House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee

Global Security: UK-US Relations - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has prepared this memorandum for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry into relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, and the implications of US foreign policy for United Kingdom interests. We welcome this opportunity to demonstrate the work the UK is doing with the US, which involves many government departments and agencies. UKTI is submitting a separate memorandum on trade promotion and investment issues. The Committee will be receiving other evidence, written and oral, both before and after their visit to the USA. This memorandum relates primarily to the FCO's areas of responsibility.

The Basis of the Bilateral Relationship

2. As the Foreign Secretary has previously stated, the United States remains our most important bilateral ally, and has the greatest capacity to do good of any country in the world today. The relationship between the two countries is broadly based and deeply rooted. The key elements are:

History

— Values. We share values like democracy, the rule of law and free markets, and seek to promote them outside our borders.

Culture

Personal ties

Business links

Security, Defence and Intelligence

Science links

Shared interests

The Nature and Value of the Bilateral Relationship, and its contribution to Global Security

3. It is obvious that the world of 2009 is very different from the world of 1941, when Churchill and Roosevelt set out their shared hopes for the future, post-war world in the Atlantic Charter. But it is also very different from the world of 2001, when the Committee last reported on British-US relations (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/327/32702.htm). In particular, in recent years countries like China, India and Brazil have seen dramatic rates of economic growth, and have begun to play a greater role in global governance. The traditional powers of North America and Europe, including the US and UK, are no longer the exclusive poles of global power that they might have been in the past. Each of us has had to adapt our foreign and economic policies to the new reality.

4. But the United States is still the only superpower, economically, diplomatically and militarily. Its GDP, which makes up more than 23% of world GDP (according to World Bank figures for 2008) is larger than that of any other country—almost three times larger than that of the second largest economy, Japan. Even if current growth trends are sustained, China's GDP is unlikely to overtake that of the US for more than a decade. The US's combination of high spending on science and research, ready access to venture capital and its entrepreneurial business culture has given it, since the Second World War, a technological lead over other countries. It has unrivalled military power and political influence across the globe. It is a key member of the global system of multilateral institutions.

5. Against that background, it is clear that the UK's ability to achieve its own international objectives will be immeasurably greater if we share those objectives with the US. Thus the maintenance of a strong transatlantic relationship has been one of the cornerstones of British foreign policy since the Second World War. Our partnership, both bilaterally and in international organisations, has made an immense contribution to global security—throughout the Cold War, through our membership in NATO; and since, through our participation in international peacekeeping, stabilisation and enforcement operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The Alignment of UK and US Interests

6. Powerful as it is, the US still needs effective international partners which share its aims and are ready to share the task of achieving them. The UK is still regarded as one of the most reliable US partners. As President Obama said on 1 April during his visit to London "The United States and the United Kingdom have stood together through thick and thin, through war and peace, through hard times and prosperity. We have always emerged stronger by standing together".

7. All countries have national interests which are particular to them and not shared with others. The UK and US are no exception. But to a very great extent we also have shared interests—in combating violent extremism around the world, and addressing the poverty, ignorance and conflict which underlies it; in promoting good governance; in supporting development and economic growth to the benefit of the world's poorest countries. Britain's willingness to support the US after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and subsequently to send troops to fight alongside US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan built on the common values and the instinct of both countries to look to the other in times of difficulty. But it also reflected the common interest we had in fighting the scourge of terrorism.

The Special Relationship and UK influence

8. As the Prime Minister has said, no international partnership in recent history has served the world better than the special relationship between Britain and the United States. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented after meeting the Foreign Secretary on 29 July "Our special relationship is a driver for greater peace, progress and prosperity, not only for our own people, but around the world".

9. We are confident that the special relationship will endure, because it is not just a relationship of sentiment but a "partnership of purpose", as the Prime Minister told the Joint Session of the US Congress on 4 March this year, based on our evaluation of our current interests, not just the depth of our shared culture and history. As President Obama said on 3 March: "The relationship is not only special and strong but will only get stronger as time goes on".

10. We have a uniquely close relationship with the US also in the scope of our co-operation—both in terms of the areas of the world where we work together, and the issues on which we co-ordinate. Relations with the Administration of President Obama have built on the tradition of wide-ranging co-operation. The new Administration spent its first months in office reviewing US policies inherited from President Bush. The Embassy in Washington and other British officials were able to contribute to many of those reviews and especially those in areas of most importance to us such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. The Prime Minister and President Obama and their respective officials worked together to prepare the G20 summit in London in April, showing that this reflex operates in the international economic field as well as in foreign and security policy. Britain has similarly established very strong working links on climate change with the new US Administration and, through our network of posts in the US, with regional leaders as well.

11. This does not mean, however, that the UK and the US always agree, or that British governments defer to the US when we occasionally disagree. The UK-US dialogue is based on mutual respect and candour which is rare between international partners, however close. The strength of the relationship lies in part in our ability to maintain a frank and open relationship with the United States even when we disagree. The UK's ability to express a different view to that of the US, coming as it does from a close friend without a hidden agenda, is something which senior US officials tell us they find valuable. But our influence is achieved not through megaphone diplomacy but through persuasive and evidence-based arguments, which in turn depends on our shared economic and financial interests and on the effectiveness of our diplomatic networks, Armed Forces and intelligence and security agencies.

12. The later paragraphs of this memorandum will set out in more detail all the elements which link together to create and maintain this relationship, which include our shared interests in international security (including our defence and intelligence co-operation); in global issues such as the world economic crisis and climate security; and in tackling regional conflicts whether in the Middle East, Afghanistan or elsewhere.

The Implications of Changes in the Nature of the Relationship

13. We do not foresee any fundamental changes in the nature of the UK's bilateral relationship with the US, given that it is based on enduring common interests. But it will evolve, not least in the light of the development of other bilateral and multilateral relationships. In recent decades, successive British governments have sought to promote the security and prosperity of the UK and advance its global interests by establishing Britain as a leading partner in the European Union while maintaining a strong link to the United States.

14. The British Government does not believe it has to choose between strengthening its ties with other European countries through its EU membership and maintaining a close relationship with the US. Indeed, in the modern, globalised world, where the emphasis is on finding multilateral solutions to global problems, the Government wants to see the EU and the US working closely together, providing leadership to the international community. Good relations between the UK and the US and between the UK and the other EU Member States are a necessary condition of that close transatlantic co-operation. The US Administration share our views on the importance of a strong Europe, as indicated by Secretary Clinton's comments in Brussels in March 2009 "President Obama and I intend to energize the transatlantic relationship and to promote a strong European Union—and more fundamentally, a strong Europe| A strong Europe is a strong partner for the United States, and the Obama Administration intends for the United States to be a strong partner for Europe".

15. The Government is not and cannot be complacent about the working of the UK-US bilateral relationship or the broader transatlantic one. The United States has a complex political system and foreign policy-making process, and a federal system in which important powers are reserved for the States. This requires not just good high level access, but a broad range of contacts developed across all levels of the Administration. It also means taking full account of the important role played by Congress and the increased overlap between domestic and international priorities. It requires the ability to influence powerful lobby groups—including those whose interests or outlook may be opposed to those of the UK. It means being able to deal directly with the powerful US media. It means maintaining a high profile and visible interest in the individual states—not merely to promote British commercial links but to influence public opinion and opinion formers across the US. Our work on climate change across the United States is a good example of how our network of nine Consulates General and the Embassy have influenced the domestic US debate and the policy of certain states. The Consulates are also key for our work on Best Practice, where they can identify innovative ways of delivering public services that might provide useful lessons for domestically focused Whitehall departments.

16. In short, the UK-US relationship goes far wider than traditional co-operation over foreign and security policy. The comprehensive nature of the relationship is reflected in the work carried out by our posts in the US. They are engaged in almost all areas of public policy from public health to trade policy, from transport to immigration and civil liberties, from aid policy to financial services and banking, from welfare to education, from drugs control to policing and so on and so forth. Whilst bringing together each of these strands underscores the strength of the overall relationship, this memorandum will focus on foreign policy.

