3 KEY AREAS OF CO-OPERATION
Military and defence co-operation
49. There is widespread agreement that the defence
relationship between the UK and the US is a central plank of the
wider bilateral relationship.[86]
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has provided the largest
and, according to Professor William Wallace and Christopher Phillips,
the "most effective" non-American contingent in three
US-led extra-European conflicts[87]:
the two Iraq wars in 1991 and 2003 respectively, where
British support for the US-led coalition was important both domestically
in the US and internationally; and the intervention in Afghanistan
since 2001, where UK support has been described as "instrumental
to US policy" and where a UK withdrawal would have a significant
impact on the US.[88]
50. At a practical level, military liaison arrangements,
individual secondments between American and British officers,
planning at Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in Tampa, Florida
and information-sharing in general remain, according to Professor
Clarke, "vigorous and intense". He believed that the
closest military relationships existed between the two navies
and air forces, though ground forces less so.[89]
Within the realm of Special Forces operations, Professor Clarke
added that there was "good co-operation and unconfirmed evidence
that in Iraq UK intelligence and Special Forces played key roles
in the neutralisation of Al Qaeda-Iraq after 2006".[90]
British military and civilian officials have also had privileged
access to US defence planning. Officials from the Ministry of
Defence were embedded in the Pentagon team that conducted the
2005 US Quadrennial Defense Review, for the first time in such
a process. Others are seconded to US naval headquarters in Norfolk,
Virginia and to a number of research and development programmes
across the United States.[91]
51. In the UK, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
acknowledged the importance and indeed centrality of the US to
UK defence efforts. The subsequent 2003 Defence White Paper did
likewise.[92] The FCO
too, told us that the UK's national security depended on a uniquely
close partnership with the US, both in NATO and bilaterally. Its
submission continued: "at its heart, the relationship relies
on sharing the burdens of nuclear deterrence, the benefits of
intelligence and technology, and the risks of military operations.
As a result, we have maintained an exceptional level of trust
and understanding".[93]
One other consequence of note, as Professor Chalmers wrote in
his written evidence, is that UK's current military capabilities
are now "primarily designed to be used as contributions to
collective operations, rather than in defence of uniquely national
interests".[94]
This was reaffirmed in the Government's Green Paper on the Strategic
Defence Review, published on 3 February 2010, which stated that
"no nation can hope to protect all aspects of national security
by acting alone", and that "international partnerships
will remain essential to our security, both membership of multilateral
organisationslike NATO, the EU and the UNand bilateral
relationships, especially with the US".[95]
CASE STUDY: AFGHANISTAN
52. According to the FCO, there are few areas of
contemporary foreign policy in which the UK and US co-operate
as closely as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether in diplomatic,
military or development terms. President Obama's re-calibrated
strategy on Afghanistan showed "a high degree of convergence
with the UK strategy presented to the House of Commons in December
2007".[96] Seventeen
British personnel were embedded in US Central Command in late
2008 while it conducted a review of the coalition's strategy in
Afghanistan.
53. On the ground, there is close co-ordination of
UK and US resources through a wide range of structures. The FCO
highlighted the existence of "UK and US military forces and
civilian experts, including development and rule of law specialists,
working with Afghan counterparts and other international partners
to deliver our comprehensive approach on the ground in the Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah".[97]
The FCO has also been working with the US as they develop their
civilian plans, sharing UK experiences in Helmand and helping
with national level development programmes, whilst also encouraging
the US to align their assistance behind Afghan development priorities
and strengthen the capacity of Afghan government institutions.
54. Military co-operation increased in 2009 as the
UK and US conducted simultaneous and joint military operations
in Helmand with a view to clearing the insurgency from major population
centres to improve long-term security and create a safe environment
for voters during the Presidential election in late August 2009.[98]
As Professor Clarke's written submission made clear, UK forces
in Afghanistan have been given status "by the appointment
of a British 3-star general as Deputy Commander ISAF, and the
new military constellation that sees Sir David Richards as Chief
of the General Staff, General Nick Parker as the new DCOMISAF,
the US General Stanley McChrystal as Commander ISAF, and General
David Petraeus as CENTCOM commander".[99]
In January 2010, the UK's then Ambassador to Kabul, Mark Sedwill,
was appointed as NATO's new Senior Civilian Representative in
Afghanistan, adding another senior British voice to NATO's machinery
in Afghanistan. Professor Clarke added that "this promises
a new effort to run the operation more genuinely from Kabul rather
than from national capitals, with a greater focus on genuine counter-insurgency
operations, and a clear mission in Helmand for British forces
to deepen their hold on the central areas - Lashkar Gah, Babaji,
Gereshk - to make the 'inkspot strategy' of counter-insurgency
irreversible".[100]
Below at paragraph 59, we discuss some of the challenges that
the UK faces in respect of its military co-operation with the
US in Afghanistan.
55. We conclude that stabilisation in Afghanistan
does require provision of security, good governance, and a belief
within the local population that international forces will outlast
the insurgents. We further conclude, as we stated in our Report,
Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, that there can
be no question of the international community abandoning Afghanistan,
and that the need for the international community to convey publicly
that it intends to outlast the insurgency and remain in Afghanistan
until the Afghan authorities are able to take control of their
own security, must be a primary objective.
DEFENCE TRADE
56. The defence trade between the US and UK is worth
approximately $2.8 billion per year.[101]
Although the US sources a relatively small proportion of its defence
equipment from overseas, the UK is the biggest offshore supplier
to the US military and indeed the US is the second largest importer
of UK defence goods, after Saudi Arabia.[102]
The US is also the Ministry of Defence's biggest supplier and
a number of US companies now have a presence in the UK including
Boeing, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, ITT, General Dynamics,
Harris, Rockwell and Northrop Grumman. In the US, British companies
such as BAE Systems, QinetiQ, Rolls-Royce, Cobham, Ultra and Martin
Baker contribute in various ways to the US defence industrial
base. UKTI argued that they have been "highly successful
in meeting niche requirements in avionics, vehicle communications,
military bridging, howitzers, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear (CBRN) defence equipment".[103]
In total, British companies employ around 117,000 people in virtually
all of the 50 US states.[104]
According to Professor Wallace and Christopher Phillips, "given
the dominant size of the US defence market, and its technological
lead, this is an immense advantage to British companiesand
to the British Government, so long as the UK is committed to maintaining
a substantial defence".[105]
57. The UK and US are also partners in 22 collaborative
equipment programmes, the most significant of which is the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) programme. This involves some 100 British
companies, within which the UK is considered to be a 'Level One'
privileged partner.
CURRENT CHALLENGES
58. Professor Chalmers argued that the Government's
commitment to maintaining a position as the US's leading ally
(previously in Iraq and now in Afghanistan) has been a driving
force in recent decisions to commit forces to major operations.
He added that this desire has also been a key driver in debates
on how geographical responsibilities in theatres of operations
have been shared, and on the extent to which the UK armed forces
have been given operational autonomy over their area of responsibility.[106]
The practical consequences of this were highlighted by Lord Walker,
the Chief of the General Staff during the Iraq war, when he gave
evidence to the Iraq Inquiry. He said that the MoD had several
options available in terms of the contribution the UK could make
to the military effort, but that ultimately the largest package,
involving a large land force option, was chosen because the military
felt this was important to their relations with the US military,
and also because it would help army morale.[107]
Professor Chalmers also argued that each of the UK's armed services
have sought to maintain a high level of interoperability, as well
as something close to what he describes as "qualitative parity",
with their US counterparts, a task which has been made all the
more difficult by rapid technological change.[108]
As Professor Chalmers stated, "none of this is cheap".[109]
We consider issues relating to defence spending in more detail
below at paragraph 80.
US military perceptions of the British armed forces
59. Since we last reported on UK-US relations in
2001, the vast bulk of British military deployment in combat operations
has been undertaken in support of US-led interventions, most notably
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the desire of the UK to use its
position as the US's leading military ally to allow it to exercise
influence at an operational level and to punch above its weight
internationally, US perceptions of the British armed forces are
important.
