 November 2005,
with the joint commitments in this Declaration being kept under
review by periodic meetings between the Afghan government and
the EU;
— the EU (specifically, the European Commission
and member states) is a major donor to Afghanistan, having disbursed
or pledged $7.5 billion between 2002 and 2011, including over
$5 billion of pledges in support of the Afghan National Development
Strategy at the Paris conference in June 2008;
— EU Member States provide approximately 16,000
troops to International Security Assistance Force;
— the EU launched its Police Mission to Afghanistan
(EUPOL) in June 2007;
— the EU Special Representative would continue
to play an important role in focusing the EU effort, and ensuring
that it dovetailed with the work of other bilateral and multilateral
partners;
— the Afghan government and international partners,
particularly the UN, continued to insist upon the need for greater
international coordination in Afghanistan;
— in view of the many challenges facing the
country in 2009, particularly the Presidential elections and the
difficult security situation in the south and east of the country,
the need for effective international engagement was even greater.
7.9 Then, in June and July 2009, we considered
a further proposal to amend the mandate to include Pakistan. In
her Explanatory Memorandum of 3 June 2009, the then Minister for
Europe said that the decision to extend EUSR Sequi's mandate to
include Pakistan "reflects the direction of international
debate on Afghanistan and broader regional challenges, particularly
on Pakistan", and "also chimes with a message that the
UK has been consistently delivering in the EU, that we need to
be better equipped to address the regional dimension of policy
on Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan." The Minister continued
as follows:
"The UK Government supports the extension of
the mandate to include Pakistan as we have been pushing the EU
to increase its engagement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and
to see the problems in both countries as interlinked. On 29 April,
the Prime Minister made a statement to the House outlining the
UK's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. This was designed to reinforce
and be consistent with the new US strategy, which has similarly
refocused its Afghanistan policy to include Pakistan. This followed
the 22 January appointment of Richard Holbrooke as US Special
Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and subsequent appointments
of various other 'Af/Pak' Special Envoys, all of which highlight
the international communities [sic] focus on the links between
instability in both countries."
Our assessment
7.10 We had no wish to hold up this amendment,
and accordingly cleared the document, which we reported to the
House because of the widespread interest in the subject matter.
But we had a number of questions for the then Minister, to which
she responded in a letter of 30 June 2009. We reported that to
the House in our Report of 8 July 2009.[19]
7.11 Returning to the present Minister for Europe's
Explanatory Memorandum of 3 February 2010, in commenting on this
latest extension of EUSR Sequi's mandate, the Minister noted that
there might be a change in the candidate for this role. He then
commented as follows:
"The Government supports the extension of this
mandate because of the important role of the EU in Afghanistan.
The EU and Afghanistan's partnership, defined by the Strasbourg
Declaration of 16 November 2005, means that EU commitments are
kept under review by periodic meetings between the Afghan government
and the EU. The EU is a major partner in Afghanistan, having disbursed
or pledged $7.5bn between 2002 and 2011. EU member states also
provide approximately 16,000 troops to the International Security
Assistance Force and the EU has launched an ongoing Police Mission
to Afghanistan (EUPOL) since June 2007.
"The EUSR will continue to play an important
role in focusing the EU efforts described above, and ensuring
that it dovetails with the work of other bilateral and multilateral
partners. The Afghan government and international partners, particularly
the UN, continue to place an emphasis upon the need for greater
international coordination in Afghanistan, the EUSR is a key part
of fostering this cooperation."
7.12 We noted that the Minister was unable to
provide any financial information on this occasion. We also understood
that, Afghanistan being a major UK priority, the Minister
was pushing for a decision at the 22 February 2010 Foreign Affairs
Council, and that, as well as there being a possible new EUSR,
it was expected that the mandate would be significantly upgraded.
7.13 We understood, too, that, these lacunae
notwithstanding, the Minister had submitted what information was
presently available in order to take account of the impending
parliamentary recess, which, regrettably, meant that there was
insufficient time between then and the 22 February FAC for the
Minister to provide this additional information.
7.14 No other questions arose, and we had no
wish to hold up the process. We accordingly cleared the documents.
But in so doing we asked the Minister to provide a Supplementary
Explanatory Memorandum as soon as possible with the sort of financial
information that he had provided on previous occasions and full
information about the candidate and mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan.
