4 THE FCO'S WORK IN THE US
The US Network
147. The UK Network of diplomatic Posts in the US
comprises one of the largest FCO operations in the world, as can
be seen from the following table:
148. Lord Hurd, referring to the UK as the "junior
partner" of the US, commented in his written submission that
"the US Congress, American think tanks and at any rate parts
of the American media play a greater part in the forming of American
policy than anything comparable here. The junior partner if he
is to be effective has to cover a very wide waterfront".[246]
149. Although the British Embassy in Washington DC
is, in many respects, the public face of the UK in the US, a considerable
amount of work, whether it is political, trade or consular, is
undertaken in the FCO's ten subordinate Posts in Atlanta, Boston,
Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Orlando
and San Francisco. Three of these posts—Chicago, Los Angeles
and New York—process visa applications.[247]
150. The FCO's largest consular operation in the
US is based in Washington where the North America Passport Production
Centre is based. It deals with applicants from the US and Canada,
and in the near future will be expanded to cover the rest of the
Americas and the Caribbean. In 2008-09, the Americas and Caribbean
region issued over 52,000 of the 380,000 UK passports issued overseas.
British nationals account for the second largest number of international
travellers to enter the US after Canadians. A total of 4,565,000
British nationals arrived from the UK in 2008, an increase of
67,000 from 2007. The FCO's written submission explained in detail
the work of the ten Consulates-General, supported by a network
of Honorary Consuls, which provide assistance to British nationals.
In 2008-09 alone, North America handled 1,972 assistance cases.[248]
151. The Posts in the US Network aim to be the British
Government's eyes and ears in their regions. Part of their role
is to develop relations with key local figures, including governors,
state legislators, heads of Fortune 500 companies and university
vice-chancellors. As the FCO explains in its written evidence,
"no US president in the modern era has come from Washington
DC [and] presidential candidates usually cut their political teeth
in the regions".[249]
The Consulates try to build relations with them before they become
national figures as well as developing links with large US businesses
which are not generally based in or around Washington DC. The
Consulates also play a role in fostering links between science
and innovation bodies. The FCO argued that it was important to
have this presence spread across the continental United States,
not least because the country is simply too large to be covered
effectively from Washington alone. The FCO noted that the US regions,
within which the Consulates General are situated, were important
centres for business, science and innovation, venture capitalism,
tourism and higher education. It concluded that "without
a local presence, we could not form the relationships we have
with senior figures and key institutions in those fields, which
we cultivate in order to promote Britain's interests".[250]
152. As well as promoting foreign
policy objectives and providing consular services, the Network
provides a platform for some eighteen other UK government departments
and agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office,
the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), UKTI, the Bank
of England and the Department of Work and Pensions. As a consequence,
the Network is engaged in almost all areas of public policy from
public health to trade policy, from transport to immigration and
civil liberties, from aid policy to financial services and banking,
from welfare to education, and from drugs control to policing.[251]
153. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, formerly British Ambassador
to the United Nations, told us that the Network provided the British
Government as a whole with a real understanding of American public
opinion and that it was vital for the Embassy to have a good feel
for what was going on outside the Washington Beltway:
That doesn't mean to say you have to cover every
single base in the United States, but the British Embassy and
its system have a huge reach in the United States. That is not
just commercial or a service to British citizens in the United
States, but a very real aspect of the British ability to do business
in the United States in every way.[252]
Influencing decisions
154. The FCO gave us some key priorities for its
work in the US and for British relations with the US:
- Economic:
promoting an open, high-growth global economy
- Political: building
deep and lasting relationships with the Administration, the Congress,
State Governors and their administrations, the Mayors of big cities
and senior figures in the business community throughout the country
in order to influence US policy in priority areas for HMG. Encouraging
the US Administration to sign up to an ambitious post-2012 climate
change treaty and the Congress to ratify it, and to strengthen
UK/EU/US co-operation on energy issues.