II. CURRENT UK OBJECTIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

17. Among our key objectives in relations with the US are:

(i)To promote an open, high growth global economy by: working with the US, bilaterally and in the G20 framework, to deliver robust and co-ordinated policy responses to mitigate the impact of the global downturn; promoting the reform of the International Financial Institutions (and other international bodies); resisting protectionist responses and committing to open markets, including liberalising EU-US air services; and delivering an ambitious, pro-development conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda.

(b) Political

(i)To build deep and lasting relationships with the Administration, the Congress, State Governors and their Administrations, the Mayors of big cities and senior figures in the business community throughout the country in order to influence US policy in priority areas for HMG and in order to contribute to UK policy development through best practice exchange in line with Whitehall priorities.

(ii)To encourage the US Administration to sign up to an ambitious post-2012 climate change treaty and the Congress to ratify it, and to strengthen UK/EU/US co-operation on energy issues.

(i)To strengthen our co-operation with the US in the prevention and management of conflict and instability in regions of key national interest to the UK, in particular Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Middle East, areas of conflict in Africa and in the European neighbourhood, on the basis of shared analysis of countries at risk, a common approach to peace support operations (including support for the UN's role) and a closer identity of views on the underlying causes of conflict and instability.

(ii)To harness US capabilities and influence US policy to develop a shared approach to preventing states from acquiring WMD, to align more closely our positions on global nuclear disarmament.

(iii)To co-ordinate all aspects of our counter-terrorism (CT) activity.

(d) Bilateral

(i)To deliver first-class public services in support of trade and investment, managed migration and British citizens abroad.

III. THE ISSUES

The Global Economy

18. The global economic crisis has highlighted the interdependency of economies and especially of their financial systems. The UK and US have worked closely together in the G20 and other fora in order to tackle the greatest economic and financial crisis the world has seen since the 1930s.

19. The key current issue facing the UK and US economies is securing a sustainable global economic recovery. In response to the economic crisis, the G20—under the UK's Presidency- has taken unprecedented action to tackle the global downturn. The London Summit agreed a $1.1 trillion package of measures to restore growth and jobs and rebuild confidence and trust in the financial system.

20. The UK and US are both committed to the pledge made at the London Summit to restore confidence, growth, and jobs; repair the financial system to restore lending; strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust; fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent future ones; promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery. Leaders also agreed at the London Summit, the principles underpinning reform of the global banking system including: bringing the shadow banking system, including hedge funds, within the global regulatory net; new international accounting standards; regulation of credit rating agencies; and an end to tax havens that do not transfer information on request. The countries also continue to work together as part of the G20 on reform of the International Financial Institutions.

21. Whereas preparations for the London Summit focused on agreeing the immediate response to the crisis, the focus of the UK-US relationship for the months ahead will be on promoting a sustained recovery, including identifying and supporting future sources of growth. The UK's engagement with the US in preparation for the G20 summit in Pittsburgh on 24-25 September has been an important step in securing sustainable recovery.

22. The UK and US trade and investment relationship is one of the most quantifiable aspects of the "special relationship"—(The US is the largest investor in the UK, as the UK is the largest investor in the US and UK exports to the US amount to around £70 billion per year).

Afghanistan and Pakistan

23. There are few areas of contemporary foreign policy in which the UK and US co-operate as closely as in Afghanistan and Pakistan—in diplomatic, military and development terms. The UK and US share the same aims of promoting peace, prosperity and stability in the region. We recognise that Afghanistan and Pakistan are at very different stages of development, but they face shared challenges, so we have promoted complementary strategies but different approaches to the problems in the region. Since the inauguration of President Obama, the US has recalibrated its approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan through a review of operations (in which the UK was closely consulted), and the conclusions of its new strategy (announced March 2009) showed a high degree of convergence with the UK strategy presented by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons in December 2007. The Prime Minister underlined this when he presented our updated strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to the House of Commons in April 2009.

24. Our aim is, as far as possible, seamless joint development and implementation of policy. It is taken forward through frequent contacts between UK and US civil and military representatives in Kabul, Lashkar Gah, Islamabad, Brussels, London and Washington. In Kabul, our embassies share information and analysis on a daily basis; co-ordinating with the UN and international partners. Apart from our Embassies and military commanders, our co-ordination involves frequent contacts between the UK's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, and his opposite number, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. A senior British diplomat has been attached to Ambassador Holbrooke's staff, contributing insights which the US recognise as valuable.

Afghanistan

25. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the US has been at the forefront of the international community's efforts in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK supported the US response in Afghanistan and provided a significant number of troops to the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This support has continued and we are the second largest contributor to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. President Obama praised the UK effort in Afghanistan saying, "The contribution of the British is critical, this is not an American mission."

26. The US is the largest single contributor of troops to both ISAF and OEF, with around 63,000 troops currently deployed. It provides the Commander of ISAF (with a British Lieutenant General as his deputy). It is also the largest contributor of bilateral aid, committing in excess of $20 billion in reconstruction aid and pledging more than $10 billion over the next two years. The US is the lead G8 partner nation on the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

27. Close co-ordination of UK and US resources in Afghanistan takes place through a wide range of structures. A key example is UK and US military forces and civilian experts, including development and Rule of Law specialists, working with Afghan counterparts and other international partners to deliver our comprehensive approach on the ground in the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah. We have also been working with the US as they develop their civilian plans, to share our experience in Helmand and in national level development programmes and encourage them to align their assistance behind Afghan development priorities and strengthen the capacity of Afghan government institutions.

28. UK-US military co-operation has recently been successfully demonstrated with the deployment of the US Marine Corps 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2 MEB) to Helmand earlier this year. 2 MEB, known as Task Force Leatherneck, have their headquarters in Camp Bastion, the main UK logistics base in Helmand. Recent UK and US military operations in Helmand were conducted simultaneously and shared the common goals of clearing the insurgency from major population centres to ensure lasting security in the long-term and a safe environment for voting in the Presidential election in late August. The value of UK troops to the US was summed up recently by General Petraeus: "I have always been impressed by the courage, capacity for independent action, skill and exceptional will of your soldiers". Regarding the British forces deployed to Afghanistan he said: "British troops have been in a very tough place and they have done exceedingly well".

29. We also enjoy strong co-operation with the US on countering narcotics in Afghanistan. The UK and US have established the Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC) and the Inter-agency Operations Co-ordination Centre (IOCC), to improve law enforcement co-ordination mechanisms and to tackle the drugs trade in Afghanistan. The UK also supports the US-led CN Joint Inter Agency Task Force, which conducts inter-agency operations against illicit trafficking. Additionally the UK and US (DfID, USAID and the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team]) jointly funded the CN (counter-narcotics) Plan for Helmand in 2008-09.

Pakistan

30. The US has significantly stepped up its engagement with Pakistan, given its strategic importance, fragility and relationship to the situation in Afghanistan. The US is now, followed by the UK, the largest bilateral donor to Pakistan. We have been working to persuade the US to bring its assistance closer in line with UK practices, including channelling funding through Government structures and working towards a shared goal of promoting strategic, long-term partnerships with Pakistan, based on mutual co-operation.

31. In particular, the UK and US are working closely together to support Pakistan's efforts to tackle terrorism effectively and to co-ordinate our own CT programmes. Both the US and UK have encouraged Pakistan to go faster and further in its efforts to counter terrorist groups operating on its soil, including those that threaten India, and are helping to build its capacity to do so. We have welcomed Pakistan's efforts to counter Pakistani Taliban groups operating in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Government of Pakistan's commitment to a comprehensive strategy for stabilising the border areas. As part of our wider programme of defence engagement, we are also working with the US to build the capacity of the Pakistani security services.

32. Effective co-ordination of development and capacity building programmes in Pakistan is essential; and we are working to ensure that international efforts in Pakistan are as joined up as possible. The UK and US were instrumental in establishing the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) group, designed to galvanise international political support for Pakistan's long-term development and to help the Pakistani Government to tackle the serious development, security and economic problems it faces. With the advice and support of UK and US experts, the Government of NWFP has designed a stabilisation plan for the Swat/Malakand region, which was announced at the FoDP Ministerial meeting on 25 August. We will continue to work closely with the US to ensure that the implementation of this strategy and the wider FoDP process is fully supported by the international community.

