Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
WEDNESDAY 11 NOVEMBER 2009
DR DANA
ALLIN, DR
DAVID H. DUNN
AND DR
ROBIN NIBLETT
Q1 Chairman: This afternoon, we are
taking evidence in our inquiry on Global Security: UK-US relations.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Can we begin for the record with
a brief introduction from each of you as to who you are and what
you do?
Dr Niblett:
I am Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House. I took over at
the beginning of 2007. Prior to that, I spent 10 years in Washington
working at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Dr Allin: I am Dana Allin, Senior
Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where
I have been for close to 12 years. I am also editor of our journal,
Survival.
Dr Dunn: I am David Dunn. I lecture
at the University of Birmingham in US Foreign and Security Policy
and Diplomacy. I have been at Birmingham for 18 years. Before
that, I taught at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. I have
also spent a lot of time in Washington, as a NATO Fellow and a
Fulbright Fellow.
Q2 Chairman: May I ask you to look
back? What is the legacy for current UK-US relations of the previous
relationship between our former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and
the United States leadership at the time?
Dr Niblett: I suppose that the
legacy is a very close military engagement in Afghanistan—and,
obviously, emerging from Iraq—so a level of military intimacy
and shared experiences of suffering and some successes is an important
backdrop to the overall relationship. I also think that the legacy
is the failure of the idea of Britain as a bridge between Europe
and America. We have closeness on the military side, but we have
paid somewhat of a price in some of the objectives that Tony Blair
had laid out for himself and the country at the time. I shall
stop there, having given a couple of first ideas.
Chairman: We will pursue that in a little
while. I call on your colleagues.
Dr Allin: I agree. On balance,
it is a positive, none the less complicated legacy. It is very
positive in the sense that, obviously the close emotional—I
say this not pejoratively—moralistic relationship between
Prime Minister Blair and President Bush was important in the way
that the decisions to go to war were presented. Prime Minister
Blair was a bridge. He had a close relationship with Bill Clinton,
so he was a bridge from one ideological camp to another. He is
much admired on the left in the United States as well as on the
right. I should say centre left and centre right. At the end of
the day, the central project in the minds of many Americans was
discredited—the Iraq war. It is good to be close, but it
is also good to be right.
Dr Dunn: I think that the legacy
is very complicated. I offer the distinction between the legacy
and policy, and the immediate legacy and perception. On policy
terms, Blair put Atlantic relations on a very strong footing in
many respects with his initiative on ESDP at St. Malo and his
role in the Kosovo war in 1999. The joint operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan put the relationship on a stronger footing bilaterally
than had been the case previously, and that was true of his relationship
with both Clinton and Bush.The perceptions are different on both
sides of the Atlantic. If we talk to most Americans, they think
that Tony Blair is fantastic. Even though many people were opposed
to the war or have looked at it negatively since then, they value
the fact that Britain was an ally in that war. Most people in
America supported the war at the time, therefore the perceptions
of America about the bilateral relationship as far as the Blair
legacy is concerned is entirely positive.The special relationship
or the UK-US relationship more broadly is primarily coming from
here. By and large, our perceptions as a country are very different
on whether we benefited from it. Americans look at you puzzled
when you ask, "What about UK-US relations?" They say,
"What do you mean? What is the problem? They are fantastic."
Here, it is a different story.
Q3 Chairman: Can I pursue the question
of the bridge? It is shorthand. Dr Niblett, you said that it had
not succeeded. Will you enlarge on that?
Dr Niblett: In practical terms,
it failed the most critical test, which was over the decision
to go to war in Iraq. So the ability of Britain to be able to
pull together where the United States was going with its decisions
on that conflict and where certainly some—not all—the
other major European countries such as France and Germany, in
particular, were going was not successful.More importantly, the
closeness that Tony Blair struck up with the United States and
the Bush Administration, particularly in the post-9/11 context,
and buying into the idea of a global war on terrorism, was not
shared largely in other European capitals. The ability for Britain
to say, "We can represent a European view to Washington.
We can deliver European policy positions to Washington. We can
interpret Washington back to Europe and perhaps modify somewhat
the US position as a result of our influence" was the central
active concept of a bridge. There is no point being a bridge if
you are not trying to do something with it, but it struck me as
not having succeeded.
