Written evidence from Reginald Dale, Director,
Transatlantic Media Network, and Senior Fellow, Europe Program,
and Heather Conley, Director and Senior Fellow, Europe Program,
Center for Strategic & International Studies
A WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE: THE FRAYING BONDS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
SUMMARY
There are two main strands to the special relationship
between the United States and Britain, both of which are vulnerable
to erosion in the coming years, although at differing speeds.
One is the deep civilizational bond between the two leading "Anglo-Saxon"
powers; the other the intense politico-military and intelligence
co-operation between the two governments since World War II. Combined,
these two strands have woven bonds of kinship and common interest
that differentiate US-UK relations from those between the United
States and its other leading allies. The first strand is a compound
mixture of historical, cultural, linguistic and political ties
that is relatively unaffected by ups and downs in inter-governmental
relations. The second strand, however, is much more prone to the
ebb and flow of foreign and security policies and changes in personal
chemistry between the two countries' leaders. Clearly, the multi-layered
relationship has been of enormous benefit to the two countries
over the past century.
While the relationship is obviously unbalanced in
power terms, UK support has helped to allay charges of US "unilateralism";
Britain has provided significant military, intelligence and diplomatic
backing to Washington; and the two have worked together to promote
a liberal, free-trading global economic system. Although the special
relationship fell into some disrepute in Britain during the Administration
of President George W. Bush, especially over Iraq, most postwar
British governments have considered close links with America to
be a vital national interest.
Now, however, as both countries undertake reassessments
of their future strategic roles, there is considerable danger
that the politico-military and intelligence elements of the relationship
will be weakened—both by an American shift in priorities
away from Europe and by a continuing decline in Britain's defense
capabilities. The civilizational bond will endure longer, but
it will also gradually diminish as memories of World War II fade
and anglophile Americans of European origin become less dominant
in US society. President Barack Obama, who has little personal
or cultural affinity with Europe, is the most prominent example
of this inexorable trend. Although we believe that the US-UK relationship
will in many ways remain "special" for years to come,
it is likely to become progressively less important to America.
HISTORICAL AND
CULTURAL CONTEXT
The phrase "special relationship",
although commonplace in British political and media circles, is
seldom used by Americans outside a small core policy group in
Washington, DC. But that does not mean that the broad historical
and cultural relationship between the two countries, which began
in Jamestown, VA, in 1607, is not special. On the contrary, Britain's
role as the "mother country" has been and will continue
to be unique. Caucasian and many other Americans as a whole continue
to be remarkably Anglophile, with the exception of big-city Irish-Americans
in the North East. (As a general rule, however, Republicans tend
to be more anglophile than Democrats, and those with military
connections more so than civilians.) Throughout most of the postwar
period, Britain has seen closeness to America, which supplies
essential elements of its strategic nuclear deterrent, as a key
global priority.
The two countries continue to have remarkably similar
ideas about what is right and wrong around the world and to co-operate
closely as permanent members of the UN Security Council and in
other diplomatic and economic forums. British diplomats and officials
have exceptional access to the policy-making machine in Washington,
and the United States works particularly closely on intelligence
with the UK (as well as with Canada and Australia). Britain has
won enormous popularity among ordinary Americans as the main ally
to provide troops to fight alongside US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
playing a loyal supportive role that many Americans have now come
to expect. On the economic front, the two countries have adopted
a similar approach to the global financial crisis, in contrast
to the different attitudes and policies of most continental Europeans.
New York and London are now so closely intertwined, both culturally
and financially, that they are sometimes referred to as a single
entity, "NyLon," although this economic and financial
solidarity must not be taken for granted.
The two countries continue to have fundamental
common interests in global political and economic stability, supported
by open markets and free trade, the rule of law, respect for human
rights and the expansion of democracy. Although Britain has been
drawn increasingly into foreign policy consultations with its
EU partners, it still regards the United States as its principal
like-minded ally. And conversely, the United States occasionally
sees the UK as a first line of defense against some of the less
desirable ideas that emanate from Brussels. Nevertheless, this
close and usually comfortable relationship is likely to come under
increasing tension as a result of short-term, medium-term and
longer-term pressures.