- Security: co-ordinating
all counter-terrorist activity and strengthening co-operation
with the US in the prevention and management of conflict and instability
in regions of key national interest to the UK, in particular Afghanistan/Pakistan,
the Middle East, areas of conflict in Africa and in the European
neighbourhood.[253]
155. The FCO has to operate in the US within a complex
federal political system and foreign policy-making process.[254]
Sir David Manning, former British Ambassador to the US, emphasised
to us the importance of recognising the differences between the
US and British political structures. There was sometimes a tendency
to think that "the United States is the UK on steroids; that
it is just like us and that if you go across there and you talk
to the White House and they say yes, that is the end of it".
[255] Both Sir David
and the FCO highlighted the fact that although the UK may "get
a yes from the Administration, […] we then have to work the
Hill extraordinarily hard to try to get what we want".[256]
For this to work, in Sir Jeremy Greenstock's view, the FCO needs
"sharp elbows":
Americans do not do self-deprecation, so you
better get up there, make your case and say why it is a really
good one. […] If you are going to get it heard, there is
a lot of competition from within the American system itself, as
well as certainly from other countries. Having access to the Hill,
having access to the White House and having access to the media
to make sure that you can get your message across to the whole
of the United States through a network are all very important.
It will not get any easier, particularly when the regime has changed
in the United States. We now have a Democrat who is not familiar
with us, so making such arguments again is very important. […]
[W]e have to have something important to say and something to
offer on the big issues.[257]
ACCESS AND INFLUENCE
156. For historical reasons, almost all the diplomatic
transactions between the two governments are conducted by the
British Embassy in Washington rather than the US Embassy in London.[258]
The effectiveness of the FCO's operation in the US, therefore,
is of critical importance. We asked our witnesses for their views
on the value of the FCO's US operation and its ability to protect
and project British interests. A great number of our witnesses
in response commented on the high regard in which the FCO's diplomats
are held in the US.[259]
We also received evidence from a variety of US academics
and think-tanks which suggested that the FCO is adept at gaining
access to key US opinion formers. For instance, former US Ambassador
Robert Hunter commented that:
The British Embassy in Washington has consistently
had excellent access throughout the US government, as well as
having one of the best information operations on Capitol Hill
(it is one of the few foreign embassies whose role in managing
relations with the US rivals that of the US embassy in the opposite
capital).[260]
157. In a similar vein, Frances Burwell from the
Atlantic Council stated that: "In Washington, British Embassy
officials have access to US government officials with a regularity
that is unmatched by other embassies",[261]
while Ian Kearns of BASIC contended that "advice from the
Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, if not politicized, is
said to be considered the best in the world by Washington".[262]
158. Lord Hurd commented that, "if the right
brains are available and deployed the Embassy is able to penetrate
the US decision-taking process high up stream at a fairly early
stage of discussion within the Administration. If the necessary
brains can be found and deployed, this gives Britain a considerable
edge".[263]
159. Within the United Nations, the US is also said
to value the tactical support that the UK is able to provide.
By way of example, Sir Jeremy Greenstock told us:
The United States would want something in the
Security Council, but the United States tends to walk around with
quite heavy boots, and there are sensitive flowers in the United
Nations [...]. The UK is a lot better at the tactical handling
of other delegations and of language in drafting texts and tactical
manoeuvring. […]. The United States, which has to conduct
policy formation and implementation in an even more public environment
than this country, tends to be very sensitive about short-term
losses and presentational difficulties, whereas we get on with
it. When we agree with the United States, we can be very helpful
to it in that kind of subterranean tactical handling, which doesn't
come out in public. The Americans appreciate that, because it
brings them something they don't normally have. We of course gain
from being on the coat tails of the immense power operation of
the United States, which brings us into places that we wouldn't
reach if we were just on our own and we wouldn't reach, frankly,
if we were just with the European Union.[264]
160. When we asked our witnesses whether the access
previously alluded to translated into influence, there was less
consensus. The Government maintains that staff at the Washington
Embassy and other British officials contributed to many of the
reviews that the Obama Administration conducted immediately after
entering office, particularly those on Afghanistan/Pakistan, nuclear
disarmament and the Middle East.[265]