7.15 Looking further ahead, we reminded the Minister
that we would expect full and timely financial and other relevant
information when all the mandates next came up for renewal, particularly
about the way in which the EUSRs would interact with the prospective
EEAS.[20]
7.16 It was announced on 22 February 2010 that
Vygaudas Ušackas — the foreign minister of Lithuania
until his resignation in January — had been appointed as
the European Union's next special representative for Afghanistan
and head of its delegation in Kabul.
The further draft Council Decision
7.17 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 22 March
2010, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) says that the Foreign Affairs Council on
22 March will confirm the appointment of Mr Ušackas as EUSR
for Afghanistan from 1 April 2010. He also notes that the mandate
for the current EUSR, Ettore Sequi, expires on 31 March 2010.
7.18 In the draft Council Decision, it says that
the financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure
related to the mandate of the EUSR in the period from the
date of entry into force of this Decision to 31 August 2010
shall be €2,500,000. The Minister says that the cost of the
new appointment will be met from existing EU budgets; and that
there will be no call for Member State contributions.
The Government's view
7.19 After briefly rehearsing some of the context,
the Minister says:
"The Government supports the appointment of
Vygaudas Ušackas. As a senior political figure, his
appointment as EUSR is a demonstration of the EU's enhanced
engagement in Afghanistan. It is also the last piece in the jigsaw
to up the international civilian effort, following the
appointment of heavyweight figures for the role of NATO Senior
Civilian Representative and the new UN Special Representative
for the Secretary General. Key to the civilian effort in Afghanistan
will be enhanced co-ordination between theses three roles."
Conclusion
7.20 Although Mr Ušackas' appointment
was announced by the High Representative on 22 February, there
is no mention of it in the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
of that same day. Indeed there is no mention of Afghanistan at
all. [21] Moreover,
the HR's letter to the Council of 22 February mentions, en
passant, the prolongation of the mandate of a further EUSR,
to Burma/Myanmar, on the same basis as the others, i.e., until
31 August 2010, or until the establishment of the European External
Action Service (EEAS), whichever is the earlier; we should like
to know when this will be submitted for scrutiny.
7.21 We ask the Minister to explain more about
this present process. Under Article 33 TEU, it is for the HR to
propose and for the Council to decide; here, however, it would
seem that an appointment has been made, and announced to the world,
with no sign of discussion in the Council; and that the Council
— and thus this Committee's role — is now to rubber
stamp it.
7.22 Contrary to what he said in his 3 February
Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister now says that Mr Sequi's
mandate was extended only until 31 March, but says nothing about
how and when this decision was taken. We ask the Minister to clarify
this. Nor does the Minister tell us anything about Mr Sequi's
successor; we should like to know more about his qualifications
for this crucially important job.
7.23 We should also like to know more about
the job itself. The Minister does not mention that it is to be
"double-hatted", i.e., that he is to be not only the
voice of the Council but also the head of the Commission's technical
assistance operations. What will this entail? What is the annual
budget that he will control? What are the main programmes that
he will be in charge of implementing? And how do they relate to
other bilateral and international activities?
7.24 In his EUSR capacity, he will have a
budget of €2,500,000 from 1 April to 31 August 2010.
What will this be spent on?
7.25 Although our understanding was that the
EUSR's mandate was to be significantly upgraded, it seems instead
to have been diminished, in that there is no mention of his predecessor's
role regarding Pakistan. We ask the Minister to explain this.
7.26 In addition to be asked to clear a fait
accompli, the Committee is also being asked to do so after
a further administrative error by the Minister's Department —
this despite several assurances that this type of administrative
oversight would be a thing of the past. We ask the Minister to
explain, in detail, the nature of this oversight and how, despite
his assurances, it came to pass. The problem of administrative
oversights exists across government departments; we will therefore
be writing to the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil
Service to ask him to give evidence to the Committee.
7.27 We now clear the document.
8 CSDP: Piracy off the
coast of Somalia
| (31426)
—
—
| Draft Council Decision on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces
|
| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 22 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Reports | None; but see (31259) —: HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20 January 2010); also see (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 19 (9 December 2009); (30982) —: HC 19-xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October 2009); (30724) — and (30728)—: HC 19 xxiii (2008-09), chapter 9 (8 July 2009) and (30341) —, (30348) — and (30349) —: HC 19-iv (2008-09) chapter 17 (21 January 2009); (30400) 13989/08: HC 16-xxxvi (2007-08), chapter 17 (26 November 2008) and HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 10 (22 October 2008); and (29953)—: HC 16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 19 (8 October 2008)
|
| To be discussed in Council | 31 March 2010
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
8.1 In response to growing international concern
over the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 (2008)
in June which encouraged "States interested in the use of
commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia, to increase
and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea". Then, on 7 October 2008, the Security Council
unanimously adopted UNSCR 1838, which was initiated by France
and co-sponsored by 19 countries (Belgium, Croatia, the US, the
UK, Italy, Panama, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Japan, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Korea and Singapore).