Dr Allin: I agree entirely, and
I assume that later we will be discussing aspects of the European-UK-US
relationship. One reason that it failed was that there was a determination
on the part of the US Administration to define this as a zero-sum
competition because of French, German and other European opposition
to the war. That was a conscious choice. It was not necessary
to create loyalty to this war. There are examples from the Vietnam
War, to which there was strong opposition throughout much of Europe,
and the US Administration decided not to make it a test of alliance
solidarity. But it was posed as a test of alliance solidarity,
and, according to the terms of the test, Britain passed and other
European countries did not. That was a short-term tactical gain
for Britain, if you want to look at it in those terms, and the
residue that it left was not positive. Now we have an Administration
led by a President who thought that the war was a mistake, who
I think is going to revert to a more traditionalist, I won't say
that things have been up and down, but, on balance, the American
position since World War Two has been to value the relationship
with Britain for many things, not least its ability to be a bridge
to continental Europe.
Chairman: Dr Dunn, do you want to add
anything?
Dr Dunn: Yes indeed. The bridge
is the metaphor: Britain can deliver Washington to Brussels and
Brussels to Washington, as a link between the two, and the Iraq
war is the example of how that policy failed. It failed partly
because of the expectations set upon it. Britain did influence
American foreign policy—Resolution 1441 was partly a consequence
of British policy pushing the American Administration towards
the diplomatic route. The action was put off as long as possible
within the confines of the weather envelope, at British insistence.
Other things were added to the policy, at British insistence,
such as some of the effort towards a Middle Eastern peace process.
In terms of the capacity to totally change American foreign policy,
when all of Washington had a consensus on going to war as part
of its grand strategy, that is a big ask for British foreign policy.
The question is partly one of expectations.I would also set the
matter in context. British foreign policy failed, but so did most
of the transatlantic relations. Germany's relationship with America
failed fundamentally for the first time in the post-war period.
France's relationship failed fundamentally as a consequence of
its lack of influence. Sure, British foreign policy failed in
terms of the bridge doing the job that it was supposed to do,
but the context was one of total failure.
Dr Niblett: There is this idea
that Britain could get something out of playing this mediating
role, but personally I don't believe that was the main reason
why Prime Minister Blair went for what he did—it was not
to get something in return. But that was part of the narrative
given to some of the European capitals, and this is where the
Middle East peace process in particular was held up, as that would
be the next step. This would be part of a bigger strategy for
the Middle East. That is an area that definitely failed. We were
not able to deliver that.
Q4 Chairman: We will come on to those
issues later. Can I take you back to the question of personalities?
Tony Blair ceased to be Prime Minister in mid-2007; then we had
one and a half years of Gordon Brown, as the new Prime Minister,
having to deal still with President Bush, both before and, for
a period, after the presidential election; and now we have the
Obama Administration, which we will come on to in a moment. In
what ways was Gordon Brown's approach to the US different from
that of Tony Blair? Did it have any positive or negative consequences?
Dr Dunn: I had a journal article
in Chatham House's International Affairs which addressed
that precise question, and I argued in that piece that the Brown
Administration had sent a variety of very clear signals to the
Bush Administration as an attempt to draw a line under the Blair
Administration's approach to Washington and to create distance,
and Washington was very clear in picking up those signals. Consequently,
despite the substantive aspects of British and American co-operation
in a whole variety of areas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush
Administration looked for other interlocutors in Europe, particularly
the new Administrations of Angela Merkel in Germany and of Sarkozy
in France, who have filled the vacuum resulting from the decision
by the Brown Administration to create distance.
Dr Allin: I don't want to quarrel
with the need or the fact of trying to signal distance, but if
that was the case, the signals were fairly subtle, as they would
have to be, given the fact that the Brown Government did not want,
or could not want, a real breach. If I have a slight question
about this, it is with the cause and effect. In the other three
capitals—Washington, Paris and Berlin—there was a
sense that they had looked into the abyss of the end of their
transatlantic relations, and they did not like what they saw.
There was a real effort in all three capitals to repair relations—that
included the Bush Administration, too. It is possible that that
was enabled by a slightly colder relationship with Britain, but
I would not look at that in zero sum terms.
Dr Niblett: I think I agree with
David. From a political standpoint, it struck me—I had been
back in London for six months when this happened—that Prime
Minister Brown felt that he had to demonstrate a level of separation
and a difference of approach in his first trip to meet President
Bush. I thought that the body signals were pretty clear of the
awkwardness there. The problem was that there was a schizophrenia:
in the first six months, we had a distancing or standing apart,
but when the new leaderships came in in France and Germany and
made an effort, as Dana said, to rebuild somewhat, relationships
with a much more open, second-term George W. Bush, suddenly Prime
Minister Brown went back and talked about this being the closest
relationship and one of the most special relationships. There
was a sense of "Oh gosh, now we're going to be pushed aside,
so we have to compete our way back in". I don't think that
it looked particularly good, and we had the hangover at the time
of the Basra period. What a lot of people in America remember
from the end of the Iraq war is British forces drawing down, and
maybe some sense of a loss of commitment. I do not necessarily
think that that is necessarily justified in terms of what physically
happened, but the impression left towards the end of that period
of the Bush Administration was of a UK that was not as reliable.
