Written evidence from Dr David H Dunn
SUMMARY
What is the basis of the bilateral relationship
between the UK and the US?
— The UK and US share an internationalist
world view and work diplomatically to advance a shared view of
the global order. — UK-US collaboration on defence policy
within NATO and bilaterally is more integrated than with any other
state.— UK-US collaboration on intelligence is similarly
unprecedented in its scale and its trust.— When British
and American political leaders hit it off the level of intimacy
in the decision making process that can follow is also unprecedented.
— UK-US relations also matter in the context
of wider Euro-Atlantic relations in that the UK is most valuable
to the US when Britain is working at the heart of Europe and the
US is most successful in Europe when its efforts are endorsed
by US support.
UK and US views on the nature and value of the
bilateral relationship and the contribution of the UK-US foreign
policy relationship to global security; the extent to which "
the special relationship" still exists and the factors which
determine this; and the implications of any changes in the nature
of the bilateral relationship for British foreign policy.
— Due to a variety of inter-related factors
the nature of the UK-US bilateral relationship is under threat.
— The most significant of these challenges
are structural changes in the distribution of power in the international
system, symbolised by the growth of the G20 and the rise of the
BRIC countries.
— These changes are augmented by the changing
international issue agenda such as the growth of terrorism, climate
change and proliferation of WMD.
— Financial pressures on the UK and its
defence and international budgets in particular (including their
effect on the Iraq and Afghan wars), may have a fundamental affect
on the functional nature of the UK-US bilateral relationship.
Great care must be taken to assess the impact of budget cuts in
Britain's international and security budgets.
— In an age of summits and leadership diplomacy
the disposition of political leaders towards each other matters.
When private advice and public support are replaced by public
criticism this has an impact on the overall relationship.
— The legacy of the Blair-Bush years was
such that many people in the UK began to question the intrinsic
value of the UK-US relationship.
— Gordon Brown's reaction to this period
did further damage to UK-US relations without apparently building
an alternative foreign policy model.
ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Dr David Hastings Dunn is Reader in International
Politics in the Department of Political Science and International
Studies at the University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, UK. His main
research interests are US foreign policy, British and European
defence policy, security studies and diplomacy. He is the author
of The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American
National Security Policy, co-author of American National
Security Policy in the 1990s and editor of Diplomacy at
the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry.
He is the former holder of both a NATO Fellowship and an EU-US
Fulbright Fellowship; the latter was spent at the National Defense
University, Washington DC. He has written many scholarly book
chapters and articles in International Affairs, The Review
of International Studies, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Contemporary
Security Policy, Defence Studies and the Irish Journal
of International Affairs. He is currently writing a book on
US-European relations entitled Rethinking Transatlanticism.
What is the basis of the bilateral relationship
between the UK and the US?
1. The UK-US bilateral relationship is multifaceted
and multilayered and operates at many levels. For example there
are 155,000 Americans living and working in the UK, and a large
number of Britons live in the US. Many formats for new TV programmes
shown across America originate in the UK while American popular
culture from TV, music, film and fashion permeates British cultural
life imperceptibly due to the common language and shared cultural
heritage. One in seven chief executives of the FTSE 100 companies
are American, and in 2006 4.2 million Britons visited the US.[84]
Over 40% of British adults have visited the United States. Public
opinion research show that cultural similarities mean that Britons
and Americans hold each other in higher regard than any other
close ally.[85]
At a state to state level, however, the basis of the strong bilateral
relationship is manifested in several distinct elements which
include; a similarity of world view and consequent world role;
defence; intelligence; leadership, and; role within Europe.
2. World view and world role
At its most fundamental level the UK and the
US share a common interest in and commitment to issues of world
order and global governance—or in Winston Churchill's phrase
"to freedom and the rights of man." While other European
states have largely eschewed such an approach in favour of a more
limited or regionally focused approach to international relations
the UK has continued to look outward with an internationalist
perspective. Due to Britain's historical role in the world, continued
international obligations and permanent membership of the United
Nations Security Council, Britain has maintained an active role
on the world stage more commensurate with its former status than
its present situation. In performing this role the UK believes
that it acts in the interest of the collective good of the international
community in order to promote peace, security, good governance
and development. In fulfilling this role it seeks to advance its
core values and approaches to the world many of which it shares
with Washington in a way which is often mutually reinforcing of
the other's diplomatic endeavours. Thus at the UN and elsewhere
the UK is often in a position to advance common interests with
the US and as such is greatly valued in Washington. To have another
great power sponsor or co-sponsor a resolution in the Security
Council, or to state on the record, for example, that the Iranian
breaches of the non-proliferation regime are unacceptable, reinforces
the international quality of the position adopted by Washington
and gives multilateral form to such a diplomatic initiative. In
such situations it also allows the UK to have a magnified influence
in that the resolution or demarche is written by the UK rather
than by the US. One of the key assets that makes this role and
influence possible is the high quality of the British diplomatic
service which enhances the influence that the UK has on US foreign
policy as a result. Although relatively small in number the extremely
high quality of the British Diplomatic Service ensures that its
analysis and London's perspective are given more considerations
than practically any other state on many areas of policy. This
is not to say that these perspectives always prevail, however.
3. Defence Policy
The UK is the only European power apart from
France with the continued ability to project military force on
a global scale. It is the only European power that has maintained
the range and sophistication of military systems to be able to
operate alongside the technologically advanced US military in
a number of military roles. Operating alongside the US military
gives an international multilateral character to operations which
might otherwise lack it. Thus in 1999 when a UN Security Council
resolution was not possible in the Kosovo conflict due to the
threat of a Russian veto, Operation Allied Force was conducted
as an alliance operation, gaining its legitimacy from its nature
as a NATO sanctioned operation. The fact that the UK was able
to play a large military role in this operation gave credibility
to the multilateral character of the mission. When hostilities
commenced against Iraq in both 1991 and 2003 British cruise missiles
were fired at targets in Baghdad and elsewhere making the operation
an overtly multilateral undertaking. In Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan
the British armed forces have played a military role second only
to those of US forces. In doing so Britain has claimed a larger
influence in the decision making processes on the future developments
of those conflicts than any other coalition member. Britain typically
has sought to send forces at least 15% the size of the US contingent.
