Written evidence from Mr Lee Bruce
Mr. Bruce is an expert on political negotiations,
defence and military strategy having completed a research thesis
at the University of Leeds. He has subsequently published a book
on British political and military strategy in Northern Ireland.
SUMMARY OF
POINTS
— The UK-US relationship is based on shared
historic, cultural, religious and economic assumptions. Endurance
is the relationship's most impressive feature with evidence of
its continued relevance being found in the close co-operation
in the Iraq and Afghan wars, the maintenance of NATO and the permanence
of extended deterrence as a defence doctrine.1— Washington
is the senior partner in the relationship and the UK should continue
efforts to influence the formulation and execution of American
foreign policy. However the notion that British interests are
marginalised because of military and economic inferiority is absurd.
— UK-US priorities align in a number of
separate theatres. Shared priorities include containing resurgent
Russian nationalism, interdicting terrorist capabilities in Afghanistan
and curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
— Evidence for the continued existence
of the special relationship can be found in the important role
of NATO in defence postures and the US subvention to secure UK
foreign policy priorities. However the special relationship is
not guaranteed in perpetuity and the UK government should make
greater effort to nurture US co-operation and investment.
— The UK government faces a perilous and
potentially catastrophic financial black hole should there be
a revision to the special relationship and subsequent end to US
assistance. Calls for the UK to jettison its transatlantic policy
and adopt a closer relationship with other "fashionable"
allies should be considered within this context.
THE BASIS
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE
UK AND US
1. Transatlantic relations are predicated
on a shared historic, cultural, religious and economic vision.
One of the founding ideals of American political thought was,
as Robert Kagan has demonstrated, a belief that America should
be a new vanguard of the Glorious Revolution.2 This Protestantism
manufactured in American politics a form of "exceptionalism"
that contrasted to the Catholic notion of "divine" right
in continental Europe. Britain, as the epicentre of the reformation,
helped shape these beliefs in individual freedom, property ownership
and the separation between church and state.
2. Both the UK and US governments view each other
as reliable bilateral partners. In Iraq and Afghanistan the two
shared—and continue to share—experience, intelligence
and equipment. By comparison other international allies with the
notable exception of the Dutch have been less co-operative and
use the conflict as an opportunity for political posturing. Such
recklessness should surprise analysts as the European Union is
set to increase its importation of oil supplies by 29% by 2012
and this gap, it is assumed, will be filled by oil secured by
the US in the Middle East.3
3. Moreover the collapse in the sub-prime
market shows the symbiotic relationship between the American and
British economies and the interdependence of international markets.4
However the importance of the present financial crisis to the
UK-US relationship is not simply its global impacts. What should
invite investigation is the similarity between the UK and US economies.
This is a product of the Thatcher and Reagan belief in fiscal
prudence demonstrated through the removal of subventions to inefficient
industries. Certain European states were by comparison less rigorous
in implementing fiscal reforms and continue to prefer policies
that involve expansive government intervention and spending.
4. Endurance is an impressive feature in
any relationship. The UK-US alliance has proved resistant to conflict
between the two partners, the fall of the British Empire and rise
of an American replacement, and the expanding boundaries of pan-European
federalism. Given the stability between the partners it is hard
to conceive of any other bilateral relationship in the world that
is more likely to survive the coming challenges of terrorism,
nuclear proliferation and state competition. In Afghanistan—and
the wider fight against global terrorism—the two partners
continue to share intelligence, equipment and utilise combined
command structures to maximise operational effectiveness.
UK AND US VIEWS
ON THE
NATURE AND
VALUE OF
THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP AND
THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE
UK-US FOREIGN POLICY
RELATIONSHIP TO
GLOBAL SECURITY
5. Washington is the senior partner in the
transatlantic relationship. The UK can influence policy formulation
and implementation, and has a role in aiding the legitimacy of
US action by galvanising support for intervention and neutering
charges of American unilateralism. However if a US Administration
was determined upon a certain course of action there is little
that a British government could do except criticise from the sidelines.