The FCO also highlighted the joint work undertaken by the Prime
Minister and President Obama, and by their respective officials,
ahead of the G20 summit in London in April 2009, and claims that
the Government had established strong working links on climate
change with the incoming Administration.[266]
161. We received a different perspective from some
of our other witnesses. Dr Robin Niblett, for example, argued
that historically it had been difficult for the UK to exercise
influence over the US "even in the hey-day of US-UK relations".[267]
He continued:
There is no doubt that British diplomats and
certain Ministers and the Prime Minister have an intimate relationship
and a more regular relationship than just about any other diplomats
across the broad area. This gives them the opportunity to influence
how the United States […] thinks about a problem. [This]
is where we can really make a difference. Sometimes, influencing
how it thinks about a problem can lead us to influencing the decision,
but we cannot assume that the former leads to the latter.[268]
162. Some of our witnesses argued that British influence
varies depending on the policy area in question. For instance,
Professor Clarke claimed that while strong and practical instances
of UK/US co-operation could be seen in the fields of defence and
intelligence, "it is harder to discern how this pays off
in other, more general, fields of transatlantic diplomacy".[269]
He argued that British officials regularly reported that
they exerted subtle influences on both the substance and presentation
of US security and foreign policy, but that hard evidence of these
assertions is difficult to find.[270]
163. We asked Ivan Lewis, Minister of State at the
FCO, to give examples of areas where the FCO had been able to
influence US political views to the benefit of the UK. Mr Lewis
told us that the UK's stance on "matters such as Iran is
taken very seriously by the Americans", and that the new
Administration has taken "very seriously Britain's views
on the Middle East Peace Process".[271]
He also claimed that there were a number of examples where
"we, as a result of the special relationship, can say that
we have moved, or contributed toward moving, American policy".[272]
Sir David Manning referred to the FCO's work on climate change
that was undertaken during his tenure as British Ambassador in
Washington:
When the then Prime Minister made it one of our
G8 presidency objectives, this was not greeted with enormous enthusiasm
in Washington, but it did not mean that we gave up because the
Administration didn't necessarily like it. We, because of this
network across the United States […] were able to do quite
a lot of work on climate change, for instance, in the states themselves.
I think, probably, opinion changed pretty dramatically in the
four years that I was there […] I am not going to claim that
that was because of the British Embassy, but I am quite sure that
making a big effort across America to influence these opinion
formers on climate change was worth it, and I think we probably
contributed.[273]
164. Dr Robin Niblett acknowledged that the Administration
may have been influenced on the issue of climate change by the
British Government, but went on to argue that because of the nature
of the US system of government and the need to gain the support
of Congress it was unlikely that President Obama would be able
to "deliver America on this". Referring to other foreign
policy areas which are of importance to the UK, he continued:
On Afghanistan, we have been intimately involved,
as I understand it, in the review process. But now the final decisions
are going to be made. […] [M]y sense is that President Obama
is going to have to make a call based on all sorts of aspects,
including US domestic politics, where our influence is going to
have to step back.[274]
165. Sir David Manning told us:
The truth is we can go and talk to the Administration
about any issue that we want to, if it matters to us and we want
to discuss it with the Administration or on the Hill, we have
access. We are very fortunate, and I think it is the case that
we probably have as good access as anybody, and probably better
than most. Access doesn't necessarily mean that what you ask for
you are going to get, of course, and I think we need to be realistic
about that. This is an unequal relationship in the sense that
the United States is a global power. We are not; and one of the
things that I think we have to be conscious of is that, on a lot
of these issues, there's not much we can do by ourselves. But
if we are successful at getting access and influencing the Americans,
it may have an effect.[275]
166. We asked witnesses what impact the creation
of the European External Action (EEAS) Service would have on the
UK's ability to influence. Our witnesses were in agreement that
it was too early to provide a definitive answer, but they also
agreed that there was no likelihood EU Member States would in
any way downgrade their bilateral relations in Washington DC as
a result of there being an EEAS presence in the city.[276]
167. We conclude that the FCO's high reputation
in the US is well-merited and that the FCO's diplomatic staff
undertake valuable work in the UK's national interest through
the US Network of Posts. Staff necessarily cover a wide remit
in their attempts to exercise influence, and cover it well.