In so doing it has tried to ensure that British officers are appointed
to second in command positions, as is currently the case in Afghanistan,
thus ensuring British influence at an operational level in such
operations. By doing so the UK has then sought to claim political
influence at the strategic level of political decision making.
4. Intelligence
Britain has an intelligence sharing relationship
with the US which is second to none. This has a number of mutual
benefits for both parties. By agreeing to share intelligence gathered
from different parts of the world both parties get access to better
intelligence without the cost of duplicating each other's assets
and efforts. This is particularly the case with regard to signals
intelligence where a degree of geographic work distribution is
in operation. Each country, however, has its own unique assets
and approaches giving the other access to material and perspective
that it would not otherwise have. For example some foreign assets
are more willing to talk to British intelligence rather than to
the Americans for a variety of historical or other reasons. Thus
it was the British intelligence service that brought an end to
Libya's programme of weapons of mass destruction and it was British
intelligence for example who recently brought to light the recent
Iranian facilities near Qum. While there is obvious value in discovering
things that the Americans have not there is also added benefit
in no-Americans bringing intelligence to the world's attention.
As well as intelligence collection there is also mutual benefit
in shared analysis. The UK role here is prized second to none
by the US. An example of this is the fact that on September 12th
2001 when US airspace was closed to all traffic an exception was
made to allow the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the three chiefs
of MI6, MI5 and GCHQ to fly into Washington for a conference meeting
of their opposite counterparts. No other ally was treated in this
way as no other ally was valued as much as the UK intelligence
agencies are. Like the diplomatic service the very high quality
of the intelligence services together with the world view that
underpins their global role ensure that they have a disproportionate
role with the US (and elsewhere) to both their size and budget,
and to their counterpart operations.
5. Leadership
In part due to the historical nature of the
bilateral relationship and in part due to the commonality of the
English language, British Prime Ministers have over time had the
opportunity to have an unusual amount of influence in Washington
by virtue of the relationship they developed with the US President
of the day. This aspect of the relationship is as apparent when
the leadership role is in operation—Macmillan-Kennedy, Thatcher-Reagan,
Blair-Clinton, Blair-Bush, as when it was not Wilson-Johnson,
Heath-Nixon, Major-Clinton, Brown-Bush. The role and influence
of a British Prime Minister in Washington is in large part a product
of the way that she or he has related to the US President. What
the US has historically valued in the relationship is private
candour and public support. Public criticism by the British Prime
Minister or his cabinet ensures a less intimate and influential
relationship. Relations with the hegemon are highly sought after
and there are many states which would wish to fulfil the close
role that the UK has traditionally sought with Washington if that
role was no longer valued by London.
6. Britain within Europe
With the end of the Cold War, Europe is no longer
the major focus of US foreign policy and as a result Washington
of necessity needs to focus its diplomatic attentions elsewhere.
The growth of the European Union and the process of European integration
also means that on many issues relations with Washington are conducted
on a EU-US basis. Collectively this means that Washington increasingly
looks to Europe to speak with one voice on matters affecting both
Euro-Atlantic issues and international security issues more broadly.
Given the similarity of world views between Washington and London
the US has made it clear for a number of years that it would prefer
the UK to be an enthusiastic member of the European project, shaping
it and guiding its development along a path that reflects that
world view rather than to be a semi-detached critic from the side-lines.
Part of Blair's popularity in Washington and access to the White
House was due to his attempt to act as a bridge between Washington
and Brussels, to relate one to the other in an attempt to smooth
out differences and create consensus. In Blair's words to the
Labour Party conference in 2000: "standing up for Britain
means knowing we are stronger with the US if we are stronger in
Europe, and stronger in Europe if we are stronger with the US".[86]
How successful Blair was in this role will be returned to below.
A large and increasing part of the value of the relationship as
far as the US is concerned, however, is Britain's role in taming
what are seen to be anti-American instincts and attitudes in Europe
rather than just being a staunch bilateral ally such as Poland.
In thinking about the bilateral relationship it is important to
remember this wider context not just in terms of what Washington
regards as most useful but in terms of what it regards as being
in the interests of both Britain and the EU too. In this respect
Dean Acheson's words from 1961 still have relevance. While everyone
remembers the first line of his famous quip, the full quote is
much more revealing—"Great Britain has lost an Empire
and not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power
role—that is a role apart from Europe, a role based on a
"special relationship" with the United States, a role
based on being the head of a Commonwealth which has no political
structure, or unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious
economic relationship by means of the sterling area and preferences
in the British market—this role is about played out".
His point was that the UK's relations with Washington can't be
a substitute for integration within Europe because the US needs
to deal with Europe as a global actor and that geopolitical weight
of the latter ultimately means that intercontinental relations
take priority. A more recent quotation from Lord Patten reinforces
why the US wants Britain to play a more active role in Europe.
"America wanted Britain in Europe, first, because she thought
this would help Europe to work better; second, because she genuinely
wanted Europe to share the burden of maintaining the world's economic
and political stability; and third, because understandably she
believed Britain would be a useful friend inside the European
stockade".[87]
The European dimension then works two ways if it works at all.
London's influence in Paris, Berlin and elsewhere is greater when
it has and is perceived to have influence in Washington and at
the same time Britain's status in the US depends in part on whether
it is seen in Washington as being capable and willing to shape
events in Brussels.[88]
UK and US views on the nature and value of the
bilateral relationship and the contribution of the UK-US foreign
policy relationship to Global Security; The extent to which "the
special relationship" still exists and the factors which
determine this; and the implications of any changes in the nature
of the bilateral relationship for British foreign policy
7. Speaking in Washington in March 2003 Gordon Brown
described the "special relationship" as "a partnership
of purpose, renewed by every generation to reflect the challenges
we face". Brown sought to portray the relationship as timeless
and the evolution of the role as seamless. In reality, however,
at this point in time there are a number of pressures on the relationship
which bring into question whether or not it will continue in its
previous form. These reasons include structural changes in the
distribution of power in the international system, the changing
international issue agenda, financial pressures on the UK and
its defence and international budgets in particular (including
those on the Iraq and Afghan wars), personalities and the relationship
between private advice and public criticism, the legacy of the
Blair-Bush years.