Q5 Chairman: You are referring to
Senator John McCain and others who made critical remarks at that
time?
Dr Niblett: And a huge number
of articles written around then in the newspapers and journals
about Britain not being as reliable an ally in that period.
Chairman: Thank you. We shall move on
to questions from John Horam.
Q6 Mr Horam: Coming on to the special
relationship and the view about that from both sides of the Atlantic,
Dr Niblett, you said in your written evidence to the Committee,
which I read with great interest, that "the gap between aspiration
and reality, however, is becoming ever more awkward". Would
you elaborate on that for the verbal record?
Dr Niblett: Yes, and I think that
that was almost my concluding statement, so I would have to pull
in a number of points, but I do not want to take up all the witness
time.On the aspiration, it strikes me that from a British standpoint
we are trying to do two things. We are trying to send a signal
that we have a special relationship. We pass up no effort, diplomatically
and almost in a public relations way, to try to demonstrate that
it is there. We look for signals, we look for language—we
almost demand the return in terms of comments from the Obama Administration.
We also have to aspire to it, because in the end what the US does
is enormously important to what we want to achieve in our own
foreign policy. There is therefore both a PR dimension, which
as you know from my testimony, I am critical of, and there is
a reality that America is very important, which I have to accept,
and which I don't dispute. From a US standpoint, however, we,
as I said in my testimony, were very important in certain tactical
areas—intelligence, military co-operation and nuclear; and
we're very important in the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I don't mean to get too far ahead in where you're going in the
testimony, but the reality is that the US has many other things
on its plate, in which we are not critical, but they are now critical
for the United States. They include the G20 world as I call it,
the rise of China, the rise of India, how to handle Russia, etc.
Therefore, we have to recognise that the United States cannot
be expected to keep coming over and calling us the most special
relationship, as Secretary of State Clinton most recently had
to do and as President Obama had to do on the margins of the UN
General Assembly. They have a bigger and busier plate, and one
that we are not constantly involved in in this G20 world. That
would be the essence of what I meant by aspirational reality.
It is a changed US reality, but it is almost harking back to an
old UK aspiration.
Q7 Mr Horam: Following that up, another
comment that we had, which is about the British approach to the
relationship, from Professor Michael Clarke of the Royal United
Services Institute, which you will be aware of, slightly echoes
what you have just said. "British leaders should be wary
of falling into a cosy bilateralism with US Presidents, attractive
as that can seem, if it ultimately undermines multilateral approaches
to global security challenges". Then he said, "At a
practical level the UK can further its interests by visibly taking
a long-term lead in making European approaches to regional global
security". I don't want to come to the Lisbon Treaty, which
we are asking about later, but he specifically said that "the
essential triangular relationship between Paris, Berlin and London"
is where we should make our effort, as opposed to carrying on
with saying all the things that we do say about the special relationship.
Dr Niblett: I am cautious, personally,
about inferring from the difficulty of being a bridge and the
realities of how I think the US-UK relationship has changed, which
I believe it has, that we automatically have to expect a clear
and constant position between Paris, Berlin and London on the
big security challenges. I don't think that A equals B. Think
of some of the big questions, although on Iran we are working
very well. That is the three plus the United States, so it is
not that we've had to separate ourselves from the United States.
Actually, as a foursome, plus others, we're working as effectively
as is possible in a very difficult situation. But if you take
Russia, for example, I don't see Britain, France and Germany necessarily
being completely of the same view on how to deal with Russia.
Q8 Mr Horam: Why not? Why do you
see a difference on Russia?
Dr Niblett: I happen to believe,
as again I think I say in my written testimony, that Russia is
a place about which the United States has quite a different view
from many of its European partners. That doesn't necessarily mean
that we, as European partners, have the same view—in particular,
Germany's energy and trading relationship with Russia puts it
in a very different thinking and strategic context from that of
France, which does not depend nearly as much on Russia for fuel,
given its reliance on nuclear energy for the bulk of its electricity
production. The UK is in a shift from being an exporter of energy
to starting to become an importer and therefore having to think
differently about its relationship, but it has a much more unique
bilateral relationship, as you all know, because of our hosting
various people who are not particularly popular in Moscow. That
has led to all sorts of complexities in our relationship. I am
concerned that there are some differences in opinion, but cut
right down to the national interest perspectives of France, Germany
and Britain, and we have not worked our way through them yet.
I would strongly encourage greater European co-operation on energy
security, but we can't simply assume that it is going to be an
easy shift to make from co-ordinating with the US in this area.