Iran

33. As two of the members of the E3+3 group of countries, the US and the UK have worked closely in concert since 2005 to find a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue. The UK's diplomatic presence in Tehran informs regular exchanges with the US Administration. Our close co-ordination over policy reflects our shared assessment of the security threat posed by the continuing development of Iran's nuclear programme, and its destabilising effect on the wider region. The UK and the US are both clear that Iran must take urgent steps to assure the international community that its nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes.

34. As members of the E3+3, the US and the UK are both fully committed to the "dual-track strategy" of pressure and engagement. Work on the pressure track has included close US-UK co-ordination during the planning and implementation of five UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, including three which impose sanctions. On the engagement track the UK and the US worked together with the rest of the E3+3 to assemble a package of incentives to encourage Iran to halt its programme and enter negotiations. The offer was made in June 2006 and renewed in June 2008, and would provide Iran with everything it needs for a modern civil nuclear programme, as well as many other benefits.

35. The US conducted a review of its Iran policy in early 2009, following the inauguration of President Obama. Following that review, the US made clear that it was now willing to engage directly with Iran on matters of shared concern, including in any negotiations on the nuclear file. This shift in the US position enabled the E3+3 to re-issue an invitation to Iran to enter talks about its nuclear programme in April 2009. The UK fully supported the position adopted by the new US Administration. We consider that the offer of Governors and their Administrations, the Mayors of big cities and senior figures in the business approach.

36. We envisage that the UK and US approach to Iran will remain closely aligned over the coming months, during the period in which Iran's response to the E3+3's April 2009 invitation will be assessed.

Middle East Peace Process

37. The US and UK fully share the aim of a settlement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In his Cairo speech of 4 June, President Obama clearly outlined the urgency for a peaceful solution. We welcome the emphasis placed on the need for all parties to co-operate and work towards a two state solution.

38. President Obama has engaged early in his term on the MEPP, both personally and through the appointment of his envoy, Sen. George Mitchell. We support US efforts: to secure a freeze on current Israeli settlement activity, and for Arab countries to demonstrate their willingness to progress towards the normalisation of relations with Israel, as first set out in the Arab Peace Initiative. This will be vital in order to restart negotiations between the parties.

39. The Government has been fully engaged in support of US efforts. The Prime Minister has held discussions with President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas. The Foreign Secretary has discussed a number of issues related to the MEPP with Secretary of State Clinton and Envoy Mitchell. The Government has also urged Israel and Arab partners to respond positively to US efforts, with the Foreign Secretary personally engaging with his counterparts on a regular basis.

Counter-Terrorism

Common Threat

40. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US and 7 July 2005 in the UK, and attacks against US and UK targets overseas, demonstrated the nature of the threat that continues to face both our countries (and others) today, a threat identified in the UK's 2009 National Security Strategy [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspx] as "the most significant immediate security threat to the UK". Al-Qaeda has sought to bring together disparate groups, networks and individuals into a single global movement with an anti-western ideology at its heart aimed principally against the US and the UK.

Shared Response

41. The US is our most important partner in protecting UK interests at home and overseas from terrorist attacks and for reducing the threat globally in the long run. Strategically and operationally we work very closely with the US, including through our network of posts in key countries as well as in London and Washington. We have a shared assessment of the threat and generally share analysis of the solutions. We share intelligence, collaborate closely on law enforcement and enjoy regular official contacts at almost every level. This far outstrips the level of interaction and co-operation with other nations. This collaboration has led to the disruption of terrorist attacks in the UK and overseas, for example in Operation Overt. British, and American, lives are saved as a result of this co-operation.

42. We work together in the fields of defence, diplomacy and development to deny al-Qaeda and other extremists safe haven in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere, and to help build the capabilities of such countries to deal with a terrorist threat. For example, in Pakistan our broad strategies are increasingly aligned and designed to support the Government of Pakistan itself in dealing with the difficult issues it faces. We co-ordinate our counter-terrorism capacity building efforts in third countries with the US. Although the US has more resources, the UK can sometimes commit funds more easily, or provide specialised capabilities.

Future Co-operation

43. Some of the strategic factors that currently sustain international terrorism are likely to persist including non resolution of conflicts and disputes, existence of ungoverned spaces and failing states and the wider availability of technology. We will therefore continue to work with the US on these issues.

44. The ideology associated with al-Qaeda is likely to be more resilient than the group itself. We therefore want to increase our co-operation with the US on countering radicalisation and extremism (our Prevent agenda, the US' "Countering Violent Extremism"). We are increasingly sharing knowledge on this subject and co-ordinating our strategic communications to challenge the rhetoric of al-Qaeda in local contexts (eg in the tribal areas of Pakistan) and globally through the internet.

45. Our close relationship, and our pre-9/11 experience of countering terrorism, means we are able to discuss frankly some difficult and sensitive issues such as those relating to Guantánamo Bay. We remain closely engaged with the US Administration on these issues.

46. US CT capabilities are enormous, and help us achieve UK counter-terrorism objectives (both domestically and overseas). Without them, it would be considerably harder for us to achieve our objectives. We continuously consider how the UK can add value to the CT relationship.

NATO

47. NATO has been the cornerstone of the UK's defence and security and an essential transatlantic link for 60 years. President Obama said in January 2009 that "Our nations share more than a commitment to our common security—we share a set of common democratic values. That is why the bond that links us together cannot be broken, and why NATO is a unique alliance in the history of the world."[1] The UK supports this analysis.

48. The US plays a critical role at the centre of the Alliance, as the world's strongest military power, the largest troop contributor to NATO operations and the Ally shouldering the largest share of NATO's budgets. The UK and US have many shared priorities for the activity and future of NATO. We want to see an Alliance that: is flexible and capable enough to tackle a wide range of threats both within the Euro-Atlantic area and further afield; works in partnership with other international actors to resolve conflict; and promotes our shared values of democracy, good governance and liberty. The UK and US have worked together closely to promote ongoing reform of the Alliance and its structures to ensure that it is best placed to deal with the evolving challenges we face.

49. At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009 the Alliance commissioned work on a new Strategic Concept for agreement at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon. This will set a vision for NATO's future role and we expect it to tackle: operational capability; reform of the Alliance; enlargement; relations with partners and other international organisations, especially the EU; and NATO's role in tackling new threats such as cyber and climate security; in addition to continuing to support a NATO role in addressing threats to our security beyond our borders, including in Afghanistan through increased use of a comprehensive, civil-military approach. The former Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP, has been appointed by the NATO Secretary General to his Group of Experts, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which will advise the Secretary General on the evolution of this concept.

50. The UK believes that a capable and effective NATO will continue to be of primary importance to our security, and to the security of all its members. The new US Administration has made clear that they share this view. The new US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, said in July 2009 that "The North Atlantic Alliance has always been the place where Washington looks first for international partners. It does so today and will do so tomorrow."[2]

Nuclear issues

51. As part of our strong defence ties, the UK and US co-operate closely on nuclear deterrence. The US and UK provide all the nuclear forces committed to the defence of NATO and co-operate closely in all elements of the Alliance's nuclear business. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO's overall strategy.

52. Our relationship is underpinned by the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (MDA). This treaty enables exchanges between the UK and US on nuclear weapon and propulsion matters and helps both nations to maintain safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpiles and propulsion systems as well as providing a unique opportunity for peer review between the two countries' nuclear specialists.

53. The UK nuclear deterrent is fully operationally independent. The decision making, use and command and control of the system remain entirely sovereign to the UK. Only the Prime Minister can authorise use of the system. Our nuclear warheads are also designed and manufactured in the UK. We procure certain other elements of the system, such as the D5 Trident missile bodies, from the US under the auspices of the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, which was amended for Trident in 1982. This arrangement enables the UK to maintain an operationally independent nuclear deterrent far more cost-effectively than would otherwise be the case. This procurement relationship does not undermine the independence of the deterrent, nor has the US ever sought to exploit it as a means to influence UK foreign policy.

54. The new US Administration is currently undertaking a major Nuclear Posture Review, due to report early next year. We are fully engaged with the review process, including through high-level consultations and visits to ensure that the UK's equities both on nuclear deterrence and disarmament are well understood.