8.2 Our previous reports set out the history
of the European Union's endeavours to address this problem, leading
to the creation of the first ESDP naval operation, Operation ATALANTA,
and subsequent developments.[22]
8.3 These include a Council Decision extending
Operation ATALANTA for a further 12 months until 12 December 2010
and to include:
- monitoring of fishing activities off the coast
in Somalia;
- the need for Operation ATALANTA to liaise and
cooperate with international bodies working in the region;
- assisting the Somali authorities by sharing information
on fishing activities;
8.4 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 25 November 2009 on that Council Decision, the Minister for
Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Bryant) went
on to note that, although 2009 had witnessed an increase in the
number of pirate attacks, the actual number of successful attacks
has been reduced significantly, especially in the critical Gulf
of Aden transit artery; but also that the threat of piracy had
not diminished, continued to pose a threat to international shipping,
and had resulted in an increase in pirate attacks in the much
broader Somali basin. The Minister also illustrated ways in which
the UK continued to provide a direct contribution to a number
of international efforts to counter piracy.
8.5 The Minister also subsequently sent the Committee
two letters, of 27 November and 7 December 2009, which in various
ways sought to respond to the Committee's request for information
on what action was being taken to deal with the circumstances
that had led to the piracy problem, and both of which are set
out in detail in our most recent Report.
Our assessment
8.6 Against this background, we drew the Minister's
attention to a relevant letter published by "The Times"
newspaper on 5 December 2009 from the Prime Minister of the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (which is reproduced at Annex
1 to our most recent Report). Though it seemed that a response
to his first point — "The help we need is first in
the restoration of both effective government and the training
of national security forces required to secure peace and enforce
laws" — was under discussion, it was not clear to what
extent the other two — restoring and enforcing Somalia's
economic exclusion zone and a large scale civil affairs programme
— were being addressed.
8.7 We therefore asked that, in his promised
further letter, the Minister included his assessment of the extent
to which:
— the activity to which he had referred in
his letter of 7 December;
— the proposals under discussion within the
EU to train Somali security forces; and
— what was contained in the Council Decision,
particularly with regard to fishing activities
8.8 In the meantime, we cleared the document,
which we drew to the attention of the House because of the widespread
interest in the situation that it was endeavouring to tackle and
the UK role in it.
8.9 For the same reasons we also drew it to the
attention of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.[23]
The Minister's letter of 9 December 2009
8.10 In his letter, the Minister said that Member
States had been discussing how the EU could increase its commitment
to Somalia in a variety of areas, including reinforcement of Somalia's
capacity to manage security challenges; this, he said, was reflected
at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 November
2009 where a crisis management concept was adopted concerning
a possible CSDP training mission for the Somali security forces.
Closer analysis was, he said, currently being undertaken with
research and planning expected to continue into next month. He
continued as follows:
"A CSDP mission could make a useful contribution
to increased international action on Somalia. We believe that
the UK should work with the international community and regional
partners and welcome further planning of this possible EU mission.
However, we have been clear that our agreement to continue planning
should not prejudice any future decisions regarding whether or
not to agree to the Mission. We need to be fully convinced that,
if launched, it will be workable and contribute to progress in
Somalia."
8.11 The Minister then went on to note that:
"Somalia is a failed state and has been for
nearly two decades. A protracted conflict has been caused by a
breakdown in the rule of law and frequent conflicts at national
and local level. This has resulted in an humanitarian crises [sic],
increased migration, and the growth of terrorism and piracy. There
is no "easy fix" and no state can deliver progress in
Somalia alone. The UK Government therefore believes that the international
community (including regional actors) needs to engage effectively
and develop a common approach. A CSDP mission could make a useful
contribution to increased international action on Somalia."
8.12 Finally, the Minister said that the Government,
the EU as a whole and the UN fully supported the UN-led Djibouti
process,[24] which he
believed must provide the basis for a lasting and stable political
settlement:
"We support the efforts of the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and welcome signs of progress
made to achieve peace and stability. Progress towards peace and
security in Somalia must be a Somali-led process, but the UK coordinates
closely with the UN and the rest of the international community."