8. Structural changes in the distribution of power
in the international system
The most obvious affect on the UK-US relationship
is the structural impact of the end of the Cold War. Given the
nature of the special bond between London and Washington in defence
and intelligence co-operation this led many to speculate at the
time that the importance of the bilateral relationship would diminish
as other issues came to dominate the international political agenda.
As it happened of course the 1991 Gulf War, the wars of the Yugoslav
succession in Bosnia and Kosovo and other conflicts around the
world ensured that the security relationship between the UK and
the US remained strong and the US remained engaged in questions
of European security. Focus on the enlargement of NATO and the
EU also kept European issues on Washington's agenda even though
their importance in global terms was diminishing. In the post
9/11 period the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also kept the intelligence
and defence aspect of the bilateral relationship to the fore.
In doing so, however, these events masked just how much was changing
and has changed in the international political system since 1989.
The growth in geopolitical power of the rising economies such
as Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so called BRICs) means
both that US influence is waning in relative terms and the importance
of the UK and Europe to America's wider diplomacy is diminishing
in some spheres. This was symbolised at the United Nation's General
Assembly special session in New York in September 2009 when President
Obama's priorities were bilateral and multilateral meetings with
powers other than the traditional US allies. Europe is at peace,
secure, prosperous, has a remarkably similar view of the world,
its problems and their resolution, there is much less need for
US political attention compared to many other states on many other
issue areas. This does not mean that the US and UK are less close,
but the relationship is less important than it was during the
Cold War, or even the 1990s.
9. The changing international issue agenda
While America's traditional allies such as the
UK still play an important role in dealing with the rise of the
terrorist threat, its role in relation to other powers is diminishing.
This was most obvious in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in
2001 where the US invested heavily in its bilateral relationships
with Pakistan, Russia and India in response to the need to address
the terrorist threat. On the issue of global climate change too,
US relations with China and India now of necessity take centre
stage within US diplomacy. The rise of the BRICs more generally
means that the focus of international engagement is shifting away
from Cold War East West security dominated axis towards a North
South economic, developmental and environmental axis.
10. Financial pressures on the UK and its defence
and international budgets in particular (including those on the
Iraq and Afghan wars)
The impact of the economic downturn on the UK
economy has had an impact on the UK's standing in both the world
in general and in the US. The fact that the British economy has
suffered an economic slump that will be deeper and longer than
any other advanced economy has raised questions about the UK's
ability to portray itself as a first division power. Rumour in
cuts in its public spending which may impact upon its international
role are already the subject of speculation in Washington and
elsewhere as to what this will mean for its foreign policy role.
Much of the reaction to the release of the Lockerbie bomber by
the UK, apparently in response to attempts to win favour for British
oil and gas contracts with Libya was seen in this light. To some
observers Britain now appeared too poor to be principled and was
willing to release a mass murdering terrorist on the vague promise
of foreign contracts.
11. Britain's efforts to play an influential
role on the world stage in the post Cold War world have meant
that it has taken an active part in NATO and coalition missions
in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. It has also maintained
a defence posture and military capabilities second only to the
US within NATO. As part of this the UK has maintained a fleet
of Trident ballistic missile firing submarines, an ocean going
navy with its own organic airpower, nuclear powered submarines
and a fleet of destroyers and frigates; an air force with global
reach and the latest fast jet technology; and a professional and
capable army able to be deployed independently in large numbers
in mechanised units for sustained periods. Through these capabilities
the UK has maintained close relations with the US military and
won the latter's respect and trust. During this period, however,
real defence spending has not increased in line with either these
defence commitments or the operation tempo which has been asked
of these forces, with the result that the British armed forces
have been increasingly asked to do more and more with less and
less resources. This has had an impact on UK-US relations in a
number of ways. Firstly, the US military has become critical of
the ability of the UK to undertake successfully the missions it
has undertaken in Basra Province Iraq, and Helmand Province in
Afghanistan. In Basra the criticism levelled is that the UK was
deployed in insufficient strength to impose security on the province
and instead cut deals with the local militia effectively abandoning
the area to their writ. Only once the Iraqi government, with the
support of the US Army, confronted this militia, this argument
goes, was security restored to Basra. In this analysis Basra was
a strategic defeat for the British Army. A similar argument has
been advanced with regard to Helmand. That the British Army has
been deployed in such a way and on such a scale that it stands
on the verge of strategic defeat, and that only with the surge
of US combat troops to fight in Helmand and elsewhere will the
situation be saved. American criticism of this nature is not of
the fighting skills of the British Army but of the way that they
have been deployed, the resources they have had to do the job
with and the subsequent limitations of role that this has implied.
12. It is in Afghanistan and Iraq that the issue
of funding of the UK defence budget is most obviously apparent
to the Americans but they are only the most visible manifestation
of a wider structural problem, the attempt to fulfil many roles
and missions without the apparent political willingness to devote
the resources to commitments to make them work successfully. American
think tanker Gary Schmitt captured the concern eloquently in a
recent article in the Financial Times, under the headline
"Defence cuts reduce Britain's value as an ally".[89]
Commenting on the debate about the "sad state of Britain's
defences" and reflecting on the fact that within that debate
the consensus is that "the UK government is facing a fundamental
choice. Should it build a military that can handle today's unconventional
wars or attempt to sustain an increasingly thin semblance of a
"do-everything" force?" he concluded by arguing
that "if those are the alternatives and a choice must be
made, we should be clear: the "special relationship"
that binds Washington and London will not remain the same"
because "Although there are many reasons for the existence
of the "special relationship"—shared history,
language, principles—the cornerstone of that relationship
from its first days has been shared "hard power" in
the areas of intelligence and defence. As such, will the US be
as interested in hearing from Whitehall if British forces are
only capable of working side-by-side with Americans in a narrower
defence arena? And, in turn, will Whitehall continue to share
a common strategic vision with Washington if its own interests
are constrained by increasingly limited military capabilities?"