Climate Security

55. The UK is and aims to remain one of the Administration's closest partners on climate issues due to our experience of developing and implementing climate policies, and the substantial diplomatic resources we dedicate to climate issues. Climate change has been part of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary's conversations with their opposite numbers and there are regular video-conferences between The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change and Todd Stern, the State Department's Special Envoy for Climate Change.

56. The UK and US broadly share goals for action on climate change. Internationally both supported references in the 2009 G8 communiqué to keeping temperature rise within 2° and to developed countries collectively reducing their emissions by 80% by 2050. The UK is working to encourage Congress to pass ambitious legislation as soon as possible. There is strong interest amongst legislators in the experience of UK businesses and consumers of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and other climate legislation. This year we have organised several high level events attended by members of Congress and the Administration.

57. In addition the UK has been working closely with the US National Intelligence Council on climate change and international security. We also have been feeding in our views to the Department of Defence as part of their consultative process on the Quadrennial Defence Review and we have jointly explored the impacts of climate change on the Arctic.

58. The UK is the US's partner of choice on climate change at a regional level. Our Embassy and nine Consulates General regularly exchange views on the UK's climate and energy experience with local government, business and other stakeholders. Five US states (California, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Virginia) have signed bilateral agreements on climate change and energy with the UK. These are primarily focussed on sharing best practise for low carbon economic growth. Three US regional emissions trading schemes continue to seek UK expertise based on our experience designing, implementing and operating under the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme.

59. The UK is uniquely well positioned to work with the US in building momentum for the transition to a low-carbon economy, given our close relationships with multiple US agencies, and our advanced domestic programme as laid out in the Climate Change Act and National Low Carbon Transition Plan. The US is likely to continue to be interested in the UK experience as it develops and implements its own domestic programme.

Other Security Issues

Cyber Security

60. The digital information and communications infrastructure known as "cyberspace" underpins much of modern society and is critical to the economy, civil infrastructure and government across the developed world. In recent years awareness of the vulnerability of this infrastructure to external threats has increased. In 2009 both the US and UK have responded to these threats by developing new structures to manage cyber security on a cross-government basis. The US has created a new Cyber Security Directorate with the National Security Council staff, is strengthening cyber security structures in the Department of Homeland Security, and will create on 1 October a new 4* Cyber Command in the Department of Defense; the UK has created a new office of Cyber Security in the Cabinet Office and a Cyber Security Operations Centre, a multi-agency body hosted in GCHQ in Cheltenham.

61. There are compelling reasons for ensuring that the US and UK Governments remain closely aligned on this issue. Our infrastructures are tightly coupled, and the key industry players are multinational. The dominance of US industry in internet service provision makes partnership with the US essential for the UK, but the UK's position as a global communications hub and as a major inward investor in critical infrastructure services in the US provides incentives for the US to engage with the UK as well. Finally, cyber security is becoming an increasingly important component of overall security collaboration between our two countries. There are, however, countervailing pressures: for example, the ICT sector is intensely competitive, which makes players nervous about sharing threat and vulnerability information widely. And privacy concerns may be a constraint.

62. This is a rapidly developing field and our strategic approaches are still evolving. The UK is well plugged into the new structures emerging in the US. A good working relationship has developed between the National Security Council staff and the Cabinet Office, and operational relationships between the relevant agencies in the US and UK are building on close collaboration that goes back many decades. It will be important to ensure that the importance of this co-operation is recognised more widely, including as the US Congress develops new legislation in this area.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

63. The UK-US bilateral relationship in the OSCE remains strong. Our interests are broadly aligned on key policy issues across its three dimensions—Human, Politico-Military, and Economic and Environmental. We both recognise the OSCE's prominent role in conflict prevention and resolution, not least in terms of the unresolved conflicts in the former Soviet Union. We both value the OSCE's key role in advancing democracy, human rights and good government across the OSCE space. We both strongly support the work of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on human rights and election-related activities.

64. We have worked closely with the US in response to President Medvedev's initiative on European security. Following close co-operation between the UK, US and other partners, the Informal OSCE Ministerial held in Corfu on 27-28 June 2009 established, amongst other things, the centrality of the OSCE for this debate and the importance of the trans-atlantic dimension.

65. We continue to support the US-led negotiations on the Parallel Actions Package with Russia aimed at bringing about the earliest possible entry into force of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and, meanwhile, Russian resumption of implementation of the CFE.

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

66. Both the UK and the US support and encourage the development of the EU's role in crisis management, and of EU-US co-operation in tackling international security problems. President Obama made clear even before his election that he was determined to intensify the US-Europe relationship, saying in Berlin in July 2008 that "In this century|[America needs] ... a strong European Union that deepens the security and prosperity of this continent". Vice President Biden further confirmed the Administration's support for ESDP, in Munich in February 2009 saying that "We also support the further strengthening of European defence, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security, a fundamentally stronger NATO-EU partnership and deeper co-operation with countries outside the Alliance who share our common goals and principles". The UK agrees with these views.

67. The UK supports the involvement of third states in EU civilian crisis management missions as a way to widen the expertise available to a mission and to further internationalise engagement in a crisis. A country with significant international experience such as the US is ideally placed to bring additional skills and capacity to an ESDP mission. The growing confidence of the US in ESDP is shown most obviously through the fact that 75 US personnel are for the first time taking part in an EU mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, as well as the close and effective co-operation that has been established between EU and US military operations, for example in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, where the activity of the EU (to which the UK is a key contributor, providing the operational HQ), NATO and US-led Coalition Maritime Forces is successfully co-ordinated by a joint mechanism. We also work with the US to strengthen the EU-NATO relationship and help to ensure that their efforts are mutually reinforcing.

The Comprehensive Approach

68. The UK and US governments both recognise the importance of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to civil-military co-operation in the delivery of operational effect, and are leading exponents in its international promotion and implementation. The UK and US are working together closely on various training initiatives in order to develop deeper shared understanding of the CA and the most effective means for its delivery and further development. We also work together on joint planning and conduct of military and civil-military exercises, as we have both recognised the need to develop CA multilaterally and the need to improve co-operation between institutions.

69. The planning and delivery by the Civil-Military Mission in Helmand (CMMH) based in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan, best illustrates the extent of the alignment between our concepts and the close co-ordination of UK and US civilian and military capabilities. Here UK and US military forces, civilian experts, their Afghan counterparts and other international partners are working towards delivering a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution and stabilisation.

70. The UK Government submitted evidence on the implementation of the CA as part of the recent Defence Select Committee Inquiry into the Comprehensive Approach, including in response to specific questions as to how the UK was working with the US

[http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/defence_committee/def090325_no_26.cfm]

Conventional Arms Control

71. On 3 December 2008 the UK signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The Convention prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of cluster munitions. The US did not participate in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the CCM and has not signed the Convention. Despite this, we have found some common ground and continue to work to expand this. Article 21 of the CCM provides for continued engagement in military co-operation and operations with non-States Parties, which was vital for the UK's ability to operate alongside the US and other NATO Allies. The Article also places an obligation on States Parties to encourage non-States Parties to join the Convention. The UK will play its full part in these efforts. Recent changes to US policy on cluster munitions are positive steps: after 2018 the US will only employ cluster munitions containing sub-munitions that, after arming, do not result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance. Congress has also included a provision, prohibiting exports of cluster munitions that have a failure rate higher than 1%, in the financial year 2009 Omnibus Appropriation legislation.

72. In parallel with these steps taken nationally, the US and UK are participating together in the ongoing negotiations aimed at adopting a protocol on cluster munitions within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

US-UK Defence Equipment Collaboration

73. The UK enjoys a close relationship with the US which covers a broad range of joint capabilities and programmes: the development of high-tech, state of the art equipment to off-the-shelf purchase of components. This delivers enhanced interoperability as well as helping to meet the UK's priority of securing the best equipment for our Armed Forces.

74. UK-owned defence companies have a major presence in the US which represents the UK's second largest defence export market. Currently, the UK and the US are partners in 22 collaborative equipment programmes, the most significant of which is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme. The UK is the US' only Level 1 (ie closest) JSF partner which allows the UK to have a major influence on the basic design of the aircraft and other areas of the programme. The programme contributes significantly to the strength of our defence relationship and has reinforced the US-UK industrial relationship, with over 100 UK companies involved in the programme.