SHAPING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS: THE
FCO AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
168. The FCO told us that "to achieve our policy
objectives in the United States we need to influence not just
those who make decisions, but also those who shape the environment
in which those decisions are made".[277]
The Department's overall aim in regard to public diplomacy is
to "shape American perceptions of the UK as the US's partner
of choice across a range of issues important to both countries",
bearing in mind that "effective public diplomacy can be as
much about shaping the discussion where ideas are formed and generated
as it is about promoting already established policy viewpoints".[278]
169. In financial year 2009-10 the FCO focused on
four priorities: the global economy; Afghanistan/Pakistan, the
Middle East and climate change. The Department's submission provided
some examples of the ways in which this work is carried out:
Our Consulate-General in Boston used the Prime
Minister's drive for comprehensive reform of international institutions
to engage the policy community at Harvard. […] The Prime
Minister called publicly for reform of the international institutions
before an audience of international researchers, US policy-makers
and Democrat strategists. The Prime Minister then invited Professors
at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (including advisers
to the then Presidential candidates) to analyse a range of options
for international institutional reform, and to report their findings
before the next US Administration took office. As the late-2008
financial crisis developed, the Consulate-General worked with
Harvard to focus these efforts on reform of international financial
institutions, and on the planned G20 response at the London Summit
(April 2009). Harvard Professors, and their graduate students,
held online debates on the UK's London Summit website to discuss
and promote their views. This work was in turn picked up […]
by traditional media. […] Meanwhile the arrival of several
key Harvard figures in President Obama's new Administration meant
that the ideas generated in the university environment were transferred
into the thinking of the new team in Washington. [279]
170. The FCO in the US is also attempting to capitalise
upon what it describes as "internet savvy" US audiences
through its use of digital diplomacy.[280]
In addition to the UKinUSA.fco.gov.uk website, the FCO has a strong
and active following on sites such as Twitter and Facebook. In
the run-up to the Copenhagen summit on climate change, it ran
a "100 days, 100 voices" campaign with a new video blog
every day from a range of people interested in climate change,
while encouraging others to submit their own videos and comments
to the site. On Afghanistan, certain foreign policy blogs are
highly influential in shaping and breaking stories and points
of view that later gain traction in more mainstream media. The
FCO has engaged these bloggers both in person for policy briefings,
and by commenting on and linking to their blogs and participating
in online debates. UK Ministers including the Foreign Secretary
regularly engage with the US online foreign policy community during
visits.[281]
171. The FCO told us that it attaches importance
to working closely with the US media at both a national and local
level to try to secure positive coverage for UK policy priorities.
Activities range from placing opinion and editorial pieces and
securing coverage of important Ministerial and other speeches,
to rebuttal where necessary (for example when faced with attacks
on the NHS in some parts of the US media during the summer of
2009, during a period when President Obama's proposed health reforms
were dominating the US domestic agenda). The FCO also seems to
benefit from Royal and Ministerial visits to the US. For instance,
the New York Consulate-General used the opportunity of a visit
by HRH Prince Harry to the city to draw attention to the UK's
and US's shared endeavours in Iraq and Afghanistan. The visit
generated some 2,500 press articles.[282]
172. We asked Ivan Lewis whether it was possible
to define how successful these approaches have been in shaping
American public perception on specific policy goals. Mr Lewis
responded that, in relation to climate change, "arguably,
Britain has played a very important role internally in the United
States in helping to change the nature of the public debate about
where America needs to stand on climate change".[283]
He also used the example of the Middle East peace process, "where
we have really pushed and pushed the argument for the urgency
of a two-state solution. While we are all very concerned at the
lack of progress in recent times, the fact that in a sense it
is now conventional orthodoxy in America to believe that the only
way forward is a two-state solution […] is an important change".[284]
173. The FCO's desire to build networks of long-term
influence for the UK in the USA is largely channelled through
its investment in the Marshall Scholarship programme. Unlike other
FCO-funded scholarship programmes which have been reduced in recent
years, these have not been adversely affected. Under the programme,
around 40 of the most talented US students each year are selected
to study for Masters-level programmes at UK universities. The
British Council is also heavily involved in fostering educational
connections between the UK and US. Of the 47,000 Americans enrolled
in courses in the UK, 73% of them have interacted with British
Council USA, primarily via its website. The British Council USA
works directly with 80 UK universities through its 'country partner'
programme—commissioning and providing market intelligence,
and provides professional development programmes for over 150
visiting British teachers each year, supporting best practice
exchange and school linking opportunities.[285]
Ivan Lewis told us that "a number of eminent people
were part of the Marshall Scholarship programme, and that as a
result of that they are often commentators in America about the
importance of the relationship between our two countries".[286]
In addition, a high proportion of the Obama Administration studied
in the United Kingdom. Although Mr Lewis said he would like to
see more investment in this area, he acknowledged that any such
decision would "have to be taken in the context of tough
financial decisions".[287]
174. We commend the FCO for its US public diplomacy
work and conclude that the societal and educational links that
it promotes add significantly to the overall effectiveness of
the Department's operations in the US.