60. In recent joint operations the UK has typically
sought to send forces at least 15% the size of the US contingent,[110]
and, as we noted above at paragraph 54, has tried to ensure
that British officers are appointed to second-in-command positions,
as is currently the case in Afghanistan, thus ensuring British
influence at an operational level.[111]
As an example of the linkage between the scale of forces committed
and the degree of influence exercised over decision-making, Professor
Chalmers noted that the UK was the leading ISAF power on the ground
in Helmand between 2006 and 2008, and as such had a commensurate
share in shaping policy in that province. However, he added that
"once the US began to deploy large forces to the province
in 2009, the UK's ability to set the ISAF agenda in Helmand, and
indeed in southern Afghanistan as a whole, began to decline".[112]
61. During the course of our inquiry, reports of
apparent US military dissatisfaction with British tactics and
equipment came to our attention.[113]
This issue was also raised in some of the written submissions
we received. For instance, Heather Conley and Reginald Dale stated
that defence co-operation has been "endangered by what Americans
(and many British officers) see as the British Army's poor performance
in Basra, in Iraq, and by the Army's lack of appropriate counter-insurgency
equipment to fight in Afghanistandue to the Brown Government's
decision not to provide additional resources".[114]
Dr Dunn stated that "without an expansion of the Army and
proper equipment including more helicopters, the UK will be continue
to be viewed as a failing force of diminishing value to Washington".[115]
Like many other commentators, he argued that British armed forces
have been increasingly asked to do more and more with consistently
fewer resources,[116]
and that this has had an impact on UK-US relations in a number
of ways. He stated that in respect of Afghanistan, a view exists
in the US that the British Army has been deployed in such a way
and on such a scale that "it stands on the verge of strategic
defeat, and that only with the surge of US combat troops to fight
in Helmand and elsewhere will the situation be saved". He
added that "American criticism of this nature is not of the
fighting skills of the British Army but of the way that they have
been deployed, the resources they have had to do the job with
and the subsequent limitations of role that this has implied".[117]
62. We asked Professor Chalmers whether he attached
any importance to the negative views that allegedly exist within
the US defence establishment. He responded that he would attach
importance to them and that they should be regarded "with
due concern". The UK has tried to follow recent developments
in the US approach despite the fact that its resources were much
more constrained. He added that in future the UK ought to be more
wary about "taking on tasks that basically involve having
the main responsibility for entire areas", such as Basra
or Helmand, and that "one of the implications for us when
thinking about the future of our defence forces and future defence
operations is whether we might be better taking on tasks that
we are sure we can do or are more confident about in order to
show the Americans that we will do what we promise".[118]
63. Professor Chalmers told us that although the
UK military remains one of the most powerful in Europe, "the
resources in the country are such that we found ourselves very
quickly overstretched in Helmand. Fortunately, the Americans are
now there in great strength and are supporting us. We left ourselves
vulnerable to that possibility by being prepared in the first
place to say that we would take on such a difficult area by ourselves".[119]
64. Professor Clarke argued that UK military contributions
to the Afghan operation "have to overcome some legacy issues
in the minds of many US military analysts and American politicians".[120]
He told us that the British Operation in Basra between 2003
and 2009 is regarded as "a disappointment; successful in
the early phase but unable to cope fully when the operation became
something different." He pointed to the fact that:
US military professionals well understand that
UK forces have borne the overwhelming brunt of the fighting since
2006, but also understand that the UK's contributions in Helmand,
still less in Kandahar and Kabul, are too small to be left to
do the job alone, now that 'support for nation-building' has turned
into a small regional war.[121]
65. Professor Clarke believed it was vital for UK
forces to overcome these "legacy issues" and re-establish
their credibility in the minds of US military planners and politicians
by prosecuting a successful counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand.
The Coalition could not win the Afghan war only in Helmand, "but
it can certainly lose it there if the present strategy is seen
by the world not to prevail".[122]
66. In our August 2009 Report on Global Security:
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we set out our assessment that British
operations were beginning to produce dividends in Helmand. Subsequent
testimony supports this,[123]
and informally we have been told that the tremendous work which
has been undertaken by British forces recently has gone a considerable
way to overcoming the Basra legacy issues described by some of
our witnesses. It is also worth noting that in his August 2009
Strategic Assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, the US Commander
of ISAF, General Stanley McChrystal, stated that changes were
required if the international mission in Afghanistan is to be
successful. We note that many of the suggestions he made have
been practised by the British task force in Helmand for over eighteen
months and that the US is now co-operating with UK forces on this
basis.[124] All of
this information suggests that the view of US troops on the ground
in Afghanistan is broadly supportive of the British armed forces.
However, it remains unclear as to whether this view is replicated
more widely in the US defence establishment.
67. Many of the senior interlocutors from the US
Administration that we met during our visit to the US were adamant
that senior officials in the Administration and the military were
entirely supportive of the UK's contribution in Afghanistan. Giving
a military perspective, General Petraeus, the head of US Central
Command, has also stated publicly that he has "always been
impressed by the courage, capacity for independent action, skill
and exceptional will of [British] soldiers".[125]
Regarding the UK forces deployed to Afghanistan he said: "British
troops have been in a very tough place and they have done exceedingly
well".[126]
68. We asked Ivan Lewis, Minister of State at the
FCO, for his views on this issue. He responded by saying that,
"I think that the General Petraeuses of this world are rather
respected figures, and maybe we should listen to them rather than
to some unnamed, anonymous individualswithout being too
disrespectful".[127]
69. We conclude that reports of dissatisfaction
with the capabilities of the British military amongst some middle-ranking
and senior US officers must give cause for concern. However, we
further conclude that, on the basis of the evidence we have received,
these reports appears to be exaggerated in their substance. Notwithstanding
this, the fact that these perceptions appear to exist at all remains
disturbing, given the considerable effort that has been expended
and the sacrifices that have been made by British armed forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Defence trade co-operation and collaboration
70. In 2000, the US promised to grant the UK a waiver
from its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The
waiver would have allowed the UK to acquire and make use of certain
US military technologies without going through a long approval
process for a licence. However, this waiver was not in the event
granted, in part due to Congressional concerns that the UK had
not strengthened its laws governing exports to third countries
such as China.[128]
71. In June 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister
Blair signed a treaty that would end the need for a separate US
export licence for each item of defence equipment and technology
sent to the UK. The objectives of the UK-US Defence Trade Cooperation
Treaty are to improve interoperability between the UK and US armed
forces, support combined military or counter-terrorism operations,
and reduce the current barriers to the exchange of defence goods,
services, technical data and the sharing of classified information
in support of co-operative defence research, development and production
and in certain defence and security projects where the UK or the
US is the end-user.[129]
The Treaty has been the subject of ongoing inquiry by the Defence
Committee.[130]
72. Although the Treaty was ratified by the UK in
early 2008, it has not yet entered into force because it remains
subject to ratification by the US Senate. The FCO's written submission
stated that "the UK continues to work closely with the US
Administration to prepare for ratification and subsequent implementation".[131]
We raised our concerns about the delay in ratification in a number
of meetings with relevant US interlocutors during our visit in
October 2009. We were told that the Administration understood
the importance of making progress in the Senate and remained fully
committed to pushing ahead with ratification. However, despite
strong expectations that the matter would be resolved in October
2009, this has not yet happened.
73. We are disappointed that despite promises
to do so, the US Senate has not yet ratified the UK-US Defence
Trade Cooperation Treaty. We conclude that its swift ratification
is imperative and would bring a range of benefits to both countries,
including the enhanced ability of British forces to work with
their US counterparts in current and future joint operations.
We recommend that the FCO should continue to press strongly its
contacts in the Administration and Congress to make rapid progress
with this matter.
74. Other problems in the field of defence trade
co-operation have been the subject of extensive comment by the
Defence Committee and others.[132]
A frequent difficulty is that with regard to defence procurement
in the American system, the Administration may propose but Congress,
as keeper of the purse-strings, disposes. As Professor Clarke
commented to us, "presidential favour only goes so far in
day to day US politics".[133]
By way of example he cited the fact that despite support in the
White House for the UK's request to have full access to all software
codes on the US Joint Strike Fighter Project, a project in which
the UK has invested heavily in both financial and opportunity
costs, there has been "little evidence of more than a strictly
commercial approach on the part of the US Congress, still less
the manufacturers". He stated that when it comes to commercial
defence interests "there is evidence of sympathy for UK positions
but little practical effect".[134]
Accountability of US bases on British territory
75. The UK acts as the host for US military facilities
within Britain and elsewhere. These include two major air bases
at RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall in East Anglia, a forward
operating base at RAF Fairford in Glouscestershire, a US intercept
and intelligence analysis station at RAF Menwith Hill in North
Yorkshire, an intelligence analysis centre at RAF Molesworth in
Cambridgeshire, and eight other small bases.[135]
The US also has significant military installations in two British
Overseas Territories, with communications and landing facilities
at Ascension Island and a major naval base at Diego Garcia in
the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). According to Professor
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, "the United States
benefits very considerably from the provision of these bases",
while "Britain benefits from this power projection to the
extent that it shares US objectives". Professor Wallace added
that the countervailing costs to the UK are largely intangible
but may be summarised as "the cession of sovereignty over
British territory, within a framework where executive agreements
largely beyond public or parliamentary accountability rest upon
mutual trust between the British and American administrations".[136]
Referring to the arrangements in place for British oversight of
US military bases in the UK, Professor Wallace stated that:
[
] when the Americans upgraded the Fylingdales
radar system, Her Majesty's Chief Scientific Adviser went to Washington
to ask about the technical specifications of the upgraded radar,
and he was not allowed to see classified material. That seems
to me rather odd for a major installation on the sovereign territory
of the United Kingdom.[137]
76. Professor Wallace argued that there ought to
be a form of parliamentary scrutiny of these bases beyond current
arrangements which permit visits by the Intelligence and Security
Committee, as well as full Government disclosure of the status
and currency of lease arrangements entered into with the US.[138]
77. In respect of Diego Garcia, Professor Wallace
argued that the claim that the territory is under British command
"is completely offset by the relatively junior nature of
the attached squadron leader who is usually the only person there".[139]
In previous Reports we have discussed issues relating to the US
presence on Diego Garcia.[140]
In the most recent of these, our 2009 review of the FCO's responsibilities
for human rights, we expressed serious concern about the island's
use by the US for the purposes of extraordinary rendition. We
concluded that it was unacceptable that the Government had not
taken steps to obtain the full details of the two individuals
who were rendered through Diego Garcia and that the use of Diego
Garcia for US rendition flights without the knowledge or consent
of the British Government raised disquieting questions about the
effectiveness of the Government's exercise of its responsibilities
in relation to this territory. We further concluded that it was
a matter of concern that many allegations continue to be made
that the two acknowledged instances of rendition through BIOT
do not represent the limit of the territory's use for this purpose,
and we added that "it is extremely difficult for the British
Government to assess the veracity of these allegations without
active and candid co-operation from the US Administration".
