2 THE BASIS AND NATURE OF THE
10. The roots of the bilateral relationship between
the UK and US reach back into the 17th century, and the relationship
has had high and low points ever since.
During the 20th century, the UK-US relationship evolved gradually
into something like its present form in the ten years following
the end of the Second World War. Dr Robin Niblett of Chatham House
has argued that there have been three main drivers of the relationship
in the post-war period. Firstly, successive British Governments
realised that they no longer had the capacity to protect or project
British interests around the world, and acquiesced in the replacement
of Britain by the United States as the world's dominant power.
Secondly, the UK believed that the most direct threat to British
and European securitythat of Soviet military aggression
and/or political subversioncould only be confronted if
the United States were tightly woven into a transatlantic alliance
whose principal focus was the defence of Europe and the broader
Atlantic community. Finally, Dr Niblett believed that a "corollary
and third driver of the special relationship was the mutual suspicion
in Washington and London about a deepening of European political
integration that could come at the expense of US engagement and
influence in the Atlantic community".
11. As a result, throughout the period of the Cold
War and beyond, Britain was one of the most stalwart of America's
European allies, and the one best-placed to support the US within
and outside the Atlantic area. This led to the building of an
infrastructure of bilateral interaction in the fields of intelligence-sharing
and nuclear and military co-operation that allowed each side to
define the relationship as 'special' rather than just close.
Echoing the view of a number of our witnesses, Frances Burwell,
of the US-based think-tank the Atlantic Council, stated that during
the second half of the 20th Century, the relationship between
the US and the UK was one of the most influential partnerships
in the global arena.
Trade, finance and cultural links
12. Although defence, intelligence and nuclear co-operation
continue in many respects to define the contemporary UK-US relationship
(see below, Chapter 3), the origins of the relationship are considerably
broader and are reflected in the shared history, shared values,
language and interests of both countries. Today, the links remain
broad and deep. UK-US ties can be found in many areas, from trade
and business to popular culture. As Frances Burwell stated, "the
fact that governments and publics can understand each other with
minimal explanation, allows much closer cultural ties, resulting
in a huge level of shared popular culture".
This wide range of links has resulted in a relationship
between the United States and the United Kingdom which has been
described as, "the densest conducted between two sovereign
has affected a broad swathe of the public in both countries.
13. Personal contacts remain strong, with tourism
a key link: in 2008 almost 3 million Americans visited the UK
while over 4.5 million Britons visited the US whether as tourists,
to study or to do business. Over 47,000 US citizens enrolled in
courses of study in the UK in 2008. In the same year, one in seven
chief executives of FTSE 100 companies were reported to be American.
In addition, some 130,000 Americans live in the UK while an estimated
678,000 British citizens live in the US.
14. Public opinion research also suggests that cultural
similarities ensure that British and American citizens hold each
other in higher regard than they do any other close ally.
There is a mesh of personal interactions between government
officials, between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and between
foreign policy/security think tanks, forming links which are said
to be as close as for any other US partner.
Media links, too, are extensive, with British television programmes
and formats becoming increasingly popular in the US.
In the field of scientific collaboration, the US and the UK are
each other's most important research partners; 30% of the UK's
international collaborations are with the US, more than double
any other country and 13% of the US's are with the UK.
15. On the issue of values, too, there remains strong
alignment. There are of course well-documented differences, as
Frances Burwell highlighted: "the support for the death penalty
among the US public and acceptance of relatively unregulated gun
ownership for example, and the British support for universal,
state-provided health care are perhaps the clearest examples of
a persistent and strong individualism in US societies and a greater
emphasis in the UK on social welfare. Nevertheless, among all
the European allies, the strongest similarities in terms of values
are clearly with the British".
16. Some of the most important contemporary links,
particularly from a British perspective, can be found in the fields
of trade, finance and the economy. Frances Burwell believed that
while New York and London were "sometimes portrayed as rival
financial capitals, they actually represented two mutually dependent
hubsnot just as cities, but as economic capitals of their
nationsin an increasingly interconnected global economy".
In their written submission, Heather Conley and Reginald Dale,
of the US-based think-tank the Center for Strategic & International
Studies, argued that "New York and London are now so closely
intertwined, both culturally and financially, that they are sometimes
referred to as a single entity, 'NyLon'".
