ATTACHMENT 1
"US-UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
UNDERSTANDING CURRENT
US-UK NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CO-OPERATION
Any understanding of the US-UK "special
relationship" must address the long-standing nuclear weapons
co-operation that underpins it. This attachment outlines the contemporary
state of that co-operation.
Anchoring itself to the US is a fundamental part
of British security strategy, and nuclear weapons are seen as
both an important part of the anchor and a symbol of its strength.[6]
The UK, however, remains heavily dependent on the United States
for its ongoing deployment of strategic nuclear weapons in the
Trident system. Without ongoing US support the UK would likely
cease to be a nuclear weapon state.
As long as HMG deems it imperative that the
UK deploy strategic nuclear weapons for the country's security
it will remain dependent upon the United States in this area.
This inevitably constrains the UK's national security policies
and actions insofar as they must not destabilise its relationship
with the US for fear of dilution or even withdrawal of nuclear
weapons co-operation. Nuclear weapons co-operation is one of several
dependency dimensions of the UK's relationship with the US, one
other primary area being intelligence co-operation.
The UK is, in fact, in a circular nuclear relationship
with the United States in which it deems it essential to deploy
strategic nuclear forces to reinforce and reproduce its role and
commitment as the United States' primary political and military
ally, in part to facilitate its willingness to support the US
militarily in interventionist activity,[7]
and in part to share the "burden" of the nuclear defence
of NATO,[8]
whilst at the same time being highly dependent upon the United
States for the provision and operation of its nuclear capability.
MDA AND PSA
Nuclear dependence upon the United States was
cemented in the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) and the 1963
Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA). The 1958 MDA, formally known as
the Agreement for Co-operation on the use of Atomic Energy for
Mutual Defence Purposes, has a number of appendices, amendments
and memoranda of understanding, many of which are still classified.[9]
It is known, however, that the agreement provides for extensive
co-operation on nuclear warhead and reactor technologies, in particular
the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons
to improve "design, development and fabrication capability".[10]
The agreement also provides for the transfer of nuclear warhead-related
materials. The agreement was renewed in 2004 for a further 10
years.[11]
Every 18 months a review, or "stock take", of US-UK
nuclear co-operation is conducted involving senior officials from
the US and UK. More frequent interaction between the US and UK
nuclear weapons laboratories and defence bureaucracies takes place
via a range of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs).[12]
The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement allows the UK to
acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile system. Originally
signed to allow the UK to acquire the Polaris SLBM system in the
1960s, it was amended in 1980 to facilitate purchase of the Trident
I (C4) missile and again in 1982 to authorise purchase of the
more advanced Trident II (D5) in place of the C4. In return the
UK agreed to formally assign its nuclear forces to the defence
of NATO except in an extreme national emergency under the terms
of the 1962 Nassau Agreement reached between President John F
Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate negotiation
of the PSA.[13]
Under the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended for Trident, the
UK is involved in a number of other working groups, including
a Joint Steering Task Group, supported by the Trident Joint Re-Entry
Systems Working Group and the Joint Systems Performance and Assessment
Group.[14]
THE TRIDENT
SYSTEM
Britain's single remaining nuclear weapon system
comprises three core components: four Vanguard-class nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); 50 US-designed and built
Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
drawn from a common pool of Trident missiles based in the US;
and 160 operational nuclear warheads. Collectively, and sometimes
misleadingly, the composite system is usually referred to as Trident.
The UK is entirely dependent upon the United States
for supply and refurbishment of its Trident II (D5) submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM). The missiles themselves are produced
and serviced in the United States by Lockheed Martin. The UK does
not actually own any individual missiles, but purchased the rights
to 58 missiles from a common pool held at the US Strategic Weapons
facility at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia. British Trident
submarines also conduct their missile test firings at the US Eastern
Test Range, off the coast of Florida.
The UK is also dependent upon the United States
for the software used for targeting and firing its Trident missiles.