75. The US Government and industry have also provided invaluable support to the UK Armed Forces, in acquiring equipment, ranging from Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Mastiff Armoured vehicles. The US Government also actively helped to expedite export licenses to meet Urgent Operational Requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

76. The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) control the export of equipment, technology and other information on the US Munitions List and can be a significant bureaucratic hurdle for industry in obtaining US export licences. In 2007 Prime Minister Blair and President Bush signed the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty (considered by the House of Commons Defence Committee on 11 December 2007), which seeks to relieve this burden for the transfer of specified categories of equipment, technology and information. This is currently awaiting ratification by the Senate. This would allow the UK to access, more quickly, material required to support operations, help improve interoperability between our forces and enable our defence industries to work more closely together. The UK continues to work closely with the US Administration to prepare for ratification and subsequent implementation.

Ballistic Missile Defence

77. Like the US, the UK recognises that there is an increasing threat from ballistic missiles which could carry weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the recent US review which demonstrates again the real US commitment to the defence of Europe, and continued close co-operation between the US and NATO allies on developing anti-missile systems. The new missile defence architecture aims to provide a robust and timely defence to the short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats that the NATO Alliance is most likely to face in the near future. As it evolves, the proposed NATO architecture will also be able to address the potential threat of longer-range missiles that may develop in a longer timeframe. As the US have set out, their new programme will enable the threat to be addressed earlier and more flexibly, based on proven, effective technology; be able to cover the whole NATO European territory, including the UK should the threat evolve; and which can be shared across NATO.

78. In 2003 the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US to facilitate bilateral information exchanges, undertake co-operative work, and allow for fair opportunities for UK industry to participate in the US BMD programme. The UK also directly supports the US BMD systems by providing early warning information from the radar at RAF Fylingdales, and by allowing the US to use a satellite downlink at RAF Menwith Hill. This will continue. The UK has no plans to host further BMD assets, or develop a BMD capability of our own, although we keep this policy under review.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

79. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is a key United Kingdom foreign policy priority. We have long recognised that US leadership is essential if we are to achieve it. The Government has worked intensively in the United States and elsewhere over the last two years to make the case for an ambitious but balanced strengthening of the NPT's three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to advocate the long-term goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We warmly welcome President Obama's leadership and personal commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. This was a major factor in the much improved atmospherics at the May 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee. President Obama's praise for the United Kingdom's "Road to 2010" plan, published on 16 July, demonstrates the complementarity of UK and US approaches. We will continue to work closely with the United States and the other Nuclear Weapon States to exercise political and moral leadership on non-proliferation, set out a clear and credible forward plan towards multilateral nuclear disarmament and achieve a clear mandate at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We welcome the conference that the US will be hosting early next year on nuclear security, and are also encouraged by the commitment of the US and Russia to conclude a successor to START I by the end of 2009.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

80. The UK works closely with the US Government on CTBT issues. UK experts enjoy excellent working relationships with US officials on the many policy and technical aspects of the CTBT. This is particularly true for the development of the CTBT's highly technical verification regime. US experts are now engaging in negotiations to prepare key tools of the On Site Inspection (OSI) regime.

81. The Administration of President Obama has opened up new opportunities for taking forward work on CTBT issues. The UK warmly welcomes the positive commitment of President Obama to pursue US ratification of the CTBT, which offers new hope for the Entry into Force of the CTBT. The development of the Treaty's OSI regime in particular offers highly promising new areas of co-operation. The OSI regime will be a key element in verifying compliance with the CTBT.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Programmes

82. The UK and US co-ordinate very closely on policy and implementation of the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. UK programmes in support of the Global Partnership are implemented as part of the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP), as set out in the Government's Annual Report (see http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3052790/global-threat-2008-100209).

83. GTRP works closely with the US on a number of programmes in its nuclear and radiological portfolio. Our flagship joint project, in partnership with the US Department of Energy (DOE), is the decommissioning of the former Soviet Plutonium-producing reactor at Aktau in Kazakhstan. Between 2004 and 2006 GTRP contributed £11 million to the US-led international programme to ensure the irreversible closure of the Plutonium-producing reactor in Zheleznogorsk.

84. Both the UK and US have been engaged in programmes of assistance with construction of the chemical weapon destruction facility at Shchuch'ye in the Russian Federation, which successfully started operations in March 2009. The initial UK funding commitment for Shchuch'ye in 2000 helped to secure Congressional support for US funding for Shchuch'ye, which totalled $1 billion making this the US's largest single cooperative threat reduction project. Since that time, the UK has maintained close co-ordination with the US to ensure complementarity and co-ordination between our respective programmes.

85. The US has developed a major cooperative threat reduction programme in the biological area, to reduce the risks of proliferation of materials and expertise that could be misused by states or terrorists for biological weapons purposes. The UK co-ordinates with the US to ensure that our respective programmes complement each other, especially in the Former Soviet Union and Iraq.

Nuclear Security

86. Because of the global spread of nuclear power and advances in nuclear technology, we need timely and concerted international action to prevent terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear material and devices and to secure international consensus for making nuclear security the fourth pillar of the multilateral nuclear framework.

87. As part of this multilateral effort, the UK is playing a leading role in tackling the nuclear security challenges that we face. The momentum for concerted action is building. President Obama has announced plans for a nuclear security summit in Spring 2010. We strongly support this initiative and are committed to working with the US and other governments to ensure that we develop an effective global response to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

88. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) provides regular opportunities for UK and US officials and other partners to discuss areas of mutual interest and share technical expertise on a wide range of issues concerning nuclear security, for example in relation to detection. UK-US co-operation continues in this area with a joint GICNT workshop on detection planned for early 2010.

Proliferation Security Initiative

89. Launched by President Bush in May 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multinational capacity-building initiative working towards more co-ordinated and effective combating of illicit trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. As indicated in President Obama's Prague speech, the new US Administration sees an important role for PSI in international Counter-Proliferation efforts for years to come. The UK shares this vision and is working with US colleagues on how the initiative can become more effective in combating the proliferation challenges of the future.

Space

90. The UK liaises closely with the US in this area. The focus of UK policy on space is on civil and scientific uses, and we firmly believe that all states have the right to explore outer space and make the most of opportunities for scientific, economic, environmental and communications advances. In addition, the security benefits the UK derives from the military use of space are important. Satellite communications, mapping, early warning, navigation, sensing and treaty verification are all integral to our national security responsibilities. As stated in the June 2009 National Security Strategy Update, the Cabinet Office will lead a Government review of the strategic security of the UK's interests in space. President Obama has also recently announced that the US will undertake a review of its national space policy.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

91. The US has been a strong and active supporter of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) since the negotiation of the Treaty began in the 1980s. The UK and the US share a number of priorities and co-ordinate closely. Key areas of co-operation include strengthening the verification regime, for example through increasing and better targeting industry inspections to address areas of greatest relevance to the Convention; pressing for comprehensive and effective national implementation of CWC obligations and ensuring that the verification regime keeps pace with technological and scientific developments.

92. The UK has worked closely with the US and other partners in assisting with Iraq's preparations to join the CWC, just as we did in the case of Libya's accession to the CWC in 2004. Iraq acceded to the CWC in January 2009. We and the US continue to work together in providing post-accession assistance to Iraq, for example, in providing training to Iraqi officials responsible for national implementation of the Convention.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

93. As a depositary (like the UK) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the US takes an active and constructive role in the current BTWC work programme. Although the Obama Administration has yet to complete a review of its policies on the BTWC, the UK Government has already taken several opportunities at official level to discuss the next steps on the Convention, and in particular on approaches to the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, where constructive US engagement will be a key factor in agreeing a substantial programme of future work.

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

94. The US and the UK work closely in a number of areas to help prevent the proliferation of conventional arms, and share the common aim of seeking to strengthen global arms export controls. The US however has concerns about how an ATT might impact on their right to export and on domestic gun ownership. They are also concerned that to have widespread adherence, an ATT would have to aim at lower standards than they would see as adequate and thereby simply legitimise the status quo. This has meant that our countries have differed so far on whether an ATT would be the most effective way of dealing with the problems associated with the unregulated trade in conventional arms.

