Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20
- 22)
WEDNESDAY 11 NOVEMBER 2009
DR DANA
ALLIN, DR
DAVID H. DUNN
AND DR
ROBIN NIBLETT
Q20 Andrew Mackinlay: I want
to put something to you and ask whether this is the thinking in
the United States—it is probably not among the public figures
that we see most of all—but is there a feeling that NATO
as we know it has run its course and that this feeling might be
accelerated by the experience of Afghanistan? Although in theory
it is an article 5 operation—I don't say this provocatively—demonstrably
it is not. There is not the solidarity. On the Georgian experience,
the Bush Administration were going to get Georgia in, but now
I think most people reflect and thank God that it didn't come
in, because it would have blown article 5 completely. Therefore,
if that thesis is true—that people are beginning to think
that the thing has run its course—it would raise the question
of whether you will have an increased bilateral alliance, perhaps
with the UK.I was particularly struck when your colleague mentioned
1982. The Falklands was not an article 5, yet we were able to
cash in on the solidarity. Caspar Weinberger saw the signals that
it would send if there were not solidarity and thought that that
was important. We were also able to use EU solidarity because
Charlie Haughey and the Belgians were locked in. They might have
wanted out, but it did prevail.Compared with 1982, when those
relationships did to some extent work, now the big thing is the
failure of Afghanistan in terms of NATO, because it is not article
5 as it was intended. It is blown. So are we not on the cusp of
a quite seminal moment? In five or 10 years, you guys will be
writing that this was the time when things changed—everything
does change. Alliances last 60 or 70 years, don't they?
Chairman: May we have brief answers on
this question please? I am conscious of time.
Dr Allin: Yes, of course. Obviously,
it is a big subject, but it seemed to me that one could observe,
after 11 September 2001, that the big question about NATO was
American interest and commitment to it. That story is well known—coalitions
of the willing and so forth.There are many ways in which I think
NATO is overloaded and stretched. I think enlargement has introduced
differing interests and differing relations with Russia that cannot
help but be stressful. You mentioned Georgia. I think that, in
a room, privately, there would be remarkable unanimity and consensus
between the Americans, the British, the French and the Germans
on that subject. But of course the Americans, and maybe the British
to a certain extent, are also tugged towards their client relations—that
is not the word I want to use—their relations with east
Europeans.I do not disagree with any of your analysis, but sometimes
you set tests that are impossible. Afghanistan may or may not
be a success. I do not think it is necessarily going to be a question
of alliance solidarity, or even European and British contributions.
I think it may just be too difficult. It does not make sense to
say that NATO failed at something that could not be done.
Dr Niblett: NATO was article 5
with Afghanistan when it really was an attack, if you see what
I say, on the US directly. The NATO operation in Afghanistan has
evolved enormously since then and for many countries it is not
an article 5 question anymore. So, for me, I would rather it were
not a test on the future of NATO. It may end up being that way
politically—there is nothing I can do about it—but
I think it is an unfair test for NATO and I think David was saying
that.I do not think it is the end of NATO. I do not think the
US wants to give up the one seat where it is at the table with
the Europeans as an equal, or even maybe a lot more than an equal,
and they will fight to maintain it. The key question is how it
is redefined. As you know, the whole strategic concept issue is
going on right now. I think that they will give that time, genuine
time, and effort. Cyber security, energy security—there
are many dimensions that are emerging on what the future NATO
may be involved in. On missile defence, I think the new structure
that has been put out got so much stick at the beginning, because
of pretty bad handling, politically. But if you look into the
detail, this could be a fascinating new area where the US and
the European countries will all be working together on a form
of protection that matters to all of them—Europeans and
the US.This will be my last point on this. Distance matters; it
is critical. This is another place where distance matters. For
most European countries you just cannot stretch NATO beyond an
extended regional defence. That is what we are trying to deliver
at the moment and Afghanistan is probably just beyond the edge
of that reach. If we can get it thinking effectively about north
Africa, the Caucasus, the Iranian missile threat within that inside
arc, maybe we'll hang in there.