Q9 Mr Horam: I would like Dr Allin
to come in on this one, but on a second point about some evidence
that we had from Lord Hurd. He said that Tony Blair never learnt
the art of being a junior partner to the US and confused it with
subservience. In handling the relationship, do you think that's
a correct comment?
Dr Allin: I think it was an inherently
problematic relationship, when you go to war in opposition to
much of European public opinion and important European countries.
Whether I would characterise it as a subservient relationship,
I am not sure. There was clearly a senior partner in the relationship
for reasons that are understandable.
Q10 Mr Horam: He is saying that Mrs
Thatcher, for example, and Churchill in wartime understood the
relationship of the junior partner, whereas Tony Blair did not
understand it, and allowed it to slide into subservience.
Dr Allin: I am not trying to avoid
the question. His basic position was clearly very pro-war. We
must not forget, he did not choose to go to war because it was
what the United States wanted. That was not my impression. Given
his basic position, I am not sure how he would have avoided that
image.
Q11 Mr Horam: We would not
have been there though if America had not been there, would we?
Dr Allin: No. That is absolutely
the case. We could discuss the same thing in terms of Afghanistan.When
we speak about the Iranian problem, clearly the United States
values Britain above all as a member of the three. There are areas
of obvious disagreement with continental Europe, but it is a perfect
example of how Britain at the heart of Europe is seen as being
in America's interest. The original question was about whether
Britain sees too much in this relationship for the relationship,
in a sense, to bear—if I understood it correctly. There
is something to that. Given the silly spasms of press coverage
about how many minutes or the missing bilateral meaning and so
forth, there are more serious things to which the British press
could devote itself and more serious problems, particularly when
the very next day we saw the importance of Britain in Pittsburgh
dealing with the Iranian file.Part of the big problem is personalising
it too much. What is new with Barack Obama is not that he does
not like Prime Minister Brown, but that he is not sentimental
in his relations with any of Europe's leaders. It is interesting
that you have the situation in which relations with Europe are
unquestionably better. When I say "with Europe", I include
the UK, but personal relations between the President of the United
States and the Chancellor of Germany, the President of France
and the Prime Minister of Britain are not the same. That is not
a particularly significant factor. If you invest too much work
and too many expectations in the personal relationship, you will
simply be hostage to the personality of the American President.
Dr Dunn: I concur with the previous
comments. The degree to which the press fixate over this is reminiscent
of Snow White saying "Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who is
fairest of them all?" Going back to your previous question
about whether there was a choice to be made between a special
relationship with Washington or a closer relationship with Paris
and Berlin, it does not need to be that stark a choice. It is
not a zero sum game. It is not like a marriage. It is not monogamous.
That is not required. America has special relationships with many
powers, such as Israel and Japan, and, indeed, China in some respects.
We can have special relationships with our closest allies, whether
in Europe or America. One does not preclude the other.
Q12 Sir John Stanley: Do you think
that the present US Administration has made up their mind as to
whether it is more in their interests that Europe becomes more
integrated and speaks more with one voice—the downside from
their point of view is that that could produce a more powerful
Europe and possibly a more anti-American Europe—or is it
more comfortable with a Europe that is less integrated and which
preserves the particular relationship it has with the UK?
Dr Allin: I think that they want
to see a more integrated Europe. The evidence for that will unfold.
I base that mainly on my personal knowledge and relationships
with people in the Administration who have a long-standing view
that we do not have to fear an anti-American basis to European
integration. As I said in answer to an earlier question, the kind
of divide and conquer strategy that you saw during the Bush Administration
has been discredited. That was one of the things that Barack Obama
ran against when he ran for President.
Dr Dunn: Indeed. I think that
every signal that I get from Washington—I have just come
back from there—shows that the Americans would like to see
a more united, and expect a more united Europe than we have, but,
primarily, they want a more engaged, more capable and more involved
Europe. In a sense, they see those two things as linked. The integration
process will enable Europe to be more of an engaged actor than
it is. There is a huge frustration that the division of Europe
leads to the incapacity of Europe to act with one voice, one policy
or any capability on the international stage.
Dr Niblett: I entirely agree with
both the previous points and, as you say, we all have personal
experiences. I remember working at CSIS, where we ended up doing
a project, in which people who are currently in the Administration
are involved, pushing for European defence integration. They actually
chaired and pushed the project, as Americans, on behalf of deeper
European defence integration, which I find quite fascinating.