Financial constraints and their
consequences for British national interests
175. During our visit to the US we received briefing
on the implications for the US Network of Posts of the serious
financial situation that the FCO finds itself in as a result of
Treasury budget cuts and the removal of the Overseas Pricing Mechanism,
which had previously helped to protect the FCO's US budget from
the vagaries of currency fluctuations. We comment in detail upon
these matters in our annual Report on the FCO's Departmental Annual
Report.[288]
176. Although this is a problem which is affecting
FCO Posts around the world, the US Network has been particularly
badly affected, both because of its size and because it necessarily
spends most of its budget in US Dollars. During our visit we were
given detailed information about the measures the FCO has been
forced to take to ensure that running costs were met across the
Network, and the impact these have had on day-to-day activities.
The scale of the cutbacks is very great. They have included (but
are not limited to) a cessation of further programme spending
for the rest of the financial year, redundancies of locally-engaged
staff, asking staff to take unpaid leave, freezing recruitment,
and the suspension of some employer pension payments. All non-core
training has been cancelled, travel and entertainment budgets
reduced and only urgent and essential maintenance work is to be
conducted on the estate.
177. Our impression was that
the measures are making the work of the UK's Posts in the US considerably
more difficult. As Sir David Manning, former Ambassador to Washington,
told us, if the FCO has to decide on the number of people it has
in US posts "according to the fluctuations of the exchange
rate, we will certainly be in trouble".[289]
He predicted that the UK's influence will shrink if key people
are lost, particularly those who were working in areas of real
interest to the US. Sir David argued that this was not only the
case in the political and military fields but also in relation
to individuals working in the fields of science, crime and international
terrorism. He added that:
We have really got something to offer. If we
are forced to continue closing our network across America, or
cutting back in salami slices, so that it is almost a virtual
network, we will find it very much harder to influence the Americans
in the ways that we want. Then, if the European External Action
Service is there building itself up, we will be leaving something
of a vacuum.[290]
178. Many of those who gave evidence to our inquiry
warned that further cuts could have a serious impact on the FCO's
ability to pursue the UK's national interests. Dr Dunn stated
that "pound for pound, you cannot get better value for money
than spending money on diplomats in Washington […]. The influence
that Britain gets in terms of trade policy and pursuing the national
interest from our skilled and highly regarded diplomatic service
is extraordinary. To cut it back would be extraordinarily short-sighted".[291]
179. The views of Heather Conley and Reginald Dale
were equally trenchant. They argued that cutbacks in the UK's
"Rolls Royce diplomatic service, still the envy of most other
countries" would be a cause for concern in Washington, and
could reduce Britain's weight in Washington more than in any other
capital—not because of a reduced effectiveness at the British
Embassy itself but because of "a wider scaling back of Britain's
global clout".[292]
180. We asked Ivan Lewis about the impact of the
removal of the Overseas Pricing Mechanism. Mr Lewis agreed that
there has been a negative impact and that the FCO has been forced
to make "difficult choices and we will have to make further
difficult choices in the period ahead".[293]
He continued:
I am not sure that many British people would
say at a time of financial hardship that cutting back on the odd
reception is a bad thing for Governments to do when ordinary people
are having to make difficult choices too. It is a difficult balancing
act […] All I can say to contextualise the matter without
lessening its significance is that it is fairly usual in America,
when seeking to reduce spend, to give staff unpaid leave. […]
But if we have budgetary, fiscal responsibility, we must find
ways of exercising that responsibility and staying within the
allocated budget. We ask people to make difficult choices.[294]
181. Commenting in December 2009 on the situation
for the FCO across its entire range of operations, Sir Peter Ricketts,
Permanent Under-Secretary, told us that, "we have been living
on pretty thin rations for at least a couple of spending rounds,
and we have, therefore, cut fat and are having to prioritise our
activities".[295]
During the 2008-09 period the UK Mission to the UN cost £22,478,210
while costs for the Embassy in Washington amounted to £12,817,750.[296]
We asked Sir Peter whether the FCO had any flexibility to change
the conduct of the British effort in the United States. He responded:
We have a degree of flexibility about the priority
that we can give the US network over other parts of FCO work.