17. The UK-US trading relationship is also strong.
The US is the UK's top export destination and is the leading destination
for UK overseas investment. In 2007-08 UK goods exports to the
US amounted to £34.7 billion (an increase of 8.3% over 2006-07),
while the value of services exported totalled £36.2 billion.
The US has consistently been the major single investor into the
UK with American capital stocks in 2007 totalling nearly $400
billion and creating employment for approximately 1 million people.
In 2008-09, UKTI succeeded in attracting 621 (out of a total of
1,744) Foreign Direct Investment projects to the UK creating 12,888
new jobs in the process.
The UK is also the largest investor in the US (with a total investment
stock of $411 billion at the end of 2007), supporting almost 1
18. The scale of the recent financial crisis has
also highlighted the importance of UK-US economic ties. Both countries
have been affected by the vulnerability of banks and financial
institutions to troubles in the US economy, and both have accepted
the need for strong co-ordination between the US Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England (as well as with the European Central
Bank). On the financial
front, there has been close UK-US co-operation. One written submission
stated that London's role as "the number two global financial
centre promotes the overall US-UK relationship", and is particularly
important as repair of the global financial system continues to
sit high on the international agenda.
The FCO's written submission pointed to the extent of the UK's
engagement with the US both bilaterally and in international fora
such as the G20, where the UK has been keen to adopt a common
approach to the global economic crisis and to secure a sustainable
19. Since we last reported on UK-US relations in
2001, global patterns of power have shifted considerably. In particular,
the emergence of countries like China, India and Brazil as major
economic and political powers, has challenged the long-standing
pre-eminence of North America and Europe. However, the fact remains,
as the FCO noted, that in spite of these changes the United States
remains the world's only superpower "economically, diplomatically
The US produces more than 23% of world GDP (according to World
Bank figures for 2008), making it larger than that of any other
country and almost three times larger than that of the second
largest economy, Japan. Current forecasts suggest that, at its
current levels of growth, China's GDP is unlikely to overtake
that of the US for more than a decade.
The FCO also pointed out that the US combination of high spending
on science and research, ready access to venture capital and its
entrepreneurial business culture have given it, since the Second
World War, a technological lead over other countries. The US is
also unrivalled in its ability to wield military power and exercise
political influence across the globe, and it remains a key member
of the global system of multilateral institutions.
20. From a British perspective, therefore, the imperative
to maintain a close relationship with the US is clear. As Dr Robin
Niblett told us, "the US is the world's pre-eminent power;
its engagement and decisions are vital to nearly all priorities
for British foreign policyfrom negotiations to combat climate
change and to control nuclear non-proliferation to stabilizing
Afghanistan. It is natural for British policy-makers to want to
be as close to their US counterparts as possible and to try to
influence their policy choices".
Many other witnesses made similar points. Lord Hurd noted in his
At the heart of the relationship lies a simple
fact. British defence policy rests on the assumption that we will
not fight a major war except in partnership with the United States.
It follows that it is crucially in our interest to understand
and influence American foreign policy. Moreover, our standing
in the rest of the world will be shaped in part by the perceived
extent of that influence.
21. For its part, it is arguable that the US also
benefits from its relationship with the UK in a number of ways.
Much of the evidence we received pointed to the added value that
the UK provides in respect of defence and intelligence matters
(this is examined in more detail in Chapter 3). British support
for the US in multilateral fora has helped to allay charges of
The UK remains an important US ally in NATO and in the UN Security
Council. For instance, it has played an important role as a key
US ally in attempts to contain Iran's nuclear programme, as well
as joining the US as an advocate for open markets in the International
Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation. As Dr David Dunn
noted, the ability of the UK to advance common interests with
the US is greatly valued in Washington.
We were told that the US looks to the UK for staunch support
of US policies at the United Nations, that the US usually reciprocates
and that co-operation at the UN is close.
The US is also said particularly to value UK engagement beyond
Europe in difficult security situations where other allies are
reluctant to become involved, and to continue to regard the UK
as its partner of first choice outside East Asia, Francophone
Africa, and Latin America.
22. As Lord Hurd commented in his written evidence,
disagreements even between good allies "are inevitable".
Nor are disagreements a new phenomenon; there is no doubt that
differences have been evident as long as the UK-US relationship
has existed. During the Cold War period, foreign policy differences
were particularly marked at the time of the Suez crisis and over
the issue of the Vietnam War. When we produced our last Report
on British-US relations, in 2001, we identified a range of issues
where there was marked divergence between the UK and US at that
time. These include issues such as arms control, the International
Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.