The most recent Council Decision
8.13 Against this background, we then considered
a draft Council Decision outlining the proposed EU military mission.
In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum of 19 January 2010,
the Minister for Europe said that, since the decision to adopt
a crisis management concept, planning work had been undertaken,
including the development of a military strategic option and a
reconnaissance mission to Uganda. He then went on to outline,
analyse and comment on the proposal in detail (all of which is
set out in our most recent Report).
Our assessment
8.14 We had no wish to stand in the way of this
process. But a number of questions arose:
— in his 9 December 2009 letter, the Minister
said that he would need to be fully convinced that, if launched,
a CSDP mission will be workable and contribute to progress in
Somalia. Given the general impression that the TFG does not control
the whole of Mogadishu, let alone the country, the question inevitably
arises as to whether it is possible to be thus convinced;
— there were already hints that this mission
would not be ended in 12 months time, given that the draft text
said that the Mission "shall terminate when 2000 Somali recruits
are trained up to and including platoon level, including appropriate
modular specialised and training for officers and non-commissioned
officers" — the feasibility of which in 12 months,
in all the circumstances, we felt must be open to question;
— when the Minister said that the Mission "would
need partners (including the US) to assist the EU by providing
(in particular lethal) equipment and pay", what did he mean?
What lethal equipment? And pay to whom for what?
— as well as contributing to strengthening
the Somali Security Forces through the provision of military training,
the draft text says that the Mission's other objective will be
"to contribute to a holistic and sustainable perspective
for the development of the Somali Security Sector". It was
by no means clear what "a holistic and sustainable perspective"
was. Nor what was meant in practice by the requirement to fulfil
these objectives "without prejudice to other security-related
actions, and the other actors in the international community,
in particular, the United Nations, the African Union and the United
States."
— in his most recent letter, the Minister said
that he believed "that the international community (including
regional actors) needs to engage effectively and develop a common
approach." Were they so engaging? If so, who, and in what
ways? What common approach was being developed?
8.15 We noted that this proposal was to be discussed
at the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 January, and no doubt the
Minister would not wish to delay progress. We also noted that
a further Council Decision would be required in order to launch
the Mission following approval of the Mission plan.
8.16 We recommended that, the forthcoming Foreign
Affairs Council discussion notwithstanding, this Council Decision
should be debated in the European Committee, to give the House
an opportunity to pursue these and other questions that interested
Members may wish to raise, and the Minister to respond to those
of our earlier questions that remain unanswered. We asked that
this debate be arranged before any further related Council Decision
was put forward for scrutiny.
8.17 As before, we are also drew this chapter
of our Report to the attention of the Foreign Affairs and Defence
Committees.[25]
8.18 That debate took place on 8 March 2010,
at the end of which the European Committee welcomed the Council
Decision as a positive contribution to building peace and stability
in Somalia.[26]
The Council Decision
8.19 This further Council Decision authorises
the mission plan that has been developed in the meantime, a launch
date of 7 April 2010 and the mission commander to release the
activation order to execute the deployment of the forces and start
the execution of the mission.
8.20 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 22 March 2010, the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Chris Bryant) says that sets out the legal basis for this
EU action, explains why he feels that the Committee's previous
concerns have been satisfactorily addressed on a continuing basis,
including before mission launch, and why he regards the mission
— which has been renamed, from EUTRA Somalia, to EUTM Somalia
— as a positive contribution to the Somali peace process..
8.21 He then describes the mission as follows:
"The political objective of the mission
would be to contribute to the strengthening of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving Somali
citizens. The military strategic objective would be to
make a comprehensive and sustainable contribution towards the
development of the Somali Security Sector through the provision
of specialist military training to some 2,000 Somali trainees
up to platoon level. The mission would contribute to the existing
African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) training programme for
the Somali Security Forces, currently being carried out by Uganda
with the objective of ensuring that the enhanced training programme
can be sustained without EU support.
"The mission would be time-limited (at least
one year). Two consecutive training periods of six months would
train 2,000 Somali soldiers up to platoon level. Of these, 670
trainees would receive recruits basic training whilst 330 would
receive NCOs basic training. Trainees would have acquired basic
techniques and would be able to fulfil trained tasks at the appropriate
level.
"EU provided instructors for specialist training
would come from several Member States and rotate over a period
of one year.
"Training modules would include: junior officers
training session; NCOs basic training session; infantry section
leaders module; communications module; combat life saving module;
mine and C-IED awareness modules; and fighting in built up areas
(FIBUA).
