Written evidence from Ian Kearns, Senior
Analyst, British American Security Information Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— Britain needs to be more assertive in
its relationship with the United States through the varied channels
at its disposal, rejecting a subservient role, but equally being
aware of the limited power Britain can wield in a world characterized
by shifting power balances.— The effects of globalisation
is inevitably encroaching upon the US/UK relationship, as Washington
focuses more attention on the relationship with up-and-coming
world powers. We also have to recognise that Washington is likely
to pay more attention to a UK voice within Europe, rather than
isolated.— Conversely Britain benefits heavily from and
is increasingly defined by globalisation, and it is directly in
the UK interest to pursue the development and observance of international
law and tighter global co-operation.
— The UK has established a reputation in
Washington as taking a lead on `responsible' disarmament (as exemplified
by the arms trade treaty and the global nuclear disarmament agenda).
Now that President Obama has outlined his strategy on this, the
UK will need to work hard to stay ahead of the game, and to influence
the direction of travel.
BASIC
The British American Security Information Council
(BASIC) is an independent research organisation that analyses
government policies and promotes public awareness of defence,
disarmament, military strategy and nuclear policies in order to
foster informed debate. BASIC has offices in London and in Washington
and its governing Council includes former US ambassadors, academics
and politicians.
We look to a world free from the dangers posed by
nuclear weapons; we engage with policy makers and opinion shapers
in a constructive manner, and serve as a trusted source of information
for politicians, government officials and other decision-makers
to promote effective strategies toward nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament. We facilitate opportunities for transatlantic
dialogue on multilateral nuclear disarmament to flourish and promote
active partnerships within the network of international NGOs in
order to develop practical alternative approaches and strategies
that can achieve progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament.
INTRODUCTION
1. The bilateral relationship with the United
States is the most important the United Kingdom has, and future
relations with the Obama Administration present both an opportunity
and a challenge. Britain has a particular chance to be in the
vanguard of moves towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
in step with the Obama agenda on this issue. But despite the enduring
close ties between our two countries, Britain is not the only
government competing for the President's ear. As the US Administration
develops its relations with emerging economies, the British government
cannot be complacent. There have been strains in the relationship
in the recent past and changes in the underlying structures of
the international system, outlined later in this submission, are
likely to mean it will be subject to further strain in future.
The Committee's work on this issue therefore represents a timely
and important opportunity to reflect on the basis, nature and
value of the relationship to the UK and on the approach necessary
to keep that relationship healthy in future.
THE BASIS
OF THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
2. The UK-US relationship rests on a mix
of linguistic, cultural, historic and strategic ties.
It has often been defined by personalities, for example
Margaret Thatcher's relationship with Ronald Reagan, and Tony
Blair's with George Bush. But too often, since the end of the
Cold War, Britain stands accused of failing to define its own
agenda, and of following the US lead.
3. The strategic relationship remains extremely
close today however and is manifested in a number of ways. For
example:
— There is daily co-operation between the
UK and US intelligence services and surveillance agencies, which
is as valuable as ever at a time when both countries face a threat
from international terrorism.
— The two countries are co-operating closely,
with other allies, to ensure the Taliban and al-Qaeda do not re-take
control of Afghanistan.
— There is co-operation on promoting stability
in Pakistan, a country of real national security concern to both
the US and the UK.
— UK and US diplomats engage in close co-operation
within NATO in pursuit of an alliance that is both cohesive, and
fit for purpose, in terms of the contemporary security challenges
it must face.
— Advice from the Foreign Office and Ministry
of Defence, if not politicised, is said to be considered the best
in the world by Washington.
— Perhaps most strikingly, the level of
co-operation between the two on highly sensitive military technology
is well above the norm, even for a close alliance relationship.
Admiral William Crowe, the former ambassador to London under President
Bill Clinton, likened the US-UK nuclear relationship to that of
an iceberg, "with a small tip of it sticking out, but beneath
the water there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes
on between our two governments in a fashion that's unprecedented
in the world." The two countries exchange classified nuclear
information, advanced technology and a range of materials under
the 1954 Mutual Defence Agreement, renewed every ten years. The
personal bonds between the US/UK scientific and technical establishments
are deeply rooted.
THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE
UK-US FOREIGN POLICY
RELATIONSHIP TO
GLOBAL SECURITY
4. In addition to being a foundation stone
of UK foreign policy and national security, and an important alliance
relationship for the United States, the relationship has also
made a major difference to European and global security over a
period of several decades. In recent times, the UK-US relationship
has underpinned international resolve to reverse Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait, the intervention in Kosovo to prevent and
reverse ethnic cleansing there, and action against al-Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11.
5. As a result, not only has the political and
strategic value of the relationship to the UK over the years been
enormous but, arguably with the exception of the invasion of Iraq,
the relationship itself has made a long-term and positive contribution
to wider global security.
6. However, the relationship is also more
complex than the comments above imply and merely declaring its
importance tells us nothing we might need to know about how to
maximise its health, or value, from the perspective of UK interests.
The UK debate on the special relationship often takes place either
in a historical vacuum or on the basis of one-sided, often mythologised,
accounts of war-time co-operation. This is despite the fact that
a setting of the contemporary relationship within a longer term
and more balanced historical context can be very valuable for
understanding both the relationship's role in UK policy and its
potential future direction.
7. The relationship has not always been
one of harmony. Even before the trauma of Iraq, and more recent
disputes over the release of the convicted Lockerbie bomber, Ali
Al-Megrahi, there were severe ups and downs. Suez, and periods
during the 1960s when Harold Wilson refused to send troops to
Vietnam and Edward Heath prioritised relations with Europe over
those with the United States, were low points. Britain needs to
be aware that other serious divergences will emerge in the future,
and could flare up over such issues as climate change or Afghanistan.
8. Despite an often assumed sentimental
basis to the relationship among many in the current generation
of UK political leaders, moreover, the truth is that the relationship
was attractive to UK policy-makers at the end of the Second World
War for the hard headed political reason that it offered a strategy
for protecting UK interests in the context of ongoing national
decline.[78]
9. Both of these previous features of the
relationship are important today.
The first demonstrates that the long-standing
importance of the relationship does not imply total and continuous
agreement though the perception persists in some quarters that
it does and that the relationship is one of almost total agreement
and sentimental attachment that stretches well beyond shared interests.
In fact, many in Washington wonder why Britain does not speak
up more publicly in timely fashion to challenge the US. When Britain
over-rode US objections on Sierra Leone, its armed intervention
there helped end the civil war. Earlier periods of disagreement
also did not destroy the relationship and indeed the earlier low
points have since been eclipsed by periods of intense personal
warmth and close inter-state partnership.
The second serves to remind us that it was national
strategy and interests, not sentiment, that underpinned the UK
approach to the "special relationship", and acceptance
of a subservient role within it.
10. Today, both of these points appear to
be more clearly understood in Washington than they are among the
political class in London. The arrival of President Obama, with
an outlook that appears closer to that of British and wider European
attitudes on international affairs than that of the previous Bush
Administration, may serve to sustain this situation, though it
should not be allowed to do so.
11. Barack Obama's comment in The Audacity
of Hope, that Bush multilateralism amounted to a rounding
up of the United Kingdom and Togo, and the US then doing as it
pleased, is not reassuring in terms of how the UK is perceived
in the US. Senior British diplomats that have served in Washington
in recent years understand this reality, and express dismay at
the failure of UK leaders to think in terms of hard edged national
interest rather than increasingly misguided appeals to sentiment.
A CHANGING STRATEGIC
CONTEXT AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR
UK-US RELATIONS
12. Some of the British illusions here badly
need to be challenged, not least because behind the positive day
to day relationship a process of power diffusion is creating long-term
structural pressures which may result in a greater divergence
of interests and greater strains in future.