23. Dr Niblett noted that British and US perceptions
of the nature of certain international risks and the appropriate
policy solutions are not always "in synch". This was
apparent during the George W. Bush Administration, when the US
position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, on combating climate change
and on some of the techniques that were used in pursuit in the
global "War on Terror" ran counter to British approaches.
24. Tactical rifts are also an ongoing risk. Dr Niblett
pointed to the unmasking of the plot to blow up transatlantic
airliners in August 2006 which revealed important differences
in British and US approaches to counter-terrorism. He also saw
a "growing gap" between the extensive resources and
troop levels which the US Administration can deploy in distant
military theatres like Iraq and Afghanistan and the more limited
resources available to Britain.
25. More recently, and during the course of our inquiry,
a number of other UK-US disagreements have come to the fore. Prominent
amongst these was the disagreement between the two countries over
the release on 21 August 2009 by the Scottish Justice Minister,
Kenny MacAskill MSP, on compassionate grounds, of the Lockerbie
bomber, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi. This decision caused considerable
anger within the US. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described
it as "absolutely wrong", while President Obama described
it as a "mistake". A letter from Robert Mueller, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Mr MacAskill
criticised him for failing to consult "partners in the investigation
and prosecution of those responsible for the Lockerbie tragedy".
The recent legal judgments concerning the case of former Guantánamo
detainee and British resident, Binyam Mohamed, which we discuss
below (see paragraph 115), have also led to difficulties.
26. From a UK perspective, there have been concerns
about actions taken by the US, for instance the decision to place
four Guantánamo detainees in the British Overseas Territory
of Bermuda without consulting Britain. We were told by US Administration
officials during our visit to Washington in October 2009 that
this had been a genuine error, and were assured that it would
not happen again. There has also been considerable criticism of
the US both in Parliament and the press over the case of Gary
Mackinnon, who recently lost his appeal in the House of Lords
against extradition to the US on charges of hacking into US defence
27. Another difference of approach emerged on 3 March
2010, following comments made by the US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton during a visit to Argentina when she stated that the US
would be willing to facilitate negotiations between the UK and
Argentina over the Falkland Islands if called upon to do so. She
is reported to have said "We would like to see Argentina
and the UK sit down and resolve the issues between them in a peaceful
and productive way".
The longstanding position of the British Government on the Falklands
was subsequently reiterated by the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband
to the House: "The Government have made it clear that we
have no doubt about the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands. The principle of self-determination underlies
that. There can be no negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falkland
Islands unless and until such a time as the Falkland islanders
so wish it. They have made it clear that they have no such wish".
28. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the former Ambassador
to the United Nations, told us that when the UK has disagreements
with the United States in official business, "we play out
those disagreements, we argue with the United States, in private.
We tend not to argue in public unless public explanation is necessary
or we are having a great row about something that cannot be kept
out of the public domain".
29. As Lord Hurd told us in his evidence, "if
the substance of the relationship is in good heart, it is not
necessary to worry about secondary though important arguments
which blow up as storms crossing the Atlantic".
Referring specifically to the disagreement over the release of
Mr al-Megrahi, Lord Hurd argued that "disagreements
properly handled do not go deep; they represent accurately a genuine
difference of approach, illustrated in this [
] case by the
different attitudes of the relatives of the victims of the bombing
on each side of the Atlantic".
Likewise, Heather Conley and Reginald Dale
described the al-Megrahi affair as no more than "a short-term
irritant". They added that "senior US officials have
assured their UK counterparts that the Lockerbie incident in no
way endangers intelligence and security co-operation".
This assessment echoes what we were told during our visit to the
US in October 2009.
30. We conclude that recent minor disagreements
between the UK and US do not in any way threaten the underlying
strength of the bilateral relationship. However, they do highlight
the need for better understanding between the UK and US governments
if the strength of the relationship is not to be eroded over the
THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH MEDIA
31. The British media are swift to report on any
alleged fractures in the 'special relationship'. For instance,
in September 2009 there was much play made of claims that UK officials
made five unsuccessful attempts to secure official talks with
the US President when the UN General Assembly met in New York.
The Daily Telegraph described how the Prime Minister had
to "settle" for an informal discussion with President
Obama after a climate change dinner at the UN, conducted as a
15 minute "walk and chat through the kitchen of the UN headquarters
as both men left the building in Manhattan".