Dr Dunn: NATO has been a different
creature in every decade of its existence. It has evolved to meet
the circumstances of the time. That is true of this decade as
of previous ones. For institutional reasons America will not give
up its involvement in NATO. It very much sees it as a way to influence
European politics more broadly and is concerned about its lack
of influence within the EU. From an American perspective it is
strong and the article 5 foundation will remain for the future.Afghanistan
is a challenge to it, however. If Operation Allied Force in 1999
over Kosovo was seen as a success for NATO, then Afghanistan,
to this point, has been much more of a failure. As a consequence,
the legacy of Afghanistan might be much more coalitions of the
willing rather than trying to do things as the alliance. As Dr
Niblett explained, as the proliferation concerns of the Middle
East and north Africa develop, we may see a new incarnation of
NATO in future.
Q21 Mr Illsley: My question
relates to our diplomatic service in the US. We have been told
in evidence that the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service
get access to US decision makers at the very highest level and
that our diplomatic staff are called upon for advice by the Administration.
To a certain extent the new Administration looked for advice from
our diplomatic service when conducting reviews shortly after they
came into office. Does that high-level access and respect translate
into practical influence? Are there any concrete examples of that,
or, in terms of what Dr Niblett said earlier, is the question
irrelevant in that we should not expect influence from our diplomatic
service in those circumstances because the relationship is evolving
and moving away from the traditional areas that were classed as
a special relationship?
Dr Niblett: I shall jump in and
try to be quick on this. It is a very important question. There
is no doubt that British diplomats and certain Ministers and the
Prime Minister have an intimate relationship and a more regular
relationship than just about any other diplomats across the broad
area. This gives them the opportunity to influence how the United
States conceptualises its problems. So the conceptualisation part—how
the United States thinks about a problem—is where we can
really make a difference. Sometimes, influencing how it thinks
about a problem can lead us to influencing the decision, but we
cannot assume that the former leads to the latter.This Administration
may or may not have been influenced by the British Government,
but certainly the work we have done on climate change with them
is shared within the Administration. Will that enable the Obama
Administration to deliver America on this? Probably not, because
of their system of government. On Afghanistan, we have been intimately
involved, as I understand it, in the review process. But now the
final decisions are going to be made. Perhaps others know better
than I do, but my sense, from some of the meetings that are happening
there with Barack Obama, is that he is going to have to make a
call based on all sorts of aspects, including US domestic politics,
where our influence is going to have to step back.My point is
that it is very important to be able to be there to conceptualise
the problem. We do that. In terms of success, the US has come
to love the G20, if I can put it that way. That has been partly
as a result of thinking about it and going round the table with
its British partners, even though we may end up losing out a bit
from this, but that is another story. Our ability to take conceptualisation
to influence cannot be taken for granted. As we said, in the end
it comes down to national interest. At some time the US Government
will decide, "What is in our national interest? Nice that
you conceptualised it that way, but in the end we are going to
do something different." We cannot stop them.
Dr Allin: I will just underline
one of Robin's examples. The concept of a proper response to the
financial and economic meltdown was in the first instance a shared
US and UK idea. I personally think that it was the correct one.
So at a time when people were worried about the end of the special
relationship this is an area where there was clear US and British
leadership. That came from having the same concept of the problem
and the solution.
Dr Dunn: I noticed that you picked
on the start of the Obama Administration. Mr Obama has been particularly
slow, even though the trend is slow, to appoint people to the
political appointee positions in the US Administration. In that
vacuum, there is a very good opportunity for the British to get
their point of view in there. Indeed, I have watched in Washington
the way in which the British diplomats operate. They are an independent
player in the American inter-agency process, which of course is
traditionally an invitation to struggle between different branches
and agencies of the Government. Britain tries to influence every
different aspect, to play its cards in trying to get different
agencies to work for what they regard as British interests and
British values. That is a very skilled role, playing the system
to British advantage—they are very good at doing that. There
are multiple examples, which we can all think of, in the financial
world, the intelligence world or the defence-industry world, in
which that influence has brought tangible benefits as a consequence.
Q22 Mr Illsley: The Committee
is really concerned that we could see some cuts to what has been
described as our Rolls-Royce diplomatic service in the US. Is
that going to be disastrous for us, if we cut back?
Dr Dunn: I think, pound for pound,
you cannot get better value for money than spending money on diplomats
in Washington and indeed elsewhere. The influence that Britain
gets in terms of trade policy and pursuing the national interest
from our skilled and highly regarded diplomatic service is extraordinary.
To cut it back would be extraordinarily short-sighted.
Chairman: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
We may have some follow-up questions, which we will write to you
about, but may I say, Dr Niblett, Dr Allin and Dr Dunn—the
three doctors, as you will now be known—thank you very much
for coming along today. It has been a very valuable session.
|