Ainslie reports that "targeting data on British Trident submarines
is processed in the Fire Control System by software produced in
America. This data is created in the Nuclear Operations and Targeting
Centre in London. The Centre relies on US software".[15]
Ainslie also reports that both UK and US Trident submarines use
the Mk 98 Fire Control System produced by General Dynamics Defense
System (GDDS) to carry out the calculations to prepare and launch
the Trident missiles.[16]
UK nuclear targeting is also integrated into
US nuclear targeting plans through the UK Liaison Cell at US Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha, Nebraska.[17]
STRATCOM develops and co-ordinates US nuclear targeting plans.
This used to involve periodic revision of a Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP) covering all US nuclear forces. It now
involves an "adaptive planning" system comprising a
family of nuclear war plans for different scenarios together with
the ability to rapidly create new nuclear targeting plans for
unexpected contingencies.[18]
The UK Trident force is formally declared to
NATO. Ainslie argues that it is likely that detailed target planning
for NATO use of strategic nuclear forces, including the UK Trident
system, is also conducted at STRATCOM.[19]
The purpose of the UK presence at STRATCOM is therefore to co-ordinate
and "deconflict" NATO and US nuclear targeting plans
as they affect UK nuclear forces and avoid possible duplication
and fratricide in nuclear war plans.[20]
It is unclear whether NATO or the UK still maintain standing nuclear
war plans.[21]
TRIDENT REPLACEMENT
In December 2006 the government presented their
decision to replace the current Vanguard-class submarines nuclear
weapon system when it reaches the end of its service life in a
White Paper on The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent.[22]
In March 2007 Parliament voted in favour of the decision.
The government stated that the Vanguard submarines
that carry the Trident missiles have a service life of 25 years.
In order to maintain the current "continuous-at-sea deterrence"
posture with one submarine at sea on operational patrol at all
times, a new submarine will be required by the time the oldest
Vanguard submarine retires in 2024. The government argued in its
2006 White Paper that it will take approximately 17 years to design,
build and test a new submarine, hence a decision on whether or
not to proceed was required in 2007. In October 2007 MoD's Defence
Equipment and Support (DES) department formally established a
Future Submarines Integrated Project Team (FSM-IPT) to develop
a concept design for a new submarine over two years.[23]
The future of the British nuclear weapons programme
is intimately linked to the United States. The UK will look to
the US for political and technical support in replacing its Vanguard
SSBNs and modernising the Trident system.[24]
The US Navy is four to five years behind the UK in planning a
replacement for its Ohio-class submarines that carry its Trident
missiles having opted to extend the life of its submarines by
15-20 years in. The UK plans to introduce its first successor
submarine in 2024 but the US only provisionally plans to introduce
a new submarine in 2028-29.[25]
The UK has already begun working with the United
States on possible new submarine designs and in February 2008
it set up a programme office in the US to facilitate liaison on
the design process in the US for an Ohio-class successor SSBN.[26]
MoD reported in December 2007 that since March 2007 UK and US
experts in the Joint Steering Task Group that oversees the Polaris
Sales Agreement had already met three times during which concept
studies for a new successor submarine were discussed.[27]
In December 2008 it was reported that US General
Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation had been awarded a contract
to perform studies and design of a Common Missile Compartment
(CMC) for both the UK Vanguard-class and the US Ohio-class successor
submarines paid for by the UK but run through the US Naval Sea
Systems Command in Washington.[28]
MoD is also contracting out additional aspects of its own concept
studies to US companies.[29]
The government has already committed itself
to the US Navy's programme to refurbish and extend the service
life of is Trident missiles.[30]
US AND UK STOCKPILE
STEWARDSHIP PROGRAMMES
In 1996 President Bill Clinton signed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning all nuclear tests. In order to
maintain the long-term safety, security and reliability of the
US nuclear arsenal in an era of zero testing the Clinton Administration
established a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).[31]
The programme was designed to sustain a consolidated
Cold War legacy nuclear arsenal well into the future. It would
use data from past nuclear tests, small-scale laboratory experiments,
large scale experimental facilities, and detailed examination
of warheads and their constituent parts to development of a comprehensive
understanding of the functioning of all aspects of nuclear weapons
under extreme conditions and the behaviour of the materials involved