SHORT-TERM
PRESSURES
The two pillars upon which any strategic bilateral
relationship are built are mutual trust and communication. Both
pillars have come under strain over the past four months. There
seemed to be a lamentable lack of communication between Washington
and London when the United States placed four Guantánamo
detainees in Bermuda without consulting Britain, which is responsible
for the island's foreign and security policies. American trust
has been challenged by Scotland's recent return of the "Lockerbie
bomber" to Libya, although senior US officials have assured
their UK counterparts that the Lockerbie incident in no way endangers
intelligence and security co-operation. These short-term irritants
have been exacerbated by resentment in Britain that the United
States has more power to extradite British citizens to the United
States than vice versa.
British hard feelings feed on a strong undercurrent
of anti-Americanism in some UK circles, particularly among the
leftish intelligentsia and the professional classes, that has
been only partially allayed by the election of President Barack
Obama. It is important to note that British grievances are often
stronger at the popular than the governmental level. Such irritation
nevertheless underlines the importance of maintaining the two
pillars of the special relationship—mutual trust and communication.
Without trust, all the other complex ingredients of the relationship
would amount to very little.
America's sense of British loyalty could be
harmed, for instance, if the UK were to reduce its military presence
significantly in Afghanistan as a result of increasing opposition
at home, while the United States soldiered on. But trust is already
being dented by a popular British sentiment that the UK does not
get much from the United States in exchange for its military support.
Many believe that Britain will have to fight even harder to get
attention from the Obama Administration (President Obama, for
example, has not scheduled a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister
Gordon Brown on the margins of the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh),
just like every other country without a recognized special status.
There is clear evidence that Europe (and thus Britain) is much
less important to the Obama Administration than it was to previous
US Administrations, and the Obama Administration appears to be
more interested in what it can get out of the special relationship
than in the relationship itself.
Economic solidarity may also be diminished as
both the United States and the UK struggle to find their footing
in the global financial arena following the worst global economic
crisis since the Great Depression. Although the two countries
have a common interest in defending and enhancing the leading
roles of the "Anglo-Saxon" financial centers in New
York and London in such multilateral structures as the G8 and
G20, prospects for a joint approach would be weakened if Britain
were to move too far toward tight, new Continental-style regulations
demanded by its EU partners.
MEDIUM-TERM
PRESSURES
By far the biggest medium-term risk to the relationship
is posed by the possibility that the next British government (whether
Labour or Conservative) will cut defense spending in ways that
make it impossible for Britain to maintain its military commitments
effectively and oblige it to reduce its capacity for overseas
intervention. The ability to fight alongside US forces is possibly
the most important practical and tangible asset—along with
US bases in the UK—that Britain brings to today's special
relationship. The support of British troops not only aids the
United States militarily, but also provides welcome international
legitimacy for Washington's policy decisions and helps to counter
foreign and domestic perceptions that the United States is acting
"unilaterally".
Already, however, this co-operation has been
endangered by what Americans (and many British officers) see as
the British Army's poor performance in Basra, in Iraq, and by
the Army's lack of appropriate counter-insurgency equipment to
fight in Afghanistan—due to the Brown government's decision
not to provide additional resources. As both major British political
parties concede that big spending cuts will be necessary after
the coming election to rein in soaring deficits, further downward
pressure is likely on defense spending. Significant defense cuts
could lead to a decline in Britain's international role and influence—and
thus its ultimate utility to the United States. Brown's recent
announcement that the UK will consider reducing the Trident missile
submarines that comprise its nuclear deterrent from four to three
is a sign of these growing financial strains. As long, however,
as the Trident and a successor system continue to provide an effective
deterrent, this should not do too much damage to the special relationship.