President Obama's decision to remove a bust of Winston Churchill
from the Oval Office at the start of his Presidency led to similar
angst on the part of some British broadsheets and tabloids. Commenting
on the press outcry, an article in the US edition of Newsweek
Has America's even-tempered new President already
ruffled feathers in the land that spawned Borat and Benny Hill?
That's certainly how the spiky British press responded after the
White House sent back to the British Embassy a bust of Sir Winston
Churchill that had occupied a cherished spot in President Bush's
But the British press, as is its wont, smells
a snub. The Telegraph speculated that British diplomats'
pulse rates would soar, while The Times of London wondered
if a shadow had been cast over the special US-UK relationship.
A spokesperson for the British Embassy, though, threw cold tea
on the notion, pointing out British politician David Miliband
was the first foreign minister to meet with US Secretary of State
32. The response in the White House to the fallout
in the British media appeared to be one of mild bemusement, as
Justin Webb of the BBC told us:
I was speaking to [an]Administration official
about the bust of Churchill and the way in which it was rather
unceremoniously taken in a taxi to the British Embassy, and the
fallout, particularly in the British press. He said, "We
thought it was Eisenhower. They all look the same to us".
33. Our witnesses were uniformly of the view that
the British media's pre-occupation with personal relations between
the two countries' leaders and the state of the 'special relationship'
is frequently at the expense of coverage of the more substantive
aspects of the relationship.
Professor Michael Clarke argues that "there is too
much political capital [
] invested by UK observers, and
by the British media in general, in the personal chemistry between
US President and British Prime Minister".
Sir Jeremy Greenstock told us that "the degree to which the
press fixate over this is reminiscent of Snow White saying 'Mirror,
mirror, on the wall, who is fairest of them all?'"
Sir Jeremy also argued that press coverage was too personalised,
often consisting of "silly spasms".
Summing up the views of most of our witnesses, Lord Hurd
told us that "the press are always keen to exaggerate the
nature of UK-US differences; this is a cost which has to be borne
as calmly as possible".
34. We conclude that in some cases the British
media performs a valuable role in informing the public about the
state of UK-US relations, but frequently it indulges in speculation
about relations between the Prime Minister and the President.
Important though personal relations at the highest level may be,
they form only one aspect of the transatlantic relationship.
Foreign policy alignment
35. The importance that the UK attaches to its relationship
with the US is stated clearly in the FCO's written submission,
which claimed that the UK's ability to achieve its international
objectives will be "immeasurably greater" if the UK's
objectives are shared with the US.
As a result of the more multilateral approach adopted by President
Obama, UK and US views now seem to converge on a greater range
of issues than under the previous US Administration.
The FCO's written evidence set out in detail the respective approaches
of the UK and US on a range of issues, and the extent of co-operation
on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East Peace Process,
counter-terrorism, NATO, nuclear issues, climate security, international
fora, arms control, non-proliferation, defence, intelligence,
the UN, and global and trade policy issues, as well as on policies
in relation to a host of individual countries. We are grateful
to the FCO for providing this comprehensive assessment which we
have published in full. The FCO's written submission also stated:
All countries have national interests which are
particular to them and not shared with others. The UK and US are
no exception. But to a very great extent we also have shared interests
in combating violent extremism around the world, and addressing
the poverty, ignorance and conflict which underlies it; in promoting
good governance; in supporting development and economic growth
to the benefit of the world's poorest countries.
36. Robert Hunter, a former US Ambassador to NATO,
told us in his written submission that "in most areas, US
and UK foreign policies have been compatible, to a consistency
the US finds with no other major European country. Despite the
improvement of Franco-American relations (and France's renewed
full integration in NATO's integrated military structure), the
US still looks to the UK as its 'first partner', at least in security
terms, even though at least outside of the current global economic
downturnthe US looks more to Germany as a leading economic
partner and to the EU overall in economic relations".
37. Notwithstanding the recent increase in alignment
between the UK and US, areas of divergence continue to exist on
a number of issues. As Dr Robin Niblett told us, this is most
obvious "in dealing with the reassertion of Russian power,
instability in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the need to find
a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the rise of
China's power in East Asia". He noted that in many of these
areas of foreign policy, "the UK hews closer to the view
of other EU Member States than it does to current US approaches".
He stated that on these issues, "Britain will be hard-pushed
either to convince the US to alter its policy approach or to build
a transatlantic consensus for action".