13. The lack of an increase in defence spending
and the delays this has caused to their procurement has meant
that many large acquisition programmes are now needing to be funded
at the same time—the so called procurement "bow wave",
which means that new money will need to be found from outside
the defence budget to pay for all these defence needs—the
two new aircraft carriers, the Typhoon procurement, the new A400M
RAF Transport aircraft, new destroyers and submarines for the
navy, and new armed personnel carriers for the Army and the replacement
of the Vanguard class of Trident submarines—if they are
all to be afforded. Rather than this increase, however, it is
much more likely that the Armed Forces will be asked to make savings
of between 10-15% of its overall budget, perhaps more if health
and education are spared their share of the cuts.[90]
The result will be that something has to give. Whichever cuts
are made will likely amount to a dramatic reduction in Britain's
traditional defence role, with wider foreign policy implications.
The naval procurement plans are designed to give the UK the capacity
to operate far from Europe and to partner the US on a global scale.
Without the ships this will not be credible. The Royal Navy is
already overstretched in its roles and missions and undermanned.
It now has the smallest fleet in living memory. The Trident fleet
is similarly designed to assert Britain's place at the forefront
of the nuclear club. With the Trident missile system the UK has
the capacity to target any target that Washington might also want
to target. During the Cold War the UK sought the capacity to target
Moscow—the so called "Moscow criteria"—so
that the USSR would be deterred from attacking the UK homeland.
In the post Cold War world the UK seeks to maintain influence
in Washington and around the world with a nuclear system of global
reach. In part this gives the UK the capacity to take part in
a multilateral retaliation should one be necessary. This "Pyongyang
criteria" is one of the reasons why a fleet based, and therefore
mobile, ballistic missile system is desirable. Any alternative
system would lack this capacity and would itself be vulnerable
to pre-emptive attack. The RAF (and European militaries in general)
lack strategic lift capacity, without a new replacement fleet
of transport aircraft the UK armed forces lack independent reach.
Without the Typhoon in sufficient quantities the RAF would lack
the capacity for either independent or allies air operations.
The Army is too small for its present commitments and operational
tempo—which is one of the reasons why so many Royal Navy
personnel are engaged in operations in Afghanistan. Without an
expansion of the Army and proper equipment including more helicopters,
the UK will continue to be viewed as a failing force of diminishing
value to Washington. According to some commentators the UK faces
a crisis in defence policy akin to the one that precipitated the
British withdrawal from east of Suez in 1967. The result of this
decision was calamitous for London's international standing and
its relations with Washington. What impact the cuts in defence
spending and military role have on UK-US relations are difficult
to predict accurately, but they are likely to diminish British
influence in Washington bilaterally. Given that the UK is the
most capable and engaged European ally within NATO, it is also
difficult to see how any such diminution of role would not also
be damaging to transatlantic defence relations in general.
14. Personalities
As indicated above, in bilateral UK-US relations
personalities matter especially so in an age of summit diplomacy.
This much is also evident in the tenure of Gordon Brown as Prime
Minister. While some observers predicted that Brown would be an
"instinctive Atlanticist" in practice he moved to distance
himself from the Bush Administration in particular and has been
less supportive of the US in general.[91]
Speaking in 2003 he asserted that, "by standing up for British
values and with our outward-looking internationalism, Britain
can be more than a bridge between Europe and America. Our British
values should make us a beacon for Europe, America and the rest
of the world, building a pro-Atlantic, pro-European consensus".[92]
What Brown may have been trying to communicate in this statement
is a desire to set his own foreign policy agenda. The symbolism
is telling, a Beacon not a Bridge—something to stand up
and shine, not something to lie down and be walked over. It was
clear from the outset that Brown wanted to distance himself in
foreign policy from both Blair and Bush. Brown's most obvious
and immediate effort to signal divergence from Blair in relations
with the US came with his new cabinet appointments. He appointed
and elevated prominent critics of the invasion of Iraq such as
John Denham (who resigned from Blair's cabinet over Iraq) and
David Miliband (a critic of UK policy in both Iraq and Lebanon)—the
latter to Foreign Secretary. Most controversially, however, he
appointed former UN Deputy Secretary General and outspoken Bush
Administration critic, Mark Malloch Brown, to a position as Minister
for Foreign Affairs, a move which was particularly annoying to
both the White House and American commentators. Nor did Malloch
Brown's appointment temper his penchant for being outspoken—calling
for the US to negotiate directly with Hamas and Hezbollah. In
a series of speeches Brown also allowed his ministers scope to
criticise US foreign policy as practised under Bush. Thus Margaret
Beckett, as outgoing Foreign Secretary, was sanctioned to make
a speech in Washington calling for the complete abolition of nuclear
weapons.[93]
Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International Development,
attacked US policy in a number of veiled ways in a speech at the
Council of Foreign Relations. "In the 20th century a country's
might was too often measured in what they could destroy."
Mr Alexander asserted, "In the 21st century strength should
be measured by what we can build together. And so we must form
new alliances, based on common values, ones not just to protect
us from the world, but ones which reach out to the world."
He described this as "a new alliance of opportunity"
adding "We need to demonstrate by our deeds, words and our
actions that we are internationalist, not isolationist, multilateralist,
not unilateralist, active and not passive, and driven by core
values, consistently applied, not special interests".[94]
According to The Guardian a British source in Washington
said that the Brown team was asserting its independence "one
policy speech at a time", adding: "It's a smarter way
of doing it than have a knockdown argument".[95]
15. In his own major foreign policy address
in November 2007, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in London, the Prime
Minister's speech was altered between release and delivery. While
the original talked about America being "Britain's most important
ally" in the delivered version this had changed to read that
America was "our most important bilateral relationship".
Since relations with the EU or any of its 27 members aren't strictly
bilateral relationships this is not saying that much. It was a
slight of hand and a slight not lost in Washington. It was language
very different to that of "the special relationship".