I do not think that they see it as a threat, they do not assume
that it will be anti-American and, certainly because of who they
see themselves as—the Obama Administration—they do
not see this as being a kind of zero-sum relationship.This is
very important in terms of where the UK ends up because there
was a value to the UK, certainly historically—I would even
say going back a bit—of being a potential guard against
too much integration, and that was an important role that it played
within the "special relationship". That aspect of the
relationship and that role for Britain as a guardian against deeper
integration is not what is needed. It is not important any more.One
thing that I suppose gets my back up a little bit at the moment
is when I hear about US frustration. This has been reported in
the press and comments have been made by the Assistant Secretary
of State for Europe about yellow lights and frustration with Europeans
for not giving enough and not being organised enough. On Afghanistan
there are clearly deep differences among European Governments
about how central and important that conflict is. It is deeply
important to us, as Brits, and to one or two other European Governments,
but it is not seen that way by others, so it is a matter of choice
that we are not organised or engaged. It is not because European
integration is failing in some particular way, it is a very clear
political decision by some not to be engaged.On the other hand,
I can see European leaders say, and I have heard them say, "Look
we're pretty organised on climate change, we've been very organised
on dealing with the global financial crisis and we've got some
pretty clear views on trade issues, so we are organised. We just
don't happen to be organised, because we don't want to be, on
the one issue that is deeply important to you. And we are organised—more
than we were—on Iran." There is a dialogue of the deaf
going on. There is a search for greater co-ordination by aspects
of the US Administration on something that is deeply important
to them, but there are things that are important to European Governments,
where they feel that they are organised, on which they are not
getting a very clear answer from the US—climate change being
the absolute case in point in the lead up to Copenhagen.
Dr Dunn: Can I make a couple of
follow ups on that? One is that the expectation is that if we
were more integrated, and had implemented Lisbon for example,
we would actually get a common position together on Afghanistan,
and, therefore, would be a more effective interlocutor as a consequence.
So there is an expectation in the frustration about where things
would go.
Dr Niblett: Which is not true.
Dr Dunn: Which is not true. America
must understand the implications of Lisbon and of European integration
more broadly. On just one other point—the defence integration
aspect—just now the European Union as a whole spends about
60% of what America spends on defence and yet has a capability
to deploy forces of about 5% to 10%. We get very bad value for
money through a fragmented European defence spend and the Americans
would like to see us move away from that.
Dr Allin: May I comment very briefly?
I thought that Dr Niblett touched on a fascinating comparison
when he referred to climate change. The standard criticism of
Europe is that in its very nature it is incoherent and cannot
get anything done. Here we have an example where Europe, by its
nature, is able to do a lot on climate change and the United States,
because of our 18th century system of bicameral legislature, may
well be prevented from doing it by about six senators representing
12% of the US population.
Q13 Ms Stuart: Let us explore this
in the context of the special relationship a little bit more.
I was struck by the earlier debate about the bridge. The comparison
came to me that we keep looking at Turkey as being our bridge
into Asia. Turkey says, "We don't want to be a bridge into
Asia. Please don't put that on us". Is there a danger here?
I have no evidence that Blair ever said, "I will be your
bridge to Europe", in that he meant that he really could
deliver that. He thought that he would be the bridge that links
two positions, but if he ever thought that he could deliver Europe
to the Americans he deluded himself. He could say that he was
the halfway house between the Europeans—us—and then
get to you.
My take on that term "special relationship"
is that when we were in the UN the American Ambassador to the
UN was quite clear that the Americans regard the UN as a useful
vehicle in as much as it delivers US national interests. Is our
special relationship with the US the same? We have a special relationship;
they have a special relationship with us in as much as we can
help them deliver their national interests and if we don't then
there isn't a special relationship.
Dr Niblett: That is a tough question.
Dr Allin: It is. The negative
answer that you are driving at is true, but it is not so sinister.
Countries are in a business, in a sense they have an obligation
to seek their national interests and that is what the US finds—one
avenue of that is the relationship with Britain. Maybe I would
turn it around. Clearly when one speaks of a special relationship—I'm
not sure we want to get into an historical, philosophical discussion
here. I am not crazy about the term to be frank, because it is
an artefact—
Q14 Ms Stuart: What would you call
it then?
Dr Allin: For one thing it is
a treaty alliance. We are part of a treaty alliance, so we are
allies. My only objection to it is that it is an artefact—a
coinage—right after World War Two, or right at the end of
it, and now it has almost become a fetish to fill it out. In a
certain sense it does more harm than good. Having said that, there
are clearly sinews of it that are not based on mechanical relations
between states. They are so obvious that it is almost embarrassing
to mention them: language, culture and shared history. All of
this is valuable and seen as valuable in the United States. The
problem is when it is—these are bad words to choose—described
in almost quasi-racialist terms as an alliance of the English-speaking
peoples implicitly against the inferior rest of the world. Sometimes
a concentration on it almost has those terms.