President Obama has declared himself the first "Pacific"
38. We conclude that under the Obama administration
there is a significantly greater degree of alignment with the
UK on a number of key policy areas. However, as is perhaps inevitable,
there remain some key areas of British interest where policies
continue to diverge. In these areas the UK may work more effectively
in harness with other countries, including its European partners.
39. Official Government statements from both the
UK and the US maintain that the 'special relationship' is in good
health. Senior politicians on both sides of the Atlantic seem
obliged to deploy the phrase whenever they refer to UK-US relations.
For instance, during her visit to London in October 2009, Hillary
Clinton spoke of the "historic importance of the special
relationship between our two nations", before extending that
description to her relations with the Prime Minister.
During our October 2009 visit to Washington DC, many of our American
interlocutors mentioned, unprompted, the 'special relationship'.
When the Prime Minister visited Washington in March 2009, the
President's official statement used a variant on the phrase, talking
of "a special partnership".
In oral evidence we were told that US ambassadors to the UK "tend
to love it [the phrase, 'special relationship'] because it gives
them something to talk about, basically, 365 days of the year".
However, many of our witnesses argued that official US rhetoric
masks a more complex reality. Lord Hurd cautioned that:
the survival and success of the partnership depends
on the usefulness of Britain to the United States as an efficient
ally. We are sometimes deceived on this point by the courtesy
of the Americans in their appearing to regard the Anglo-American
partnership as crucial to the United States when in fact it is
40. Much of the evidence we have received suggests
that it would be more appropriate to use the phrase 'special relationship'
in relation to specific areas of UK-US co-operation, in relation
to nuclear, intelligence, counter-terrorism, security and military
matters, than in relation to the totality of UK-US relations.
(We examine the extent of co-operation in these specific areas
in more detail in Chapter 3.) Professor Michael Clarke of RUSI
argued that, when the context does not emphasise these elements,
or when they are not utilised successfully, it is difficult to
discern in Washington's eyes what is 'special' about the UK.
41. Dr Robin Niblett considered that many of the
"drivers" that gave rise to the special relationship
no longer exist, not least the threat of Soviet domination and
the fear in the US that a unified Europe might pose a serious
challenge and threat to US interests. In his view, a shift in
US perspective away from the UK has been under way for some time,
"certainly since the end of the Cold War and the beginning
of the Clinton Administration".
He told us that although tactical co-operation on defence and
intelligence remain strong, at a strategic level the Obama Administration
was now conducting its diplomatic relations on multiple levels
simultaneously, and not all of these levels contained the UK as
a key US partner".
42. There may be, as Nick Witney told us, advantages
in literally speaking the same language because it makes it easier
to converse, exchange ideas and act as a sounding board, but he
and others were of the view that the UK no longer has "the
particular advantage that we have liked to believe we have".
Indeed, it is clear that the US views its relationship with the
UK as one of a growing number of 'special' relationships, which
extend to, for instance, Israel, Canada, Mexico, China and Japan.
As Stryker McGuire told us: "China and Japan now own 47%
of US Treasury securities. They basically have their hand around
the neck of the dollar".
43. There is an asymmetry in mutual awareness between
the US and UK which means that the phrase 'special relationship'
does not have the same resonance with the American public as it
does in the UK. Indeed, it is not a phrase that would likely to
be used by most Americans. Heather Conley and Reginald Dale told
us that "the phrase 'special relationship', although commonplace
in British political and media circles, is seldom used by Americans
outside a small core policy group in Washington, DC".
Interestingly, nor do British officials use the term 'special
relationship' any longer, as Sir Jeremy Greenstock told us. He
We might have to respond to it in public if it
is thrown at us by Americans, but we don't regard it as special:
we regard [the relationship] as an asset that has to be nurtured
and worked at, and the access to the United States in terms of
politicians, officials and Members of Congress has to be earned
because we're bringing something to the table. That is the way
we think and work. We do not think it is special unless we are
introducing substance to make it special.
44. Justin Webb of the BBC told us that within the
current US Administration there is "a level of real frustration
and eye-raising at what they perceive as the obsession of the
Brits with their relationship with the Americans". He stated:
In preparation for coming to see you, I asked
someone in the White House to take a minute or so with a senior
Administration official the other day and have a quick word on
the current feeling. He said that he had 30 seconds: the Administration
official said, "Get out of my room. I'm sick of that subject.
You're all mad". There is a sense in the Obama press office
that we obsess about this.