as they aged. This knowledge would be used to develop and improve
powerful computer codes that simulate aspects of weapons performance
and enhance understanding and prediction of defects in warheads.[32]
The primary objective of the SSP was to maintain the capability
to identify problems in nuclear warheads, repair any problems
and certify the repairs, or replace complete warheads or their
component parts that could not be repaired, all without explosive
nuclear testing.[33]
A central part of the SSP was the modification
and refurbishment of several types of nuclear warhead through
extensive modernisation and life extension programmes (LEPs),
including the W76 Trident warhead.[34]
The UK Trident warhead is an "Anglicised" version of
the W76 warhead. The refurbished US warhead is known as W76-1.[35]
The first test flight of the W76-1 on a Trident missile took place
in December 2002 with a series of further tests resulting in a
first production unit in 2007.[36]
The UK has pursued a comparable programme, albeit
on a much smaller scale, labelled the Warhead Assurance Programme
designed to "ensure the safety, effectiveness and durability
of the UK nuclear warhead stockpile."[37]
The comparable purpose is to develop highly accurate computer
models that can be used to predict the physical processes of the
many materials used in the Trident warhead which occur when a
weapon is detonated and validate those models against as wide
a range of experimental data as possible, as well as against the
database of previous nuclear tests.[38]
US AND UK STOCKPILE
STEWARDSHIP AND
W76 LIFE EXTENSION
CO-OPERATION
The US and UK have collaborated on many aspects
of their stockpile stewardship programmes. As early as 1995 MoD
stated that the UK's stockpile stewardship programme would be
"undertaken in continuing co-operation with the United States,
which will contribute to the safe stewardship of Trident throughout
its service life as well as sustaining capabilities to meet future
requirements".[39]
In 2009 then Defence Secretary John Hutton stated
that "Research, including trials, and experiments, is conducted
on a regular basis, by the Atomic Weapons Establishment as part
of its responsibility for maintaining the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the UK nuclear stockpile in the absence of live
testing. Some of this research is undertaken in collaboration
with the United States under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement".[40]
In addition the US and UK have conducted joint
hydrodynamic experiments under the auspices of the MDA.[41]
O'Nions et al state that "In addition to future [hydrodynamic]
tests planned at AWE, complementary experiments are being carried
out in collaboration with the US weapons laboratories, including
some at their U1A facility in Nevada".[42]
The two countries have also conducted joint
"sub-critical" nuclear tests using fissile material
in tests that do not produce a nuclear explosion. O'Nions, Pitman
and Anderson, for example, state that the UK has conducted a number
of sub-critical nuclear experiments at the US Nevada Test Site
in 2002 and 2006 "that provided data of direct benefit to
both the U.S. and UK warhead certification efforts".[43]
The permissibility of sub-critical tests under the terms of the
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is controversial but both the
UK and US government insist they are permitted because they do
not establish conditions for an exponentially growing fission
chain reaction.[44]
US nuclear weapon laboratories have similarly
used AWE experimental facilities to conduct tests that Congress
had prohibited in the United States. Stanley Orman, former Deputy
Director of AWE, stated in 2008 that "we also devised a technique|of
imploding a non-fissile plutonium isotope. Now because it was
plutonium the laws in the States would not allow you to implode
this even though it was non-fissile, because it was plutonium.
So again the American scientists would come across and use our
laboratories because they couldn't use theirs".[45]
US nuclear weapons labs will also have access to the Orion Laser
at Aldermaston under the MDA.[46]
In fact, an important rationale for additional
UK government investment in AWE expertise and advanced experimental
facilities is to ensure that AWE can continue to make a valuable
contribution to US nuclear weapon programmes, including a credible
peer-review capability, and ensure benefits from the relationship
are two-way. Under-investment in experimental facilities and high-fidelity
computer modelling capability and atrophying expertise would risk
undermining AWE's vital relationship with the US by appearing
to have little to offer the US nuclear weapons laboratories in
exchange for their invaluable support.[47]
As Linton Brooks, former head of the US National Nuclear Security
Administration, argues: "The major revitalisation conducted
in recent years at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston,
will improve British technical capability and thus the technical
value of ongoing exchanges".[48]
The UK has been involved in the US W76 LEP under
the Stockpile Stewardship banner, although to what extent is unclear.
