Written evidence from Dr Robin Niblett,
Director, Chatham House
ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Robin Niblett has been the Director of Chatham
House (home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs) since
January 2007. Dr Niblett's research has focused on European external
relations, US foreign policy and transatlantic relations. He spent
10 years from 1997-2007 at the Center for Strategic & International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, where he was Executive Vice-President
and Director of the Europe Programme and Initiative for a Renewed
Transatlantic Partnership. He is the author of a number of CSIS
and Chatham House reports, most recently Ready to Lead? Rethinking
America's Role in a Changed World (Chatham House, February
2009)
SUMMARY
— The relationship between the UK and the
US remains "special", but is special principally at
the tactical levels of intelligence sharing, nuclear deterrence
and military co-operation, most clearly in the current operations
in Afghanistan. — The fact that Britain and the United States
possess a uniquely close infrastructure for co-operation on two
of the most direct and common threats to their national security—fighting
violent Islamist extremists in general and in Afghanistan, in
particular—will mean that the UK-US political relationship
will continue to be among the most intimate for both countries.
— However, the UK-US relationship is becoming
less special at the strategic level. The two countries look out
at some of the most important challenges to their common international
interests from different perspectives.
— European security is no longer at the
centre of US security priorities. And the fear that the EU might
emerge as some powerful counter-weight to US influence has receded.
Many Americans would welcome a more co-ordinated EU in the areas
of defence or energy, for example. The value of Britain to the
US as an opponent of deeper European integration has receded.
— In a "G-20 world", the US is
one of the big players alongside China, India, Russia, and Brazil.
They are all viscerally sovereign powers which resist the rise
of genuinely multilateral forms of international governance.
— The Obama Administration is conducting
increasingly intense diplomatic relations with these countries
on multiple levels simultaneously, and not all of these levels
contain the UK as a key US partner.
— Inevitably, this decline in its relative
position also reduces the scope for British influence on US decision-making
in its international relations.
— Britain finds itself in an awkward position,
therefore. The US remains the world's pre-eminent power; its engagement
and decisions are vital to nearly all priorities for British foreign
policy—from negotiations to combat climate change and to
control nuclear proliferation to stabilizing Afghanistan. It is
natural for British policy-makers to want to be as close to their
US counterparts as possible and to try to influence their policy
choices.
— At the same time, it must be recognised
that British and US perceptions of the nature of certain international
risks and the appropriate policy solutions are not always in synch.
These include dealing with the reassertion of Russian power, instability
in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the need to find a solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the rise of China's power
in East Asia.
— In many such areas of its foreign
policy, Britain hews closer to the view of other EU Member States
than it does to the current US approaches.
— Despite these realities, British
politicians continue to talk up in public the country's overall
"special relationship" with the US. In fact, this and
future British governments should be as dispassionate in the way
they approach their relations on matters of foreign policy with
the US as the US has been with the UK.
— The British government needs to focus
on specific areas when it will invest its effort and resources
alongside the US, in order achieve their common goals. Natural
areas for strong continuing bilateral US-UK co-operation include
Afghanistan, Pakistan, dealing with Iran's nuclear programme and
re-writing international financial regulation and other new rules
for the post-crisis global economy.
— Some areas where Britain should not
assume it will share common interests with the US include the
effort to "re-set" the West's relationship with Russia,
dealing with China and India, and approaches to managing climate
change, where the US body politic remains far more sceptical than
the Administration. In these areas co-ordination with our EU partners
needs to be the main priority.
INTRODUCTION: THE
EMERGENCE OF
THE "SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP"
1. Much has been written about the origins
of the "special" relationship between Britain and the
United States. In essence, the UK-US relationship evolved gradually
in the 10 years following the end of the Second World War as successive
British governments realised that (a) they no longer had the capacity
to protect or project British interests around the world, while
the United States would take its place as the world's dominant
power, and that (b) the most direct threat to British and European
security—that of Soviet military aggression and/or political
subversion—could only be confronted if the United States
were tightly woven into a transatlantic alliance whose principal
focus was the defence of Europe and the broader Atlantic community.
2. A corollary and third driver of the special
relationship has been the mutual suspicion in Washington and London
about a deepening of European political integration that could
come at the expense of US engagement and influence in the Atlantic
community.
3. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, Britain
was one of the most stalwart of America's European allies, and
the one best-placed to support the US within and outside the Atlantic
area. This led to the building of an infrastructure of bilateral
co-operation in the areas of intelligence sharing and nuclear
and military co-operation that allowed each side to define the
relationship as "special" rather than just close.
4. To be sure, there are also important
cultural and historical connections between the UK and United
States, especially as seen from the US. There are also some broadly
shared values, principally a commitment to supporting democracy,
individual rights and open markets around the world. It is worth
noting, however, that popular attitudes in the UK and US towards
religion, the death-penalty, the international rule of law, among
other issues, are far more divergent than notions of a "special
relationship" might suggest.