This was not a view that was shared by Ivan Lewis,
the Minister of State who, when asked whether he believed that
senior US officials think that the UK is obsessed with the 'special
relationship', simply replied "No".
45. It is unsurprising that some office holders in
the US Administration think the UK has what Justin Webb describes
as "a neuralgia" about 'the special relationship',
given that in the UK the omission of the words 'special relationship'
at a high level political meeting, whether deliberate or not,
can be enough to generate what Stryker McGuire described as much
"hand-wringing" on the part of many British media commentators
who appear to fear, and regularly forecast, the imminent demise
of the 'special relationship'.
46. Our witnesses were in agreement that while the
relationship is still special in some respects, the use of the
phrase to cover every aspect of the bilateral relationship is
outdated, or in the view of Dr Allin, a post-World War Two coinage
which has now "almost become a fetish".
Stryker McGuire went further when he argued that "the last
thing Britain needs is more talk about the special relationship".
He added that while the relationship is an important one, "the
phrase and the way it's used by politicians, and even more so
by the media, has caused [
] a problem [
]. The relationship
is what it is and it has been what it is for quite some time".
Others, like Dr Robin Niblett, emphasised the fact that the relationship
cannot have the uniqueness that many in the UK expect it to have:
We wish it was unique; it is not unique, it is
special. But where it is specialand it is likely to be
a very important area for the next 10 to 20 yearswhere
we can help each other, is on counter-terrorism and that complex
aspect of security that requires a sharing of information and
] That is in both our national interests.
47. Sir David Manning also concluded that "if
the special relationship is hyped too much, expectations are exaggerated
about what it can deliver and what to expect from it. [
Sentiment can be used from time to time in support of a policy.
I don't think one should disguise the fact that warmth between
the two countries can help us, but it is certainly not a policy
in its own right".
48. We conclude that the UK has an extremely close
and valuable relationship with the US in specific areas of co-operation,
for instance in the fields of intelligence and security; that
the historic, trading and cultural links between the two countries
are profound; and that the two countries share common values in
their commitment to freedom, democracy and the rule of law. However,
the use of the phrase 'the special relationship' in its historical
sense, to describe the totality of the ever-evolving UK-US relationship,
is potentially misleading, and we recommend that its use should
be avoided. The overuse of the phrase by some politicians and
many in the media serves simultaneously to de-value its meaning
and to raise unrealistic expectations about the benefits the relationship
can deliver to the UK. We further conclude that there is nothing
wrong in acknowledging the undoubted truth that the UK has a
special relationship with the US, as long as it is recognised
that other countries do so also, including the regional neighbours
of the US and its other key strategic allies and partners.
5 Ev 87 Back
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Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2001-02, British-US
Relations, HC 327, 11 December 2001 Back
Ev 119 Back
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"Lockerbie bomber: Letter from FBI director Robert Mueller",
Daily Telegraph, 23 August 2009 Back
For discussion on this see, for example, Oral evidence taken before
the Home Affairs Committee on 15 December 2009, HC 165, Q 97 Back
"Clinton: US will help resolve Falklands oil row", The
Guardian, 2 March 2010 Back
HC Deb, 2 Mar 2010, col 788 Back
Q 127 Back
Ev 83 Back
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Ev 106 Back
"Barack Obama rebuffs Gordon Brown as 'special relationship'
sinks to new low", Daily Telegraph, 23 September 2009
Kate Connelly, "Busted: The Churchill Flap", Newsweek,
21 February 2009 Back
Q 99 Back
Q 170 Back
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Q 11 Back
Q 11 [Dr Allin] Back
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Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan,
14 November 2009 Back
"Hillary Clinton meets Gordon Brown amid mounting tensions
over Iran", The Times, 12 October 2009 Back
Statement by the Press Secretary on an Upcoming Working Visit
to Washington by Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom,
White House Press Office, 21 February 2009 Back
Q 94 [Mr McGuire] Back
Ev 83 Back
Ev 139; Ev 120 Back
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Q 55 [Mr Witney] Back
For example, Q 116 [Mr McGuire] Back
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Q 162 Back
Q 94 Back
Stryker McGuire, "An Island, Lost At Sea", Newsweek,
23 February 2009 Back
Q 14 Back
Stryker McGuire, "Why put yourself through all this?",
The Independent, 5 March 2009 Back
Q 104 Back
Q 14 Back
Q 126 Back