According to AWE's 1998 Annual Report, AWE participated significantly,
as an independent contributor, in the United States Dual Revalidation
Programme that reviewed the status of the US W76 Trident warhead
as the first stage of the LEP process.[49]
It has also been revealed that an April 1998 US Stockpile Stewardship
Plan: Second Annual Update report from the US Department of
Energy that set out the work plan for the W76 LEP between 1999
and 2001 included an engineering, design and evaluation schedule
for the UK Trident warhead.[50]
Furthermore, Steven Henry, Deputy Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) under George W Bush,
stated in an audio interview for the US Center for Strategic and
International Studies in 2008 that in the mid 1990s, when the
US began developing Life Extension Programs (LEP) for various
warheads: "As part of that exchange we also did exchanges
with the UK to find out what kind of information did they know
through their surveillance program and what kind of concerns did
they have with their own unique weapons systems that would help
us learn and to make decisions as to what kind of components would
we replace and at what time would we replace those components.
So we entered into a co-operation with the UK looking at Life
Extension itself for the different warheads. We entered into a
program of sharing information for the Enhanced Surveillance program
and we also looked at more innovative ways of being able to do
production so that we could gain efficiencies".[51]
One clear instance where the UK has benefitted
directly from the W76 LEP is through the design and production
in the US of a new Arming, Fusing and Firing system (AF&F)
for the Mk4A re-entry body. The Mk4A AF&F is being installed
on UK warheads and AWE has been recruiting a number of new staff
to work on AF&F. A recruitment notice for one of these posts
referred to work on introducing the Mk4A AF&F into UK warheads.[52]
Then Defence Secretary Des Browne confirmed that this upgrade
is taking place and would be introduced over the next decade.[53]
CO-OPERATION
ON RELIABLE
REPLACEMENT WARHEADS
In the mid-1990s the US began to explore potential
new warhead designs to replace the W76.[54]
Development of these designs ran parallel to the W76 warhead life
extension programme.[55]
This evolved into the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme that
Congress funded in 2004 to "improve the reliability, longevity
and certifiability of existing weapons and their components".[56]
RRWs were conceived as completely re-engineered and
remanufactured warheads based on existing tested designs that
would incorporate less exacting design requirements and enhanced
safety features. They would also be easier to monitor and maintain
than the existing arsenal of Cold War-era warheads that had tight
performance margins designed to minimise weight and size and maximise
yield giving very little room for error as weapons age.[57]
The first planned RRW, labelled WR-1, would replace some, and
perhaps eventually all, of the W76 warheads for the US Trident
II (D5) SLBM fleet.[58]
Nevertheless, Congress remained unconvinced as the necessity and
expense of the RRW programme and stripped funding in 2007 and
2008. In March 2009 the Obama Administration formally terminated
the RRW programme in its current iteration.[59]
It is now likely that a compromise package will be agreed by Congress
and the Obama Administration for a hybrid LEP/RRW programme.[60]
The UK faces a decision on whether to refurbish
its Trident warheads through a full LEP comparable to the W76-1
process in the US or develop its own version of an RRW. In its
2006 White Paper on Trident replacement the government stated
that a decision on whether to refurbish or replace the current
UK Trident warhead is likely to be needed during the next parliament
(2010-15).[61]
The White Paper stated that "The current warhead design is
likely to last into the 2020s, although we do not yet have sufficient
information to judge precisely how long we can retain it in-service.
Decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace
this warhead are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.
In order to inform these decisions, we will undertake a detailed
review of the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and
analyse the range of replacement options that might be available.