In comparison the failure of the Suez expedition in 1956 and the
successful recapture of the Falkland Islands in 1982 exhibit the
reliance of the UK government on its American ally.
6. Lawrence Freedom provided a precise and succinct
definition of how the UK should perceive its role: "the United
Kingdom should nurture a special relationship with the United
States in the hope of shaping the exercise of US power".5
However the military inferiority of the UK has allowed for confusion
and misrepresentation to infect the public debate on both the
character and achievements of the transatlantic
relationship. Characterisations of the UK as a "poodle"
duped into supporting its nefarious ally are wildly inaccurate.
Rational analysis shows that the UK has its territorial integrity
guaranteed, its interests in Europe protected, and its geopolitical
position protected by the projection of US power across the globe.
This has allowed the UK to reap a "peace dividend" and
therefore reduce its defence spending as a proportion of total
government expenditure, protect its energy supply and ameliorate
regional antagonisms such as those present in the Balkans and
Africa.
7. For Washington it is less clear cut as
to what partnership with the UK achieves for the US national interest.
This could explain why there has been an apparent cooling—apart
from the Bush-Blair hiatus—in transatlantic relations since
the end of the Cold War. Frustration in America at UK shortcomings
is evident across the political divide. Britain stands accused
of allowing its territory to become a breeding ground for Islamic
militancy, of reducing its defence budget irrespective of consequence
and bending its policies to suit the pan-Arabism of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office.6
8. However the sheer historical resilience
of the transatlantic relationship enables the US to ignore the
often egregious failings of its ally. Neither is there a credible
alternative European partner as France and Germany missed the
opportunity in 2003 and none of the other EU Member States invest
heavily enough in defence assets to viably support US power projection.
Kagan used the memorable phrase "post modern paradise"
to describe European diplomacy and presciently warned against
the dangers of Europe debilitating the US: "since they have
no intention of supplementing American power with their own, the
net result will be a diminution of the total amount of power that
the liberal democratic world can bring to bear in its defence".7
The US in contradiction to the European position has a less sanguine
reading of international relations and the UK should adopt the
paradigm set by its transatlantic partner.
THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
UK AND US INTERESTS
ALIGN IN
KEY FOREIGN
POLICY RELATED
AREAS INCLUDING
SECURITY, DEFENCE
AND INTELLIGENCE
CO-OPERATION
9. The interests of the UK and US should
continue to converge across a broad spectrum of foreign policy
areas. In Europe both partners should aim to curtail recalcitrant
Russian nationalism and with it the bellicose foreign policy implemented
by Vladimir Putin, and subsequently continued by Dmitry Medvedev,
that includes tormenting former Soviet satellites. Russian attempts
to control energy supply and prices will affect the posturing
of European states—notably Germany and France—meaning
that the UK could become ever more reliant on US assistance when
deterring Russian irredentism. Clear indication of this was given
during the Georgian crisis when the EU diplomacy lead by Nicolas
Sarkozy focused on placating Russian demands and not safeguarding
the viability of a democratic state.
10. A belief in the merits of European integrationism
remains one of the cornerstones to British and American foreign
policy. For the UK this is manifested by faith in a shared common
European defence policy which, it is argued, will enable the EU
to guarantee political stability both within its own border and
where necessary abroad. Certain commentators will no doubt welcome
a return to European liberal interventionism. The US for its part
recognises that an independent European defence force could precipitate
a reduction in the American military commitment in Europe.
11. However the potential success of a shared
European defence policy is limited by the deplorable track record
of EU Member States in armed conflict—the Balkan conflagration
of the mid-1990s is a stain on European collectivism—and
the lack of appetite across Europe to treat the issue of national
security with the degree of serious thought and financial investment
it deserves. There is little reflection on how an integrated European
command structure could operate, or what a combined European defence
force is there to achieve, or how procurement policy should be
decided—for example which state purchases what pieces of
equipment. Likewise the brittle commitment of European allies
in Afghanistan sets another unenviable precedent.