"The mission Commander is Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez
Elul (Spain). He will exercise the functions of EU Operation Commander
and EU Force Commander. The EU Mission Headquarters, intended
to perform the functions of both Operational Headquarters and
Force Headquarters, would be based in Uganda. It would perform
the functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters.
A Liaison Office would be established in Nairobi, Kenya, and a
Support Cell will be established in Brussels.
"The next training programme of Somali Security
Forces in Uganda begins on 1 May. The EU hopes to reach Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) by 23 April 2010 (the Mission Headquarters
will be at full strength in Kampala, Bihanga (the training location),
Brussels and Nairobi and critical infrastructure projects for
the training will be completed). Full Operational Capability (FOC)
would be reached by 1 May 2010 -when training would begin."
8.22 The Minister concludes by saying that, although
the Decision is in draft form and is still being discussed by
the External Relations DG RELEX, he does not expect any significant
changes to be made to the draft text.
Subsidiarity
8.23 The Minister again says that the EU, working
with the wider international community, is seeking to contribute
to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
as a functioning government able to deliver basic services to
the population. He notes that the EU provides support to Somalia
— through humanitarian aid and EUNAVFOR to tackle piracy
— and continues to discuss further ways to promote peace
and stability in Somalia; and that the wider international community,
despite some differences of emphasis, shares a broad analysis
of Somalia's problems and possible solutions (for example, the
need for the process to be Somali-led, the need for political
outreach, support for the TFG and the African Union's peacekeeping
force: AMISOM). EU Member States, with a significant Somali diaspora,
are increasingly interested in Somalia and are looking for ways
in which to positively engage with the peace process.
8.24 This CSDP Mission, he says, presents EU
Member States with the opportunity to share costs and to work
together to create a mission with a greater effort and enhanced
result than if each country was working towards the same goal
individually:
"For the UK the ability to leverage international
resources for an area we are interested in has benefits for our
foreign and security policy. We have worked with the international
community and regional partners to influence and shape this mission,
ensuring that it is a well-organised initiative delivering positive
results."
8.25 The Minister also sees this CSDP mission
as "an example of how the Lisbon Treaty will allow the EU
to be a more effective international player", and describes
this approach as:
"fully in line with the intentions behind the
European External Action Service to have a foreign policy structure
which is more coherent and able to develop policy on a more consistent
basis — getting the collective voice of the EU heard throughout
the world — and supports the UK objective to develop effective
international organisations, above all the UN and EU."
The Government's view
8.26 The Minister then comments further, as
follows:
"Somalia is a high priority for the UK. We
have concerns about migration, terrorism and piracy and there
is a large Somali diaspora living in the UK. Instability in Somalia
exacerbates the suffering of its people and is a severe threat
to regional and international peace, security and development.
The UK already contributes to EUNAVFOR, the operation to tackle
piracy off the coast of Somalia, including the provision of the
Operational Headquarters.
"During previous scrutiny by both Houses pre-requisites
for this mission were set out. A commitment was made to the House
of Lords Scrutiny Committee to ensure that these were fully addressed
before the final decision to launch:
i. A force structure to incorporate newly trained
Platoons, and a mentoring process to develop TFG security forces.
ii. A structure, process and funds to ensure regular
payment to returning trainees for at least one year.
iii. Logistical arrangements to house, feed and supply
such forces.
"These pre-requisites were included in the formal
Conclusions from January's Foreign Affairs Council: these issues
should be 'satisfactorily addressed on a continuing basis, including
before the mission launch'.
"These issues have been gripped. Key partners,
the EU institutions, EU Member States (France), the US, the UN
and Uganda (key AMISOM partners in the training effort), are convinced
of the importance of these requirements.
"All partners are fully seized of the need to
have funds in place to pay the newly trained recruits. UNPOS (UN
Political Office of Somalia) and the African Union (AU) have stressed
the need to ensure funds are available for salaries for at least
one year. The Secretariat (Brussels) has designated a lead person,
working to the High Representative, Baroness Ashton, to coordinate
these contributions and manage donors to ensure the right level
and mechanisms for salaries are in place. A key partner has committed
to fund salaries for all troops until January 2011. A mechanism
has been identified through which funds can be transmitted to
troops in a safe, prompt and accountable way.
"A force structure for TFG security forces has
emerged in the past two months and oversight arrangement to incorporate
newly trained platoons can be confidently expected to be in place
by the end of training.