This will include a number of activities to be undertaken with
the United States under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Co-operation
on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes."[62]
In November 2007 the government stated that
studies on the potential need for a new warhead were now being
undertaken by a Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group at AWE.[63]
Some of this research is being undertaken with the US. Then Defence
Secretary John Hutton announced that following an exchange of
letters between Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George
W. Bush in December 2006 "additional research is currently
being undertaken, some in collaboration with the US, on how we
may need to refurbish or replace our current warheads to help
inform decisions, likely to be made in the next parliament".[64]
It has been suggested that the UK is exploring
options for a new RRW-type warhead that could be developed without
nuclear testing, a so-called High Surety Warhead.[65]
The government has denied any direct involvement in the US RRW
programme[66]
and insists that it is not developing a new warhead at Aldermaston.[67]
Nevertheless, in 2006 David Overskei, Chair of the US Secretary
of Energy's Advisory Board reportedly said that "as far as
I know they [the British] are not involved with the RRW ... but
they are keenly, keenly interested".[68]
In 2004 the Mutual Defence Agreement was extended
for a further 10 years and amended to facilitate US-UK co-operation
on nuclear warhead research related to the RRW concept. In 2008
John Harvey, policy and planning director at the US National Nuclear
Security Administration, stated in an audio interview for the
US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), that
"we have recently, I can't tell you when, taken steps to
amend the MDA, not only to extend it but to amend it to allow
for a broader extent of co-operation than in the past, and this
has to do with the RRW effort".[69]
He added that the MDA had been amended to give the UK access to
information on US technologies to secure warheads against possible
unauthorised use, for example by a terrorist group that managed
to steal or otherwise gain access to a US nuclear weapon. This
technology had not previously been explicitly declared as an area
of cooperative research under the MDA. Harvey said that it "is
such an integral part of our RRW efforts we will need to have
the Brits involved in that if we are going to have them involved
in RRW".[70]
Harvey also stated that UK scientists "are observers on some
of the working activities that are chaired by the Navy for the
Reliable Replacement Warhead".[71]
This is supported by the most recent US nuclear
weapons budget for FY2010 that shows AWE is continuing to collaborate
with US nuclear weapons laboratories on a programme of "Enhanced
Surety" for nuclear warheads.[72]
This is research into ways of making warheads safer and introducing
new technologies to prevent unauthorised use "for consideration
in scheduled stockpile refurbishments, life extension programs
(LEP), and future stockpile strategies".[73]
Warhead research of this type was previously associated with the
RRW programme. It constituted one of the concept's core rationales
and formed a critical part of the RRW design competition. One
specific area of future joint research collaboration between Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
and AWE Aldermaston is the design of a Multi-Point Safe warhead.[74]
Current UK Trident warheads are designed to be one-point safe,
meaning that an accident leading to detonation of the high explosive
trigger at one single point will not cause the warhead to go critical.[75]
Re-designing the current UK Trident warhead to make it Multi-Point
Safe could be difficult, suggesting that this collaborative UK-US
research is for a potential future warhead design.
A number of other interviews in the CSIS series
suggest that the UK has worked closely with the US on the RRW
programme. Frank Miller, a civil servant who was Senior Director
for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council
under George W Bush and previously held senior positions in the
Department of Defense with responsibility for nuclear weapons
policy under Reagan, Bush senior and Clinton, stated in 2008 that
"They [UK] will need a Reliable Replacement Warhead of their
own. In fact they are working on one. It has a different name.
It's got a different acronym. But they are working on the same
kind of a thing for their W76 variant".[76]
It was also reported that data from the 2006
UK sub-critical Krakatau test conducted at the US Nevada Test
Site would be used in the US RRW study. The Times stated
that "Jacob Perea, project manager at Los Alamos, told The
Times that data from Krakatau, a British-US test, was being
used to help the US to work out how to build its new generation
of weapons. Although he said that the project was American, he
added: `It would be pretty surprising if they (the British) weren't
watching this pretty closely'".[77]
DEPENDENCY CONTINUES
The historical record shows that the UK nuclear
weapons programme, including work on the UK Trident nuclear warhead
at AWE Aldermaston, has been heavily dependent upon the United
States since the late 1950s through provision of nuclear weapon
systems, materiel, design assistance and operational support.