95. The Government has maintained a very close dialogue with the US up to the most senior Ministerial levels since 2006 and has addressed their main concerns on the right to export and domestic ownership. Although the US have been the only country to vote consistently against work towards an ATT in the UN, they remain a participant in the UN process and have participated fully in the discussions in the UN Working Groups on ATT held this year.

96. The Foreign Secretary has reiterated to Secretary of State Clinton and to Senator John Kerry that we would not support a weak ATT. We hope that the emerging signs of a re-evaluation of the role of the US in the UN ATT process will result in a change in US policy on an ATT.

Intelligence

97. The UK has a long established and very close intelligence relationship with the US, which owes much to our historical and cultural links. The continuing high value of this relationship has been demonstrated on many occasions in recent years and on a wide variety of issues. We share many common objectives, including countering terrorism, drugs and serious crime. The closeness of this intelligence relationship allows us to extend our own national capabilities in ways that would not otherwise be possible and is invaluable.

98. Our intelligence relationship with the US includes a range of collection and assessment activities involving all of the UK's intelligence machinery. A fuller account of this relationship has been provided.[3]

OTHER UN, GLOBAL AND TRADE POLICY ISSUES

Co-operation in the UN Security Council, and on UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

99. As Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the UK and US share particular responsibilities for decisions on maintenance of international peace and security, and we are both committed to ensuring that the UN is able to draw on the full range of tools at its disposal to deliver this.

100. In pursuit of common objectives the UK and US continue to work closely together across the range of issues at the UN Security Council (UNSC). In recent months close co-operation has resulted in UN action on topics such as Burma, DPRK, Iran, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan (all covered in more detail elsewhere in this memorandum). For example, we and the US have worked to ensure sanctions have been tightened on the DPRK (in the light of its further missile and nuclear tests); and that strong statements have been made on Burma (to address the ongoing detention of Aung San Suu Kyi) as well as on Sri Lanka (to address concerns about the humanitarian impact of military operations).

101. UN peacekeeping is a crucial area of UN activity, which has seen significant growth over recent years. We are both committed to ensuring the UN makes the most effective and efficient use of resources available and that the efforts of peacekeepers on the ground are backed up by broader engagement to build sustainable peace.

102. The US and UK (with some US$2.04 billion (26.4%) and US$606 million (7.8%) respectively), are among the biggest contributors to UN peacekeeping costs, and have worked together to ensure that missions are tasked to find savings and efficiencies. In a welcome move, the United States announced in a Security Council meeting on 5 August that it had cleared all peacekeeping arrears accumulated from 2005 to 2008 (totalling $159 million) and had every expectation of meeting its obligations for 2009, currently estimated at approximately $2.2 billion, in full.

103. In the coming months, the UK and the US will continue to work together on a range of issues affecting international peacekeeping, where we are already pressing for improvements on planning, mandate design, and monitoring and evaluation. The UK is also working closely with the US on building global capacity in support of international peacekeeping. Building on the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit commitments, the US and the UK have consecutively hosted international meetings over the last two years which have brought together the international peacekeeping community to address the challenges of meeting the operational needs for peacekeeping missions. We also intend to build on existing US-UK co-operation to address more comprehensively a range of complex issues affecting the conduct of peacekeeping missions, including women in peace and security, robust peacekeeping and the protection of civilians.

104. To complement our work on peacekeeping, the UK initiated a new phase of work in the UN to improve its peacebuilding efforts, following a special meeting of the Security Council chaired by the Foreign Secretary in May 2008. We have increasingly engaged with the US, following the transition to a new US Administration, which, like the UK, is pursuing a comprehensive approach to enhancing international effectiveness across the conflict cycle. We will continue to work with the US to contribute to wider efforts: to ensure rapid implementation of the recommendations within the Secretary-General's Report; on preparations for the Peacebuilding Commission review in 2010; and on building links between peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

Energy Security

105. Both the US and UK recognise that access to diverse, reliable and affordable energy supplies is central to the global economy and global security; share a similar approach to achieving energy security; and work together closely bilaterally and multilaterally in pursuit of our aims. These include increasing the transparency and efficiency of the global oil market; working to eliminate fossil fuel and electricity subsidies; diversifying sources of supply; reducing our dependence on hydrocarbons through driving investment in clean energy and energy efficiency; and reducing energy poverty.

106. The UK and US have a shared interest in improving the EU's energy security through diversification of sources and routes of supply. The most visible manifestation of this policy is the development of the Southern Corridor, a route to bring hydrocarbons from the Caspian to Europe via Turkey, which the US strongly supports. US interest lies in bringing Caspian energy products to world markets, in assisting Caspian region states as they work to diversify their export routes, encouraging the EU to diversify its sources of gas supply. Both countries would also be keen in the medium term to investigate the potential to use the Southern Corridor to export Iraqi gas to the EU as well, assuming the political conditions allow.

107. US diplomacy was instrumental in bringing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) oil pipeline projects to fruition. The US has considerable influence in the region, and will have a key role to play as the Southern Corridor develops.

UN Human Rights/Democracy

108. The new Administration shares our belief that the promotion of human rights and democracy is integral to the pursuit of our strategic objectives, not least our shared security. President Obama stated in Accra that democracy was a universal value, and one that was crucial to sustainable development. The new Administration recognises the UK and the EU as indispensable partners in global democracy promotion. They have sought our views on reclaiming and reinvigorating the democracy agenda.

109. Bilaterally, we continue to work alongside the US around the world to promote human rights in specific countries. Our complementary strengths, networks and alliances play an important role in this regard. The new Administration has acknowledged that the human rights agenda includes lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender issues, and has turned to us for our experience in this area.

110. At the UN, we welcomed US re-engagement with and subsequent election to the Human Rights Council. Both here and at the UN General Assembly's Third Committee, the new Administration is already putting into effect a new policy of reaching out to non-traditional partners to find common ground, whilst defending international human rights institutions and the universal principles that underpin them. We welcome this new approach and have already seen its benefits in, for example, the renewal of the Council's monitoring of Sudan.

111. There are, of course, some important differences between the UK and the EU on the one hand and the US on the other. EU opposition to the death penalty is well known, and we will continue to make it known in general and on specific cases. In UN fora, different approaches to economic rights, the rights of the child, and limits on freedom of expression have all caused difficulties between the EU and US in the past.

International Criminal Justice

112. The UK and US share a common agenda on issues relating to international criminal justice. Both governments work closely together in the UN Security Council on the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, and both governments have been among the principal donors to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The US has also recently become a donor to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and now sits, with the UK, on the UN Steering Committee which provides administrative oversight over the court.

113. With 110 States Parties, the International Criminal Court has, in UK eyes, successfully established itself as the permanent judicial institution at the very centre of the global fight against impunity. We note that President Obama, Secretary Clinton and US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice have all spoken positively of the Court. We hope that US co-operation with the Court will continue and increase. We will continue to encourage and assist the US in overcoming its concerns about co-operating with the Court, focusing on the areas of greatest concern, such as Sudan, where our interests most clearly converge.

Development

114. There is a great deal of common interest and collaboration in UK and US development policy, on countries (e.g. Zimbabwe), on policies (e.g. faster progress on neglected tropical diseases), and in relation to other institutions (e.g. The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria). The recent White Paper Building our Common Future sets out key challenges in development policy for the UK and many of those, including security, the need for the international system to work better, and value for money remain common. The UK has an active dialogue on security and development including country specific collaboration (e.g. Afghanistan), sharing best practice (e.g. stabilisation training practices and conflict assessments) and in working together to ensure more effective multilateral responses to post-conflict reconstruction.

115. President Obama's Administration has committed itself to increasing levels of US development spending, working in a more co-ordinated way with other donors and to a US system for development which is more joined up, and where the US fully participates in the Millennium Development Goals. We continue to encourage the US to take on a greater global leadership role in development. We hope to develop stronger programmatic partnerships in the areas of global health and education and to work towards closer alignment of broader policies affecting developing countries such as trade, climate change financing, and peace-building.

116. There are some philosophical differences between the UK and US development approaches, particularly in relation to untying assistance from national suppliers (UK is 100% untied), the use of developing country systems, focus on the poorest countries, and ability to make predictable, long-term commitments with partner countries.