12. Consequently it is in the UK and US
national interest that a strong American military presence is
retained in Europe to guarantee the territorial integrity of key
allies. Moreover, it is prudent for UK and US to continue with
the post Second World War policy of ensuring French geopolitical
impotence and containing German aspirations to re-establish continental
hegemony.
13. Afghanistan is presently the stage on
which the War on Terror is being fought. However, the battle could
legitimately be extended to the border regions of Pakistan, the
Pakistani mainland should the country fall to the Taliban, and
Iran should the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad succeed in acquiring
nuclear weapons. The UK and US have a shared interest in rigorously
pursuing the campaign in Helmand, and must continue to monitor
the situation in neighbouring states closely with the intention
of acting should there be a sudden deterioration in the security
climate. Bargaining with regimes in command of nuclear weapons
and propagating nothing less than the destruction of Western civilisation
is a dangerous game. It will be under these dire circumstances
that the UK and US governments might have to consider the value
of nuclear pre-emption: indeed an action potentially necessary
for survival.
THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
THE UK IS
ABLE TO
INFLUENCE US FOREIGN
POLICY AND
UK POLICY IS
INFLUENCED BY
THE US UNDER
THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
14. Dwindling military prowess, rising national
debt and failure to invest in its defence forces could render
the UK a less worthwhile partner. Yet the government in London
continues to wield remarkable influence on US foreign policy:
projection of US power guarantees the status quo in Europe,
stabilises energy supply, underwrites nuclear non-proliferation
and negates the operational capacity of non-state terrorist organisations.
All of these aspects of US foreign policy serve the UK national
interest and show palpable British influence in the State Department.
In fact it could be argued that certain aspirations of US foreign
policy are of greater advantage to the Prime Minister than they
are to the President.
15. In contrast to popular mythology the
Bush Administration was keen to engage with the UK as a crucial
bilateral ally. Most notably in 2003 effort was made to elicit
a resolution from the UN Security Council, an edict that would
have little benefit for President Bush, but was seen as a powerful
political weapon by Prime Minister Tony Blair. The pursuit of
a UN resolution tarnished Washington's public image by opening
the invasion to endless debates which then allowed those states
intent on protecting oil agreements with the Saddam regime to
build a coalition of support against the US and UK governments.
In the context of this investigation it is appropriate to remember
that even though there were clear limitations to multilateralism,
the US dutifully pursued a resolution out of respect for the domestic
political calculations made by the British government.
16. Since the inauguration of the Obama
presidency the US has distanced itself—at least rhetorically—from
the UK as evidenced by the tepid summit held between Prime Minister
Brown and President Obama earlier in 2009. The irony of such a
demarche is noteworthy when considered against the backdrop of
the wild populism that greeted the Democrat's electoral success
in the UK. However even in the context of a reduced congeniality
in transatlantic relations there is still no sign that the US
will divest itself of the responsibility for delivering UK foreign
policy objectives.
17. Meanwhile Europe as an entity benefits
from the security dividend created by the forward projection of
American military power. Profit is not reaped by the US taxpayer
as the Defence Department continues to invest heavily in its military
capabilities. Instead it is American allies like the UK who are
able to reduce military expenditure in real terms and focus on
domestic priorities. The result of this situation for the transatlantic
relationship is intriguing. In effect the US bears the cost for
guaranteeing the most pressing British security priority: European
continental stability. By comparison, the European theatre could
be thought a peripheral concern in the US and one that if jettisoned
would not lead to a collapse in Washington's security position.
Considered along these lines it is difficult to discern how a
rational evaluation of UK-US relations could fail to conclude
that the British government is anything but the benefactor of
the alliance.
THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
"THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP" STILL
EXISTS AND
THE FACTORS
WHICH DETERMINE
THIS
18. There has in recent months been a chill
in the special relationship. Abdication of its position in Iraq,
vacillations over Afghanistan, the Megrahi affair and a general
failure to articulate the importance of transatlantic relations
are signs that the UK government is either intent on a rift with
Washington or guilty of disastrous incompetence in the conduct
of its foreign policy.