It is clear that:
1. This extends to the current Trident system
where dependencies are reflected in provision of the Trident missile,
assistance with the development and production of the UK Trident
warhead, including the Mk4 re-entry body, operational targeting,
and in-service support for the weapon system.
2. The UK has embarked on a long process of replacing
the current Trident system beginning with the procurement of a
new fleet of ballistic missile submarines to carry the Trident
missile. US-UK co-operation on nuclear weapon systems is already
shaping the UK programme, for example through co-operation with
the US on a new Common Missile Compartment for both countries'
next generation SSBNs.
3. Both the US nuclear weapons laboratories and
AWE Aldermaston have developed extensive science-based stockpile
stewardship/warhead assurance programmes focussing on high-energy
laser experiments, hydrodynamic experiments, powerful computing
capabilities to simulate nuclear explosions, archived nuclear
test data and surveillance of individual warheads in the operational
stockpile and that the US nuclear weapons laboratories and AWE
Aldermaston have conducted joint stockpile stewardship experiments
and used each other's facilities stockpile stewardship activities.
4. The US nuclear weapons laboratories have undertaken
a major life extension programme to refurbish a significant quantity
of its W76 Trident warhead stockpile and that AWE Aldermaston
has participated in aspects of the W76 LEP and has benefited from
some of its outputs, notably the new Arming-Fusing and Firing
system.
5. The US nuclear weapons laboratories have developed
a new Reliable Replacement Warhead design based on tested weapon
designs to replace some, or all, of the W76 stockpile and that
evidence suggests AWE Aldermaston has been involved in RRW design
studies at US nuclear weapons laboratories and that it is currently
involved in "enhanced surety" studies to develop warhead
use-control technologies integral to the RRW concept.
6. The UK government has stated that a decision
on whether to refurbish or replace the current warhead will be
required in the next parliament; that it has established a programme
at AWE to explore these options; and that it is working with the
United States on these options under the auspices of the 1958
Mutual Defence Agreement.
Current co-operation with the US on new ballistic
missile submarine designs, the W76 warhead LEP and possibly RRW
R&D programmes, and the Trident missile life extension programme
reflect the deep cultural and bureaucratic institutionalisation
of these relationships. They constitute a largely unquestioned
norm from which the UK is seen to derive enormous benefit whilst
the wider opportunity costs go unexamined and unquestioned.
Nick Ritchie
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
September 2009
6 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American
Relations in the Cold War and After, (Macmillan: Basingstoke,
2001); John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United
States, Britain, and the Military Atom (MacMillan: London,
1983). Back
7
Nick Ritchie, Trident and British Identity, Department
of Peace Studies report (University of Bradford: Bradford, September
2008). Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing3.html Back
8
See Michael Quinlan, "The future of nuclear weapons: policy
for Western possessors", International Affairs 69:
3, July 1993, p 489. Back
9
Mark Bromley and Nicola Butler, Secrecy and Dependence: The
UK Trident System in the 21st Century (BASIC: London, November
2001). Available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2001UKtrident1.htm. Back
10
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United
States of America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy
for Mutual Defence Purposes, signed in Washington, 3 July 1958. Back
11
See Nigel Chamberlain, Nicola Butler and Dave Andrews US-UK
Nuclear Weapons Collaboration under the Mutual Defence Agreement:
Shining a Torch on the Darker Recesses of the `Special Relationship',
BASIC Special Report 2004.3 (BASIC: London, June 2004). Back
12
Official Report, House of Commons, February 27, 2009, column
1150. Back
13
For details see Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2007). Back
14
Official Report, House of Commons, January 12 1998, column
140. Back
15
Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, p 12. Back
16
Ibid, p 67. Back
17
Ibid, and Interview with Frank Miller by Jessica Yeats,
CSIS, January 28, 2008. Audio files available at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-cooperation-after-50-years Back
18
Nick Ritchie, US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War
(Routledge: Abingdon, 2009), pp 25, 65. Back
19
Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, p 66. Back
20
Ibid, p 52. Back
21
On NATO see Ibid, p 52. On the UK see Michael Quinlan,
"The British Experience", in Henry Sokolski (ed), Getting
MAD: mutual assured destruction, its origins and practice,
Strategic Studies Institute (Army War College, Carlisle, PA),
November 2004, p 265. Back
22
Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office
(FCO) The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
Command 6994 (HMSO: London, December 2006). Back
23
"Birth of Son of Trident, at Yard", North-West Evening
Mail, October 11, 2007; "Future Submarines Integrated
Project Team Office Officially Opens", News Release, BAE
Systems, 12 October 2007. Back
24
It was reported in July 2005 that Defence Secretary John Reid
had authorized officials to begin negotiations with Washington
on the nature of Britain's post-Vanguard nuclear force. David
Cracknell, "Talks start with U.S. on Trident's 15bn successor",
The Sunday Times, 17 July 2005. Back
25
Elaine Grossman, "Strategic Arms Funds Tilt Conventional
in 2009", Global Security Newswire, 7 November 2008.