13. There are three dimensions to this. First,
as new powers rise in the East and the balance of world power
changes, the US finds itself confronting stronger challenges to
its leadership abroad while simultaneously suffering economic
hardship at home. Partly as a result, its economic and political
interests and concerns are not only intensifying but also geographically
diversifying and Europe is becoming less central to the US world
view than at any time since 1945. In these circumstances, and
given both the collective failure of European leaders to show
cohesive and strong international leadership since the end of
the Cold War, and the widespread scepticism and even derision
in the US in relation to Europe's international role, there is
now a real danger that the US will be less willing and perhaps
even less able to invest in the military defence of Europe and
specifically of the UK in future, as it has done for much of the
last seven decades.
14. Second, the UK will have to take into
account the arrival of a European President in its relations with
the US. For the first time, if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by
Dublin on 2 October, Europe really will have a single telephone
number, addressing Henry Kissinger's historic complaint.
15. Third, as power shifts to some extent
from state to non-state actors like terrorist groups that can
operate across national borders, and issues such as climate change
emerge as literally global in reach, there is an increasing realisation
on the part of many that more effective multilateral co-operation
to tackle transnational and global threats across a wide range
of issues is going to be needed in future (IPPR, 2009). However,
while this is now a widely accepted view in a medium-sized country
like the UK, it is less widely accepted in the United States,
where some (though thankfully not the current Administration)
still believe a more assertive use of American power can bring
the desired international results.
16. This is directly relevant to the UK-US
relationship because when a US Administration seeks to pursue
this more robust line, as it did during the first term of the
George W Bush presidency and in relation to Iraq, this can fracture
public opinion in the UK and place huge strains on the transatlantic
relationship, leaving ministers feeling trapped between the demands
of supporting their most important ally on the one hand, or reflecting
domestic public opinion or an alternative viewpoint on the required
strategy on the other. As globalisation and the need for more
multilateral co-operation in response to it continues to develop
apace, the dilemma here is likely to be exposed more frequently
and to become more acute as a result.
17. Structural changes, therefore, in this
early period of the 21st century have the serious potential to
complicate and undermine a shared and cohesive account of UK-US
strategic challenges, interests and responses.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY
18. All of this has major implications for
UK foreign and national security policy. There is an urgent need
for UK policymakers to get beyond declarations on the importance
of the relationship and to begin defining more clearly what the
UK actually needs from it. To that end, we need a clearer and
fully up to date statement of UK national interests to underpin
policy and the approach to the relationship with the United States.
19. The government's 2009 national security strategy
update, Security for the Next Generation, offers an account
of the UK's international position which can be summarised as
follows. The UK, it is said, is:
— an established democracy committed to
the rule of law;
— an open economy, with a global, not only
local and regional pattern of inward and outward trade and investment;
— a global hub for a number of activities
and services including financial services, communications, transport,
the media (partly as a result of English being a world language)
and education;
— a country with a growing and increasingly
diverse population in which international events can have a very
direct impact on our communities domestically and in which international
instability and tension can be played out on UK streets;
— a country with limited domestic food
and energy resources;
— a leading member of a number of important
international organisations (NATO, the EU, the UN Security Council,
the G8 and G20); and
— one of the world's five recognized nuclear
weapons states.
20. On this basis, it is possible to be
explicit about three core features of the UK national interest.[79]
These are that:
— First, as a relatively open economy
and society, heavily bought into and dependent upon global trade,
investment and people flows, the UK has a strong national interest
in building a rules based international order both to maintain
these flows and to address a range of global and transnational
security threats.[80]
The UK national interest, in other words, will be well served
by attempts to strengthen international law and global co-operation
across a wide range of issues, an agenda underlined by President
Barack Obama when he chaired the Security Council session on 24
September 2009. As an outward-looking country with citizens and
representatives well linked in to global events, Britain could
use its relationship with the United States to encourage informed
debate around how the west relates effectively to the rest of
the world in pursuit of this agenda.
