Written evidence from the British Pugwash
Group
GLOBAL SECURITY:
UK-US RELATIONS
1. The Foreign Affairs Committee has announced
that it is taking evidence on the relationship between the UK
and the US and the implications this has on UK foreign policy,
and has invited interested groups or individuals to submit their
views on six specific issues:
— the basis of the bilateral relationship
between the UK and US; — UK and US views on the nature and
value of the bilateral relationship and the contribution of the
UK-US foreign policy relationship to global security;
— the extent to which UK and US interests align
in key foreign policy related areas including security, defence,
and intelligence co-operation;
— the extent to which the UK is able to
influence US foreign policy and UK policy is influenced by the
US under the Obama Administration;
— the extent to which "the special
relationship" still exists and the factors which determine
this; and
— the implications of any changes in the
nature of the bilateral relationship for British foreign policy.
2. The British Pugwash Group (BPG) wishes
to offer the following thoughts on these six issues, as set out
below. The BPG is affiliated to the international Pugwash movement,
which has for over 50 years provided independent expert advice
to national governments on matters affecting international security,
particularly in relation to nuclear weapons. For example, it played
major roles in the development of arms control treaties, including
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. The British
Pugwash Group has been an active participant in the work of International
Pugwash since the movement started. It has strong international
connections, and has technical expertise in many areas related
to security, nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction),
arms control and disarmament. It has recently produced a significant
report on the Management of the UK Stockpile of Separated Plutonium.
Copies of this report can be provided on request.
3. THE BASIS
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE
UK AND US
3.1 The roots of the bilateral relationship
between the UK and US reach back into the 17th century, and the
relationship has had high and low points ever since. The so-called
"special relationship" was forged during the Second
World War: it owed a great deal to the personal relationship between
Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, but has survived to
the present day in spite of periodic tensions. In recent years,
some of the most significant structural foundations of that relationship
have been the close collaboration between the two countries in
the areas of nuclear weapons and intelligence. In both areas there
have been a series of formal agreements and informal cooperative
practices.
3.2 In the nuclear area, among the most important
of these have been the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) and
the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA).
The 1958 MDA, formally known as the Agreement
for Co-operation on the use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
Purposes, has a number of appendices, amendments and memoranda
of understanding, many of which are still classified. It is known,
however, that the agreement provides for extensive co-operation
on nuclear warhead and reactor technologies, in particular the
exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons
to improve "design, development and fabrication capability".
The agreement also provides for the transfer of nuclear warhead-related
materials. The agreement was renewed in 2004 for a further 10
years.
3.3 The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement allows
the UK to acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile
system. Originally signed to allow the UK to acquire the Polaris
SLBM system in the 1960s, it was amended in 1980 to facilitate
purchase of the Trident I (C4) missile and again in 1982 to authorise
purchase of the more advanced Trident II (D5) in place of the
C4. In return, the UK agreed to formally assign its nuclear forces
to the defence of NATO except in an extreme national emergency
under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement reached between President
John F Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate
negotiation of the PSA.
3.4 The second area is intelligence co-operation.
Exchange of intelligence information between the US and UK agencies
has been routine since the 1930s, but was greatly expanded during
the second World War, and in relation to signals intelligence
(SIGINT) it was formalised on 17 May 1943 with the conclusion
of the still-secret, and possibly still-active, BRUSA COMINT agreement.
More general exchanges of information continue to this day, though
periodically threatened by espionage scandals (eg the Philby affair).
4. UK AND US
VIEWS ON
THE NATURE
AND VALUE
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
AND THE
CONTRIBUTION OF
THE UK-US FOREIGN
POLICY RELATIONSHIP
TO GLOBAL
SECURITY
4.1 A consequence of these agreements is
that the UK has always been heavily dependent on the United States
for its ongoing deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. Without
ongoing US support the UK would very probably cease to be a nuclear
weapon state. This inevitably constrains the UK's national security
policies and actions insofar as they must not destabilise its
relationship with the US for fear of dilution or even withdrawal
of nuclear weapons co-operation. A more general consequence of
the particularly close co-operation in these two areas has been
that the UK has felt constrained to support the United States
in other areas of military activity, including interventionist
activities in the Middle East, and in sharing the "burden"
of the conventional and nuclear defence of NATO.
4.2 These "distorting" effects of the
"special relationship" in these two key areas has meant
that the UK has periodically been subject to criticism from other
international players, and particularly from the European Community,
for paying insufficient attention to the international policy
objectives of its other partners.
4.3 A particular issue where the UK has
been seen to pay undue attention to US foreign policy has been
the so-called "War on Terror". It is now widely believed
that statements made by President Bush on this subject were counter-productive,
but the UK at no stage expressed public reservations about these.