Dr Dunn: I think the relationship
we talked about earlier in terms of the way in which the press
fetishise about the term "special relationship" can
be problematic. But there is value in the discursive act of describing
something as a special relationship as a rhetorical device. In
a sense by discussing it and describing it as such it consequently
has a meaning in a wider sense. We get a special warmer feeling
from the relationship as a consequence of describing it in those
terms. In a subliminal way it can be beneficial, although it can
be frustrating for academics trying to pin it down. That is the
first point.There is a wider point at which the whole variety
of the lineage of our common histories, approaches and linguistics
and stuff—what Obama called the kinship of ideals, at one
level—gives us that automatic plug-in, which is a special
term. Then, of course, there is the way in which at a functional
level in defence, intelligence and diplomacy we are linked in.
There is an operationalised aspect of the relationship where it
does work hand in glove in a way that is unusual. It is unusual
for two states to work as closely together as is the case and
has been established and institutionalised over time. As for national
interests, there is a degree to which America uses its relations
with Britain on occasion to get us to draft a resolution or to
be there, to broaden the issue out and make it appear that it
is not just America doing things but that there is a multinational
aspect. But the reverse is also true. I asked at the British Embassy
in Washington, "What do you see as your main mission?"
They said, "Our main mission is to deliver American power
to British interests". It plays both ways. When the UK is
asked to draft a UN resolution, we get to put our language, expertise,
values and interests in, as a consequence of being the custodian
of the English language. That is a phrase used when they ask us
to draft something because we are better at English than they
are. We derive benefit from them.
Dr Niblett: I agree with the points
made. A special relationship in today's world cannot have the
uniqueness that we in Britain expect. It is still special—we
have all agreed on that and certainly I wrote that in my testimony—in
some specific areas in particular where it is unique. That is
what special has almost come to mean. We wish it was unique; it
is not unique, it is special. But where it is special—and
it is likely to be a very important area for the next 10 to 20
years—where we can help each other, is on counter-terrorism
and that complex aspect of security that requires a sharing of
information and intelligence. We have built very close links on
operational capabilities; we are, in a way, intertwined, in a
way that we will not want to disentwine—if that is a word.
That is in both our national interests, and we can both do something
special for each other, and that will remain strong.Something
that we haven't talked much about so far, but this is a pivotal
and fascinating moment, is: is there an Anglo-Saxon economic model?
We are wondering that right now but don't really want to mention
it. As we look to the future, I think that we—Britain and
the US—will want to fight for certain aspects of open markets
and financial regulation. Although mistakes were made, we don't
want to throw out the entire model that in many ways has delivered
fantastic wealth for many in other parts of the world. Aspects
of trade, open trade, deeper financial markets—even if they're
better regulated—could become a common agenda.Along with
Paris and Berlin, in particular, and other European countries,
we are united in a view about non-proliferation and the risks
that nuclear proliferation carries for us all. We will work together
on that common national interest. Again, it doesn't have to be
sinister. We have to recognise that there are certain areas where
we have a national interest but the US may not. We can't assume
that it's special because it covers the waterfront. I don't think
it does any more.
Q15 Ms Stuart: The Committee
went to New York and Washington recently and we were struck by
the absence of any mention of Al-Megrahi. We expected that to
be mentioned. Was that just politeness, or is it something that
hasn't really damaged our relationship as much as some aspects
of the press seem to suggest?
Dr Dunn: I got no mention of it
when I was in Washington, either. I scoured the US press for it
and it was difficult to find. I wonder whether it is a bit of
posturing on the part of Americans to get us to change our policies
and not go down that direction, rather than a serious threat to
information-exchange on intelligence matters.
Dr Allin: As I recall, at the
time American officials said they were angry about it; they didn't
like it, but it was not a threat to relations with the UK. I think
one can take that pretty much at face value. It's over now.
Dr Niblett: There have been differences
in approach on other counter-terrorism operational aspects in
particular, and the balance struck between acting and observing.
We have had these irritants through the process. I was there three
weeks ago and didn't get much mention of that. What I did hear
just about everywhere was something I'll precede with an important
point. It all depends where the local politics and domestic politics
really play. They did play for a moment on the Al-Megrahi case,
with some of the families concerned, but I think it was dealt
with. The Conservative party's decision not to be part of the
EPP had raised some domestic politics within the US body politic
that were being talked about when I was there. I think where the
domestic politics come in, it can take something from being an
irritant, which maybe the Government do not want to become a problem,
but they are forced to raise it to another level. Neither of those
things are fundamental to the relationship, but domestic politics
can sometimes get in the way.
Q16 Ms Stuart: That leads
me to the final question. To what extent do personal relationships
between the leaders—the President and the Prime Minister—matter?