— Second, given the blurring of
domestic and foreign policy boundaries and the UK's susceptibility
to be impacted seriously by events elsewhere in the world, the
UK has a strong national as well as moral interest in tackling
some of the long-term drivers of international instability such
as global poverty, inequality, health challenges, competition
over energy supplies, and the increasingly evident and disruptive
effects of climate change.
— Third, given its status as a nuclear
power with a weapons infrastructure closely bound to the US complex,
Britain is in a strong position to seize the initiative and
play a leadership role on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
There is increasing cross-party support for this agenda in Britain
and there is a chance to co-operate with the Obama Administration
for real progress. As evidenced by a recent high-level Parliamentary
delegation to Washington facilitated by BASIC and under the aegis
of the APPG for Global Security and Non-proliferation, decision-makers
in Washington are impressed when exposed to this unity, our best
chance to influence crucial forthcoming debates on the Hill. President
Obama has repeatedly expressed his understanding that progress
on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually beneficial
to each other, expressed most forcefully during his speech in
Prague on 5 April 2009 and in front of the UN General Assembly
on 23 September 2009. His opponent in the 2008 presidential election,
Sen John McCain (Republican-Arizona), has also acknowledged the
importance of US movement on nuclear arms control to revive global
nuclear non-proliferation efforts and has called for a world free
of nuclear weapons.[81]
The UK can take a number of steps here, beyond
those already being taken. In particular, and following on from
the repeated offer from the Prime Minister made at the United
Nations on 23 September to reduce the number of submarines in
the Trident fleet from four to three boats as part of the disarmament
process, the UK can and should look to reduce the number of nuclear
warheads it possesses further. This will require re-examining
what minimum means in the context of the UK's minimum deterrent.
Arguably, though, it is even more important
to consider how we might use the close relationship we have with
the US to further the agenda promoted by the President in this
area. UK scientists could be encouraged to share expertise and
opinion relevant to CTBT ratification concerns with colleagues
and members of Congress in the United States, and the UK could
fund and support a major Track II nuclear disarmament diplomacy
initiative among representatives of the P-5, plus India, Israel
and Pakistan. The US Administration is ambitious on this agenda
but also heavily preoccupied with the recession, Afghanistan and
healthcare reform; and while the President can outline his vision,
his Administration is going to need all the help it can get on
this agenda, particularly from America's closest allies.
21. These illustrative features of the UK
national interest suggest the need for a series of changes of
emphasis in policy with regard to the US.
It is clear, for example, that the UK has an
interest in re-balancing the relationship. The UK has an interest
in a US that:
— values and seeks multilateral solutions
to a range of international problems from nuclear proliferation
to climate change;
— has some understanding of the importance
but also the limits of what hard power can achieve;
— supports and seeks to build respect for
international law; and
— uses soft power and persuasion to rebuild
respect for the United States itself.
Where the US seeks to lead not dominate, and
to pursue multilateral solutions and a rules based international
order, the UK should actively support it. Where it does not, and
where it engages in activity that is contrary to long-term UK
interests, it should not. This is not an easy balance to maintain
and an issue-by-issue approach is necessary. The Blair government
stands accused of making a catastrophic mistake in relation to
Iraq but managed to find its own voice on issues like climate
change, where the UK position was radically different to that
being taken up by the Bush Administration.
22. This suggestion for a re-balancing,
and that the UK should be more assertive in the relationship with
the US from time to time, sets alarm bells ringing for some. But
it simply lacks credibility to claim, as some do, that any public
disagreement with the US on a major issue would destroy the relationship.
The history of the relationship tells us otherwise and there are
examples of other countries, not least Germany and France, which
have strongly disagreed in public with the US without any long-term
and lasting damage to their relationship. Despite its often strident
criticism of US foreign policy in the past, France still manages
to co-operate with the US in important ways. Americans have little
respect for subservience.