Available at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/11/7/2E8D226C-261C-4209-8B38-147F3CD8012B.html;
"Sub officials: missiles will decide design of strategic
deterrent", Inside the Navy, 23 February 2009. Back
26
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence to the Committee of Public
Accounts hearing on The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent
Capability, 19 November 2008, p 19. Back
27
Defence Secretary Des Browne, House of Commons, Official Report,
3 December 2007, Column 843W. Back
28
"CMC Contract to Define Future SSBN Launchers for UK, USA",
Defense Industry Daily, 26 December 2008. Back
29
"UK WTS Training Implementation Plan Future Hull", Defense
Contract Management Agency, solicitation number N00030-07-G-0044NJ57,
28 May 2008. Back
30
Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office
(FCO) The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
Command 6994 (HMSO: London, December 2006). Back
31
William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address",
3 July 1993, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
vol 29, no 27, pp 1229-1296 (Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C.). Back
32
Jonathan Medalia, "The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program:
Background and Current Developments", CRS Report for Congress
(Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2007),
p 7. Back
33
Siegfried Hecker, "Testimony by Dr Siegfried S Hecker, Director,
Los Alamos National Laboratory", Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, March 19, 1997 (Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.), pp 206-207; Tom Collina & Ray Kidder,
"Shopping Spree Softens Test-Ban Sorrows", Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, vol 50 no 4 (July/August 1994). Back
34
Stockpile Stewardship Program: 30-Day Review (U.S. Department
of Energy: Washington, D.C., 1999), pp 2-1. Back
35
Hans Kristensen, "Administration Increases Submarine Nuclear
Warhead Production Plan", FAS Blog, Federation of American
Scientists, 30 August 2007. Available at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/08/us_tripples_submarine_warhead.php Back
36
Ibid. Back
37
Defence Secretary Des Browne, Official Report, House of
Commons, 13 July 2006, column 1944W. Back
38
Caroline Handley (a scientist in the Design Physics Department
at AWE) "Nuclear Weapon Design and Certification in the CTBT
Era" in A Collection of Papers from the 2007 PONI Conference
Series, Project on Nuclear Issues (Center for Strategic and
International Studies: Washington, DC, 2008), p 31; Keith O'Nions,
Robin Pitman and Clive Marsh "Science of Nuclear Warheads",
Nature, Vol 415, 21 February 2002. Back
39
House of Commons Defence Committee, Progress of the Trident
Programme, HC 350 (HMSO: London, July 1995), p 24. Back
40
Official Report, House of Commons, 23 March 2009, column
17W. Back
41
Official Report, House of Commons, 27 February 2009, column
1151W. Back
42
O'Nions et al, Science of Nuclear Warheads, p 856. Back
43
Keith O'Nions, Roy Anderson and Robin Pitman, "Reflections
on the Strength of the 1958 Agreement", in Mackby, J and
Cornish, P U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years (CSIS
Press: Washington, D.C., 2008), p 182. Back
44
See Suzanne Jones and Frank von Hippel, "Transparency Measures
for Subcritical Experiments under the CTBT", Science &
Global Security, vol 6, 1997, pp 291-310. Back
45
Interview with Stan Orman by Tara Callahan, CSIS, 24 January 2008.