"Work is underway to secure funds from the European
Commission as well as through bilateral donations to improve the
infrastructure for troops on return to Mogadishu. An existing
base used by AMISOM has been identified and its needs established.
"On balance, taking into account what has been
done and what is left to be done, I am satisfied that the right
processes are in place to ensure that the required salaries and
infrastructure are in place at the point at which they are needed,
for example, that the matching mechanism in Brussels will ensure
that remaining funds are in place for salaries from January 2011.
The UK will continue to work with the Secretariat, EU Member States
and the US to push this work through.
"The UK has been working to ensure that the
mission should fit with other international security sector reform
efforts, led by the UN; be based on political commitment from
the Transitional Federal Government; and be acceptable in resource
terms. This would mitigate against defections and the loss of
equipment provided as part of the mission. I believe that these
have been addressed.
"The mission fits with other international security
sector reform efforts. The UN takes the lead internationally on
Somalia, working with the international community and regional
actors, including the EU. UN Security Council Resolution 1872
stressed the importance of the re-establishment, training, equipping
and retention of Somali security forces and urged Member States,
regional and international organisations to offer technical assistance
for the training and equipping of the Somali security forces.
"The Mission would meet the recommendations
from the Joint Needs Assessment on Security Sector Reform. The
Transitional Federal Government, the UN Political Office of Somalia
(UNPOS), the EU, the United States and other international actors
were all involved in producing this Needs Assessment. This CSDP
mission would involve close EU cooperation and coordination with
the African Union (AU), the UN and other relevant partners, in
particular the US. This coordination and cooperation has been
evident during the planning stages. Troops will be vetted by AMISOM,
with support from the US, before training begins, looking at age,
health and clan representation. This should ensure that the troops
represent 'Somalia' rather than a particular area or clan.
"The TFG is committed to the Security Sector
process through the JSC and has expressed its appreciation for
EU efforts to carry out the training of the Somali National Forces
in letters to the EU. Together with the EU Member States and Key
Partners we will continue to engage with the TFG about this mission
and to secure further support throughout the TFG. During his Guest
of Government visit to the UK (8-11 March 2010) the President
of Somalia requested support in the security sector — equipment,
pay, infrastructure and training. This mission responds to this
request for support.
"The mission is acceptable in resource terms
(see below — Financial Implications). The costs of the mission
are shared across Member States through Assessed Costs. Member
States have been invited to contribute trainers to the mission.
Such contributions are optional and there has been a positive
response across EU Member States. The UK has secured two positions:
Executive Officer, Kampala, Uganda; and the Liaison Officer in
the Nairobi Mission Headquarters.
"It has been questioned previously how the Government
can be convinced that the CSDP mission will be workable and contribute
to progress in Somalia given the general impression that the TFG
does not control the whole of Mogadishu, let alone the country.
"The UK approach to Somalia is supportive of
the UN-led Djibouti Peace Process which resulted in a new Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia in January 2009 and looks to take
the peace process forwards towards elections in 2011. A key element
of the TFG is that the government is 'transitional'. We ought
to support the process and buy-in to the long-term — Somalia's
problems will not be solved overnight. We acknowledge the TFG
as the current government in power in Somalia, as does the EU
and the UN, and we deal with them on that basis. The UK recognises
states, not governments. We support the Transitional Federal Institutions,
the Transitional Federal Government, the Offices of the President
and the Prime Minister and the Independent Commissions (for example
Constitutional and Reconciliation Commissions), not the individual
incumbents within the institutions. There has been recent fighting
in Mogadishu in response to attacks by insurgent groups. The government
has the right to defend and control its capital city. EUTM Somalia
will develop the ability of the TFG to manage its own security
in the longer term, ensuring better standards, and allow the TFG
to focus on building up infrastructure and government institutions
within a more secure environment.
"The mission's end state will be after two 6
month training periods have been completed and EUTM Somalia personnel
and equipment have been recovered. The final agreed text stated:
'The EU military mission shall terminate in 2011 after two consecutive
six-month training periods'. This means that the mission's objectives
are met whilst ensuring that it has a clear exit strategy.
"The mission is small, designed to support and
enhance existing Ugandan-led training. Uganda is currently carrying
out basic training of Somali Security Sector Forces. The Ugandans,
veterans of Mogadishu, have a clear idea of what will work in
Somali culture and are in an excellent position to work alongside
EU trainers. The Ugandans have welcomed the CSDP mission. The
Mission supports the African Union's peacekeeping mission to Somalia
(AMISOM). By focusing on the need to 'train the trainer' the benefits
of the training are extended beyond the Mission's timeframe as
trainers are given the capability that will endure beyond the
end of the mission. The training will take place outside Somalia,
taking account of the security situation and its impact on the
safety of EU instructors."