For example, Gordon Brown is an immensely transatlantic-minded
Prime Minister. Does the personal relationship with Obama matter
if you were to compare it with David Cameron, who has left the
EPP, which really irritated the Americans? Would personality overcome
those kinds of conflicts, or is the importance of personal chemistry
just something superficial?
Dr Niblett: The personal chemistry
is important. In a world—at least as I see it—where
more and more critical foreign policy decisions seem to centralise
in the Executive branch, partly because of the media and the speed
of reaction, you need to trust somebody and be able to go on instinct
at times, as a leader at that pinnacle position. Not having a
personal linkage and element and a sense of trust can be problematic;
at least it's a plus if you have it.On the other hand, what is
this Administration looking for? Like any US Administration, I
think they are looking for delivery. I don't think that they are
necessarily deeply upset about the EPP decision—the party
chooses whether to join—they are worried about delivery.
Will this make it tougher for Britain to deliver a Europe that
can be a better partner on particular issues that we have talked
about so far? Britain remains a very important partner for the
US in Europe. Will it be difficult for Europe to be a partner,
with this internal conflict? Will Britain become less constructive,
and will Europe, as a result, be less constructive? I don't think
it's emotional—it's quite a practical calculation.
Dr Dunn: President Chirac had
a habit of using his mobile phone and being very rude about President
Bush on the mobile phone to his friends. Of course, with the Americans'
satellite system, he got transcripts on his desk. Bush would never
forgive Chirac for the comments he made about how dumb and stupid
he was. That made a real difference to that relationship. Only
when he was gone were French-American relations able to improve.
The nature of international politics today—the technology
of communication and the expectation of leadership-derived diplomacy—is
such that personalities matter. They meet an extraordinary number
of times in different forums around the world. They are expected
to communicate—we have, between Downing Street and the White
House, a video link—and to talk on a regular basis. The
interaction is so prolific that the personal chemistry matters.
We've seen that particularly during the period when Blair was
so popular in the States and Brown, for various reasons, was more
awkward, partly due to personality, and the relationship suffered.
I think personalities matter, unfortunately. They are looking
at Cameron, unsure of what to make of him, partly because of the
issues you mentioned, and partly because of his attitude to Europe
more broadly. They are anxious to see how that will pan out.
Dr Allin: Personal relationships
obviously matter—it would be silly to suggest that they
don't. Alliances and relationships of trust are important. Having
said that, the flip side is that you can get into a situation
where things are personalised in a negative sense, to the detriment
of what should be common work and common interest. I think about
President Bush's relationships with the leaderships of Spain,
Germany and France. Although it is important, it is not something
to obsess about.
Q17 Sir Menzies Campbell:
Isn't it the truth that we shouldn't put too much store on this
personal relationship aspect? It didn't stop the invasion of Grenada
and it certainly didn't stop F-111s flying from Lakenheath. These
were actions conceived of as being in the strategic interests
of the United States, notwithstanding the very close personal
relationships at that time between the Prime Minister and the
President—they went ahead. That is why I was rather relieved
to hear Dr Dunn say that if you think about this from the other
side of the Atlantic, the truth is, our relationship with the
United States is, I think you said, based on a conception of where
our national interest lies. It is in our national interest to
have access to intelligence. It is in our national interest to
have access, unlike anyone else, to nuclear technology, and also
defence co-operation. It is in our national interest to be part
of the joint strike fighter programme and put £3 billion
into it, because it gives us some leverage but also gives us access
to equipment that we would not be able to fund ourselves. So perhaps
the partnership is best understood as being a partnership of mutual
interest, which has some tinges of affection around it, some nostalgia,
and sometimes some personal relationships. But if you think about
it all the time as being about national interest, that is a much
more logical and more explicable analysis. Would you agree with
that?
Dr Dunn: Exactly right. If you
go back to the F-111 decisions from Lakenheath, that was a deliberate
quid pro quo for American support during the Falklands
war. The deal was "You support the Falklands and we will
support you in this". Even though Thatcher might have gritted
her teeth over it, that was the deal that was done.
Sir Menzies Campbell: I remember it was
Lord Tebbit who gritted his teeth more than anyone else.
Q18 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: There
is a book called The Death of Distance, which proposes
that, because of communications and information technology, geography
does not matter any more and what counts by extension are things
such as language, culture and historical experiences, and therefore
the colossal interchange between the United States and here—the
films that people watch, the music they listen to, the trips they
make, the language they speak—is arguably increasing in
intensity. Is this just sentimentality, or would this actually
decide the sacrifices that people might make in a crisis? Alternatively,
is it the case that hard-headed military power and diplomatic
clout renders this populist cultural dimension unimportant?
Dr Allin: What is deciding this
sacrifice that Britain is making in a crisis, and the crisis that
followed September 11, for example? I am not saying that a cold-headed
look at British interests would not have brought the same decision.