More generally, the UK has been inhibited from
developing its own foreign policy in relation to cases of actual
or threatened nuclear weapon proliferation such as Israel, North
Korea and Iran.
5. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
UK AND US INTERESTS
ALIGN IN
KEY FOREIGN
POLICY RELATED
AREAS INCLUDING
SECURITY, DEFENCE
AND INTELLIGENCE
CO-OPERATION
5.1 The foreign policy interests of the
UK and the US are naturally and properly aligned in a number of
areas. Both have a strong interest in sustaining and strengthening
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in exerting pressure on those countries
which have not already signed the NPT to do so, and to subscribe
to the Additional Protocol. Both have a strong interest in deterring
acts of terrorism, including particularly nuclear terrorism. Both
have a strong interest in protecting the environment, particularly
against the threat of global warming. Both have a consequential
interest in promoting the "nuclear renaissance" and
other low-carbon means of generating electric power. Both have
a strong interest in the establishment of safe means of disposing
of nuclear waste, and in the management of fissile materials.
5.2 However within this broad area of coincidence
of interest, there are a number of actual or potential divergences.
5.3 Independent nuclear deterrent.
The UK has always prided itself on its possession of an independent
nuclear deterrent, and the US has always been outwardly supportive,
and has indeed taken active steps to assist the UK in this, to
the extent that the UK deterrent cannot really be described as
"independent" (see attachment 1). However recent developments
in US policy (as formulated by President Obama) raise the question
as to whether it is really in US interests for the UK to continue
to pursue this policy. It is arguable that US policy objectives
would be better served if the UK were to take a lead, among the
nuclear powers, in abandoning its nuclear weapons altogether,
either as a unilateral step, or as part of a bargaining process.
The BPG takes the view that no-one (politician, journalist, academic
or whomever) has devised a plausible scenario in which an independent
British nuclear weapon might actually be used, either now or in
the foreseeable future.
5.4 Openness in strategic policy formation.
The UK has over many years operated a policy of forming international
policy within government and behind closed doors, and has used
the Offical Secrets Act as a means of preventing the unauthorised
disclosure of information to outsiders. The recent Freedom of
Information Act has done little to change this. By contrast, in
the US, policy formation is much more open. One disadvantage of
UK practice in this area is that government is unable to make
effective use of advice on such matters coming from NGOs, academia
etc, because those sources are unable to tap into the existing
state of thinking within government. In the US, there are various
mechanisms which make this possible—e.g. the mechanism of
the JASON Defense Advisory Group, which gives expert outsiders
access to classified information. One of the drivers behind the
UK policy has been the belief that disclosure of information by
the UK might prejudice UK-US co-operation in such areas as nuclear
weapon development or intelligence. To remove this concern, there
is a need for the UK and US governments to reach a common understanding
about how to open up this channel of expert advice, without damaging
real security interests.
5.5 Constraints upon the nuclear renaissance.
During the past three decades, the US and UK have operated highly
divergent policies on the subject of reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel. The US policy—to prohibit reprocessing internally
and to exert strong pressure on other nations not to embark on
it—was triggered by its concern over the Indian nuclear
weapon test in 1974, in which the plutonium came from reprocessing
technology supplied by the US. By contrast, the UK and France
have actively engaged in reprocessing since the 1950s, and have
in recent years offered a commercial reprocessing service to countries
which have not developed their own capability. There are still
authoritative voices in the US which argue that the US should
maintain its policy, and take active steps to discourage reprocessing
world-wide. On this view, only the once-through nuclear fuel cycle
should be pursued, and those countries (like the UK and France)
which have large stockpiles of separated plutonium should stop
producing more, and take active steps to dispose of their stockpiles
immediately in a manner which does not facilitate retrieval. On
the other hand, there is a strong argument that if the nuclear
renaissance is to be sustained for more than a few decades, it
will become essential to engage in reprocessing, and to make the
resulting plutonium available for a fast reactor programme. The
existing stockpiles would therefore need to be either securely
stored, or converted to MOX fuel for burning in suitable power
reactors. The BPG has explored the arguments for and against each
of these views in the report cited above, and has concluded that
it is impossible to reach a decision without having access to
information which is not in the public domain. It has recommended
that HMG should make sufficient information available to permit
a rational debate on the matter. When a firm UK policy in these
matters emerges, it may be desirable to convince the US government
that it is correct.