23. It is also important to bear in mind
that at any given time the view of the US Administration is only
one view among many to be found within the United States. There
is always a vigorous foreign and security policy debate in Washington,
with many analysts and politicians disagreeing with the incumbent
Administration. If we allow debate and even disagreement with
a US Administration to be painted as disloyalty to an ally we
unnecessarily limit the room for UK manoeuvre and allow the UK
national interest to be subsumed within that of the United States.
Moreover, if we treat the views of the current US Administration
as a permanent feature of the landscape, we fail to acknowledge
the obvious point that US politics is itself dynamic and cyclical.
Different parties come to hold Congressional majorities and administration
positions obviously change over time, with implications for the
UK, which need to be familiar with both the Administration and
the power of Congress. Despite the undoubted importance and value
of the relationship to the UK therefore, to simply agree with
the United States in all circumstances is to agree to be buffeted
by the prevailing political winds in Washington.
24. Beyond this, it also seems clear that
there is a need to move beyond illusions of a special relationship
between the UK and US and to acknowledge that, as William Wallace
and Christopher Phillips recently noted: "The Obama Administration,
even more than the Bush Administration at the end of its term,
is interested in a partnership with the major European states
collectively more than with the United Kingdom alone—let
alone with the UK as interpreter and `bridge' to thinking in Paris
and Berlin" (Wallace and Phillips, 2009: 283). Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, in a speech to the Council for Foreign
Relations in Washington on 15 July explained the administration's
approach to revitalize US relations with its "historic"
and "bedrock" allies without mentioning Britain a single
time. She specifically referred to improving relations with Europe
and put special emphasis on major and emerging powers—China,
India, Russia and Brazil, as well as Turkey, Indonesia, and South
Africa.
As the United States faces new global challenges
it will look more and more to the European states to both look
after their own security and to make a more effective contribution
to the maintenance of international order and stability. This
in turn will mean that, to strengthen and sustain the transatlantic
alliance for the future, European foreign and security policy
co-operation must now be taken more seriously. If the Lisbon Treaty
comes into force, it will be.
25. Finally, the required changes are not
all about foreign policy. There is an important need to develop
and allow a more open debate on the relationship with the US inside
the UK itself. British policy-makers are often reluctant to allow
such discussion for fear of facilitating an outflow of anti-American
sentiment among a vociferous minority. However, there needs to
be a recognition that whenever the relationship is allowed to
lapse into either unconditional support for US positions, or unconditional
opposition, the health of the relationship is in doubt. More debate
is healthy.
26. The UK-US relationship can continue
to make a vital contribution to the promotion of UK national interests,
and to wider global security for many years to come. Sober judgments
however, on where the interests of the two countries overlap,
and the development of policy on that basis and no other, will
be the surest way to ensure that outcome.
24 September 2009
78 This use of the relationship to manage the consequences
of decline is visible in the combination of a "America in
Britain's Place" narrative on the promotion of a liberal
international economic order after the Second World War and a
"hug them close" strategy on national security in the
same period. Both reflected British weakness and a belief that
the US was best placed to provide an international environment
conducive to British interests. Subservience to the US was also
made more palatable by the linguistic, cultural and ideological
similarities between the UK and US already outlined. Back
79
Clearly, this is an illustrative and not exhaustive list. Back
80
The issue agenda here is wide, ranging from human rights, global
trade negotiations, and reform of the international financial
system to a strengthening of the international regimes to deal
with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, global bio-security,
and the increasingly important areas of cyber and space-security.
On some issues, such as international institutional reform, the
UK is well placed through its permanent membership of the UN Security
Council to play a leading diplomatic role in trying to bring about
change. On other issues, such as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
the UK not only can and should seek to play a leading role as
a member of the P-5 group of nuclear weapons states, but is also
well placed to use its close relationship and history of nuclear
co-operation with the United States to collaborate in efforts
to strengthen the non-proliferation regime globally. Back
81
Elisabeth Bumiller, "McCain Breaks with Bush on Nuclear Disarmament",
The New York Times, 28 May 2008 and see Sen McCain's Floor
Statement on "A World Without Nuclear Weapons," 3 June
2009. Back
|