The Government did not accept our conclusions.[141]
78. Professor Chalmers told us:
The UK itself, as well as bases in Diego Garcia,
Ascension Island and Cyprus, is very important to the United States.
When we have discussions that are framed around the proposition
that unless we do A, B or C we will threaten our relationship
with the United States, we have to remember that those bases are
really quite an important card for us, which we do not have to
remind the Americans of. They know they are important to their
interests, but it does mean that we can be a little more self-confident
that the Americans are not going to take steps that are fundamentally
against our interests, without there being consequences.[142]
79. We conclude that the issues relating to rendition
through Diego Garcia to which we have previously drawn attention
raise disturbing questions about the uses to which US bases on
British territory are put. We greatly regret the fact that there
are considerable constraints upon the abilities of both the UK
Government and Parliament to scrutinise and oversee many of the
longstanding agreements which govern US use of British territory.
We recommend that the Government should establish a comprehensive
review of the current arrangements governing US military use of
facilities within the UK and in British Overseas Territories,
with a view to identifying shortcomings in the current system
of scrutiny and oversight by the UK Government and Parliament,
and report to Parliament on proposals to remedy these whilst having
regard to the value of these facilities to the security of the
UK.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
80. The ability to fight alongside US forces is,
in the view of many of our witnesses, one of the most important
practical and tangible assets that the UK can offer the US in
support of the UK-US bilateral relationship. In her written evidence,
Frances Burwell considered that "across a broad spectrum
of US opinion, from the military to policymakers to the public
at large, Britain is seen as a country that has joined the United
States in some very difficult and dangerous tasks".[143]
In return for providing the US with this assistance, the UK has
harboured what Professor Wallace described as "expectations
of influence".[144]
According to Nick Witney,
[In] the last major Defence White Paper [in]
2003, we are saying that the job of the British armed forces is
to be sized and shaped so that we can make a chunky contribution
to an American-led operation. That will get us to the table, so
that we can be there when the decisions are taken (with the suppressed
premise that they will therefore be better decisions).[145]
81. This approach has had tactical consequences for
the military as well as strategic implications for defence and
foreign policy. Professor Chalmers noted that in respect of more
challenging operations, the UK only envisaged committing its armed
forces if the US is also doing so. Referring to British involvement
in Afghanistan, he stated:
Despite claims that the operations were vital
to the UK's national interests, there was never any question of
it being involved [
] without US military commitment. Nor,
despite the government's insistence on the threat that a Taliban-led
Afghanistan would pose to the UK, is there now any realistic possibility
that the UK would retain its armed forces in that country were
the US to leave.[146]
82. Many of our witnesses also highlighted what they
perceived to be the cost to the UK of this 'hug them close' approach.
Professor Wallace and Christopher Phillips argued that, "the
costs over the preceding ten years of maintaining Britain's position
as America's most loyal and effective ally, with a contribution
to make in all major dimensions of conflict, have been high".
They added that the US drive towards network-enabled warfare and
a steep rise in US defence procurement has left the UK "with
a heavily overcommitted future procurement programme".[147]
In support of this argument, they referred to a study by RUSI,
which estimated the British contribution to operations in Afghanistan
in 2008 at 80% of the American effort in relation to population
size and 110% in relation to GDP before concluding that "the
parallel commitment to intervention and post-conflict occupation
in Iraq has left British forces severely overstretched".[148]
83. There are many who question whether the UK can
and should continue with this level of commitment and investment.
Frances Burwell argued that the concurrent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq had revealed "the limitations of British military
forces, as well as those of everyone else", and she stated
that "the stress of frequent deployments and the loss of
lives and matériel in such operations has exacted a high
price". In her view, the increase in US military personnel
in Afghanistan meant that US forces would increasingly dominate
operations and as a consequence, "allies and partners may
wonder whether their contributions [
] are making a real
difference, beyond the immensely valuable political demonstration
of allied unity". She concluded that these pressures were
likely to make the UK "less capable and less willing to be
a significant partner in future military operations".[149]
84. Professor Clarke told us that under the present
circumstances the UK could no longer maintain its existing force
structure alongside open-ended military commitments.[150]
Professor Chalmers argued that, simply because of the two
countries' respective sizes, the US was more important to the
UK than the UK to the US, and that whether the UK was important
in particular circumstances "often depends on what we bring
to the table, whether it is the symbolic importance of being there
[
], military capabilities or basing or whatever it might
be".[151] Professor
Wallace believed that as the US shifted its strategic focus away
from Europe towards the projection of power in the Middle East
and perhaps the Asia Pacific region, it would be more difficult
for the UK to make corresponding military commitments unless "we
have long-range transport and Oceanic naval deployment, and those
things cost a lot of money".[152]
85. Many of our witnesses argued
that cuts to the defence budget could lead to a decline in Britain's
international role and influence, and thus its ultimate utility
to the United States. Dr Dunn told us that it was difficult to
predict accurately the impact of defence spending cuts but warned
that "they are likely to diminish British influence in Washington
bilaterally".[153]
86. For those who believe that defence spending must
be maintained in order for the UK to retain its influence over
the US, the financial prognosis for the Ministry of Defence is
not encouraging. In a statement to the House on 3 February 2010,
the Secretary of State for Defence said that "the forward
defence programme faces real financial pressure. We will need
to rebalance what we do in order to meet our priorities".[154]
A report by RUSI, published in January 2010, stated that "the
growing costs of UK defence capabilities, combined with cuts in
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget as a result of the nation's
fiscal crisis, will make it impossible to preserve current numbers
of service personnel and front-line capabilities". The report
projected a fall in trained UK service personnel of around 20%:
from 175,000 in 2010 to around 142,000 in 2016, arguing that this
would be the probable result of an expected cut in the defence
budget of around 10-15% in real terms, together with continuing
real annual unit cost growth of between 1% and 2% for UK defence
capabilities.[155]
Dr Dunn believed that, "the result will be that something
has to give. Whichever cuts are made will likely amount to a dramatic
reduction in Britain's traditional defence role, with wider foreign
policy implications".[156]
Access and influence
87. Even if it were to be financially affordable,
there are those who question whether the UK should continue to
try to retain its status as the United States' leading military
ally, in the light of what they perceive to be questionable returns
by way of increased access and influence. Nick Witney told us
that the assumptions which he considered had underpinned recent
UK defence and foreign policy, that the UK's defence investment
and commitment would result in an ability to influence the US,
had been "tested to destruction, first through Iraq and now
through Afghanistan. We cannot afford it. Even if we could, the
Americans are not that interested, because they are so big and
have so much power to bring to the table".[157]
He argued that the UK had to rid itself of "the illusion
that we can act as a loyal first lieutenant" which will be
"admitted to the inner councils of the American defence establishment
and will be able to guide and steer them, because the experience
of recent years has demonstrated that we can't do that".[158]
88. Professor Wallace's view was that although the
UK might have had access, this had not necessarily equated to
influence. He commented:
I was quite struck by those who told me that
we have had people embedded in the analytical stage of the discussion
of US policy towards Afghanistan, but that the Americans insisted
on taking the embedded British officers out when they moved on
to the strategy stage. That is access without influence. It is
clearly going to be a question for anyone's security review: where
are our interests in this and how much are we going to spend in
order to buy privileged access?[159]
According to him, "The sentiment of a lot of
people in and around the Ministry of Defence is that we need either
to spend more on buying influence or accept that we have less
than we would like.[160]
89. Some of our witnesses advocated a major re-think
of the nature and extent of the UK's defence links to the US.