THE US-UK RELATIONSHIP
TODAY
5. Today, the relationship between the United
Kingdom and the United States remains "special", but
is special principally at the tactical level where the two countries
still engage in unique bilateral interaction on matters of intelligence
(including on counter-terrorism), nuclear deterrence (sharing
the Trident system) and military co-operation, the latter manifested
most clearly in the current operations in Afghanistan.
6. There are always risks of UK-US rifts at this
tactical level—the unmasking of the plot in Britain to blow
up transatlantic airliners in August 2006 revealed important differences
in British and US approaches to counter-terrorism, and there is
a growing gap between the extensive resources and troop levels
the US Administration can deploy in distant military theatres
like Iraq and Afghanistan and the more limited resources available
to Britain.
7. But the fact that Britain and the United
States possess a uniquely close infrastructure for co-operation
on two of the most direct and common threats to their national
security—fighting violent Islamist extremists in general
and in Afghanistan, in particular—will mean that the UK-US
political relationship will continue to be among the most intimate
for both countries.
8. It is also a fact, however, that the
UK-US relationship is becoming less special at the strategic level.
In other words, leaders in the two countries look out at some
of the most important challenges to their common international
interests (both in terms of long-term prosperity and security)
from different perspectives.
9. There remain, therefore, practical advantages
to both sides of sustaining both the infrastructure and the appearance
of the special relationship. But, without a more dispassionate
assessment in London of the differences in international perspectives
and interests between the UK and the United States and of the
limits of British influence over US decision-making in the 21st
century, disappointments will continue to outweigh the visible
advantages.
THE US-UK RELATIONSHIP
AS SEEN
FROM WASHINGTON
10. The "bottom line" today, as
Americans would put it, is that the second and third drivers that
gave rise to the special relationship are no longer there. The
threat to Britain, Europe and the United States from possible
Soviet domination or destabilization of Europe has disappeared.
Russian meddling and aggressiveness towards parts of central and
eastern Europe is an important concern, but is outweighed in US
perceptions by other more pressing international concerns, as
will be discussed further below. European security is no longer
at the centre of US security priorities.
11. And the idea that the European Union might
emerge as some powerful counter-weight to US influence has receded.
Many Americans, especially a number of senior officials in the
Obama Administration, would welcome a more co-ordinated EU, including
in the areas of defence or energy, for example—an EU that
could be in a position to share more effectively the burdens of
projecting stability and security within and beyond the Atlantic
area. The value of Britain as a reliable opponent of deeper European
integration in the security area and other areas, therefore, has
receded.
12. This shift in US perspective has been
under way for some time, certainly since the end of the Cold War
and the beginning of the Clinton Administration. At heart, it
is a reflection of the emergence of a more multi-polar world,
where rising powers offer both opportunities and risks to US interests,
and where European nations and the EU are of greatest value as
allies that potentially tilt the bargaining advantage in the US
favour, not simply as members of a static Atlantic Alliance.
13. In this "G-20 world", the
US is one of the big players alongside China, India, Russia, and
Brazil. Although all are increasingly aware of their inter-dependence
at an economic level, they are viscerally sovereign powers which
resist the rise of genuinely multilateral forms of international
governance at a political level. The UK is not one of the big
powers and, although more deeply attached to its sovereign prerogatives
than many other EU Member States, is bound formally and informally
into EU positions on a range of policy topics.
14. Of course, the UK remains important
in this emerging order as a US ally in NATO and in the UN Security
Council—for example, on issues such as containing Iran's
nuclear programme—as well in advocating for open markets
in the IMF and WTO.
15. However, as the apparent fiasco of the
British government's efforts to secure a bilateral meeting with
President Obama at the UN General Assembly in September 2009 revealed
(the latest in a line of minor, accidental slights by the new
US Administration towards the Prime Minister), the Obama Administration
is now conducting its diplomatic relations on multiple levels
simultaneously, and not all of these levels contain the UK as
a key US partner.
16. There are other more intangible forces
at work in the UK-US relationship from the US perspective. A new
generation of policy-makers are rising within American think tanks,
businesses, law-firms and universities who look to Asia as much
if not more than Europe for dynamic change within their areas
of interest. European studies are in serious decline at America's
Ivy League institutions. And Anglo-Americanism is in decline in
terms of demography and relevance alongside this gradual shift
away from a Euro-centric US economic and political culture.
17. Inevitably, this decline in the "specialness"
of its position also reduces the scope for British influence on
US decision-making in its international relations. Such influence
has been difficult to exercise even in the hey-day of US-UK relations
(the Reagan Administration's early decisions in the Falklands
conflict were one case in point) and even under the most positive
of personal relations between Prime Ministers and Presidents (Prime
Minister Blair's lack of impact on US policy towards the Arab-Israeli
conflict following his support for the Iraq war, for example).
18. But the more the US is focused on managing
the shifting relations between the major powers in an emerging
"G-20 world" the harder it will be for the UK to find
a durable perch within US conceptual thinking and decision-making.