Counter-narcotics

117. The UK and US have a common interest in tackling drugs trafficking and international organised crime. As such the US is a key strategic partner, both bilaterally and through the multilateral institutions, on both general drugs and crime policy and on specific issues such as Afghanistan counter-narcotics. The UK works closely with US partners at a policy and operational level on countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia, and regions such as the Caribbean and West Africa. Our network of posts acts as a platform for our partners across government to operate from, for example the Serious Organised Crime Agency which has representatives based in our Consulate-General in Miami.

Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance

118. One aspect of our co-operation in fighting serious crime relates to extradition and mutual legal assistance. The UK-US Extradition Treaty 2003 was signed on 31 March 2003. It came into force when both Governments exchanged instruments of ratification on 26 April 2007. Present-day arrangements redress the imbalance in the previous (1972) Treaty, under which the US was required to demonstrate a prima facie evidential case in support of extradition requests made to the UK, whereas the UK only had to demonstrate "probable cause".

119. Between 1 January 2004 and 31 August 2009, 49 people have been extradited from the UK pursuant to extradition requests made by the US. In the same period, 28 people have been extradited from the US to the UK. Since the Treaty came into force on 26 April 2007 and up to 31 August 2009, 12 people have been extradited to the US as a result of extradition requests made to the UK since 26 April 2007; whilst 16 people have been extradited from the US to the UK as a result of extradition requests made to the US. These figures do not include requests made to or by Scotland or Northern Ireland (prior to 1 April 2008). Scotland deals with its own US extradition cases, as did Northern Ireland until 1 April 2008 when the Home Office assumed responsibility for extradition.

120. Under the new arrangements, the information that must be provided in order for a UK extradition request to proceed in the US is in practice the same as for a US request to proceed in the UK. On the one hand, the UK is required to demonstrate "probable cause" in the US courts. In American law this is described as "facts and circumstances which are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime". The US is required to demonstrate "reasonable suspicion" in UK courts. This has been defined in UK case law in the following terms, "circumstances of the case should be such that a reasonable man acting without passion or prejudice would fairly have suspected the person of having committed the offence".

Scientific Collaboration

121. The US is the largest investor in scientific research in the world, investing $368 billion in 2007. The US invests more on R&D than the rest of the G7 countries combined, accounts for around 36% of world R&D spending and employs 37% of OECD researchers (more than the whole of the EU combined). The US and the UK are each other's most important research collaborators with 30% of the UK's international collaborations being with the US (more than double with any other country), and 13% of the US's collaborations being with the UK. The new Administration has placed a high priority on science seeing it as the foundation of the "new energy economy" that will drive the next generation of US growth and wealth creation. In order to improve the quality of UK science the US Science and Innovation Network facilitates new collaborations in areas of high priority for the UK such as climate science, biomedical (including stem cell research) and nanotechnology, and has helped UK researchers to access substantial US funding.

OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

India

122. There is a general convergence of views between the UK and the US on India. The UK regards the strategic re-alignment of US-India relations in recent years, which started under the previous Administration, as a positive development. The American Administration pursues an approach which recognises India's pivotal role in maintaining stability in South Asia and its increasing global role as a member of the G20, leading developing nation and economic powerhouse, as well as a country with a key role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.

123. The UK supported the US India nuclear deal which offered India a perspective on regularising its nuclear arrangements, encouraged India to behave in line with international non-proliferation norms and helped to meet India's energy needs from uranium, thus reducing global competition for energy from hydrocarbons. The UK played a prominent role in promoting international consensus in support of the deal. UK support was welcomed by the US government.

Sri Lanka

124. The UK and the US took a very similar line to the conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). In February and May the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State Clinton issued joint statements in response to the deteriorating situation. We have been in full agreement with the US that only a fully inclusive political settlement could lead to lasting peace between Sri Lanka's communities. Since the end of the conflict in May the US and the UK have both been pressing the GoSL to take necessary measures to meet the needs of the almost 300,000 internally displaced persons. We have also been pressing the government to address minority concerns and to take effective action to tackle human rights issues.

Iraq

125. The UK's involvement in Iraq is the subject of an inquiry led by Rt Hon Sir John Chilcot as announced to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on 15 June. However, it is worth highlighting the strength of the UK and US relationship in our support of emerging Iraqi democracy since 2003.

126. Throughout this period the UK and US have worked very closely both diplomatically and militarily. The UK filled key roles in the Coalition Provisional Authority and our personnel worked with US colleagues in key Baghdad ministries before and after transition to the Government of Iraq. The UK contributions to the Iraqi Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Interior were particularly substantial and British civilians were recognised by the US Government on a number of occasions.

127. After transition, the UK and US Embassies have continued to co-operate closely in support of the Iraqi Government and political development in Iraq. We are at present working with the US in assisting Iraq's efforts to normalise its relationships with both neighbouring states and the United Nations Security Council (by addressing the Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq) as well as promoting dialogue within Iraq on outstanding internal political issues such as the Arab/Kurdish dispute; the reconciliation process with disaffected Sunni groups; and intra-Shia'a reconciliation.

128. The UK was a significant contributor to the US-led Multinational Force—Iraq, taking command of and contributing the majority of forces to the Division in southern Iraq. The US provided significant resources to support the Division, including vital ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities.

129. The UK provided key personnel to Coalition headquarters in Baghdad, including the Deputy Force Commander, and UK forces participated in counter-terrorism operations in Baghdad. Throughout the presence of UK forces in Iraq, senior US commanders went on record to commend the UK military contribution and were clear that UK strategy in southern Iraq was devised "in close consultation and dialogue with the senior operational command of the multi-national corps."[4]

Libya

130. The UK and US have co-operated closely for over a decade on a range of issues in relation to Libya. We worked together to investigate and bring to trial those responsible for the 1998 Lockerbie bombing in 2001, to persuade Libya voluntarily to renounce its WMD in 2003 and to end its support for international terrorism. We continue to work together on important Libya-related issues, including counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.

131. The 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie was an appalling act of terror. We understand the depth of feeling in the US and elsewhere over the decision by the Scottish Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, on 20 August to grant compassionate release to Abelbasset Al-Megrahi, the man convicted of the crime, and the manner of his reception in Libya. In particular we understand the pain the decision has caused to the families of those on board Flight 103, the people of Lockerbie and many others. But as Ministers have consistently said, the decision was for Scottish Ministers to make.

132. Despite the well publicised US Administration criticism of this decision, the US and UK retain a shared strategic interest in ensuring Libya continues to abide by international norms.

Zimbabwe

133. General approach to Zimbabwe: The US and UK continue to work closely together on Zimbabwean issues. Both are committed to assisting, where possible, the Inclusive Government to achieve the political and economic reforms to which the parties in Zimbabwe have committed. The UK and US are two of the largest bilateral donors to Zimbabwe and work closely together and with other international donors on the provision of humanitarian and other essential aid. The UK will contribute £60 million to Zimbabwe this year, the US over $114 million. Prime Minister Tsvangirai visited Washington and London, amongst other capitals, during a tour in June 2009, meeting the most senior political leaders in both countries. The US and UK governments urged the same message upon him; that we are willing to do all we can to assist the government and people of Zimbabwe, including the provision of more support, subject to further progress in the Zimbabwe government delivering its commitments on the ground. The US and UK are also working closely together—and, again, with international partners—in encouraging constructive Zimbabwean re-engagement with the International Financial Institutions.

134. Sanctions: Both the UK, via the EU, and the US maintain targeted measures against individuals and companies associated with the violence and human rights abuses of the Mugabe regime, and agree that these measures should not be lifted until there is evidence of substantial further progress on the ground.

Sudan

135. The UK works closely with the US on supporting peace and reducing poverty in Sudan. Both countries strongly support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the UN/AU-led political process for Darfur, UNAMID deployment and provide significant development and humanitarian assistance. Progress in all these areas is vital for all the people of Sudan, including in Darfur. The US and UK are the largest and second largest bilateral providers of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.

136. The UK and US are committed to supporting peace in Darfur. A Tanzanian battalion funded, trained and equipped by the UK & US will be deploying September 2009 with an advance party already in Darfur. In March this year, the UK gave £1.85 million to the US to assist with training and equipping of the Sierra Leone Reconnaissance Company. This will be Sierra Leone's first ever deployment to a UN Peacekeeping mission after years of receiving international aid in a number of areas. They are scheduled to deploy November 2009. We continue to explore options for future US/UK co-operation on deployment and funding of UNAMID and building peace in Darfur.