Similarly Brown talked broadly of the world being a more dangerous
place when "Europe and America are distant from one another",
no hint of a separate role for the UK, special, bridge or otherwise.[96]
In a line perhaps intended to chide at both Europe and the US,
Brown also argued that "Europe and America [can] achieve
historic progress [by] working ever more closely together".
Whatever the intention the signals were seen by Washington as
an attempt to create distance.
16. Brown's clearest attempt to differentiate
his approach to Bush from that of his predecessor was on display
at his first meeting with the US President at Camp David in July
2007. Here there was very obviously no "Colgate moment"—the
ice breaker of the Blair-Bush encounter where Bush joked about
their common brand of toothpaste. Brown was stiff, insisted on
wearing a suit and tie and, according to one American official
present, "went out of his way to be unhelpful".[97]
The meeting itself was only conducted after Brown had first met
his French and German counterparts, Angel Merkel and Nicholas
Sarkozy, thus symbolically downplaying the transatlantic tie.
None of this amounted to direct criticism; it was instead a form
of indirect signalling, dog whistles, to his political supporters
that things had changed since Blair's tenure. When asked, the
British Embassy in Washington was briefed to deny that any offense
or policy difference was being signalled. On policy the foundations
of the relationship remained the same. Close military and intelligence
co-operation continued and the harmony of outlook on many international
questions remained constant. Only on Iraq was a substantial change
of policy evident. In contrast to America's surge in troop numbers
the UK government announced its intension to half the British
presence in Basra province and to withdraw the forces there to
the air station in an "oversight" role. The politics
of this announcement were obvious, that Brown was distancing himself
from the operation in Iraq. Unlike the policy of the then new
Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, however, who withdrew his
forces from Iraq on coming to office in 2006, the British effort
was muted in both scale and purpose. Indeed Brown sought to compensate
for it by announcing an increase of British troop numbers in Afghanistan
to bring the total to 7,800. This appeared calculated to signal
the government's political ambiguity in its support for Iraq in
contrast to the "good war" in Afghanistan; to demonstrate
simultaneously that Britain is a good and loyal ally but that
it doesn't support this President in this war.
17. In other areas of policy however, Brown
stressed the substantive support for American policy which the
British government extended. And so in that same Guildhall speech
Brown announced that the UK "will lead in seeking tougher
sanctions both at the UN and in the European Union, including
on oil and gas investment and the financial sector," and
that Iran, "should be in no doubt about the seriousness of
our purpose".[98]
Britain remains the largest aid donor to both Iraq and Afghanistan,
after the United States, and in many other areas of policy is
America's closest ally and supporter. Thus the steps taken to
signal distance were more presentational than substantive. In
adopting this policy the Brown government remained a long way
from satisfying its more radical constituents. Brown was criticised
from the left for not going further in repudiating the Blair position
of support for Bush. The Institute of Public Policy Research,
for instance, has urged Brown to reject "core elements of
the Blair approach to international affairs" and to "engage
seriously with either Damascus or Tehran over Iraq", seek
to lift the economic boycott of the West Bank and Gaza and apply
"serious international pressure on Israel" and to achieve
such a "values based" foreign policy by working more
closely with European partners.[99]
Clearly such an agenda is incompatible with the substantive policy
positions of the Brown government towards the United States. Brown's
position thus amounted to a precarious half-way-house, a situation
not unlike the anomalous position of the British forces at Basra
Air Station at the time: a cut-back and partly withdrawn continuation
of the previous policy. In Iraq, but with a reduced mandate and
role; there but not there; neither fully withdrawn nor fully engaged;
marooned at the airport amid the detritus of a policy of indecision
and dither. Likewise, in its broader policy towards the United
States the government found itself isolated between two poles.
It attempted to be simultaneously anti-Bush and pro-American,
managing in the process to achieve neither.
18. What was particularly odd about this position
was its temporal context. The Bush Administration had moved on
since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, in part precisely because
of the policy failures that followed. It had moved on with regard
to Iraq: where it has incorporated local Sunni support in its
security strategy for the country; with regard to Iran, where
it had largely followed the EU-led diplomatic path sending its
own senior diplomatic envoy to the EU led talks with Iran in 2008;
and with regard to North Korea, where it had reversed course to
pursue intense diplomacy through the six party talks, with a reasonable
measure of success.[100]
As a result, in his trip to London in June 2008 Bush was able
to argue, with only a touch of irony, that: "One of the things
I will leave behind is a multilateralism to deal with tyrants
so problems can be solved diplomatically."[101]
The makeup of the Administration had also changed: Rumsfeld is
gone from the Pentagon, Vice President Cheney is more isolated
and Secretary of State Rice is energetically engaged in the Middle
East peace process. Yet despite all this change, Brown made policy
from 2007 as if it were still 2003, reacting to the events of
Bush's first term in the middle of his second.
19. This led to the oddity that Britain, which
supported Bush in his war, was in danger of being supplanted in
America's affections by Germany and France, which publicly condemned
it. By mid-2007, Germany and France had moved into their post-reaction
phase with regard to Iraq. They were, in a sense, "over"
the arguments sparked by that conflict, and having elected new
leaders to replace Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder were engaged
in rebuilding their relations with Washington. Hence Brown found
himself engaging with a new set of principal international interlocutors,
most of whom were not in power during the 2003 Iraq crisis. Angela
Merkel of Germany has replaced the more outspoken and undiplomatic
Schroder, while President Chirac has been succeeded by Nicolas
Sarkozy who has pursued a more pragmatic and Atlanticist form
of international politics, including plans to return France to
the integrated military structure of NATO.[102]
As a result, the UK's belated negative reaction under Brown to
Bush and his Iraq policy seemed out of sync with the rest of Europe,
unable to grasp that time had moved on. To many American observers,
Brown's apparent desire to re-run the Blair years and do things
differently seems futile and as a consequence somewhat petty.
To many Europeans it seems too little, too late and unhelpful
to the new mood of reconciliation. Brown's actions seemed to presuppose
prematurely that the Bush Administration was over. His policies
seemed to be designed to send signals to the Democratic Party
opposition in the US, expecting and awaiting their victory in
the presidential and congressional elections in November 2008.