Professor Chalmers commented that as the time for a new UK Defence
Review approached, "there is bound to be renewed scrutiny
of whether the UK is getting an adequate return (in terms
of influence on the US) in return for its defence efforts, and
what this means for future defence priorities".[161]
He argued that the UK should recognise that it could exert greatest
influence over the US either when decisions to take military action
were about to be taken, or when commitments to provide forces
(or reinforcements) were being made. If the UK had reservations
about how military operations may be conducted, or whether they
should be conducted at all, it should be willing to make any military
commitment dependent upon a satisfactory resolution of its concerns.
Sometimes, he argued, the UK should be "willing to say no".[162]
90. Professor Chalmers said the UK needed to recognise
that "when the US is fully engaged and determined to take
military action, the views of allies are unlikely to count for
much in its decision-making calculus". The UK could often
be more influential if it pursued an approach that was complementary
to that of the US, rather than simply mirroring whatever current
US priorities might be. In the cases of both Sierra Leone and
Kosovo, "it was the UK's willingness to take a lead in military
action, or to plan for unilateral action, that was the key to
its ability to help shape the strategic environment".[163]
91. We conclude that the current financial climate
has implications for the UK's future defence posture and its ability
to sustain the level of military commitment in support of the
US that it has demonstrated in recent years. We further conclude
that it is likely that the extent of political influence which
the UK has exercised on US decision-making as a consequence of
its military commitments is likely also to diminish.
Niche and specialist capabilities
92. For some of our witnesses, one possible way of
adjusting to decreased resources and providing "added value"
in the UK-US defence relationship would be to focus the UK's defence
spend increasingly on more affordable "niche" capabilities[164]
which, in turn, could result in greater political leverage. Professor
Clarke argued that:
rather than try to maintain a force structure
that looks essentially like US forces on a smaller scalein
effect a beauty contest to encourage US policy-makers and public
to take the UK more seriouslythe objective might instead
be for the UK to be capable of taking on a particular role in
a joint operation and doing it independently, reliably and without
recourse to significant US help.[165]
There were military niche and specialist capabilities
which the UK possessed and which the US did not. These would help
UK forces to "fit in" to a US battle plan for instance
in the fields of maritime mine counter-measures, air-to-air refuelling,
special forces reconnaissance and human intelligence assets. He
noted that, in the past, the ability of UK forces to begin a battle
alongside the Americans 'on day one' with roughly comparable equipment
of all categories had been a matter of pride for British leaders.
However, he cautioned that "the outcomes have not always
been happy or rewarding for the British". Professor Clarke's
conclusions are worth citing at length:
Better to be capable of doing a job in a US-led
coalition, even if it is less prestigious and does not begin on
day one, but be trusted to accomplish it well. This implies a
more radical approach in reviewing UK defence to produce forces
that might be significantly smaller but more genuinely transformative
[
]. Genuinely transformative armed forces would also provide
a model for other European allies and partners facing similar
pressures. This would help reinforce a more assertive political
leadership role for the UK in the transatlantic arena and provide
a practical link between smaller European powers with limited
but useful military forces, and a US that is likely to continue,
even in austerity, to spend 10 times more than the UK on defence,
3 times the combined spending of EU countries on defence equipment
and 6 times their combined spending on military research and development.
The UK can gain more influence by pursuing flexible complementarity
with a US force structure of this magnitude than being a pale
imitation of it.[166]
93. Professor Chalmers, likewise, argued that the
Government should focus defence investment in "areas of national
comparative advantage, where the gap in capabilities between the
UK and US is less than that in overall military capability, and
where a second centre of operational capability can accordingly
bring greater influence". Capabilities in which the UK could
still claim to be relatively well-placed included special forces
and intelligence services. However, comparative advantages "could
often vanish remarkably quickly, given the US's ability to innovate
and its massively greater resources". He added:
With the recent surge of doctrinal innovation
in the US military, for example, the UK has now largely lost the
comparative advantage in counter-insurgency that it had developed
in Northern Ireland. In the coming period of defence austerity,
it will be particularly important to be able to prioritise those
areas where comparative advantage can be sustained, where necessary
at the expense of those areas where this is not feasible.[167]
94. We asked Ivan Lewis, Minister of State at the
FCO, about areas where the UK was at a comparative advantage.
In response, he pointed to the UK's experience in engagement with
local communities, arguing that, "Our troops have a tremendous
track record in that kind of local, community-based work. That
does not suggest that the Americans don't or can't do that, but
I know that our troops and forces are particularly respected internationally
for that kind of work. I would argue that that is one example
of where we add value. It is not just about military might".[168]
95. Our witnesses identified other ways in which
the UK could, at least in the short term, continue to be of assistance
to the US. For instance, Professor Clarke proposed that the UK
should continue to champion "drastic institutional reform"
in NATO and in relation to the EU's machinery for European Security
and Defence Policy. In his view, "The UK and US have a powerful
mutual interest in addressing these problems; the Europeans have
an equally powerful imperative to ensure that the US remains genuinely
engaged with European security structures. Institutional sclerosis
will only increase the long-term trend towards US engagement in
European Security".[169]
Others such as Robert Hunter argued that the UK should focus on
close, bilateral co-ordination on security issues, including for
NATO, and co-operation in trying to break down barriers between
NATO and the EU.[170]
96. We conclude that, in the short term, the UK
should continue to do all it can to assist the US in the areas
where it is also in the UK's security interests to do so, most
notably in relation to Afghanistan and Pakistan and in respect
of reform of NATO. We further conclude that, in the longer-term,
the Government's foreign and security policy needs to be driven
by the UK's national security obligations including those towards
Britain's Overseas Territories, its NATO commitments and its security
partnership with the US.
Strategic Defence Review
97. The last major Strategic Defence Review was conducted
in 1998. On 3 February 2010, the Government published a Green
Paper entitled Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the
Strategic Defence Review. It points to a number of the key
questions that the Government believes the next Strategic Defence
Review (due to take place in 2010) should address, some of which
we have already discussed above. Many of the points raised in
the Paper are relevant to our present inquiry into UK-US relations,
including the crucial question of whether the UK's current international
defence and security relationships should be re-balanced in the
longer term and whether the UK should move towards greater integration
of its forces with those of key allies and partners.
98. Gary Schmitt, from the US think-tank, Project
for the New American Century, stated that there is a consensus
that "the UK Government is facing a fundamental choice: should
it build a military that can handle today's unconventional wars
or attempt to sustain an increasingly thin semblance of a "do-everything"
force?"[171] He
adds: "if those are the alternatives and a choice must be
made, we should be clear: the 'special relationship' that binds
Washington and London will not remain the same". He asks,
"will the US be as interested in hearing from Whitehall if
British forces are only capable of working side-by-side with Americans
in a narrower defence arena? And, in turn, will Whitehall continue
to share a common strategic vision with Washington if its own
interests are constrained by increasingly limited military capabilities?"[172]
99. As Professor Chalmers told us, in light of recent
UK experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, "there is a strong
case for a thorough review of how the UK can maximise the national
political and security benefits that it obtains from its defence
investments":
There is still a common tendency to articulate
the need for the UK to spend more on defence in terms of national
honour and a generic need to maintain a strong role in the world.
This is often underpinned by an assumption that the UK must accept
the burden imposed by the altruistic and internationalist nature
of its foreign policy, which (it is argued) contrasts with the
more self-interested policies of other major powers. Considerations
of honour and responsibility indeed do have a place in foreign
policy. Yet there is a danger that, if not anchored in a clear
calculus of national benefits and interests, these sentiments
can lead to policy approaches of doubtful utility and unacceptable
costs.[173]
100. Summing up much of the evidence presented to
us, Mr Witney stated that the UK must now "think about our
position in the world and what sort of operations we think we'll
be taking part in".[174]
101. We conclude that it is imperative that the
forthcoming Strategic Defence Review should be foreign policy
and defence commitments led and be preceded by an honest and frank
debate about the UK's role in the world based on a realistic assessment
of what the UK can, and should, offer and deliver. Only once these
fundamental questions have been addressed can the long-term scope
and nature of the UK's defence relationship with the US be determined.
From hard power to soft?