For example, Ministers could decide that they wanted to devote
more of the available money to the US and that money would have
to come from somewhere else, which would imply that there would
be less money for somewhere else. Therefore, we would have to
do that as part of setting the budget for the next year.
Those are very difficult choices because, as
I said, I think that we have already removed the excess. Therefore
a decision to give more money to one part of the overseas network
means a decision to take money away from somewhere else. There
are no obvious candidates for that. So our flexibility is limited
[...] if we are going to accept the current range of responsibilities
that the FCO has.[297]
182. As we concluded in our Report on the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09, the FCO as
a whole, like so many other public and private sector organisations,
is facing very difficult decisions due to current budgetary constraints.
We commend the FCO for the considerable resourcefulness it has
shown in making required budgetary savings for this financial
year following successive waves of real-term cuts to the FCO's
budget by the Treasury. We further conclude that the severity
of the spending cuts already being imposed, as evidenced by those
being experienced by the US Network, let alone those which are
still in the pipeline, gives us grounds for serious concern about
the impact they will have on the FCO's future effectiveness in
the US.
183. We conclude that the FCO's US Network is
facing unacceptable financial pressure due to a double whammy
of Treasury imposed budget cuts and a depreciation in Sterling.
Having previously shed fat and muscle, the FCO's US network is
now being forced to cut into bone. We further conclude that additional
cuts will diminish the FCO's ability to exercise influence in
the US and have a knock-on effect on the UK's global standing.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO provide
us with an update on the current situation in relation to the
US Network and its future plans with particular reference to the
specific areas of concern we have raised in the Report and the
minimum funding it considers necessary to effectively discharge
its functions and obligations in the US.
246 Ev 84 Back
247
Ev 75 Back
248
Ev 76 Back
249
Ev 75 Back
250
Ev 75 Back
251
Ev 58 Back
252
Q 138 Back
253
Ev 58 Back
254
Ev 58 Back
255
Q 128 Back
256
Q 128 Back
257
Q 132 Back
258
Ev 83 Back
259
Ev 119; 120 Back
260
Ev 86 Back
261
Ev 115 Back
262
Ev 101 Back
263
Ev 83 Back
264
Q 134 Back
265
Ev 57 Back
266
Ev 57 Back
267
Ev 121 Back
268
Q 21 Back
269
Ev 139 Back
270
Ev 139 Back
271
Q 178 Back
272
Q 178 Back
273
Q 136 Back
274
Q 21 Back
275
Q 136 Back
276
Q 49; Q 142 Back
277
Ev 77 Back
278
Q 78 Back
279
Ev 78 Back
280
Ev 78 Back
281
Ev 78 Back
282
Ev 77 Back
283
Q 168 Back
284
Q 207 Back
285
Ev 79 Back
286
Q 208 Back
287
Q 208 Back
288
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09, HC 145 Back
289
Q 142 Back
290
Q 142 Back
291
Q 22 Back
292
Ev 106 Back
293
Q 201 Back
294
Q 207 Back
295
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09, HC 145, Q 15 Back
296
Committee of Public Accounts, Third Report of Session 2009-10,
Financial Management in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HC
164, 17 December 2009 Back
297
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09, HC 145, Q 17 Back
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