In fact, in the case of Iraq, it might have brought a better decision.
There is no question that moral sentiment, if I may use that phrase,
has influenced great sacrifices on the part of Britain and it
is appreciated in the United States. Your suggestion that this
will become more intense because of communications—I suppose
that is true. This is getting very personal but I can give you
a counter-example. I am much more plugged into my own country
and much less plugged into Britain, in a sense. I should not say
the latter part, but even though I have lived here for 12 years,
because of the web I am much more connected to culture and political
debates and so forth in the United States than I would be. In
a sense, that alienates me from my British hosts. I do not want
to exaggerate that. I say that only because I lived abroad in
the `80s, when one did not have that. Also I was younger and more
open to experience, but I was a little more into the foreign culture
and politics in the country I was living in then. I have just
thought of this. I do not know if that makes any sense.
Dr Dunn: Distance matters in a
variety of ways, but distance has shrunk. It has shrunk by virtue
of technology. It is replaced by a new speciality. Academic geographers
are really thrilled by the different conceptions of space brought
about by the technology revolution. Some people talk about
the easyJet map of Europe, how Europe has changed its geography
by virtue of where the chief networks of flights go and how any
notion of what Europe is is actually influenced by those things.
In terms of Britain's relations with the US, geography matters
in one sense in that, where we are, the time zones mean that the
City of London is uniquely placed to be in the hub of business:
it is awake at the right time for the rest of the world, at the
end of the day and the start of the day. Distance has an effect
that way.Language is important as well. In a sense, Britain benefits
from the fact that the superpower on the world stage speaks English.
The fact that English, or American English, has become the international
lingua franca means that we benefit as a consequence. Everyone
speaks English and we can influence them by virtue of the fact
that we speak English and that we produce our cultural artefacts
and output in English. It therefore has a worldwide audience.
Our diplomacy benefits from the fact that we can speak English
to the world and it can understand what we are saying. We can
communicate with the whole world directly in English, and we are
good at doing that.The hard-part aspect also matters—this
is something that I mentioned in my written evidence—in
that we are approaching the prospect of a defence review that
may require us to make hard decisions on where we spend the money,
especially if the defence budget is going to be asked to make
significant cuts in capability. The capacity to actually be on
the ground in Iraq to support American operations in a variety
of different theatres is not a capacity that every other state
has. Therefore, if we find ourselves in a situation five or 10
years hence where, by virtue of our lack of capabilities, our
solidarity with Americans in defence terms were lacking, I think
that would be to the detriment of the overall relationship.
Dr Niblett: Geography may not
matter as much for globalisation in an economic sense, but I think
it matters deeply geopolitically. I still think that our conception
of who we are and where we are in the world as Britain is affected
by our being to the side of Europe, and I think that the US conception
of the world is affected by where it is. So I think that geography
matters in terms of geopolitics, but not as much for economic
globalisation. I will give one line—this is mentioned in
my written evidence—and say that, from a cultural standpoint,
the US is changing, to state the obvious. It is becoming less
Anglo-Saxon and less European, which will have an impact over
time. We are not going to see it: it will be gradual and hard
to spot, but I see the first changes now.
Q19 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Dr
Dunn mentioned the importance of military power. There are only
two armies in Europe: the French and British armies. Ultimately,
that is what counts. Two of us here were on the Convention on
the Future of Europe. I went to America at that time and know
that there were misgivings in the Bush Administration about the
enhanced co-operation articles in the constitution, which is now
the Lisbon Treaty. They felt that it might separate European military
power from NATO and the United States. That was never expressed
publicly, because of the Bush-Blair alliance. Have any of those
fears been carried over into the Obama Administration, or is it
all still about the rather superficial cliché about having
a single telephone number for the Europeans and assuming that
that is the end of the argument?
Dr Dunn: I think that a lot of
those disquiets were dropped towards the end of the Bush Administration.
The fear was more to do with the lack of ability of the Europeans
to get their act together to produce any capability that was deployable
at all, rather than the configuration that that took. In a sense,
it was a case of, "We don't really care how you organise
it, but please create some capability". There was frustration;
that is what comes through.The Obama Administration are much more
relaxed in their attitudes towards European integration. The ideas
that we saw in the early 1990s of the geopolitical rival have
largely been discounted. The world has changed so fundamentally
and there is recognition of how close we in Europe and America
are in terms of our geopolitical view of the world, compared to
the rest of the world with the rise of BRICs or the rise of transnational
threats to national security more broadly. There is recognition
that actually we approach the world in a very similar way.
Chairman: I am conscious that we don't
have much time left. There are two more witnesses and there will
be a slight delay before we call them.
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