102. We asked our witnesses whether, in light of
future defence spending cuts, it might be prudent to spend more
on projecting the UK's soft power through, for instance, the FCO
where there may be better value for money in terms of influence
gained. Some of our witnesses argued that the answer depended
on the nature of the threat; clearly in response to a conventional
military threat the US would require military assistance. However,
as Professor Wallace told us, on the basis of a broader security
agenda involving problems of immigration, climate change and counter-terrorism,
any investment would not only be in the interests of the US, but
in those of the UK too.[175]
Professor Chalmers agreed that the Foreign Office offers "relatively
good value for the amount of money spent" and that it may
be prudent to give that "a relatively higher priority at
the margins".[176]
103. We asked Ivan Lewis, Minister of State at the
FCO, whether, in the future, the UK could be a more effective
ally by focusing resources in the areas where the UK can provide
added value, for instance, in the diplomatic, intelligence and
foreign policy fields. Mr Lewis conceded that we are all "increasingly
aware of the link between security, governance and development,
and therefore we need to look at that in terms of how we have
a more strategic approach".[177]
Intelligence co-operation
104. Exchange of intelligence information between
the US and UK agencies was greatly expanded during the Second
World War as part of the wartime partnership between Britain's
Special Operations Executive and Secret Intelligence Service (SOE
and SIS) and equivalent US agencies, which rapidly outgrew their
British counterparts as they subsequently expanded to counter
the perceived Soviet threat. Partly as a result of the Suez crisiswhen
London concealed intelligence from Washington and Washington retaliated
by cutting co-operationthe UK was relegated to the role
of junior partner that it has played ever since.[178]
105. Under a 1947 agreement on signals intelligence
(SIGINT), the UK has monitored Europe and the Middle East through
its two bases in Cyprus and at GCHQ in Cheltenham and passes SIGINT
to the US National Security Agency (NSA). Through its participation
in the UKUSA Echelon network the UK has access to projects it
could not afford alone, although the degree of integration of
the SIGINT network with the NSA has raised questions about the
operational independence of GCHQ from NSA.[179]
The US collates much of its own European intelligence data from
its UK-based SIGINT station at RAF Menwith Hill.[180]
The situation in relation to human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered
by the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service
(MI6) is somewhat different, with both agencies retaining operational
independence, despite close co-operation with their US counterparts.
106. The intelligence relationship between the UK
and US was described to us by Dr Dunn as "second to none".[181]
The FCO stated:
The UK has a long established and very close
intelligence relationship with the US, which owes much to our
historical and cultural links. The continuing high value of this
relationship has been demonstrated on many occasions in recent
years and on a wide variety of issues. We share many common objectives,
including countering terrorism, drugs and serious crime. The closeness
of this intelligence relationship allows us to extend our own
national capabilities in ways that would not otherwise be possible
and is invaluable.[182]
107. Although the default UK position appears to
be set to allow the automatic relay of human intelligence to the
US, more selective reporting based on political considerations
is not uncommon. This was the case in relation to Northern Ireland
in previous years, and in 2007 the Intelligence and Security Committee
(ISC) reported that the US approach to human rights and rendition
since 9/11 had led to the UK agencies exercising "greater
caution in working with the US, including withdrawing from some
planned operations".[183]
In a chapter of its 2007 report headed Implications for the
Special Relationship, the ISC commented: "The rendition
programme has revealed aspects of the usually close UK/US relationship
that are surprising and concerning. It has highlighted that the
UK and US work under very different legal guidelines and ethical
approaches." The ISC concluded that, "it is to the credit
of our Agencies that they have now managed to adapt their procedures
to work round these problems and maintain the exchange of intelligence
that is so critical to UK security".[184]
Professor Wallace commented that "few in the UK agencies
today question the value of the intelligence relationship with
the United States, even if they have reservations about some US
methods".[185]
108. The US is said to benefit from the fact that
the UK has sources in places that it does not and that some "foreign
assets are more willing to talk to British intelligence rather
than to the Americans for a variety of historical or other reasons".[186]
Dr Dunn highlighted British intelligence operations in relation
to Libya's programme of weapons of mass destruction and Iranian
nuclear facilities near Qum,[187]
suggesting that there was "added benefit in non-Americans
bringing intelligence to the world's attention". He continued:
As well as intelligence collection there is also
mutual benefit in shared analysis. The UK role here is prized
second to none by the US. [
] Like the diplomatic service
the very high quality of the intelligence services together with
the world view that underpins their global role ensure that they
have a disproportionate role with the US (and elsewhere) to both
their size and budget, and to their counterpart operations.[188]
109. Nevertheless, Professor Wallace told us that
global patterns of information sharing, particularly in relation
to signals intelligence were evolving and "a number of British
personnel were talking about how much they now value the sharing
of analysis with [
] European partners". He added that
likewise, "the Americans [
] when they are talking about
the Middle East or East Asia, obviously find it more valuable
to share with others who have more resources in those regions
than we do".[189]
110. Since 2001, intelligence co-operation between
the two countries has focused on counter-terrorism, as expressed
in the US Homeland Defense Strategy and the UK's CONTEST documents.[190]
The FCO's written submission stated that the US is the UK's most
important partner in protecting UK interests at home and that
strategic and operational co-operation is close in a bid to deny
Al-Qaeda and other extremists safe haven in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere and to help these countries build
their capacity to deal with terrorism.[191]
111. The FCO also stated that intelligence sharing
and collaboration between the two countries on law enforcement
takes place at every level and that the extent of this "far
outstrips the level of interaction and co-operation with other
nations".[192]
Such collaboration is claimed to have led to the disruption of
terrorist attacks in the UK and overseas, for example in Operation
Overt.[193] Professor
Clarke agreed that the relationship has been pursued in a "generally
co-operative framework", but told us that "this is not
to say that mutual police co-operation has been particularly good,
or that successive spy scandals in the UK have not damaged the
credibility of the security services in the eyes of the US".[194]
112. Lord Hurd noted that "the Anglo-American
intelligence partnership has proved durable in all weathers".[195]
Certainly, levels of trust are reported to be higher than those
which exist in other allied relationships, but, according to Professor
Clarke this does not mean that the relationship cannot be susceptible
to damage. By way of example, he recalled that "in 2006 the
British Prime Minister kept the US President fully briefed on
the development of the 'Bojinka II' airline plot as it was developing,
only to have the surveillance operation blown early, according
to reliable accounts, from the top of the US hierarchy who saw
the development of the emerging plot differently".[196]
There was also much publicity over remarks made by the former
head of the UK Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller,
during a lecture in the House of Lords on 10 March 2010. She is
reported to have said that it was only upon her retirement in
2007 that she discovered that the US had 'waterboarded' Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, who is alleged to have organised the 9/11 attacks
on the US. She stated that the US had been "very keen to
conceal from us what was happening".[197]
113. More recently, UK-US intelligence co-operation
came under scrutiny following the attempted suicide bomb attack
allegedly by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on a plane bound for the
US on 26 December 2009. There were allegations in the US media
that the UK might not have acted sufficiently swiftly in passing
on information to the US.[198]
(It was also reported in the American press that "senior
policymakers in the United States said the attempted suicide bomb
[
] was further evidence that one of the biggest threats
to US security came from Britain, where the capital has been dubbed
"Londonistan" by critics".[199])
In a statement to the House on 5 January 2010, the Home Secretary
asserted that no information had been either held by the UK or
shared by the UK with the US that had indicated that Abdulmutallab
was about to attempt a terrorist attack against the US. President
Obama subsequently stated publicly that responsibility for intelligence
failings in this instance lay within the US security establishment.
114. We conclude that, despite some recent frictions,
the field of intelligence co-operation is one of the areas where
the UK-US relationship can rightly be described as 'special'.
We further conclude that there can be no doubt that both the UK
and US derive considerable benefits from this co-operation, especially
in relation to counter-terrorism.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF US INTELLIGENCE
MATERIAL
115. There has been considerable public debate over
whether a recent judicial decision may affect the UK-US intelligence
relationship. In May 2008 the US charged Binyam Mohamed with terrorist
offences. Mr Mohamed is an Ethiopian national who was arrested
in Pakistan in 2002 and transferred to Guantánamo Bay in
2004 having spent time in detention in Morocco and Afghanistan.
He alleges that he was tortured and that British officials were
aware of and complicit in his treatment.