5.6 Negotiating positions at the 2010
NPT review meeting. It is widely recognised that the 2005
NPT review meeting was a nearly-disastrous failure, and that if
the NPT regime is to be sustained, the 2010 review meeting must
have a more successful outcome. The UK government has published
a document entitled The road to 2010 which sets out the
steps which it believes need to be taken to this end. Various
policy statements are made in that document which are not self-evidently
consistent with the approach which is currently being taken by
the US. These include:
(a) advocating the introduction of a "fourth
pillar" into the NPT framework—securing fissile material
against the risks from clandestine diversion or nuclear terrorism;
(b) development of multilateral approaches to
the fuel cycle, so that countries developing new nuclear programmes
can reliably access the fuel they need to generate power without
having to establish individual national facilities; and
(c) strengthening the powers and organisation
of the IAEA so that it can play a stronger role in securing fissile
material and preventing proliferation.
Important though such issues are, they may well
be overshadowed at the review meeting by complaints from non-nuclear
signatories that the five nuclear powers recognised by the Treaty
are not doing enough to honour the spirit, if not the letter,
of Article VI of the Treaty. In this respect, the UK position
is currently looking less credible than the US position.
6. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
THE UK IS
ABLE TO
INFLUENCE US FOREIGN
POLICY AND
UK POLICY IS
INFLUENCED BY
THE US UNDER
THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
6.1 It is clear that because of the long
history of collaboration in many areas of foreign policy, the
US and UK have always had a strong mutual influence. Specifically
in the nuclear area, the pattern of collaborative agreements and
informal cooperative practices has again led to mutual influence,
though with the US as the predominant partner for obvious economic
reasons. In recent years, the collaboration on the development
of next-generation nuclear warheads, nuclear missiles and submarine
delivery systems has been particularly complex (for details and
supporting evidence see attachment 1).
6.2 The UK's policy on warhead development has
largely been driven by two parallel US programmes which started
in the 1990s—to extend the life of the W76 warhead, and
to develop new warhead designs to replace it. These programmes
evolved into the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) programme,
which Congress funded in 2004 but subsequently stripped of further
funding in 2007 and 2008, and which was formally terminated by
the Obama Administration in March 2009. The UK faces (but has
not yet taken) a decision on whether to extend the life of its
Trident warheads or develop its own version of an RRW. It is currently
undertaking a number of exploratory activities jointly with the
United States under the MDA, including work which is being undertaken
by a Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group at the Atomic Weapons Establishment
(AWE). Some of this research is being undertaken with the US,
and it is reported that AWE is "keenly, keenly interested"
in the US RRW programme. The two countries have also conducted
joint "sub-critical" nuclear tests using fissile material,
in tests that do not produce a nuclear explosion. The UK conducted
a number of sub-critical nuclear experiments at the US Nevada
Test Site in 2002 and 2006 "that provided data of direct
benefit to both the U.S. and UK warhead certification efforts".
US nuclear weapon laboratories have used AWE experimental facilities
to conduct tests using non-fissile plutonium isotopes that are
prohibited by US law. US nuclear weapons labs will also have access
to the Orion Laser at Aldermaston under the MDA. In fact, an important
rationale for additional UK government investment in AWE expertise
and advanced experimental facilities is to ensure that AWE can
continue to make a valuable contribution to US nuclear weapon
programmes, including a credible peer-review capability, and thereby
ensure that benefits from the relationship are two-way.
6.3 As regards missile development, the
UK government has already committed itself to the US Navy's programme
to refurbish and extend the service life of its Trident missiles.
6.4 As regards next-generation ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) development, the US Navy is four to five
years behind the UK. The UK plans to introduce its first successor
submarine in 2024 but the US only provisionally plans to introduce
a new submarine in 2028-29. In consequence the UK has already
begun working with the United States on possible new submarine
designs, and the Joint Steering Task Group that oversees the Polaris
Sales Agreement has already met three times during which concept
studies for a new successor submarine were discussed. In December
2008 the US General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation was awarded
a contract to perform studies and design of a Common Missile Compartment
(CMC) for the successor submarines to both the existing US and
UK submarines, paid for by the UK but run through the US Naval
Sea Systems Command in Washington.
6.5 The above represents what might be termed
"business as usual". However during the past two years,
a new theme has emerged, commonly referred to as "getting
to zero" or "a nuclear-weapon-free world". This
idea has been put onto the international political agenda, as
a result of the ground-breaking open letter of Schultz, Perry,
Kissinger and Nunn (4 January 2007), the speech made by Margaret
Beckett to the Carnegie Foundation (25 June 2007), and recent
speeches and publications by eminent UK politicians and generals,
including some recent statements by Foreign Secretary Miliband,
and Barak Obama's recent address to the UN General Assembly.