In playing this long game, however, Brown undercut his relationship
with the then present Administration even though it was to remain
in office until January 2009.
20. A related and not insignificant further
potential consequence of the current financial crisis is the prospect
of funding cuts to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
Intelligence services, particularly the Secret Intelligence Service
(MI6). Since 2004 the FCO has closed 19 out of 300 overseas missions
and reduced others to local staff only. Since then the FCO has
cut staff from 6,000 to 4,000 and its £2 billion budget is
rumoured to be under threat of being cut back to £1.6 billion.
Given the need for savings in Whitehall it is also unlikely that
the intelligence services will be spared financial hardship. Such
small saving will have a large impact on the influence the UK
has in Washington and elsewhere.
21. Perhaps more interesting than the particular
effects of the Brown strategy on current relations between London
and Washington is the question of what this episode tells us about
UK-US relations in general and transatlantic relations more broadly.
Certainly the absence of a close and cordial relationship between
the British Prime Minister and the American President has been
a gap the new French President, Nicholas Sarkozy has proven quick
to fill. With his easy bonhomie and accommodating rhetoric Sarkozy
has quickly become the "new Blair" in American affections.
As a result, in his farewell tour of Europe, Bush spent two nights
in Paris compared to one in London, and used the French capital
to deliver the centrepiece speech of the tour—calling France
"America's first friend"—a historical fact, but
one rarely mentioned recently.[103]
Remarkably, given the depth of the crisis between the US and France
resulting from the Iraq crisis in 2003, Bush was also able to
state that "When the time comes to welcome the new American
President next January, I will be pleased to report that the relationship
between the United States and Europe is the most vibrant it has
ever been".[104]
For Washington, according to a US diplomat, Sarkozy is now "the
axis on which our relations with Europe will turn".[105]
This is all rather different from the "axis of weasel"
of five years ago. For France too "the frost is over"
according to an Elysee Palace spokesman, "We want to show
the warmth that now exists between the two countries after the
friction of the recent past".[106]
22. Sarkozy's transformation of Franco-American
relations is also a remarkable illustration of the impact that
a change in leadership can make. This is especially true given
the nature of those changes, for Paris has not improved relations
with Washington by focusing on that bilateral relationship, but
by re-conceptualising France's entire approach towards its international
role. Unlike Brown, Sarkozy has adopted an ambitious internationalist
foreign policy agenda which has seen him adopt a number of policy
initiatives on behalf of both France and Europe. The Mediterranean
Union summit in Paris in July 2008 was successful in bringing
together the Palestinian, Syrian and Israeli leaders and in injecting
European energy into the Middle East Peace process.[107]
Similarly Sarkozy's announcement on his tour of the Gulf states
in January 2008 that France plans to establish a permanent military
base in the United Arab Emirates in 2009 was an effort to raise
France's international and diplomatic role and convince Washington
of Paris's global outlook.[108]
Sarkozy has learned a lesson from the Iraq debacle which seems
to have been lost on the Brown government that you can't hope
to build a united Europe that is divided towards the United States.
Sarkozy realises that the opposite can also be true, that by being
pro-American he has actually aided EU cohesiveness and given Europe
a larger role as result.[109]
While it may not always be in agreement on every nuance of French
led EU diplomacy, Washington has shown a remarkable propensity
to allow Paris to take the diplomatic initiative on a number of
issues. Most notably it was Sarkozy under the French Presidency
of the European Council who took the lead in negotiating a cease
fire agreement over the clash between Russian and Georgian forces
in August 2008. While Gordon Brown and British Foreign Secretary
David Miliband were echoing some of the more exited commentaries
on these events in Washington demanding that Russia pay a price
for its over reaction to events, it was France who brokered the
terms of a deal that was acceptable to all parties in the region,
Europe and internationally. Most interestingly Washington was
happy to acquiesce in this leadership role and in the peace deal
secured. Washington also announcing that it had no plans of its
own to impose unilateral punitive action against Russia in an
apparent abdication of policy leadership to Paris on this issue.[110]
Moscow too was happier to deal with Paris than to listen to the
diplomatic protests of Washington and London which it regarded
as hypocritical in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Thus
in several substantive policy areas France has replaced the UK
as America's leading partner in Europe in the wake of British
foreign policy under Brown.
23. So what does this tell us about UK-US relations?
It would seem that the more substantive aspects of British American
defence and intelligence co-operation exist in a different dimension
to the personal relationship of the political leaders and by themselves
deliver no automatic position of favour at the personal level.
It also seems to indicate that it is not possible to successfully
separate relations with an individual leader from relations with
a state as a whole: from the recent experience it would seem that
the UK can be unparalleled in its commitment to Iraq, Afghanistan,
the Middle East Peace Process and building a sanctions regime
against Iran and still be downgraded in presidential diplomacy.
From this it would seem, contrary to what realist theorists would
tell us, that what matters in international intercourse is less
about the absolutes of substantial policy and more about personal
relations and the atmospherics of summit meetings and political
rhetoric. Or perhaps more substantively—as in Sarkozy's
case, the return of the prodigal son is more readily greeted with
the fattened calf than his more constant brother. The fact that
Sarkozy offered to return France to NATO's integrated Military
Command Structure was enough for Bush to accept his case for a
distinct role for the EU in relations with the Alliance. Similarly,
the fact that the UK pledged significantly more money than any
other country (apart from the US) to the reconstruction of Afghanistan
seemed to matter less to Bush than Sarkozy's rhetoric that "We
cannot give in to tortures".[111]
This raises the question of whether US relations with Europe are
less influenced by structure than by agency, and to what extent
they are influenced by substantive issues or personal relationships.
It also directs us to wonder about the relative influence of personalities
as a dynamic in transatlantic politics. Is what we are witnessing
the result of comparisons between Blair and Brown, or even Blair
versus Brown compared to Chirac versus Sarkozy and thereafter
Brown versus Sarkozy? Of course, separating style and charisma
from policy differences is not always possible. The Brown government
has sought to signal difference and was critical of the Bush Administration,
however mildly, while the new French President oozed charm, offered
more troops for Afghanistan and talked of rejoining NATO.