116. There has been much controversy over whether
42 US documents previously disclosed to Mr Mohamed's counsel should
be made public. The Foreign Secretary told the House on 5 February
2009 that:
the disclosure of the intelligence documents
at issue by order of our Courts against the wishes of the US authorities
would indeed cause real and significant damage to the national
security and international relations of this country. For the
record, the United States authorities did not threaten to "break
off" intelligence co-operation with the UK. What the United
States said, and it appears in the open, public documents of this
case, is that the disclosure of these documents by order of our
Courts would be 'likely to result in serious damage to US national
security and could harm existing intelligence information-sharing
between our two governments'[200]
117. In May 2009 the Government continued to argue
that the memoranda should not be disclosed, providing a letter
from the Obama Administration that stated:
if it is determined that Her Majesty's Government
is unable to protect information we provide to it, even if that
inability is caused by your judicial system, we will necessarily
have to review with the greatest care the sensitivity of information
we can provide in future.[201]
118. On 16 October 2009, the High Court ruled that
some of the US intelligence documents containing details of the
alleged torture of Binyam Mohamed could be released. The key document
was a summary of abuse allegations that US intelligence officers
shared with their counterparts in London. Lord Justice Thomas
and Mr Justice Lloyd Jones ruled that the risk to national security
was "not a serious one" and there was "overwhelming"
public interest in disclosing the material.[202]
119. The Foreign Secretary subsequently announced
that the Government would appeal against the judgment. He stated:
"We have no objection to this material being published by
the appropriate authorities, in this case the United States [
]
What I do have a very deep objection to is the idea that a British
court should publish American secrets - in the same way that I
would have a deep objection if an American court started publishing
British secrets".[203]
A spokesperson for the US State Department said the US government
was "not pleased" by the court's decision.[204]
During our visit to the US in October 2009, several interlocutors
expressed concern about the recent judicial developments and implied
it might restrict the flow of intelligence from the US to the
UK.
120. Giving oral evidence to us, the Minister of
State, Ivan Lewis MP said:
We were given intelligence in confidence by an
ally. It is very clear to us that, for whatever reason and in
whatever circumstances, for us to release that into the public
domain would be a breach of trust and confidence that could seriously
damage our relationship not just with the United States, but with
others who give us intelligence in confidence. The second issue
is that, frankly, it is a responsibility of the United States
if it wishes to make public its own intelligence. It is not our
job to make public intelligence gained by another country.[205]
121. Witnesses were divided over this issue. Professor
Wallace stated that over the past thirty years it had been commonplace
that "more information is available in Washington than in
London". He alleged that "quite often highly confidential
or secret information that we are holding in London is published
in Washington. So I am doubtful about the basis for the Foreign
Secretary's case".[206]
However, Professor Chalmers expressed a different view when he
told us that his "instinct is that having the ability to
exchange information with the United States on a confidential
basis is actually rather important to the relationship. We have
to take seriously the Foreign Secretary's concern that if a precedent
is established and extended in this area, less information will
be shared".[207]
He continued:
The issue is that, if the Americans are doing
something very sensitive in, say, Afghanistan or Iran and are
thinking about whether they want to discuss it with their British
counterparts, they will want to know that they can discuss it
frankly without it getting into the public domain through the
British legal system. If there is not a reasonable degree of assurance
about that, it will make them bite their tongue more than they
have.[208]
122. On 10 February 2010, the Court of Appeal ruled
that the seven paragraphs which had been redacted from the original
judgment of the Divisional Court on 21 August 2008 should be published. It
followed the disclosure by a US Court in December 2009 which included
references to the treatment of Mr Mohamed covered in the seven
paragraphs. In a statement to the House on 10 February 2010, the
Foreign Secretary stated:
The Court of Appeal [...] ordered the publication
of the seven paragraphs because in its view their contents were
placed in to the public domain by a United States District Court.
Without that disclosure, it is clear that the Court of Appeal
would have upheld our appeal and overturned the fifth judgement
of the Divisional Court.
The Court of Appeal was also clear that the judiciary
should only overturn the view of the executive on matters of national
security in the most exceptional circumstances. It states [...]
that "it is integral to intelligence sharing that intelligence
material provided by one country to another remains confidential
to the country which provided it and that it will never be disclosed,
directly or indirectly by the receiving country, without the permission
of the provider of the information. This understanding is rigidly
applied to the relationship between the UK and USA".[209]
123. The Foreign Secretary added:
I am grateful for the consideration the Court
of Appeal gave to the control principle. This principle, which
states that intelligence belonging to another country should not
be released without its agreement, underpins the flow of intelligence
between the US and the UK. This unique intelligence sharing relationship
is vital to national security in both our countries. [...] Crucially,
[...] the Court has upheld the control principle today. The judgement
describes that principle as integral to intelligence sharing.[210]
124. The Foreign Secretary also stated that the Government
would work "carefully with the US in the weeks ahead to discuss
the judgment and its implications in the light of our shared goals
and commitments".[211]
125. We conclude that the decisions of the High
Court to uphold the principle that intelligence material provided
by one country to another remains confidential to the country
which provided it, are to be welcomed. We further conclude that
the Government should, in its response to our Report, set out
its understanding of the implications of the recent Court of Appeal
judgment for future UK-US intelligence co-operation.
Security co-operation
126. The FCO believes that both bilaterally and through
partnership in international organisations, the UK-US relationship
had made "an immense contribution to global securitythroughout
the Cold War, through our membership in NATO; and since, through
our participation in international peacekeeping, stabilisation
and enforcement operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Afghanistan
and elsewhere".[212]
In an article written for The Times in March 2009,
the Prime Minister argued that "there is no international
partnership in recent history that has served the world better
than the special relationship between Britain and the United States".[213]
Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, commented after meeting
the Foreign Secretary in July 2009 that "our special relationship
is a driver for greater peace, progress and prosperity, not only
for our own people, but around the world".[214]
127. One example of the benefits that a joint UK-US
approach can bring to a current international security concern
can be seen in relation to piracy. The FCO told us that the UK
and US have been "two of the key drivers behind the provision
of effective counter-piracy military operations and wider efforts
in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean" and that
both have worked closely together on the political side of the
counter-piracy effort, in the preparation of Security Council
resolutions authorising and later renewing military counter-piracy
operations, and finding ways to tackle financial flows related
to piracy.[215]
One other area where UK-US co-operation has been important
can be seen in relation to Pakistan.
CASE STUDY: PAKISTAN
128. The arrival of President Obama in office led
to the start of a markedly different approach to Pakistan and
one which fell more in line with that which the UK Government
has adopted in recent years. The US Administration's recognition
of Pakistan's strategic importance vis-à-vis Afghanistan
led to a significant step change in its engagement with Pakistan
during the President's first year in office. For some time, the
UK has been working to persuade the US to bring its assistance
closer in line with UK practices, including channelling funding
through strategic long-term partnerships to tackle terrorism.
The FCO stated that both the US and UK have encouraged Pakistan
to go faster and further in its efforts to counter terrorist groups
operating on its soil, including those that threaten India. The
UK has also been working with the US to build the capacity of
the Pakistani security services and both countries were instrumental
in establishing the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) group,
designed to galvanise international political support for Pakistan's
long-term development and to help the Pakistani Government to
tackle the, security problems it faces.[216]
129. In his written submission, Professor Clarke
told us the future of Pakistan [
] "is a vital shared
interest between London and Washington where the UK is even more
the junior partner than in Afghanistan".[217]
In spite of the UK's apparently junior status, Professor Clarke
stated that there are some elements of policy towards Pakistan
that "play to the UK's comparative advantages". Like
the FCO, he believes that the UK can contribute to "both
the military and political re-orientation of Pakistan's armed
forces in ways that the US cannot, and without some of the stigma
that attaches inside Pakistan to association with the US".
In particular he points to the benefits of "making the best
of the UK's natural links with Pakistan and its advantage as a
European, as opposed to an American, voice could help address
the acute problems of the sub-region in a way that binds Washington
and London more closely together".[218]
130. We conclude that the new US approach to Pakistan
is to be welcomed and marks an important and long overdue recalibration
of its relationship in an area which is of significant importance
to both the UK and US.
Nuclear co-operation
131. During the Cold War, the UK's nuclear co-operation
with the United States was considered to be at the heart of the
'special relationship'. This included the 1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement, the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) (subsequently
amended for Trident), and the UK's use of the US nuclear test
site in Nevada from 1962 to 1992. The co-operation also encompassed
agreements for the United States to use bases in Britain, with
the right to store nuclear weapons, and agreements for two bases
in Yorkshire (Fylingdales and Menwith Hill) to be upgraded to
support US missile defence plans.[219]
132. In 1958, the UK and US signed the Mutual Defence
Agreement (MDA). Although some of the appendices, amendments and
Memoranda of Understanding remain classified, it is known that
the agreement provides for extensive co-operation on nuclear warhead
and reactor technologies, in particular the exchange of classified
information concerning nuclear weapons to improve design, development
and fabrication capability. The agreement also provides for the
transfer of nuclear warhead-related materials. The agreement was
renewed in 2004 for another ten years.[220]
133. The other major UK-US agreement in this field
is the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) which allows the UK
to acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile system.