Financial Implications
8.27 The Minister says that:
— the initial reference amount for the mission
was estimated at €4.8 million for a 12 month period;
— he expects the final budget to be "in
the vicinity of" €4.978 million;
— the UK share of the estimated budget, from
Assessed Costs, under the Athena mechanism, would be around £700,000
for 2010/11, which would come from the Tri-Departmental Peacekeeping
budget;
— a proportion of the infrastructure costs
could be covered by the Africa Peace Facility, in which circumstances
the UK share from Assessed Costs would be about £550,000
for 2010/11;
— the Peacekeeping budget can meet the UK share
of the mission cost if the final figure is, as he expects, slightly
above the €4.8 million reference.
Conclusion
8.28 We are grateful to the Minister for explaining
the nature and purpose of this mission, and for endeavouring to
address earlier concerns, so comprehensively.
8.29 We now clear the draft Council Decision.
9 Stability and Growth
Pact: excessive deficit procedure
| (31407)
7340/10
COM(10) 91
| Commission Communication: Follow-up to the Council Decision of 16 February 2010, giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Document originated | 9 March 2010
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 11 March 2010
|
| Department | HM Treasury
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 18 March 2010
|
| Previous Committee Report | None
|
| Discussed in Council | 16 March 2010
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
9.1 The Stability and Growth Pact adopted by
the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 emphasised the obligation
of Member States to avoid excessive government deficits, defined
as the ratio of a planned or actual deficit to gross domestic
product (GDP) at market prices in excess of a "reference
value" of 3%.[27]
Each year the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN)
issues an Opinion on the updated stability or convergence programme
of each Member State.[28]
These Opinions, which are not binding on Member States, are based
on a recommendation from the Commission. The economic content
of the programmes is assessed with reference to the Commission's
current economic forecasts. If a Member State's programme is found
wanting, it may be invited by ECOFIN, in a Recommendation, to
make adjustments to its economic policies, though such Recommendations
are likewise not binding on Member States. This whole procedure
is essentially the Pact's preventative arm.
9.2 On the other hand, the Pact also endorsed
a dissuasive or corrective arm involving action in cases of an
excessive government deficit — the excessive deficit procedure
provided for in Article 126 TFEU (formerly Article 104 EC) and
the relevant Protocol. This procedure consists of Commission reports
followed by a stepped series of Council Recommendations (the final
two steps do not apply to non-members of the eurozone). Failure
to comply with the final stage of Recommendations allows ECOFIN
to require publication of additional information by the Member
State concerned before issuing bonds and securities, to invite
the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy
for the Member State concerned, to require a non-interest-bearing
deposit from the Member State concerned whilst its deficit remains
uncorrected, or to impose appropriate fines on the Member State
concerned.
9.3 On 16 February 2010 the Council adopted a
Decision[29] giving notice
to Greece to take measures for a deficit reduction judged necessary
in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit —
this followed on from the Council's December 2009 finding on the
inadequacy of Greece's earlier responses in relation to the excessive
deficit procedure. The adjustment required by the Decision to
bring the fiscal deficit to below 3% of GDP by 2012 would include
an annual structural adjustment of at least 3.5% of GDP in 2010
and 2011 and of at least 2.5% of GDP in 2012. Towards this end,
the Council outlined a number of consolidation measures to be
adopted by the Greek authorities, most of which were included
in Greece's latest updated Stability Programme.[30]
The document
9.4 At the 16 February 2010 Council meeting,
at which decisions related to Greece were adopted, it was agreed
that Greece should stand ready to take further action if, by mid-March
2010, a Commission-led technical mission to Athens, assisted by
the European Central Bank and IMF staff, assessed that the deficit
reduction plan for 2010 was lagging behind targets. On 3 March
2010 the Greek government announced a package of additional measures
worth approximately 2% of GDP and which were outlined in a report
to the Commission on 8 March 2010.