Audio files available at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-cooperation-after-50-years. Back
46
Stephen Jones, "Recent Developments at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment", Standard Note SN/IA/05024 (House of Commons
Library: London, March 2009), p 7. Back
47
See, for example, interview with Everet Beckner, former deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security
Administration, by Cassandra Smith, CSIS, 2008. Audio files available
at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-cooperation-after-50-years Back
48
Brooks, The Future of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement,
p 155. Back
49
Bromley and Butler, Secrecy and Dependence, citing "Hunting-BRAE
Annual Report", 1998, p 41. Available at
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2001UKtrident1.htm Back
50
Tara Callahan and Mark Jansen, "UK Independence or Dependence",
in Mackby, J and Cornish, P U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After
50 Years (CSIS Press: Washington, D.C., 2008), p 31. Back
51
Interview with Steve Henry by Michael Gerson, CSIS, 2008. Audio
files available at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-co-operation-after-50-years Back
52
Recruitment notice for a Warhead Electrical Engineer for AWE as
publicised by Beechwood Recruitment Agency, 2 February 2007, reference
CA829v27. Back
53
Official Report, House of Commons, 28 March 2007, column
1524W. Back
54
US Department of Energy's 1996 "Green Book" on "Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan", p V-9. Reprinted in End
Run: Simulating Nuclear Explosions under the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (National Resources Defense Council: Washington,
DC, 1997. Available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/endrun/erintro.asp Back
55
Bruce Tarter, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
The National Nuclear Security Administration's Budget Request
for FY2002, Hearing of the Committee on Armed Services, 25
April 2001 (Government Printing Office: Washington, DC), p 7. Back
56
Medalia, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, p 1. Back
57
Medalia, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, p 11. Back
58
Interim report of the Feasibility and Implementation of the
Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, Submitted to the Congressional
Defense Committees in response to section 3111 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163,
by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy in consultation with
the Nuclear Weapons Council, p 3. Back
59
America's Strategic Posture, Final Report of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (United
States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C., 2009), p 41. Back
60
Bruce Goodwin and Glenn Mara, Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile,
AAAS Technical Issues Workshop, Washington, DC, 24 April 2008.
See also Jeffrey Lewis, "After the Reliable Replacement Warhead:
What's Next for the US Nuclear Arsenal?", Arms Control
Today, December 2008. Back
61
MoD & FCO, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
p 7. Back
62
MoD & FCO, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
p 31. Back
63
Defence Secretary Des Browne, Official Report, House of
Commons, 28 November 2007, Column 452W. Back
64
Official Report, House of Commons, 23 March 2009, column
17W. Back
65
Ian Bruce, "Britain in top-secret work on new atomic warhead",
The Herald, 4 September 2007. Back
66
Official Report, House of Commons, 27 February 2009, column
1150W. Back
67
Official Report, House of Commons, 21 March 2006, column
364W. Back
68
Cited in Geoff Brumfiel, "The next nuke", Nature,
vol. 442, no 6, July 2006. Back
69
Interview with John Harvey by Jessica Yeats, CSIS, January 23,
2008. Audio files available at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-co-operation-after-50-years Back
70
Interview with John Harvey. Back
71
Interview with John Harvey. Back
72
FY2010 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security
Administration (U.S. Department of Energy: Washington, D.C., May
2009), volume 1, p 101. Back
73
Ibid, p 100. Back
74
Ibid, p 105. Back
75
See "JSP 538-Regulation of the Nuclear Weapons Programme",
NIS Technical Briefing Note (Nuclear Information Service: Reading,
August 2008), p 4. Back
76
Interview with Frank Miller by Jessica Yeats, CSIS, January 28,
2008. Audio files available at http://csis.org/program/us-uk-nuclear-co-operation-after-50-years Back
77
Tim Reid, "In the Wilderness, a Computer Readies a New Nuclear
Arsenal", The Times, 7 April 2006. Back
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