Originally signed to allow the UK to acquire the Polaris Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system in the 1960s, it was
amended in 1980 to facilitate purchase of the Trident I (C4) missile
and again in 1982 to authorise purchase of the more advanced Trident
II (D5) in place of the C4. In return, the UK agreed to formally
assign its nuclear forces to the defence of NATO, except in an
extreme national emergency, under the terms of the 1962 Nassau
Agreement reached between President John F. Kennedy and Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate negotiation of the PSA.
134. Current nuclear co-operation takes the form
of leasing arrangements of around 60 Trident II D5 missiles from
the US for the UK's independent deterrent, and long-standing collaboration
on the design of the W76 nuclear warhead carried on UK missiles.[221]
In 2006 it was revealed that the US and the UK had been working
jointly on a new 'Reliable Replacement Warhead' (RRW) that would
modernise existing W76-style designs. In 2009 it emerged that
simulation testing at Aldermaston on dual axis hydrodynamics experiments
had provided the US with scientific data it did not otherwise
possess on this RRW programme.[222]
135. The level of co-operation between the two countries
on highly sensitive military technology is, according to the written
submission from Ian Kearns, "well above the norm, even for
a close alliance relationship". He quoted Admiral William
Crowe, the former US Ambassador to London, who likened the UK-US
nuclear relationship to that of an iceberg, "with a small
tip of it sticking out, but beneath the water there is quite a
bit of everyday business that goes on between our two governments
in a fashion that's unprecedented in the world." Dr Kearns
also commented that the personal bonds between the US/UK scientific
and technical establishments were deeply rooted.[223]
136. Nick Witney told us that the UK's leasing arrangement
with the US in relation to Trident missiles was "highly cost-effective
[...], so that's clearly something to preserve". However,
he added that there could be a downside to the relationship and
that this could bring opportunity costs:
Take the case of nuclear propulsion. Things may
have changed in the six years since I was in the Ministry of Defence,
but up to that point we'd actually had nothing out of the Americans
of any use on nuclear propulsion since the original technical
help back in the 1950s. What we had had, because of this technical
debt, was an inhibition on being able to co-operate with the French
in these areas.[224]
137. In its written submission the FCO reasserted
the Government's position that the UK nuclear deterrent was fully
operationally independent and that the decision making, use and
command and control of the system remained entirely sovereign
to the UK. It explained that only the Prime Minister could authorise
use of the system and that the UK's nuclear warheads were designed
and manufactured in the UK. Other elements of the system, such
as the D5 Trident missile bodies, were procured from the US under
the terms of the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, which was amended
to cover Trident in 1982. The FCO claimed that this "procurement
relationship does not undermine the independence of the deterrent,
nor has the US ever sought to exploit it as a means to influence
UK foreign policy".[225]
138. Other witnesses argued that in practice the
"independence" of the British nuclear deterrent was
purely notional. The British Pugwash Group contended that without
ongoing US support the UK would "very probably cease to be
a nuclear weapon state" and that this "inevitably constrains
the UK's national security policies and actions insofar as they
must not destabilise its relationship with the US for fear of
dilution or even withdrawal of nuclear weapons co-operation".[226]
The Pugwash Group added that "a more general consequence
of the particularly close co-operation in these two areas has
been that the UK has felt constrained to support the United States
in other areas of military activity, including interventionist
activities in the Middle East, and in sharing the 'burden' of
the conventional and nuclear defence of NATO".[227]
The Group continued:
These 'distorting' effects of the 'special relationship'
in these two key areas have meant that the UK has periodically
been subject to criticism from other international players, and
particularly from the European Community, for paying insufficient
attention to the international policy objectives of its other
partners.
139. This view was shared by the Acronym Institute
which claimed that the extent of UK-US nuclear co-operation means
that Britain must depend on the United States if it wishes to
deploy nuclear weapons. The Institute argued that "this nuclear
dependence has influenced and at times distorted UK foreign policy
decisions. It has contributed to the reluctance of successive
UK Governments to criticise US policy and actions, even where
such actions appear to damage Britain's long-term security interests".[228]
140. We asked Professor Chalmers whether he agreed
that the UK's nuclear relationship with the US had affected, and
continues to affect, the UK's foreign policy choices. He acknowledged
that it "constrains the exploration of other options, for
example, in relation to France", but added that "there
are a number of different factors preventing the UK from going
in a fundamentally different direction from the US [...] After
all, it wasn't long after the Nassau Agreement that Harold Wilson
refused to go into Vietnam, despite American requests, and that
didn't have any impact on the nuclear relationship that I know
of. One can exaggerate that. Clearly there are things at the margins
that Americans could do if we cut up awkward in other areas, so
it does increase a degree of interdependence".[229]
141. The Obama Administration is currently undertaking
a major Nuclear Posture Review, due to report in 2010.[230]
The FCO told us that it was fully engaged with the review process,
including through high-level consultations and visits to ensure
that "the UK's equities both on nuclear deterrence and disarmament
are well understood".[231]
That view was not necessarily shared by all of our witnesses.
For instance, Robert Hunter stated that "Britain's role in
defence promotes influence in Washington", but that, by contrast,
"the British nuclear deterrent is largely ignored by the
US"[232]. Professor
Chalmers likewise told us that the UK nuclear force was not very
important for the US. While the UK would be consulted on the Nuclear
Posture Review it would not have a great deal of input into it.
He suggested that the UK might have more influence in discussions
about the NATO Strategic Concept through a working group established
by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and of which
former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon is a member. The group is
chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and is
examining the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's future posture.
He concluded that "the UK nuclear deterrent is at present
assigned to NATO, so there we have a structural position which
we can use, but in relation to the US domestic Nuclear Posture
Review, much less so".[233]
Changes in the nature of the most imminent international threats
had resulted in a reduction in the importance to the US of the
British nuclear deterrent. During the Cold War the British deterrent
has drawn "all sorts of attention and interest in Washington"
but "now that the United States is much more concerned about
Iran, South Asia, China and other potential threats outside Europe,
we play a much smaller part in all those calculations".[234]
Professor Chalmers added a caveat, that "we live now in a
period in which nuclear confrontation and deterrence is less relevant
in Europe. If we were to return to a period in which it became
more important, consideration of the UK deterrent would rise in
salience".[235]
CASE STUDY: DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION
142. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation
regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is a key United
Kingdom foreign policy priority. The FCO stated that it had "long
recognised that US leadership is essential if we are to achieve
it".[236] One
of the FCO's security objectives in its relationship with the
US is to "harness US capabilities and influence US policy
to develop a shared approach to preventing states from acquiring
WMD [weapons of mass destruction], to align more closely our positions
on global nuclear disarmament".[237]
(We have considered the background to current non-proliferation
initiatives in detail in our June 2009 Report on Global Security:
Non-Proliferation.[238])
143. The Government has worked intensively in the
United States and elsewhere over the last two years to make the
case for an ambitious but balanced strengthening of the NPT's
three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, and to advocate the long-term goal of a world
free from nuclear weapons. In the FCO's view, President Obama's
praise for the United Kingdom's Road to 2010 plan, published
on 16 July 2009, demonstrates the complementarity of UK and US
approaches.[239]
144. According to Ian Kearns, the UK has established
a reputation in Washington as taking a lead on 'responsible' disarmament,
as exemplified by the Arms Trade Treaty and the global nuclear
disarmament agenda. He added that "now that President Obama
has outlined his strategy on this, the UK will need to work hard
to stay ahead of the game", and also to influence the US.[240]
The UK has "a particular chance to be in the vanguard of
moves towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in step
with the Obama agenda on this issue".[241]
Although the Obama Administration has indicated it favours a return
to a regime-based approach to nuclear non-proliferation, that
is not necessarily a view that is shared throughout Congress or
in the Washington policy community.[242]
Professor Clarke argued that anything that the UK can do at the
2010 NPT Review conference "either to revitalise the grand
bargain in the NPT between legal access to civil nuclear power
and restrictions on nuclear weapons acquisition; or to help push
strategic arms control among the nuclear weapons states, would
make success more likely". He urged that both of these aspirations,
which are contained in the UK's Road to 2010 policy document,
should "be pushed as vigorously as possible and in as transatlantic
a context as possible to obtain greatest leverage".[243]A
recent report in the International Herald Tribune which
focused on the likely outcome of the United States Nuclear Posture
Review suggested that the US would move to permanently reduce
America's arsenal by thousands of weapons but that it would reject
proposals that the US declare it would never be the first to use
nuclear weapons.[244]
145. The UK also has also been working closely with
the US Government on Conventional Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issues.
UK experts are said to enjoy excellent working relationships with
US officials on the many policy and technical aspects of the CTBT.