US support for an increase in China's voting weight within the
IMF at the recent G20 summit in Pittsburgh, most probably at the
cost of Britain and other European members, may be a minor harbinger
of the future.
BRITAIN: STILL
TALKING UP
THE "SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP"
19. The US remains the world's pre-eminent
power; its engagement and decisions are vital to nearly all priorities
for British foreign policy—from negotiations to combat climate
change and to control nuclear proliferation to stabilizing Afghanistan.
It is natural for British policy-makers to want to be as close
to their US counterparts as possible and to try to influence their
policy choices if at all possible. US policy-makers are not under
the same pressure. There is an asymmetry of power, and we need
to live with this reality.
20. At the same time, however, it must be recognised
that British and US perceptions of the nature of certain international
risks and the appropriate policy solutions are not always in synch.
This was most apparent during the George W. Bush Administration,
where the US position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, on combating
climate change and on some of the techniques that needed to be
used to win the "global war on terror" ran counter to
British approaches.
21. The arrival of the Obama Administration
appears to have narrowed some of the differences between the US
and UK approaches, including on the three examples given above.
In addition, British public opinion has swung behind President
Obama.[83]
Nonetheless, the panorama of global challenges that the US faces
do not always look the same from a UK vantage point. There are
four examples, among others:
(a) British concerns about Russia's growing influence
in Central and Eastern Europe are based not only on the sorts
of strategic considerations shared by US policy-makers, but also
on immediate fears about the future of British energy security.
There is considerable British scepticism about the potential for
"re-setting" the West's relationship with Russia as
the Obama Administration is attempting to do now.
(b) British concerns about political stability
and sustainable development in North and Sub-Saharan Africa are
based on more than fears about growing radicalisation—a
principal driver for US policies and actions on the continent.
Britain will be one of the favoured destinations in Europe for
the illegal migration that will accompany continued instability
on the African continent.
(c) British insistence on finding a fair and
durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is based
on more than a desire to help promote peace and prosperity in
the Middle East. A resumption of conflict there could lead directly
to a rise in extremist violence in Britain.
(d) Britain does not share the same concerns
about the rise of China's power in East Asia as does the United
States, which has an array of military alliances and commitments
across the region.
22. In many areas of its foreign policy,
Britain hews closer to the view of the majority of other EU Member
States on how to confront these questions than it does to the
current US approaches. Despite its continuing close relationship
with the Obama Administration on the centrality of Afghanistan
and Pakistan, on nuclear disarmament or on dealing with Iran,
for example, there are many other areas where Britain will be
hard-pushed either to convince the US to alter its policy approach
or to build a transatlantic consensus for action.
23. Despite these realities, more often
than not British politicians appear determined to continue to
talk up in public the idea of the permanence of the country's
overall "special relationship" with the US. The gap
between aspiration and reality, however, is becoming ever more
awkward.
WHERE TO?
24. It is a fact that British politicians
from both major parties are ambivalent about engaging more proactively
with their EU partners in order to try to increase Britain's international
leverage on issues of common European concern. Given the growing
gap in strategic outlook between the US and the UK, however, Britain
could find itself adrift between these two moorings of its foreign
and security policy.
25. Whether British ambivalence about the EU
should or will ease in the near future is not the topic of this
paper. But it is also very possible that the EU's international
influence outside its near neighbourhood or outside international
trade policy (two areas where it can have real clout) will remain
marginal, irrespective of how engaged Britain might be.
26. As it thinks about its relationship
with the US, therefore, it is all the more important that this
and future British governments be as dispassionate in the approach
to their relations with the US as the US has been with the UK.
27. Most importantly, they should not cling
to the notion of an all-encompassing bilateral special relationship—the
US cannot honour this broad a concept, whatever the rhetoric they
choose (or feel obliged) to offer in support of the notion. The
United States can and does honour an intimate and even privileged
bilateral relationship in specific areas (intelligence sharing
and nuclear and military co-operation) and on specific policies
(towards Afghanistan, for example). But there are limits to how
far the US side of the relationship will reach.
28. Similarly, the British government needs
to focus on specific areas where it will invest its political
effort and human and financial resources, alongside the United
States, in order to achieve their common goals. Natural areas
for strong continuing bilateral US-UK co-operation—whatever
the occasional disagreements—include Afghanistan, Pakistan,
dealing with Iran's nuclear programme and re-writing international
financial regulation and other new rules for the post-crisis global
economy.
29. Some areas where Britain should not
assume it will share common interests with the US include the
effort to "re-set" the West's relationship with Russia,
dealing with China and India (both on political and economic interests),
and approaches to managing climate change, where the US body politic
remains far more sceptical than its executive branch of government.
In these areas co-ordination with our EU partners needs to be
the main priority.
30 September 2009
83 President Obama's approval ratings in the UK earlier
this year stood at 82% compared with the 17% for President Bush
in 2008. In addition, 73% of those surveyed in Britain in 2009
expressed a favourable opinion of the United States, compared
with 48% for the EU-German Marshall Fund "Transatlantic Trends
Survey" 2009. Back
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