Another cause for concern in Washington would
be cuts to Britain's "Rolls Royce" diplomatic service,
still the envy of most other countries, which allows the UK to
exercise disproportionate influence in world affairs. Cutbacks
would be especially damaging if combined with simultaneous defense
cuts, and would reduce Britain's weight in Washington more than
in any other capital, not because of reduced effectiveness at
the British Embassy but because of a wider scaling back of Britain's
global clout.
As for the British public, stronger anti-Americanism
could revive if the perception gained ground that Obama was continuing
the trend of demanding sacrifices from Britain without giving
much in return. British anti-Americanism is a recurrent threat
to the fabric of the special relationship—especially when
Americans get wind of it.
LONG-TERM
PRESSURES
If Britain's world influence declines, and America
continues to shift its priorities away from Europe to other more
pressing geopolitical challenges, the special relationship faces
a gloomy future. Britain's usefulness to Washington could increase
if the European Union were to develop a more active global role.
If the EU, for example, were to exert as strong an influence in
international affairs as it does in world trade negotiations,
Britain would be important to Washington as a potential force
for steering the EU in policy directions that pleased the United
States. The EU's external influence, however, is directly related
to the extent to which its members agree on common policies, and
US policy-makers currently see little chance of big steps toward
closer integration in an EU of 27 nations. Moreover, few officials
in today's Washington have a strong understanding of the institutional
intricacies of the Lisbon Treaty and do not hold out much confidence
in the EU's future as a strategic global power even if the Treaty
enters into force.
Washington's diplomatic efforts are therefore likely
to remain focused more on national capitals than on the EU institutions
for the foreseeable future, with reduced expectations that Britain
will be needed to "deliver" the EU on major issues of
importance to the United States. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair's
vision of Britain as a "bridge" between the United States
and Europe was never a viable proposition, not least because Britain's
European partners did not feel any need for help in communicating
across the Atlantic or for British translation services. On the
other hand, a move by Britain to distance itself from central
EU decision-making under a future Conservative government would
also reduce the UK's usefulness to Washington.
At the time of his celebrated "Year of
Europe" in 1973, Henry Kissinger said that the United States
was a strategic global power, whereas Europe was a regional economic
power. Despite the huge steps taken to closer European integration
since then, that analysis has not greatly altered in Washington
36 years later.
Meanwhile, demographic changes on both sides
of the Atlantic in the years ahead are likely to work against
traditional transatlantic ties. The United States, with its growing
and increasingly diverse population, will assume a greater share
of the West's inhabitants, and thus greater political weight in
the Atlantic Alliance, as the populations of most European countries
age and decline. As the proportion of Caucasians shrinks in the
United States, the percentage of Americans with a natural feel
for Europe as a whole and for the "mother country" in
particular can only diminish, progressively undermining the civilizational
foundations of the special relationship and British influence
in America.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to staunch the loss of vibrancy that
currently characterizes the special relationship, we offer the
following recommendations:
— Despite the budgetary squeeze, Britain
should at least maintain its current military spending at about
2.2% of GDP, and preferably increase it.
— Britain should step up its co-ordination
with Washington on the nature and future direction of its defense
spending to keep its forces interoperable with those of the United
States and to reduce the growing capabilities gap between the
United States and the UK.
— UK political leaders should do more to
explain the advantages of the special relationship to the British
public and counter underlying anti-Americanism.
— Contacts between US and UK armed forces
should be further intensified at all levels.
— British leaders should make greater efforts
to avoid offering the media gratuitous opportunities to report
"the end of the special relationship."
— US leaders should make greater efforts
to avoid conduct that can be interpreted as "snubs"
to Britain by the UK media.
— UK leaders should avoid giving the impression
that they are trying to ingratiate themselves with US leaders,
and never appear to be "whining" about their treatment
by Washington.
— The complex history of the US-UK relationship
should be better taught in British (and American) schools.
— More exchange programs should be instituted
for visits by Americans to Britain and Britons to America.
— British families should be encouraged
to extend their contacts, and friendships, with US armed services
personnel and their families at bases in the UK.
— Consideration should be given to the
formation of a serious "British lobby" in Washington.
24 September 2009
|