19. In recognition of the new priorities facing
the US, and the failure of its ally, President Obama could implement
a radical realignment of his international priorities. Such a
shift in American foreign policy cannot be dismissed lightly—the
US Defense Strategy8 neglects to mention Britain—and
has far reaching strategic and tactical ramifications. British
desire to renege on its commitments in Afghanistan, along the
lines of the withdrawal from Iraq, and the failure of other European
partners, could potentially lead the Obama White House to question
whether it is worth buttressing continental stability in Europe.
US military bases in the UK, Germany and Kosovo might instead
be redeployed to augment other priorities across the globe. Moreover,
these geopolitical arguments could support a new isolationism
in US foreign policy and enable the federal deficit to be ameliorated.9
20. In the meantime if the UK provokes the
US into removing intelligence co-operation it will atrophy the
capacity of MI5 and MI6 to defend British interests. Renewed efforts
should now be made to restore the special relationship.
21. Whilst there is rightly concern about
the prospect of the special relationship no longer being a permanent
feature of international diplomacy it should nevertheless be recognised
that the vital factor determining the alliance is US preparedness
to invest in securing the UK's defence posture. The existence
of NATO, access to missile defence, and the doctrine of US extended
deterrence—the US nuclear umbrella—is evidence the
special relationship remains a marked feature of the international
scene. Crucially, President Obama has kept these projects and
is not arguing for their cancellation or removal. The continuing
US commitment to British objectives should imbue a sense of optimism
across the UK government.
THE IMPLICATIONS
OF ANY
CHANGES IN
THE NATURE
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
FOR BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY
22. Radical revisions to the UK-US bilateral
relationship could leave the British Exchequer with a crippling
financial black hole. The collapse of NATO, removal of US bases
in Europe, and the end of extended deterrence will open a gaping
hole in the UK's defence portfolio. Any loss of US patronage raises
difficult questions over how the UK can defend its interests abroad,
threatens the continued existence of European pan-federalism—with
Washington no longer able to mediate the EU could fall into factional
strife—requires a slashing of expenditure across all government
departments at Whitehall—except defence which would require
stifling increases—in order that the security of the UK
can be maintained. The final and most ominous consequence of a
substantial change in the nature of the bilateral relationship
is the potential for a re-emergence of the disastrous geopolitical
competition that last afflicted Europe in the 1930s.
23. Neither will removing US influence from
UK foreign policy lead to a period of mutual co-operation with
other European partners. The historic record should caution against
believing in the viability of a collective European defence posture
or political identity. Reckless calls for US withdrawal from Europe
and an end to the special relationship should be considered against
this backdrop. Those who rail against US influence on the UK must
prepare for—but notably do not accept—a precipitate
increase in the UK defence budget. In the tumultuous economic
climate additional increases in expenditure may not be a viable
option to the British Exchequer and therefore the transatlantic
relationship should remain ensconced as a permanent feature of
UK foreign policy.
REFERENCES1 Extended
deterrence was developed by the US in the Cold War. Under this
doctrine the US deterred attack on itself with strategic nuclear
forces whilst extending a guarantee to its Cold War allies that
it would retaliate if the Soviet Union threatened invasion. Even
though the Cold War has finished extended deterrence remains a
component of the UK-US relationship. For a further examination
of deterrence theories see: Naval Studies Board, National Research
Council, Post Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) at http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=5464#orgs
2 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America
and the World 1600-1898 (London, 2006).
3 Discussions about Energy and our future at
http://europe.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/22/95855/4850
4 For a more detailed examination of financial
history see: Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial
History of the World (Penguin, 2009).
5 Lawrence Freedman, From the Falklands to
Iraq, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2006).
6 Robin Harris, "State of the Special Relationship",
Policy Review, no—113, (June/July 2002) at www.hover.org
7 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America
and Europe in the New World Order (London, 2nd edition 2004),
p 158.
8 US Department of Defense, National Defense
Strategy (2008) at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf
9 There is a tradition of isolationism in US
strategic doctrine. For examples of this argument see: America's
Strategic Choices (The MIT Press, 2000).
13 September 2009
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