24. Another question prompted by this anomalous
situation is the role of timing in transatlantic relations, or
more precisely the relative tenures of office of the principal
protagonists. The Brown government seemed to approach the Bush
White House as if it was an interregnum Administration, counting
down to its expiry date, without properly calculating that it
must deal effectively with it until January 2009. In adopting
this approach it over estimated its own position vis a"
vis America and inadvertently invited the Americans to take
a similar approach to the increasingly isolated and unpopular
Brown government. So what started off as Brown trying to wait
out Bush has turned into the Americans waiting out Brown. It was
an odd double interregnum, two lame ducks competing to out quack
the other. Certainly the way that Sarkozy and Merkel have behaved
has demonstrated that the White House, even with George W Bush
as its incumbent, has no shortage of suitors for the role of loyal
ally. What is interesting with this approach, however, is that
it was predicated on winning favour with an incoming Democratic
President in 2009. In practice, however, the frost in the UK-US
bilateral relationship together with the opportunism of Merkel
and Sarkozy mean that the UK under Brown has lost out to other
European suitors of the United States.
The legacy of the Blair-Bush years
25. Blair was driven from office because of
dissatisfaction with his government's relationship with Washington
in two ways. First, there was frustration that Blair apparently
had little influence over the Washington decision-making process
yet continued to support its policies. Second, there was widespread
rejection, especially in the ranks of the Labour Party, of America's
foreign policy direction after 9/11. The oft-repeated insult that
Blair was Bush's poodle—dependant, subservient, obedient
and uncritical—is a conflation of these criticisms in the
form of caricature. The fact that Blair was an advocate and exponent—in
Kosovo and Sierra Leone—of the use of force in pursuit of
humanitarian intervention before George W Bush was even elected
is an inconvenient fact conveniently ignored.[112]
And while Blair may not have pushed for the invasion of Iraq without
Bush he supported the need to address the perceived threat which
Saddam Hussein presented. The fact that Blair was pilloried for
this support, however, illustrates that the rejection of his foreign
policy is more about his particular approach to transatlanticism
than about liberal interventionism as such. Blair's foreign policy
was predicated both on being the "bridge" between America
and Europe, and about developing a role within Europe "believing
that by becoming more European, London could strengthen its role
in the special relationship with Washington".[113]
What the Iraq crisis demonstrated for many observers, however,
was that Britain was incapable of either delivering Europe to
America or America to Europe. While Blair's relationship with
Bush might well have displayed a unity of values and beliefs regarding
the conduct of international politics, the same could not be said
of the wider relationship between Britain and America, or wider
still, between European opinion and American policy. In Europe,
public support for the Iraq war was weak or absent.
26. The value of the "special relationship"
as a means of containing and curtailing the worst excesses of
American foreign policy was also seen to have failed during the
Iraq crisis. The result was to bring into question the whole thrust
of British relations with Washington in the post-9/11, post Iraq
War world. The "special relationship" with Washington
was premised on public support for America on the part of the
British Prime Minister in return for private influence on policy.
In the run-up to the war, Blair sought to persuade the Bush Administration
to pursue a more multilateral and diplomatic path. Once this failed
and war became inevitable, Blair sought assurances from Bush in
return for British support—that the reconstruction of Iraq
would be taken seriously and handled responsibly; that post war
Iraq would involve the UN; and that Bush would address the Israel-Palestine
issue.[114]
In both these sets of goals Blair's influence and thus his strategy
were widely judged to have failed. The critical consensus on his
policy was that it had failed to deliver any demonstrable influence
or advantage for Britain while at the same time damaging the UK's
relationships and position within Europe.
27. Blair's foreign policy was a political balancing
act wherein he sought to be America's best friend and a committed
European through his attempt to deliver Europe as a constructive
partner to the United States. In Blair's words to the Labour Party
conference in 2000: "standing up for Britain means knowing
we are stronger with the US if we are stronger in Europe, and
stronger in Europe if we are stronger with the US".[115]
The failure of this policy in the Iraq crisis was bad enough.
When Blair gave unconditional support for the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in 2006 this was enough for his tenure and his particular
vision of foreign policy to be brought to an end. Given the nature
of his political demise there was necessarily much speculation
as to policies his successor would pursue across the Atlantic
and Brown did not disappoint those who sought change—as
demonstrated above. But in reacting to the Bush Administration
in the way it did has this brought more influence for British
foreign policy in Washington, Paris, Berlin or Brussels? The answer
is an obvious no. Instead it created a vacuum in relations with
Washington which France and Germany filled. Other than the moral
satisfaction of being able to adopt a line independent from Washington
it is difficult to see what benefit this foreign policy approach
brings.
CONCLUSIONS
28. This piece has argued that the UK-US bilateral
relationship has historically been unusually close and that it
has served both parties interests over the post war period. Given
that the UK has largely viewed the US as heir to its former role
in global governance London has sought to direct US power towards
British interests and values. This has been possible over a sustained
period by virtue of the fact that those interests and values have
often been viewed largely in common. Defence, intelligence and
security actors from both states have worked hand in hand, therefore,
in interests mutually conceived as being beyond purely national
interest and instead as serving the wider purposes of collective
public goods. Due to a variety of reasons including structural
changes in the distribution of power in the international system,
the changing international issue agenda, financial pressures on
the UK and its defence and international budgets in particular
(including their affect on the Iraq and Afghan wars), personalities
and the relationship between private advice and public criticism,
and the legacy of the Blair-Bush years after which the very value
of the relationship began to be questioned within the UK, there
are reasons to question whether this bilateral relationship will
continue to function on the same basis in the near future. For
a relationship to be regarded in high worth—in some degree
as special—requires both parties to treat it as such. The
Blair-Bush period led some to conclude that during this period
the UK gave slavish support in return for nothing of tangible
value save the knowledge that the support was given. Where that
support was seen to be for the actor and not the particular action,
the very value of that support was brought into question. Reacting
to that period, however, the Brown government appears to have
gained little from its attempt to distance itself from Washington
except perhaps to be relegated to a less intimate position of
influence in both the US and Europe. Taken together with the other
pressures on the relationship it is less than clear either that
this was intentional or beneficial. Without a clear alternative
foreign policy strategy for promoting British interests and values
in the world it is less clear that having less influence in Washington
when other European powers are seeking it, would be considered
desirable.