Ian Kearns told us that it is important to consider how the UK
could use the close relationship it has with the US to further
the agenda promoted by President Obama in this area. He suggested
that UK scientists could be encouraged to share expertise and
opinion relevant to CTBT ratification concerns with colleagues
and members of Congress in the United States, and the UK could
fund and support a major Track II nuclear disarmament diplomacy
initiative among representatives of the P-5, plus India, Israel
and Pakistan. The US Administration is, he says "ambitious
on this agenda but also heavily preoccupied with the recession,
Afghanistan and healthcare reform; and while the President can
outline his vision, his Administration is going to need all the
help it can get on this agenda, particularly from America's closest
allies".[245]
The impression that we ourselves gathered during our October 2009
visit to the US was that there is now a greater chance than in
recent years of seeing progress made on the CTBT initiative, but
that if this was to be successful, there would have to be considerable
movement before the US mid-term elections in November 2010.
146. We conclude that the goal of a nuclear weapons-free
world is gathering more serious international political support
than at any time since the end of the Cold War. We conclude that
the Government's leadership on multilateral nuclear disarmament
is to be commended.
86 Ev 108 Back
87
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, "Reassessing the
special relationship", International Affairs 85: 2
(2009) 263-284, p 267 Back
88
Ev 85 Back
89
Ev 139 Back
90
Ev 139 Back
91
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 268 Back
92
Ministry of Defence, "Delivering Security in a Changing World:
Defence White Paper 2003", Cm 6041-I, December 2003. See
also "The defence plan: including the government's expenditure
plans, 2008-12", Cm 7385 2008, June 2008 Back
93
Ev 56 Back
94
Ev 108 Back
95
Ministry of Defence, "The Defence Green Paper, 'Adaptability
and Partnership: Issues for a Strategic Defence Review'",
Cm 7794, February 2010 Back
96
Ev 59 Back
97
Ev 60 Back
98
Ev 60 Back
99
Ev 142 Back
100
Ev 142 Back
101
Ev 111 Back
102
Ev 111 Back
103
Ev 112 Back
104
Ev 112 Back
105
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 268 Back
106
Ev 108 Back
107
Ev 108 Back
108
Ev 108 Back
109
Ev 108 Back
110
Ev 129 Back
111
Ev 129 Back
112
Ev 109 Back
113
See for example, Rachel Sylvester, "Memo: don't rely on the
Brits during a battle", The Times, 6 January 2009,
Daniel Marston, "British Operations in Helmand Afghanistan",
Small Wars Journal, 13 September 2008 Back
114
Ev 106 Back
115
Ev 133 Back
116
Ev 132 Back
117
Ev 132 Back
118
Q 29 Back
119
Q 30 Back
120
Ev 142 Back
121
Ev 142 Back
122
Ev 142 Back
123
See for example Professor Theo Farrell, "A Hope in Helmand",
Guardian Unlimited, 8 November 2009; Foreign Affairs Committee,
Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Oral and written
evidence, 24 February 2010, HC (2009-10) 398. Back
124
COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified), re-produced in Washington
Post, 21 September 2009 Back
125
Ev 60 Back
126
Ev 60 Back
127
Q 193 Back
128
See for example "US likely to approve trade treaties with
Australia and UK this year", Jane's Defence Weekly,
29 May 2009. Back
129
UK-US Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty, Standard Note
SN/IA/4381, House of Commons Library, 17 February 2009 Back
130
See for example Third Report of Session 2007-08, UK/US Defence
Trade Cooperation Treaty , HC 107, 11 December 2007. Back
131
Ev 65 Back
132
See for example Third Report of Session 2007-08, UK/US Defence
Trade Cooperation Treaty , HC 107, 11 December 2007 Back
133
Ev 139 Back
134
Ev 139 Back
135
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 271 Back
136
Ibid. Back
137
Q 35 Back
138
Q 35 Back
139
Q 33 Back
140
Seventh Report of Session 2008-09, Human Rights Annual Report
2008, HC 557; Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, Human Rights Annual
Report 2007, HC 533; Seventh Report of Session 2007-08, Overseas
Territories, HC 147-I Back
141
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Response of the Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Seventh Report from
the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2008-09, Annual Report
on Human Rights 2008, Cm 7723, October 2009 Back
142
Q 35 Back
143
Ev 116 Back
144
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 267 Back
145
Q 67 [Mr Witney] Back
146
Ev 108 Back
147
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 268 Back
148
Michael Codner, The hard choices: twenty questions for British
defence policy and national military strategy (London: Royal United
Services Institute, 2008), p 1 quoted in Wallace and Phillips,
"Reassessing the special relationship", International
Affairs 85: 2 (2009) 263-284 Back
149
Ev 116-117 Back
150
Ev 141-142 Back
151
Q 24 Back
152
Q 26 Back
153
Ev 133 Back
154
HC Deb 3 February 2010, col 303 Back
155
Professor Malcolm Chalmers, "Capability Cost Trends: Implications
for the Defence Review", Royal United Services Institute,
12 January 2010 Back
156
Ev 132 Back
157
Q 67 [Mr Witney] Back
158
Q 88 Back
159
Q 28 Back
160
Q 25 Back
161
Ev 108 Back
162
Ev 109 Back
163
Ev 109 Back
164
Ev 141 Back
165
Ev 141 Back
166
Ev 142 Back
167
Ev 109 Back
168
Q 185 Back
169
Ev 143 Back
170
Ev 86 Back
171
Gary Schmitt, "Defence cuts reduce Britain's value as an
ally", Financial Times, 19 July 2009 Back
172
Gary Schmitt, "Defence cuts reduce Britain's value as an
ally", Financial Times, 19 July 2009 Back
173
Ev 107 Back
174
Q 88 Back
175
Q 37 Back
176
Q 37 Back
177
Q 188 Back
178
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 273 Back
179
Ibid. Back
180
Ibid. Back
181
Ev 129 Back
182
Ev 68 Back
183
Quoted in William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 274 Back
184
Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition, Cm 7171,
July 2007, para 156 and Recommendation Z Back
185
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, p 273 Back
186
Ev 130 Back
187
Ev 130 Back
188
Ev 130 Back
189
Q 40 Back
190
Ev 143 Back
191
Ev 61 Back
192
Ev 61 Back
193
Ev 61 Back
194
Ev 138 Back
195
Ev 83 Back
196
Ev 138 Back
197
"Ex-MI5 head: US concealed torture", Press Association,
10 March 2010 Back
198
See "White House accuses Downing Street of making 'a mistake'
over intelligence claim", Daily Telegraph, 5 January
2009. Back
199
"Americans blame Britain for rise of Islamic extremism",
Daily Telegraph, 30 December 2009 Back
200
HC Deb, 5 February 2009, col 989 Back
201
"Obama intelligence threat over "torture" case",
The Times, 14 May 2009 Back
202
"Ban on 'torture documents' lifted", BBC News,
16 October 2009 Back
203
Ibid. Back
204
Ibid. Back
205
Q 171 Back
206
Q 42 Back
207
Q 42 Back
208
Q 43 Back
209
HC Deb, 10 February 2010, col 914 Back
210
HC Deb, 10 February 2010, col 913 Back
211
HC Deb, 10 February 2010, col 914 Back
212
Ev 57 Back
213
"The special relationship is going global", Sunday
Times, 1 March 2009 Back
214
Ev 57 Back
215
Ev 152 Back
216
Ev 60 Back
217
Ev 142 Back
218
Ev 142 Back
219
Ev 87 Back
220
Ev 87 Back
221
Ev 138 citing Michael Clarke, "Does my bomb look big in this?
Britain's nuclear choices after Trident" International
Affairs, 80(1), 2004, pp. 50-53. Back
222
Ev 138 Back
223
Ev 101 Back
224
Q 87 [Mr Witney] Back
225
Ev 88 Back
226
Ev 88 Back
227
Ev 88 Back
228
Ev 123 Back
229
Q 44 Back
230
The 2009-2010 NPR will be the third formal review of U.S. nuclear
strategy conducted since the end of the Cold War. The preceding
reviews were conducted early in each of the Clinton and Bush administrations'
first terms. Back
231
Ev 63 Back
232
Ev 84 Back
233
Q 45 Back
234
Q 40 Back
235
Q 44 Back
236
Ev 66 Back
237
Ev 59 Back
238
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, Global
Security: Non-Proliferation, HC 222, 14 June 2009 Back
239
Ev 66 Back
240
Ev 100 Back
241
Ev 100 Back
242
Ev 143 Back
243
Ev 143 Back
244
"Obama to cut U.S. nuclear arsenal; New policy will push
use of other defenses but doesn't eliminate options", International
Herald Tribune, 2 March 2010 Back
245
Ev 103 Back
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