Somalia

137. The UK and US share a common goal of a stable, prosperous and secure Somalia. Our policies to achieve this goal are similar, and we work closely to realise it, collaborating at the UN Security Council and through regular bilateral dialogue in London, Washington, Nairobi, and elsewhere in the region. We both fully support the Djibouti process and the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) to achieve peace and security. We continue to work closely with the US to support a stable political settlement in Somalia which can underpin future development, and are clear that any long-term solution must be Somali generated and not imposed from the outside. The UK and US share a common will to prevent Somalia becoming an unchallenged safe haven for international terrorists. Failure to do so will leave the UK, the US and our allies in the region open to the direct threat of terrorist attack.

138. Prolonged violence and instability in Somalia has also led to an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The UK and US governments work closely together as part of the international effort to counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia—both through our work at the UNSC and in the Contact Group on Piracy, and in our naval collaboration.

Nigeria

139. UK and US relations concerning Nigeria are good, cemented by regular contact and a close relationship at official levels. The key areas of co-operation include the fight against corruption and narcotics trafficking, efforts to promote stability in the Niger Delta and UK-US military co-operation in training Nigerian peacekeepers.

140. Development co-operation is also strong. DFID works closely with USAID across the human development sectors: health, education, HIV/AIDS. Both USAID and DFID also participate in a country-level Political Governance Working Group; a group which will co-ordinate the international community's response to the 2011 elections and the broader democratisation process in Nigeria.

China

141. In President Obama's words "the relationship between the US and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world". The stance the US and China take on issues like climate change, the global economy, and on foreign policy challenges such as counter-proliferation, Afghanistan/Pakistan, or Africa will have a key impact on the UK's interests in those areas. The Government engages closely with the US Administration on the Chinese approach and on US/China relations on such issues.

142. Secretary Clinton set out the Obama Administration's approach to China in February this year, saying that it was "committed to pursuing a positive relationship". This is similar to the UK's strategy of constructive engagement outlined in UK & China: A Framework for Engagement which the Foreign Secretary launched in January. Our objectives as set out in that strategy align closely with those of the US notably to foster China's emergence as a responsible global player and to promote sustainable development, modernisation and internal reform in China.

Burma

143. The UK and US share policy objectives in Burma, including benchmarks for progress by the regime—the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and all other political prisoners, and a credible and inclusive political process leading up to free and fair elections. We have regular exchanges of views on how best to work towards these objectives. We also co-operate closely on the ground in Rangoon.

144. In February this year, Secretary of State Clinton launched an interagency review of US Burma policy. The US sought our views at official level. We are remaining in close touch with US officials, as their thinking develops and will continue to concert so that our approaches remain consistent.

Russia

145. The UK and the US, along with our EU and NATO partners, have common objectives in engaging with Russia, aiming to encourage Russia to work within international rules-based frameworks for co-operation and to meet its commitments to the international community. The reset in US-Russia relations, culminating in the July 2009 Moscow summit, has potential for bringing about progress on a range of areas where the US and UK have shared interests. We support the development of strong US-Russia relations across the board, including the important work to negotiate a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We believe that we can pursue our interests through dialogue with Russia in areas such as non-proliferation, climate change, international economic co-operation as well as regional conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. However, we also attach importance to working with the US and other close partners to maintain our resilience where Russian interests run counter to our own. The US and the UK support the right of Russia's neighbours to choose their own path and strategic alliances. Following Russia's disproportionate military actions in Georgia last summer we are now working with the US and other key partners to encourage more constructive Russian participation in the Geneva talks.

Europe

Ukraine

146. As shown by Vice-President Biden's recent visit to Kyiv, UK and US goals with respect to Ukraine continue to be essentially the same: a politically stable and economically prosperous Ukraine more deeply integrated in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. To these ends, we both support continued democratisation and economic reform in Ukraine, using a range of bilateral, multilateral and public diplomacy instruments. The UK maintains a regular dialogue about Ukraine with US policy-makers in Washington, Brussels and Kyiv.

Western Balkans

147. The UK and US share a common strategic interest in stability in the Balkans region, and have invested considerable political, military and financial resource in effort to stabilise the region after the conflicts of the 1990s. This fundamental alignment of interest remains, even if the scale and nature of US and UK engagement has evolved, as large UN and NATO military and civilian stabilisation operations (primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo) have gradually drawn down, and the EU has taken on a bigger role. Crucially, the US fully supports the strategic goal set by the European Union for the region of eventual EU membership, seeing the associated Stabilisation and Association Process, and its conditions based approach, as the best way to embed the political, social and economic reforms needed to ensure long-term stability. In parallel, the UK and the US also support the objective of eventual NATO membership for those countries in the region who aspire to it.

148. We, together with our EU partners, welcome and value highly continued US engagement in the region and US support for EU objectives. The new Administration has emphasised continuing US interest in, and commitment to, the region and has confirmed its support for the strategic goal of its Euro-Atlantic integration: a position set out clearly by Vice-President Biden during his visit to the region in May this year.

Turkey

149. As strong supporters of Turkey's EU accession and influential allies of Turkey, the US have a significant role to play in encouraging continued reform in Turkey. As an EU member the UK can help to ensure that EU and US activity is complementary. We co-operate with the US on human rights and minority issues in Turkey more broadly, including in relation to the Kurdish issue, where increased Turkish-American co-operation in tackling the PKK has strengthened their counter-terrorism co-operation across the board.

Cuba

150. The UK and the US share the objective of a Cuba which respects the basic human, political and economic rights of all its citizens, though our approaches differ. We welcome the recent changes in US approach towards Cuba such as the restarting of bilateral migration talks and the decision to remove all restrictions on remittances and family visits to the island for Cuban Americans. The UK, acting with EU Partners, has long preferred a policy of dialogue and engagement with Cuba. We have each year supported a Cuba-sponsored resolution against the US embargo at the UN General Assembly. We have also consistently rejected the US extraterritorial Helms-Burton legislation which penalises non-US companies doing business with Cuba.

151. In 2008, the UK took the decision with EU Partners, to resume the wide-ranging EU-Cuba Strategic Dialogue (following its suspension after the Cuban crackdown on opposition groups in 2003). Together with EU partners we will continue to press the Cuban government for progress on human, political and economic rights and will review progress under the Strategic Dialogue on an annual basis.

Colombia

152. The UK and US co-operate closely on counter-narcotics issues in Colombia at both a policy and operational level. The Home Office have the UK lead for tackling drugs and organised crime internationally.

Argentina

153. Both the UK and the US have a shared relationship with Argentina as a fellow member of G20. Argentina is in favour of International Financial Institutions (IFI) reform and has worked with the US on seeking additional funding for the Inter-America Development Bank. Other areas of close mutual interest are counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics and money laundering. On the Falkland Islands, the US is well aware of the UK and Argentine positions, and states publicly that it views this as a bilateral issue.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

154. The special relationship between the UK and United States is based on strong historical and cultural ties deriving from our shared values, and close links across a wide spectrum of interests, including economic issues, a strong trading relationship and close co-operation of foreign policy issues. The relationship continues to thrive, notwithstanding occasional disagreements—and indeed the manner in which such disagreements can be aired with the US in a full and frank manner further underscores the depth and strength of the relationship. This memorandum sets out many of the areas in which the UK and US work together as a matter both of long standing experience and necessity. However, it cannot hope to capture the full range of exchanges and debate.

155. The FCO welcomes the Committee's continuing interest in the UK-US bilateral relationship and looks forward to its Report.

25 September 2009

1 Letter from President Obama to the Secretary General of NATO and the Members of the North Atlantic Council, 20 January 2009-http://nato.usmission.gov/dossier/Obama_NATO_Letter.asp Back

2 Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO, Transatlantic Forum, Berlin, 1 July 2009-http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_FA_Berlin070109.asp Back

3 Not printed. Back

4 General David Petraeus, 18 September 2007. Back



© Parliamentary copyright 2010	Prepared 28 March 2010