6.6 It is rather clear that to reach the
eventual goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the international
community will have to proceed in steps. There is an immediate
and pressing need to prevent the current situation from deteriorating
further. This requires the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty regime, encouraging those countries that have not already
signed the Treaty and the Additional Protocol to do so, and ensuring
that those countries which have signed abide by its provisions.
In parallel with this, there is a need for those countries which
have already acquired nuclear weapons to start or continue arms
reduction, arms limitation and other confidence-building measures,
both to fulfil their obligations under the NPT and to move in
the direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the longer term,
there is a need to create the international security framework
within which nations could abandon nuclear weapons altogether
as an element of their defence policy.
6.7 In the context of this long-term goal,
there is an urgent need for leadership, and a particularly useful
suggestion was made by Margaret Beckett in her speech of 25 June
2007, that the UK should become the "disarmament laboratory"
of the world. The BPG has been seeking to develop this idea, and
has proposed the creation of a British institution (which it has
named BRINPARDI) which would bring together all the expertise
which exists in this country in these matters, and which would
contribute an element of British leadership to the international
efforts which are required. It should be both British and International,
in the same way that SIPRI is both Swedish and International—i.e.
located in the UK, and predominantly funded from British sources—but
open to both individual experts from around the world, and to
funding from outside the UK. It should be a predominantly non-classified
institution, but should be able to draw on the advice of experts
with security clearance as necessary, as is possible in the US
JASON system. It should operate in such a way that it earns the
respect of the international community as an objective, fair-minded
organisation, not subject to undue influence from any national,
political or military faction, but should be regarded by the British
government as a reliable source of information and advice on policy
in this area. This idea is developed further in attachment 2.
7. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
"THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP" STILL
EXISTS AND
THE FACTORS
WHICH DETERMINE
THIS
The importance of the "special relationship"
can easily be exaggerated. However it still exists, and is likely
to survive spats such as that over the repatriation of Abdelbaset
Ali Mohmet al-Megrahi. It was strengthened by the US-UK partnership
as allies during the Second World War, and by the UK support for
US policy in Iraq, and draws on strong linguistic and cultural
links. It could be strengthened further if the UK and US adopt
a common approach to the NPT review and take parallel steps towards
a nuclear-weapon-free world.
8. THE IMPLICATIONS
OF ANY
CHANGES IN
THE NATURE
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
FOR BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY
8.1 The most significant change during the
next decade or two will be driven by the shift from the US as
the sole super-power to a multi-polar world in which China and
other countries move towards economic, and perhaps also military,
parity with it. The UK, as a country which has been through the
experience of losing an empire, can perhaps help the US to develop
a useful role in this new world. The US certainly still needs
encouragement to show sufficient respect to international institutions.
8.2 The US has recently experienced some major
set-backs in the exercise of power, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
Israel, North Korea (to name but five) proving that they are able
to thwart its foreign policy. The UK may be able to help find
diplomatic solutions to problems which the US has been unable
to solve by the exercise or threat of military power.
8.3 In the nuclear sphere, the US has taken
a number of policy decisions (e.g. on reprocessing) which, with
hindsight, were perhaps ill-advised. The UK may be able to help
it to move forward.
8.4 During the past decade, the UK has adopted
a number of foreign relations policies which, with hindsight,
showed undue subservience to US policy. It would benefit the bilateral
relationship if the UK were able to find ways to dissociate itself
from US policy in certain areas, without undermining a long history
of fruitful collaboration.
9. RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 The UK should explore with the US government
whether its policy objectives would be better served if the UK
were to take a lead, among the nuclear powers, in abandoning its
nuclear weapons altogether, either as a unilateral step, or as
part of a bargaining process.
9.2 The UK and US governments should seek to
reach a common understanding about how to open up the channel
of expert advice from UK NGOs, academics and other experts on
nuclear policy matters, without damaging the real security interests
of either country. One specific possibility that should be followed
up is to explore the applicability of the JASON model in the UK.
9.3 The UK government should develop, in
consultation with NGOs, academics and other experts, a policy
on reprocessing and plutonium stockpile management, and should
then seek to convince the US government that it is correct.
9.4 The UK and US should seek to develop
common negotiating positions for the 2010 NPT review meeting,
having regard to any concerns that the US may have about the policies
outlined in The Road to 2010, and Article VI of the NPT
Treaty.
9.5 The UK government should take forward
the suggestion which was made by Margaret Beckett in her speech
of 25 June 2007, that the UK should become the "disarmament
laboratory" of the world, for example by establishing an
institution such as BRINPARDI (see attachment 2). The precise
form that this institution should take could usefully be explored
with interested NGOs, academics and other experts.
9.6 The UK should try to find ways to dissociate
itself from US policy in selected areas, without undermining a
long history of fruitful collaboration.
23 September 2009
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