29. At a time of great and rapid change in the international
system and in the issue agendas which dominate it the contest
for influence on the world stage is becoming more and more competitive.
While Britain must realise that it cannot always command top billing
with the US at every forum and on every issue it must also take
care not to squander the value of a relationship of trust and
co-operation built up over many years. While UK-US relations cannot
be seen as an alternative foreign policy to an active leadership
role in Europe nor should the latter be seen as in any way incompatible
with the former. The resource challenge and its implication for
the UK's overseas role is potentially the most significant threat
to the functional closeness of the two states in defence, intelligence
and diplomatic relations. Care and consultation are therefore
needed as to where cuts would be least damaging to UK relations
with the US and within Europe. One obvious recommendation from
the above would be to counterbalance defence budget cuts with
increases in funding for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Intelligence Services to buttress those elements of influence
at a time while other areas are in decline. Pound for pound this
money could not be better spent elsewhere. Another recommendation
might be that if the need for a defence review hastens the development
of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDP) then this
must be done in concert with Washington and not in opposition
to it. Although the US' position within the international system
is one which is in relative decline, it remains the dominant power
in that system and seems likely to occupy that position for the
foreseeable future. Learning how best to relate to that power
position in order to extract the maximum value possible for both
the UK and the international system as a whole should be the guiding
principle for policy.
13 October 2009
84 See "The Ties that bind", The Economist,
p 26, 26/7/08. and www.usembassy.org.uk/rctour.html.
Unless otherwise stated all websites were accessed in October
2009. Back
85
Ibid. Back
86
Tony Blair's speech to the 2000 Labour Party Conference, see
www.guardian.co.uk/labour2000/story/0,,373638,00.html#article_continue
accessed February 2007.
Cited by William Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too Far:
The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship", in
David M Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic Alliance Under Stress:
US-European Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge; Cambridge university
press; 2005) p 166. Back
87
Lord Chris Patten, "Britain's role: Has Dean Acheson's question
been answered yet?"
www.ditchley.co.uk/page/157/ditchley-lecture-xli.htm.
Accessed 0ctober 2009. Back
88
See Stephen Philips, "Little Englanders are of little use
to America", FT, 5/10/09.
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7a1e2a6-b1e6-11de-a271-00144feab49a.html Back
89
Gary Schmitt, "Defence cuts reduce Britain's value as an
ally", FT, 19/7/09
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5dd45c64-748b-11de-8ad5-00144feabdc0.html Back
90
See Malcolm Charmers, "Preparing for the Lean Years",
Royal United Services Institute, July 2009
www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/FDR_Working_Paper_1.pdf Back
91
C O'Donnell and Richard Whitman, "European policy Under Gordon
Brown", International Affairs, Vol 83:1, 2007. Back
92
Paul Waugh, "US relationship challenged by Gorgon Brown",
The Independent, 29 September 2003.
see www.news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article88947.ece Back
93
Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US:
it's time to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy
shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian,
Friday 13 July 2007. Back
94
Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US:
it's time to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy
shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian,
Friday 13 July 2007. Back
95
Ibid. Back
96
Irwin Stelzer, "The Special Relationship is between Washington
and Brussels", The Spectator, 21/11/07. Back
97
Irwin Stelzer, "The Special Relationship is between Washington
and Brussels", The Spectator, 21/11/07. Back
98
Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US:
it's time to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy
shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian,
Friday 13 July 2007. Back
99
See David Held and David Metham, "Gordon Brown's foreign
policy challenges", 8/10/2007.
www.opendemocracy.net Back
100
On the evolution of US Iranian policy see David Hastings Dunn,
"Real Men want to go to Tehran: Bush, Pre-emption and the
Iranian Nuclear Challenge", International Affairs,
Volume 83, Number 1. January 2007. pp 19-38. Back
101
Ann Treneman, "George Bush goes unplugged for the final elg
of his farewell tour". The Times, 17 June 2008. Back
102
John Kampfner, "Brown plans foreign policy shock: to put
UK first", Daily Telegraph, 07/01/07. Back
103
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7455156.stm Back
104
Tom Baldwin and Charles Bremmer, "After years of the special
relationship, is France America's new best friend?", The
Times, 14/6/08. Back
105
Ibid. Back
106
Ibid. Back
107
Eric Pape, "Mediterranean Bridge Building", Newsweek,
8/7/08. Back
108
Molly Moore, "France Announces Base in Persian Gulf",
Washington Post, 16 Jan 2008. Back
109
See Roger Cohn, "France on Amphetamines", The New
York Times, 17/7/08. Back
110
Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, "US Rules Out Unilateral
Steps Against Russia", The New York Times, 9/9/08. Back
111
Ibid. Back
112
As Matthew Jamison writes, "In reality the ideas that animate
current Anglo-American foreign policy were first posited by Mr
Blair in his Doctrine of the International Community speech of
1999, long before Mr Bush entered the White House. Indeed, the
latter was an acknowledged sceptic about the merits of `nation
building' until 11th of September focused his attention".
"Liberal interventionist or the return of Realism? The Curious
case of Mr Cameron". 21 September 2006 see the Henry Jackson
Society website, http://zope06.v.servelocity.net/hjs
Accessed 11/2/07. Back
113
Steven Philip Kramer, "Blair's Britain after Iraq",
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005. volume 82, Issue 4,
p 90. Back
114
See William Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too Far: The
United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship", in David
M Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European
Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge; Cambridge university press;
2005) p 172. Back
115
Tony Blair's speech to the 2000 Labour Party Conference, see
www.guardian.co.uk/labour2000/story/0,,373638,00.html#article_continue
accessed February 2007. Cited by William Wallace and Tim Oliver,
"A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic
Relationship", in David M. Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic
Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge;
Cambridge university press; 2005) p 166. Back
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