9.5 This Commission Communication is the report
from the Commission-led technical mission, which visited Greece
between 22-24 February 2010. The document covers the initial findings
of the mission, together with its assessment of the additional
measures announced on 3 March 2010 and outlined to the Commission
on 8 March 2010 and the next steps that the Greek government will
need to take over the near future. The Commission's conclusion
is that Greece is implementing the Council Decision on the need
for Greece to ensure the reduction of the 2010 government deficit
to a target 8.7% of GDP. Although it identifies significant risks
to the budgetary outcomes projected in relation to measures outlined
in the updated Stability Programme, the Commission assesses that,
on balance, the additional measures announced by the Greek government
"appear sufficient to safeguard the 2010 budgetary targets
provided in the Council Decision of 16 February 2010 and in the
stability programme".
9.6 However the Commission notes that its assessment
will be an ongoing process that will progressively widen to structural
reforms and to the fiscal plans for 2011 and 2012. Accordingly,
the next steps that it outlines for Greece include a number of
specific planning and reporting requirements. In line with the
Council's decision to place Greece under increased surveillance,
the Commission asks the Greek authorities to submit to it and
to the Council, by 15 May 2010, a report presenting "in full
detail":
- the fiscal consolidation measures to be implemented
in 2010, including a detailed calendar of implementation of all
measures announced;
- the preparatory steps to be made for the respective
measures to be taken in 2011 and 2012; and
- data on the monthly state budget execution, infra-annual
budget implementation by social security, local government and
extra-budgetary funds, debt issuance and reimbursements, public
employment, spending arrears and financial situation in public
enterprises.
9.7 Thereafter, Greece is requested to submit
and make such reports public on a quarterly basis. In line with
the Council Decision these quarterly reports will additionally
outline the government's planned structural reforms, including
a detailed calendar of implementation of all measures announced.
And these plans should include measures to increase the competitiveness
of the economy in the field of pensions, healthcare, public administration,
the functioning of product markets, labour market, absorption
of structural funds, supervision of the financial sector, and
statistics.
The Government's view
9.8 The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Ian
Pearson) says that there are no direct policy implications for
the UK arising from this document. He adds that:
- the Government supports the appropriate and timely
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact as a means to
manage the course of fiscal consolidation in Member States toward
a level of sustainable public finances; and
- there is, furthermore, a clear need to address
more specific recommendations in this situation and it supports
the process and recommendations that have been applied.
Conclusion
9.9 Although we clear this document from scrutiny,
it adds to the information we have about the present situation
with Greece and the EU's requirements of the Greek authorities
and, as such, we draw it to the attention of the House.
13 (27603) 10448/06: see HC 34-xxxv (2005-06), chapter
12 (12 July 2006). Back
14
(30535) 8526/09: see HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 5 (13 May 2009). Back
15
See headnote: (28857) 12379/07: HC 41-xxxiii (2006-07), chapter
17 (2 October 2007). Back
16
See headnote: (30874) 12744/09: HC 19-xxvii (2008-09), chapter
25 (14 October 2010). Back
17
For full information on the NPT, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
Back
18
For the full text of this speech, see http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/keynote.pdf.
Back
19
See headnote: (30674) -: (HC 19-xix (2008-09), chapter 14 (10
June 2009) and HC 19-xxiii (2008-09), chapter 7 (8 July 2009).
Back
20
See headnote: (31296) -: HC 5-x (2009-10), chapter 8 (9 February
2010). Back
21
The Council Conclusions are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/112999.pdf.
Back
22
See headnote. Back
23
See headnote: (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 19
(9 December 2009). Back
24
According to the Institute for Security Studies , the Djibouti
peace process, which began in May 2008, was started following
the failure of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to consolidate
itself into an all-inclusive national government embraced by all
Somalis, came in the midst of a deteriorating security and humanitarian
situation following the forcible ouster of the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC) by Ethiopia, and was driven by the realization that
the Somali crisis would not be resolved without a negotiated settlement
involving the Islamist groups, who denied foothold to the TFG
in most parts of Somalia. For information on the Djibouti process,
see http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=7229&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3.
Back
25
See headnote: (31259) -: HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20 January
2010). Back
26
The record of the debate is at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmgeneral/euro/100308/100308s01.htm.
Back
27
This obligation does not apply to Member States, including the
UK, whilst they remain outside the eurozone, but they are required
to endeavour to avoid excessive deficits. Back
28
The 16 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) that have adopted the
euro have Stability Programmes, whereas the other 11 Member States
(including the UK) produce Convergence Programmes. Back
29
(31334) 6147/10: see HC 5-xiii (2009-10), chapter 5 (10 March
2010). Back
30
(31331) 6560/10: see HC 5-xiii (2009-10), chapter 5 (10 March
2010). Back
| 
